https://www.steynonline.com/15260/truth ... y-right-in
Excellent article about the making of Battle of Britain.
Mike
"Truth, Myth, Or Both? Getting History Right In The Battle Of Britain..."
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MikeKozlowski
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Nik_SpeakerToCats
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Re: "Truth, Myth, Or Both? Getting History Right In The Battle Of Britain..."
What RAF knew, when they knew, how they knew of Luftwaffe plans may vanish into history.
The Germans did not realise RAF's integrated control system worked via wondrous mix of RADAR, 'Observation Corps' spotters and a vast planning table. Plus whatever came in via 'Radio Interception' etc...
Happily, does not seem Luftwaffe were aware of those bitter politics behind the RAF scenes, or they would have 'played' it by design rather than accident...
Down-side, the RAF egos proved bigger than most attempts at 'Operational Analysis'...
And, sadly, the brutal assessment that RAF resources sent to France would be lost proved horribly true. France was already imploding, their tragic train-wreck in progress. The Luftwaffe met the same paradigm when so many of their 'BoB' planes did not get back across the Channel...
Um, before the magnetron, could RAF night-fighters have done better ??
Also, yes, the infamous 'Battle of the Beams' where 'rounding errors' and calibration problems meant the German bombing aids sometimes were poorly munged: 'Remember Coventry'.
That Churchill sacrificed city to conceal an Enigma de-crypt seems a tad far-fetched...
FWIW, as an adherent of the 'Oops' theory of history, I'd accept SOE deliberately ignored many warnings that their Dutch network was utterly compromised. They seem to have considered that body-count worth-while to convince the Germans a major part of D-Day would come that-away. Like Patton's non-existent army facing Calais. Like the multiple bombs onto Pas-de-Calais for each onto Normandy...
War is Hell...
The Germans did not realise RAF's integrated control system worked via wondrous mix of RADAR, 'Observation Corps' spotters and a vast planning table. Plus whatever came in via 'Radio Interception' etc...
Happily, does not seem Luftwaffe were aware of those bitter politics behind the RAF scenes, or they would have 'played' it by design rather than accident...
Down-side, the RAF egos proved bigger than most attempts at 'Operational Analysis'...
And, sadly, the brutal assessment that RAF resources sent to France would be lost proved horribly true. France was already imploding, their tragic train-wreck in progress. The Luftwaffe met the same paradigm when so many of their 'BoB' planes did not get back across the Channel...
Um, before the magnetron, could RAF night-fighters have done better ??
Also, yes, the infamous 'Battle of the Beams' where 'rounding errors' and calibration problems meant the German bombing aids sometimes were poorly munged: 'Remember Coventry'.
That Churchill sacrificed city to conceal an Enigma de-crypt seems a tad far-fetched...
FWIW, as an adherent of the 'Oops' theory of history, I'd accept SOE deliberately ignored many warnings that their Dutch network was utterly compromised. They seem to have considered that body-count worth-while to convince the Germans a major part of D-Day would come that-away. Like Patton's non-existent army facing Calais. Like the multiple bombs onto Pas-de-Calais for each onto Normandy...
War is Hell...
If you cannot see the wood for the trees, deploy LIDAR.
Re: "Truth, Myth, Or Both? Getting History Right In The Battle Of Britain..."
Gosh, nice easter egg in there with Michael Korda.
That was the first biography (by him) I read of Ike from cover to cover many years ago.
That was the first biography (by him) I read of Ike from cover to cover many years ago.
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warshipadmin
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Re: "Truth, Myth, Or Both? Getting History Right In The Battle Of Britain..."
" Churchill sacrificed city to conceal an Enigma de-crypt seems a tad far-fetched"
Not exactly sure how Churchill would do that. Fighters defending London could have been relocated by 12 minutes to cover Coventry
Here's wiki
Ultra decrypts for the period have been available in the National Archives. Between 07:35 GMT on 10 November 1940 and 05:00 on 11 November, a German signal was deciphered and given the serial number CX/JQ/444, paragraph 4. The message set out code words to be used by aircraft on an operation named Mondschein Sonat but did not give Coventry as the target or a date. It said that transmission of a figure 9 would denote Korn and hindsight has recognised that to be the code name for Coventry. This was not known at the time even though Paula had been identified as Paris and Loge as London. Korn was used in two reports from an aircraft taking part in a raid on Southampton on 30 November, two weeks after the Coventry Blitz. Another decrypt on 11 November or early on 12 November gave navigational beam settings for Wolverhampton, Birmingham, and Coventry but no dates. There was a hiatus in Ultra decrypts from 01:15 GMT on 13 November until 02:40 on 15 November by which time the raid was well under way: Churchill could not have acted on new Ultra intelligence on the afternoon or evening of the attack because there was none to give him. Intelligence from captured airmen and documents did not offer an unambiguous picture either.
Not exactly sure how Churchill would do that. Fighters defending London could have been relocated by 12 minutes to cover Coventry
Here's wiki
Ultra decrypts for the period have been available in the National Archives. Between 07:35 GMT on 10 November 1940 and 05:00 on 11 November, a German signal was deciphered and given the serial number CX/JQ/444, paragraph 4. The message set out code words to be used by aircraft on an operation named Mondschein Sonat but did not give Coventry as the target or a date. It said that transmission of a figure 9 would denote Korn and hindsight has recognised that to be the code name for Coventry. This was not known at the time even though Paula had been identified as Paris and Loge as London. Korn was used in two reports from an aircraft taking part in a raid on Southampton on 30 November, two weeks after the Coventry Blitz. Another decrypt on 11 November or early on 12 November gave navigational beam settings for Wolverhampton, Birmingham, and Coventry but no dates. There was a hiatus in Ultra decrypts from 01:15 GMT on 13 November until 02:40 on 15 November by which time the raid was well under way: Churchill could not have acted on new Ultra intelligence on the afternoon or evening of the attack because there was none to give him. Intelligence from captured airmen and documents did not offer an unambiguous picture either.