RN KG V (1942)

[OSCSSW]

I enjoyed this old Propaganda film hope you do

FYI King George V was the flagship of Admiral Sir John Tovey, during the hunt for Bismark.
When a Catalina flying boat of RAF Coastal Command, piloted by a US Naval Aviator sighted her, heading for the French port of Brest. Rodney and King George V were still about 125 miles from DATUM. Ark Royal Fairey Swordfishes torpedo bombers damaged Bismarck, slowing her down and jamming her rudder, forcing her to turn back out into the Atlantic, away from the safety of port. At 1500 Rodney joined King George V and they maintained 22 knots – which was nearly maximum speed for Rodney. King George V had only 32 percent of her fuel left while Rodney had only enough fuel to continue the chase at high speed until 0800 next day.

Admiral Tovey's 27 May orders were simple; Rodney was free to maneuver independently conforming generally to KG V. Both ships were to close the range to 15,000 yards as quick as possible, then turn for broadside fire. At 0859 KG V range was 16,000 yards from Bismarck. She was firing full 14-inch guns salvoes; Rodney was firing 16-inch salvoes. Bismarck concentrated all her remaining guns on KG V, but only an occasional shell came close. At 0914 KG V, now at 12,000 yards just about point blank, fired her 5.25-inch guns.

At 09:27 an AP shell penetrated the hydraulic machinery in turret 'Anton' and damaging it, the guns dropped maximum depression making them useless. Everything but the main battery turrets above the main deck were a wreck with, serious fires burning out of control amidships. After firing steadily for over 30 minutes, without a casualty to the main battery, at 0927 KG V began having trouble, and from that point onward every gun missed at least one salvo due to failures in the safety interlocks for antiflash protection and from ammunition feed jams. At 1021 Admiral Tovey ordered CA Dorsetshire to finish her off with torpedoes.

REMASTERED | HMS King George V (1942)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yCr5zloEjxo

[MikeKozlowski]

...Interesting that both KGV and PoW seemed to be having turret issues, even though KGV had been in service for seven months already.

Mike

[jemhouston]

...Interesting that both KGV and PoW seemed to be having turret issues, even though KGV had been in service for seven months already.

Mike

Have the Senior Chief from both ships have a "talk" with design team.

Anyone know how many rounds KGV put through her main guns before this?

[Pdf27]

...Interesting that both KGV and PoW seemed to be having turret issues, even though KGV had been in service for seven months already.

Mike

A legacy of both the naval treaties and Jutland. The original design was for 3 triple 15" turrets, then for 4 quadruple 14", then finally they had to change B turret to a twin to save topweight. The problems were primarily with the ammunition handling interlocks, which after the self-inflicted battlecruiser losses at Jutland was something the RN was not going to accept work-arounds on.

[OSCSSW]

...Interesting that both KGV and PoW seemed to be having turret issues, even though KGV had been in service for seven months already.

Mike

A legacy of both the naval treaties and Jutland. The original design was for 3 triple 15" turrets, then for 4 quadruple 14", then finally they had to change B turret to a twin to save topweight. The problems were primarily with the ammunition handling interlocks, which after the self-inflicted battlecruiser losses at Jutland was something the RN was not going to accept work-arounds on.

Always best to lock the barn door after a horse is stolen!

Mechanical and design problems played their part against the Battle Cruisers at Jutland
BUT
Admiral of the Fleet David Richard Beatty, 1st Earl Beatty, GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO, PCBeaty and his Gunnery officers, have a lot of blood on their hands. They knowingly disregarded standing RN gunnery regulations. They allowed storage of propellent charges outside the magazines in order to increase the rate of fire of the main batteries.

I am pretty sure the RN is much like the USN in that we are all have it driven home to us that Gunnery regulations must always be followed because "THEY ARE WRITTEN IN BLOOD!"

In the USN we have UCMJ Article 102 "Forcing a Safeguard"

"A safeguard is a detachment, guard, or detail posted by a commander for the purposes of protecting a person, place, property of the enemy, or of a neutral party affected by the relationship of belligerent forces in their prosecution of war. A safeguard may also refer to a written order left by a commander with an enemy subject or posted in enemy property for the protection of the person or property. The purpose of a safeguard is to pledge the honor of the nation that the person or property shall be respected by the national armed forces. The forcing of a safeguard is the commission of an act or acts that are in violation of the protection of the safeguard. Actual knowledge of the safeguard is not a requirement for conviction. A reasonable assumption that the accused should have been aware of the existence of the safeguard is sufficient for prosecution."

I am most certainly prejudice. Therefore, IMO, these men deserved better from the brass. It might not have been murder but was certainly was:
A. Negligent Homicide defined under Article 134, UCMJ, as (1) that a certain person is dead; (2) that this death resulted from an act or failure to act of the accused; (3) that the killing by the accused was unlawful; (4) that the accused's act or failure to act that caused the death amounted to simple ... negligence and dereliction of duty.

B. Failure to Obey Order or Regulation Article 92 UCMJ. A service member may be charged with a violation of Article 92 if they: (1)violate or fail to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2) have knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order (3) ; or is derelict in the performance of his duties.

Chief Stokers on British Battle Cruiser HMS Queen Mary, all lost when Queen Mary blew up and sank during the Battle of Jutland on 31st May 1916

[Pdf27]

Mechanical and design problems played their part against the Battle Cruisers at Jutland
BUT
Admiral of the Fleet David Richard Beatty, 1st Earl Beatty, GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO, PCBeaty and his Gunnery officers, have a lot of blood on their hands. They knowingly disregarded standing RN gunnery regulations. They allowed storage of propellent charges outside the magazines in order to increase the rate of fire of the main batteries.

I think you're being FAR too kind to Beatty here. It wasn't just storing propellant charges outside the magazine (which by itself wouldn't have been enough to cause a magazine explosion, just the loss of a turret), but also the deliberate disabling of anti-flash precautions in order to facilitate rapid fire, which caused flash-back from the turret to the magazine. And the reasoning for it is even more damning: the Battlecruiser Squadron couldn't shoot straight because they didn't have enough time for shooting practice, so Beatty decided to emphasise rate of fire in the hope that if he threw enough shells at the enemy some might hit.
It's notable that the gunnery of 5th Battle Squadron (BARHAM, VALIANT, WARSPITE & MALAYA) was far more effective than the rest of the Battlecruiser Squadron it was attached to - and despite being far more heavily hit (WARSPITE suffered 15 main gun hits when the squadron was engaged by the whole of the High Seas Fleet) they all made it home again. They were normally part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa, so actually did gunnery practice and followed the correct ammunition handling procedures.

It's also notable that Beatty completely failed at his principal job at Jutland: provide Jellicoe with accurate and timely information about the position of the enemy capital ships. He did lead the High Seas Fleet onto the guns of the Grand Fleet, but that was more by luck than judgement - he was running north without an accurate position for the Grand Fleet, and Jellicoe guessed correctly. Replace Beatty with someone competent and Jutland becomes a very different battle.

[Poohbah]

...Interesting that both KGV and PoW seemed to be having turret issues, even though KGV had been in service for seven months already.

Mike

A legacy of both the naval treaties and Jutland. The original design was for 3 triple 15" turrets, then for 4 quadruple 14", then finally they had to change B turret to a twin to save topweight. The problems were primarily with the ammunition handling interlocks, which after the self-inflicted battlecruiser losses at Jutland was something the RN was not going to accept work-arounds on.

Always best to lock the barn door after a horse is stolen!

Mechanical and design problems played their part against the Battle Cruisers at Jutland
BUT
Admiral of the Fleet David Richard Beatty, 1st Earl Beatty, GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO, PCBeaty and his Gunnery officers, have a lot of blood on their hands. They knowingly disregarded standing RN gunnery regulations. They allowed storage of propellent charges outside the magazines in order to increase the rate of fire of the main batteries.

I am pretty sure the RN is much like the USN in that we are all have it driven home to us that Gunnery regulations must always be followed because "THEY ARE WRITTEN IN BLOOD!"

In the USN we have UCMJ Article 102 "Forcing a Safeguard"

"A safeguard is a detachment, guard, or detail posted by a commander for the purposes of protecting a person, place, property of the enemy, or of a neutral party affected by the relationship of belligerent forces in their prosecution of war. A safeguard may also refer to a written order left by a commander with an enemy subject or posted in enemy property for the protection of the person or property. The purpose of a safeguard is to pledge the honor of the nation that the person or property shall be respected by the national armed forces. The forcing of a safeguard is the commission of an act or acts that are in violation of the protection of the safeguard. Actual knowledge of the safeguard is not a requirement for conviction. A reasonable assumption that the accused should have been aware of the existence of the safeguard is sufficient for prosecution."

I am most certainly prejudice. Therefore, IMO, these men deserved better from the brass. It might not have been murder but was certainly was:
A. Negligent Homicide defined under Article 134, UCMJ, as (1) that a certain person is dead; (2) that this death resulted from an act or failure to act of the accused; (3) that the killing by the accused was unlawful; (4) that the accused's act or failure to act that caused the death amounted to simple ... negligence and dereliction of duty.

B. Failure to Obey Order or Regulation Article 92 UCMJ. A service member may be charged with a violation of Article 92 if they: (1)violate or fail to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2) have knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order (3) ; or is derelict in the performance of his duties.

Chief Stokers on British Battle Cruiser HMS Queen Mary, all lost when Queen Mary blew up and sank during the Battle of Jutland on 31st May 1916

Article 102 refers to violation of orders issued to protect the property of neutrals or noncombatants. The death penalty is on the table because, when those orders are issued, the officer issuing them is doing so to preserve the honor of the United States of America.

Article 110 (Improperly hazarding a vessel) is, IMNHO, the appropriate charge. Improper storage of explosives aboard ship and disabling/removing safety-critical magazine fittings is likely to cause loss of the ship for no gain in tactical capabilities.

Article 99 would apply for Beatty's overall negligence in reporting the developing tactical situation to his immediate senior in command.

[MikeKozlowski]

....Allow me to recommend Drachinfels' two part video on Jutland. I had never really understood the battle until I watched those, and they are more than worth taking the time.

Mike

[kdahm]

Article 110 (Improperly hazarding a vessel) is, IMNHO, the appropriate charge. Improper storage of explosives aboard ship and disabling/removing safety-critical magazine fittings is likely to cause loss of the ship for no gain in tactical capabilities.

Article 99 would apply for Beatty's overall negligence in reporting the developing tactical situation to his immediate senior in command.

I believe you mean:

Armed Forces Act, Part 1, Section 24 Damage to or loss of Public or Service Property and Section 31 Hazarding of Ship in regards to the ammunition arrangements and Section 2 Misconduct on Operations in regards to failure to notify Jellicoe.

As well as the de rigeour Section 19 Conduct Prejudicial.

Of course, those are the current numberings. In actuality, Beatty was almost guilty of Article 666 Annoying a Superior Officer While Not Having Sufficient Political Friends in High Places, but escaped by having sufficient political friends.

[Johnnie Lyle]

Mechanical and design problems played their part against the Battle Cruisers at Jutland
BUT
Admiral of the Fleet David Richard Beatty, 1st Earl Beatty, GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO, PCBeaty and his Gunnery officers, have a lot of blood on their hands. They knowingly disregarded standing RN gunnery regulations. They allowed storage of propellent charges outside the magazines in order to increase the rate of fire of the main batteries.

I think you're being FAR too kind to Beatty here. It wasn't just storing propellant charges outside the magazine (which by itself wouldn't have been enough to cause a magazine explosion, just the loss of a turret), but also the deliberate disabling of anti-flash precautions in order to facilitate rapid fire, which caused flash-back from the turret to the magazine. And the reasoning for it is even more damning: the Battlecruiser Squadron couldn't shoot straight because they didn't have enough time for shooting practice, so Beatty decided to emphasise rate of fire in the hope that if he threw enough shells at the enemy some might hit.
It's notable that the gunnery of 5th Battle Squadron (BARHAM, VALIANT, WARSPITE & MALAYA) was far more effective than the rest of the Battlecruiser Squadron it was attached to - and despite being far more heavily hit (WARSPITE suffered 15 main gun hits when the squadron was engaged by the whole of the High Seas Fleet) they all made it home again. They were normally part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa, so actually did gunnery practice and followed the correct ammunition handling procedures.

It's also notable that Beatty completely failed at his principal job at Jutland: provide Jellicoe with accurate and timely information about the position of the enemy capital ships. He did lead the High Seas Fleet onto the guns of the Grand Fleet, but that was more by luck than judgement - he was running north without an accurate position for the Grand Fleet, and Jellicoe guessed correctly. Replace Beatty with someone competent and Jutland becomes a very different battle.

It’s also worth pointing out that Hood’s 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron had dramatically improved their shooting during their brief stint on gunnery practice, but were not materially better at reporting in to the fleet commander. This despite Jellicoe explicitly sending them out to find Beatty and the Germans. Nor were the light cruiser squadrons very good at reporting in, despite scouting being their job.

The destroyers and armored cruisers similarly failed to keep Jellicoe informed that night, and many COs assumed the division and squadron officers could see the exact same things they could see. Jellicoe had no idea there was a fight going on in his screen, despite sort of expecting one (that’s why the screen was so heavy astern).

As a result, instead of the Grand Fleet being between Scheer and home at early morning hours on June 1 (as Jellicoe planned), the Germans got away relatively unscathed. Whether Jellicoe could have repositioned the Grand Fleet to cut the Germans off is a good question, but there’s very little doubt if Jellicoe can do so most German battleships are going to be bottom, given how devastated the KOINGs (and to a lesser extent the KAISERs) were, how Jellicoe’s combat power was virtually unimpaired, and the German gunnery systems degraded by the exhaustion of their crews.

Quite frankly, most RN officers at the battle were extremely negligent in keeping their superiors informed, and Jellicoe had a much less complete picture than he should have had, even accounting for the chaos of battle. Yes, his guesses/intuitions/deductions emphasize how good he was and how well Fisher chose him, but it’s still a massive failure that cost the Royal Navy a huge victory.

This failure ultimately lies at Jellicoe’s feet for not sufficiently emphasizing proper communication and reporting and granting individual captains the responsibility and expectation they would report in - whether or not they thought someone else saw things.

Fortunately, that error was rectified after the battle, but far better for the RN had it been before.

[OSCSSW]

....Allow me to recommend Drachinfels' two part video on Jutland. I had never really understood the battle until I watched those, and they are more than worth taking the time.

Mike

Yup real good vids Mike.

[OSCSSW]

Article 110 (Improperly hazarding a vessel) is, IMNHO, the appropriate charge. Improper storage of explosives aboard ship and disabling/removing safety-critical magazine fittings is likely to cause loss of the ship for no gain in tactical capabilities.

Article 99 would apply for Beatty's overall negligence in reporting the developing tactical situation to his immediate senior in command.

I believe you mean:

Armed Forces Act, Part 1, Section 24 Damage to or loss of Public or Service Property and Section 31 Hazarding of Ship in regards to the ammunition arrangements and Section 2 Misconduct on Operations in regards to failure to notify Jellicoe.

As well as the de rigeour Section 19 Conduct Prejudicial.

Of course, those are the current numberings. In actuality, Beatty was almost guilty of Article 666 Annoying a Superior Officer While Not Having Sufficient Political Friends in High Places, but escaped by having sufficient political friends.

Good one kdahm