November 1939

[Pdf27]

Going to try and re-post this now the board is back up...

13th November 1939
General Gamelin sat at his desk after the meeting he’d had with his staff for the new Dyle plan. It hadn’t gone well – his staff were split, while his deputy Georges was downright scathing. Not particularly about the details of the plan – he’d been quite complimentary about those, unusually for him, but one point he’d thundered on about at some length. “Where is the Reserve?” The various Army commanders had their own reserves, of course, but there was no real central one. For what they expected the Germans to do it was the best plan available – but Georges’ accusation that he was planning to fight the last war had struck a nerve. If they did try something new, he’d be in trouble. At the back of his mind, a shred of doubt started to bother him – Georges had been imposed by his political enemies and wanted his job, but was still a very competent general. The commentary he'd submitted on the plan was well-argued too:
The problem is dominated by the question of available forces... There is no doubt that our offensive manoeuvre in Belgium and Holland should be conducted with the caution of not allowing ourselves to commit the major part of our reserves in this part of the theatre, in the face of a German action that could be nothing more than a diversion. For example, in the event of an attack in force breaking out in the centre, on our front between the Meuse and the Moselle, we could be deprived of the necessary means for a counter-attack.
Alone in his office, he got the maps out and started to sketch out an alternative plan with the strong reserve that Georges wanted. He’d then have his staff game out both options, and hopefully that would make things a little clearer.
Between his forces and the British he had 44 divisions available in the North, and another 48 manning the Maginot line. It was too dangerous to just transfer forces from the south to give his Northern forces the reserve they needed – the cornerstone of French strategy was to channel a German attack to the North where mobile forces could deal with it – but he could use some of the forces there as a powerful reserve for employment after the axis of a German attack had been identified.
In Flanders, to create a reserve he had no option but to shorten the line. He daren’t weaken the forces holding the Dyle or especially the Gembloux gap, and without them there was no reserve. That in turn meant staying with the Escaut plan, with a few modifications.

15th November 1939
The staff meeting was over. Georges had seemed far less sure of his demand for a reserve, while Gamelin hadn’t mentioned audacity once. The main result was a long list of questions for the Military Intelligence branch. How much warning would they have of a German attack? What sort of co-operation would the Belgians give them? How strong was the KW line, really? How did the crossings of the Dyle and Schelde compare? Colonel Vallory realised he wasn’t going to be getting much sleep for the next two weeks, and started drawing up orders for some of his subordinates to take a “motoring holiday” in Belgium. While the Belgian government was strictly neutral, a number of the more senior officers within their armed forces had long memories of the previous war and knew exactly which side they would find themselves on if another broke out. If he could arrange for discreet discussions to be carried out with them, much could be learnt.

[Bernard Woolley]

Going to enjoy reading this from the beginning again!

[bobbins66]

I agree. The reloading into the new board gives me an excuse to revisit most stories from scratch!