The Chernobyl Raid

[Matt Wiser]

This has come up on the other board, so let's put it out for discussion: On the night of 24/25 March 1986, one of the most controversial raids of the war took place when two SAC FB-111s from the 393rd BS, 509th BW out of Pease AFB, NH, flying out of RAF Lakenheath in England, struck the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukraine. While JCS and NCA approval was not needed, the Joint Chiefs were informed and the President also notified in his Presidential Daily Brief.

While waiting for weather to clear, and additional tankers to stage, SAC informed the British Ministry of Defense of the mission, basing the strike decision on "All available current intelligence" suggesting the plant was offline. The MOD could have asked SAC to hold off on the strike pending additional intelligence to indicate the plant was still offline, but did not. Strike commit came afternoon of 24 March, and the mission launched that evening. One refueling over the North Sea, another over the Baltic, then the Varks went in, each with four Mark-84 AIR retarded 2,000 lb. bombs. Ingress was surprisingly uneventful, threading gaps in Voyska-PVO's air defense radars, until they picked up Lake Pripiyat. With no Pave Tack, the Radar Navs bombed by radar, walking their bombs across the complex and into both reactor complexes. Egress was out over the Black Sea, with a tanker meetup halfway between Sevastopol and Istanbul, and recovery at Incirlik AB.

After a hold for 24 Hours as per Turkish policy, the two Varks returned to Lakenheath via the Long-Range Aviation bomber base at Tartu, Estonia, leaving behind two dozen Mark-82 Snakeyes in each Vark's wake. Only after recovery at Lakenheath, and JAG showing up at the Debrief did the crews realize something was awry.

[Rocket J Squrriel]

Didn't one of the pilots utter the most terrifying word imaginable when they got the briefing on the results? "Oops!"

[Wolfman]

It’s not the crews’ fault that Intelligence dropped the ball.

[Poohbah]

Intelligence motto: "We bet YOUR life on it."

[Wolfman]

JAG motto: “Guilty until proven innocent.”

[Bernard Woolley]

Interestingly the Joint Intelligence Committee files on the raid are still Top Secret. A historian of the air war put in an FOI request and was refused on grounds of National Security. That to me suggests there may have been dissent on the intelligence we had on the state of Chernobyl. It also would explain the anger of the PM afterwards.

It’s said there was a serous reshuffle of personnel at Century House and some members of Defence Intelligence were posted to front line units in Canada. How true that is, I’ve no idea.

[Poohbah]

Interestingly the Joint Intelligence Committee files on the raid are still Top Secret. A historian of the air war put in an FOI request and was refused on grounds of National Security. That to me suggests there may have been dissent on the intelligence we had on the state of Chernobyl. It also would explain the anger of the PM afterwards.

It’s said there was a serous reshuffle of personnel at Century House and some members of Defence Intelligence were posted to front line units in Canada. How true that is, I’ve no idea.

One phrase that I have learned to read with cold dread: "It is the consensus of the Intelligence Community that . . . "

[jemhouston]

Interestingly the Joint Intelligence Committee files on the raid are still Top Secret. A historian of the air war put in an FOI request and was refused on grounds of National Security. That to me suggests there may have been dissent on the intelligence we had on the state of Chernobyl. It also would explain the anger of the PM afterwards.

It’s said there was a serous reshuffle of personnel at Century House and some members of Defence Intelligence were posted to front line units in Canada. How true that is, I’ve no idea.

One phrase that I have learned to read with cold dread: "It is the consensus of the Intelligence Community that . . . "

That would imply they actually thinks.

[Matt Wiser]

Interestingly the Joint Intelligence Committee files on the raid are still Top Secret. A historian of the air war put in an FOI request and was refused on grounds of National Security. That to me suggests there may have been dissent on the intelligence we had on the state of Chernobyl. It also would explain the anger of the PM afterwards.

It’s said there was a serous reshuffle of personnel at Century House and some members of Defence Intelligence were posted to front line units in Canada. How true that is, I’ve no idea.

Most of our stuff from SAC, DIA, CIA, has been declassified, apart from "sources and methods" and the names of the FB-111 crews who flew the mission.

Bush's memoirs mention an angry, but measured, call from Maggie Thatcher two days after the raid, and Labour leader Neil Kinnock was more...expressive, shall we say. Yes, there was a hold on SAC operations out of the UK for 48 Hours by the Iron Lady, but that didn't interfere with any scheduled missions. Because as soon as that was lifted, two Varks (probably the same two) hit POL storage near the port and Naval Base at Klaipeda, Lithuania.

The Chernobyl Raid is still discussed to this day at both the Air Force Academy and the Air War College.

[Poohbah]

Interestingly the Joint Intelligence Committee files on the raid are still Top Secret. A historian of the air war put in an FOI request and was refused on grounds of National Security. That to me suggests there may have been dissent on the intelligence we had on the state of Chernobyl. It also would explain the anger of the PM afterwards.

It’s said there was a serous reshuffle of personnel at Century House and some members of Defence Intelligence were posted to front line units in Canada. How true that is, I’ve no idea.

One phrase that I have learned to read with cold dread: "It is the consensus of the Intelligence Community that . . . "

That would imply they actually thinks.

I am firmly of the opinion that "consensus" is used to get out of actually having to think. Split the difference, aim for the mean . . . instead of weighing evidence, asking tough questions, making judgements as to reliability and accuracy, all with the phrase, "but I could be wrong" firmly in mind. Because doing the hard work might mean having to discard your pet theory due to a lack of hard data to support it, or having to listen to that guy you never did think was a proper gentleman and then give additional weight to his words because he's actually worked in that field, or having to tell C, "Sir, I'm afraid that you're going to have to tell the PM that we just don't know the answer yet."

[Bernard Woolley]

One phrase that I have learned to read with cold dread: "It is the consensus of the Intelligence Community that . . . "

The fact that it’s still top secret suggests to me that there was anything but a consensus. Nigel West, Richard Aldrich, Rory Cormac, the late Chapman Pincher, Peter Hennessy, Duncan Campbell and others have all written on the raid. West and Pincher had some of the best contacts in the intelligence community and AFAIK, Hennessy personally knew more than one Chairman of the JIC.

Despite that, nobody has talked about it. Not even off the record as an anonymous source. Pincher got close with a quote from someone from Defence Intelligence - “you’re not going to get me to say a thing about that cake and arse party!”

I personally suspect that there was intelligence suggesting that power station had been refuelled. Perhaps via the Gordievsky Network, which was highly reliable. However, for some reason, the dissenting opinion was overruled at our end.

[Poohbah]

One phrase that I have learned to read with cold dread: "It is the consensus of the Intelligence Community that . . . "

The fact that it’s still top secret suggests to me that there was anything but a consensus. Nigel West, Richard Aldrich, Rory Cormac, the late Chapman Pincher, Peter Hennessy, Duncan Campbell and others have all written on the raid. West and Pincher had some of the best contacts in the intelligence community and AFAIK, Hennessy personally knew more than one Chairman of the JIC.

Despite that, nobody has talked about it. Not even off the record as an anonymous source. Pincher got close with a quote from someone from Defence Intelligence - “you’re not going to get me to say a thing about that cake and arse party!”

I personally suspect that there was intelligence suggesting that power station had been refuelled. Perhaps via the Gordievsky Network, which was highly reliable. However, for some reason, the dissenting opinion was overruled at our end.

There is consensus, and then there is Consensus.

They come from two different directions. The former comes from those who wish to Do Something that is good and proper in the service of their country. Generally, this consensus comes from the bottom up, and is built on a lot of hard work.

The latter comes from someone who wishes to Be Somebody. S/he/it may have a clique of sycophants who are also looking to Be Somebodies. They want that corner office with The Big Chair. And they want to make a mark on the world situation. (And in this case, boy, did they ever.) This Consensus comes from the top down. (Or, as I have heard various personages express it in the Air Force, it's telling people, "Shut up and color." The three times I have ever heard that command given, I gave those officers' reporting seniors some Very Frank and Brutally Honest input for said officers' OERs.)

The really bad things happen when someone mistakes wanting to Be Somebody with Doing Something.

(This taxonomy of wanting to Do Something or to Be Somebody is based on the conversation I had with Boss-Ma'am when she recruited me into the Air Force.)

[Matt Wiser]

One phrase that I have learned to read with cold dread: "It is the consensus of the Intelligence Community that . . . "

The fact that it’s still top secret suggests to me that there was anything but a consensus. Nigel West, Richard Aldrich, Rory Cormac, the late Chapman Pincher, Peter Hennessy, Duncan Campbell and others have all written on the raid. West and Pincher had some of the best contacts in the intelligence community and AFAIK, Hennessy personally knew more than one Chairman of the JIC.

Despite that, nobody has talked about it. Not even off the record as an anonymous source. Pincher got close with a quote from someone from Defence Intelligence - “you’re not going to get me to say a thing about that cake and arse party!”

I personally suspect that there was intelligence suggesting that power station had been refuelled. Perhaps via the Gordievsky Network, which was highly reliable. However, for some reason, the dissenting opinion was overruled at our end.

To be fair, SAC Intelligence was still rebuilding after losing many of their best people on Day One with the strike on Offutt. Eighth Air Force (moved to Westover AFB, MA), relayed everything that came from SAC, and both CIA and DIA for that matter, to the mission planners, CINC-SAC (GEN Larry Welch), testified at both House and Senate Hearings after the war that he asked both DIA at Arlington Hall and CIA at Langley (and presumably, NSA) if they had any hint the plant was online, and if there had been, he would've canceled the mission. HQ Sixteenth Air Force in the UK asked their MOD and RAF Strike Command Liaisons if they had anything new on the plant status, and got back "We have no new information." It was on that basis that Sixteenth Air Force gave the strike commit.

Some have asked, "Could they have aborted if necessary?" If information developed while in the air that necessitated either a recall or (more likely) a divert to their alternative target, they would have to have gotten that no later than the second refueling-the one over the Baltic. Because once they leave the tankers, they are committed and getting down low to penetrate Soviet airspace. Once they gave the "Coast in" call, that was it. No more coms until the "Coast out" call over the Black Sea.

[Wolfman]

Do we know what their secondary target was?

[Matt Wiser]

If that had been my mission to plan? I would've chosen the Antonov Factory NW of Kiev. The actual alternate target has not been declassified.

[Johnnie Lyle]

If that had been my mission to plan? I would've chosen the Antonov Factory NW of Kiev. The actual alternate target has not been declassified.

It’s a nasty conundrum because power stations are key military targets, and knocking out power generation may be both more effective and more humane than trying for the factories directly.

[Matt Wiser]

If that had been my mission to plan? I would've chosen the Antonov Factory NW of Kiev. The actual alternate target has not been declassified.

It’s a nasty conundrum because power stations are key military targets, and knocking out power generation may be both more effective and more humane than trying for the factories directly.

If the strike had gone off as it was originally planned, I would agree with that.

Some of the fallout from the raid (Pardon the pun) was a UN Conference after the war, to add additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions. One article specified that nuclear power plants are now off-limits to attack. But not everybody ratified it....

[jemhouston]

How many countries that signed the Geneva Conventions later broke them?

[Poohbah]

How many countries that signed the Geneva Conventions later broke them?

They're called the Geneva Suggestions for a reason...

[Bernard Woolley]

OOC: Here is an outline of why the UK end of the background of the Chernobyl Raid is still classified, which I have discussed with Matt. Please remember that this is OOC and our characters would not have any knowledge of it. Though, who knows? Some hints of it may leak at some point...

My concept is this. When SAC makes the MoD aware of the plan for the mission before it gets UK approval, it has to be signed off by No.10. The Joint Intelligence Committee is asked to give its assessment.
SIS advises the JIC that it has an asset in Pripyat. While they don't work directly for the power station, they have heard news that it is being refuelled. As the source is low-level there is skeptisism of their reliability.
The CIA rep argues that they have no such indications. GCHQ adds that neither they, nor the NSA have picked up any electronic evidence of refuelling. The Defence Intelligence Staff rep states that the DIS doesn't have any intelligence either way, though it does note that certain MVD units that escort nuclear material, have been noted as moving to the Ukrainian SSR.

The Chairman of the JIC recommends to War Cabinet that SIS be given 48 hours to prove that their source is correct. Therefore, two members of the Special Operations Section (The Sandbaggers) & an intelligence officer (Patrick Hyde from Craig Thomas' novels). The mission goes disasterously wrong. The source and the two Sandbaggers are killed. Hyde goes is left on the run in Ukraine. By the time he makes it out with the proof that Chernobyl has been refuelled, it is too late. The crew of the fishing boat that rescues him in the Black Sea tells him of the effects of the raid.

Since Hyde was rescued only hours after the raid was launched, the War Cabinet decide that the mission never happened. The JIC minutes are permanently made Top Secret, the War Cabinet minutes are shredded & the proof is dumped in the Black Sea in a weighted bag.

The only person outside the JIC, the War Cabinet and senior members of SIS who know about the operation is Hyde. It's made very clear to him that even thinking about blabbing could be fatal.

Thatcher's handbagging of Bush and Kinnock's anger is part of the cover-up. As they know that they could have given SIS just a few more hours, and are, therefore, partly responsible for the disaster.