Just saw this - Battlecruiser Alignment Chart

[Andy L]

Perhaps another good comparison would be Jeb Stuart during the Gettysburg campaign

Inverse Stuart, maybe - Beatty and Hood at least found the enemy.

[Johnnie Lyle]

Looking at this, do we need to coin Fisher's Law:

"Any discussion about battlecruisers will eventually devolve into the Battle of Jutland and who did what there."

There’s not really much of a data set to discuss if we don’t discuss Jutland. We have the razees, Humphreys frigates (with a side diversion to the fast ships of the line), the big armored cruisers with battleship armaments (and a diversion into some of the second class battleships), the “traditional battle cruisers” and then the panzerschiffs.

Within that period, there’s a lot of peace and not a lot of war - and much of the war that did happen didn’t feature “battlecruisers,” so we talk about very few situations.

[Johnnie Lyle]

I've never come across the "Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser" name, but certainly Fisher made it clear, initially at least, they should never be employed in the battleline. As I understand it was the new Prime Minister Herbert Asquith who mistakenly referred to them as 'battle cruisers', and the name stuck; big, long ships with dreadnought armament, and high speed. Certainly such a name appealed to the government who wished no part of Fishers revolutionary 'flotilla defence' for the home islands and 'fast armoured cruisers' deployed worldwide to protect Britain trade routes.

Fisher did later say these vessels 'could' be used in the line of battle, but this (to me at least) smacks of political subterfuge to gain funding for them from a government solely interested in building dreadnoughts - "We want eight and we won't wait". Much the same as the Admiralty in the seventies hoodwinked the Labour government into agreeing to fund the 'Through-Deck Command Cruiser' to replace HMS' Tiger and Blake. Only a true naval person would understand a 689ft long warship with essentially a full-length full-width flight deck was nothing less than an aircraft carrier!

Unfortunately, they already had been, in most of the naval actions of the last twenty years: the Battle of the Yalu, the Battle of Santiago, and most of the battles of the Russo-Japanese wars. The Japanese especially used their 8”/10” armored cruisers as an additional battle squadron, while Sampson and Schley’s battleships commanders handled theirs like cruisers. Frankly, keeping any ship of similar size and armament to a battleship out of the battleline was not going to happen unless the range was such that only 12” guns could reach.

Fisher knew, or should have known, that.

I think this ignores the pretty unique position the Royal Navy was in at the turn of the 19th/20th centuries. Britains Empire was big, not just big but BIG. No other country had requirements and demands of its navy as Britain had. Fishers problem as he saw it was less maintaining a battlefleet close to home to deter French or German moves, but more protecting Britains maritime commerce all over the world, from the middle east through to India through to Singapore and Malaya through to Hong Kong, Australia, Canada . . . all-points empire. He foresaw, way back in 1904, the biggest maritime threats to Britain were the torpedo and commerce raider. This proved prophetically true not only in the Great War but even more so in WW2.

Hence his concepts of Flotilla Defence to protect the UKs home islands, and the Fast Armoured Cruiser to protect the trade routes.

I agree with you on the factor of trying to keep vessels of similar size and armament as battleships out of the battle line; given the aggressive nature of the Royal Navy it was as you say, only a matter of time . . .

Fisher’s approach was a one-off, though. Before and after saw the usual RN approach - flood the seas with cruisers. Even during the classic cruiser snacking of 1914, the battlecruisers brought a plethora of other cruisers to the party. Most of the first class cruisers were as big and as expensive as a battleship.

Now, we can reasonably say that most RN armored cruisers were inferior in the gunnery department to foreign cruisers until the WARRIOR. I’d be really interested in why the RN thought they only needed 2 9.2” when most people were mounting 4-8.

Maybe INVINCIBLE isn’t as much a reaction to foreign raiders as Fisher’s belief that the usual first class cruiser was wholly inadequate, especially in the armament. I’m not sure the Royal Navy got much value from its first class cruisers, especially those of the BLAKE to DRAKE classes. The RN was very disappointed with the POWERFUL and TERRIBLE, and the ORLANDOs also didn’t perform too well either. Overall, they were big, expensive ships with minimal long range capabilities, as Coronel demonstrated. INVINCIBLE gives you a lot more capabilities for a 4,000 ton increase.

Of course, Fisher also had a mixed relationship with the second class cruiser, as did the RN as a whole. We saw the RN go with and then without a uniform battery on the second-class cruisers at least three times, and keep trying to bring back the third class cruiser with 4” guns. The RN certainly liked the idea of the second class cruiser, but they sure kept trying to half-ass it. The mixed battery (6”/4.7”) was introduced in APOLLO, ASTREA and ARROGANT classes, phased out in ECLIPSE and completely abandoned in HIGHFLYER, ENCOUNTER and CHALLENGER classes, brought back as 6”/4” in BRISTOL, abandoned in WEYMOUTH, CHATHAM and BIRMINGHAM, and then brought back in ARETHUSA.

For some reason, the Royal Navy loved two heavy guns fore and aft and smaller quickfirers amidships for their cruisers.

[Craiglxviii]

They did for the pre-dreadnoughts too. Two turreted twin 12” and then a mixed battery of wing turreted/ casemated 9.2” or 7.5” and 6” QF; the actual main gun power was (meant to be) in the secondary & tertiary batteries, with the 12” intended to finish off a crippled opponent.

[Johnnie Lyle]

They did for the pre-dreadnoughts too. Two turreted twin 12” and then a mixed battery of wing turreted/ casemated 9.2” or 7.5” and 6” QF; the actual main gun power was (meant to be) in the secondary & tertiary batteries, with the 12” intended to finish off a crippled opponent.

Not sure the 12” was intended to finish as much as slow smashers as the action developed. Armor-piercing shells didn’t really allow for much in the sinking department until 1915 or so. Nor were the tertiaries really expected to do much against armored targets.

But the big difference is that British battleships didn’t really revert to a previous inferior armament. They may have reverted to a previously inferior armor scheme to keep size down/increase speed/for foreign stations, but the armaments were kept reasonably constant - and certainly didn’t devolve into pre-dreadnoughts the way 2nd class cruiser armaments did!

The other question is why the RN thought four big guns were needed on the battleships, but were content with just two big guns on cruisers up to the DRAKES and 3 on the DEVONSHIRES.