This is the SIOP that went "hot" in August 1962 and was active during the Cuban Missile Crisis...
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb236/SIOP-63.pdf
HISTORY OF THE JOINT STRATECIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF:
PREPARATION OF SIOP-63
HISTORY & RESEARCH DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
JANUARY 1964
The SIOP-62, completed in December 1962 and put into effect 1 April 1961, was generally recognized as the best plan that could have been prepared within the short time (four months) available.
The Joint Chiefs had already begun to solicit coments and recommndations for the future from the CINCs and the services. Most of the replies centered on questions of damage criteria, assurence of delivery, constraints, the target value system, operational factors, war gaming, and flexibility in execution of the plan.
The Army, Navy, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC complained of the high level of damage and population casualties provided for in SIOP-62. They believed that a change was required in damage criteria to take into account overall effects, i.e., fire and radiation as well as blast, when assessing damage.
If this were done, the weight of effort applied against targets could be reduced. These same four also believed that procedures for achieving a high level of assurance of delivery of weapons to each bomb release line would result in many targets being struck with multiple weapons.
The three services, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and DSTP were in agreement thet more research was required on how to compute expected coses of radiation on friendly peoples from bomb bursts.
The SIOP-62 had stayed within prescribed radiation levels by air bursting many weapons which otherwise would have been surface burst. Criticized, however, was the use of average seasonal winds instead of an annual average wind; the assumption that for computing constraints one weapon would be delivered at each desired ground zero (DGZ); and the consideration of only SIOP weapons when computing dosages.
At the root of this problem was the divergency of opinion among sciertists regarding criteria to use in establishing probable fallout intensities and the relative value of shielding materials. Clearly more research was needed in the development of constraints policy for SIOP-63.
Another recommendation, by the Navy, was that the target point value system used in SIOP-62 be made more receptive to the needs of all commands rather then just to SAC. Certain operational factors -- probability of success of weapon systems and base survivability factors -- were also recommended for reexamination during STOP-63.
General Power, as DSTP, agreed with the need for some changes based on experience; he had earlier informed the JCS that planning factors used in preparing the first plan would be reviewed and modified as required when preparing the second. He did, however, consider the SIOP-62 guidance sufficient for use in preparing the next plan.
The first detailed exposition of the [Kennedy] administration's strategic thinking for general war went out from the JCS to the unified and specified commands for comment in May 1962.
A message in two parts, it quoted a policy memo prepared for the Chairman of the JCS by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and an attached draft of a proposed new basic national security policy prepared in the Secretary of Defense's office. The theme followed earlier administration statements calling for greater flexibility in U.S. nuclear strategy.
The essence of this lengthy document was that U.S. plans and programs needed a wider range of alternativos or options to meet the various forms a thermonuclear war could take.
The CINCs and the DSTP were asked for their opinions on what actions in the near and far term could be taken to widen the latitude of our response.
Of particular interest to Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric were options to permit withholding of reserve forces from initial attack; to avoid attacks on urban-industrial, population, and government control centers; to avoid attacks on one or more Sino-Soviet Bloc nations; and to provide adjustments in force readiness.
The CINCs and DSTP commented at length to the JCS, who in turn replied to the Secretary of Defense. Their responses mirrored the attitudes of men who bore heavy responsibilities for direct command of strategic forces and who were intimate with the vast complexities of
operating these forces.
They agreed that more work was needed to increase flexibility and options to nuclear war, indeed some steps had already been taken, but they also urged caution lest our strategic plans outstrip our capability to put them into practice.
All agreed that force survival must be enhanced by improving weapon systems, but until sufficient invulnerability had been achieved by the deterrent forces to permit a second strike role, all potential enemy targets would have to be judged according to military necessity. The capability simply did not yet exist to permit avoidance of enemy non-military centers and population in an attack.
Both the JCS and the DSTP, in their replies, cited the sizable list of options and provisions for flexibility already existing in the SIOP [then SIOP-62] and command war plans:
(1) Exemption of one or more specific countries or areas from initial attack.
(2) Redirection of follow-on forces before the order to execute was given.
(3) Recall of manned systems after initial launch.
(4) Alternate launch positions and timing.
(5) Selective launch of positive control force from U.S., forward bases, or both.
(6) Missiles generally had dual targets.
Both the CINCLANT and CINCPAC representatives believed that, in fact, improved
methodology had not been developed, and that for all practical purposes the methods for 1963 remained those of 1962.
The new plan would contain the defects of the old. They criticized the system used for SIOP-62: because it produced a plan which contemplated attacks on too large a target system, which was too destructive, which underestimated weapons effects, and which gave enemy forces a high probability of success while giving SIOP forces a low probability of success. Requirements for SIOP-62 were termed as having been "unrealistic" and "far in excess" of what was required.
The CINCLANT's recommendations for change in 1963 methodology featured:
(1) Establishment of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) of the minimum size required to meet the NSTAP.
(2) Economy of force application to this minimum strategic target system.
(3) More realistic assumptions of own and enemy capabilities.
(4) Emphasis on neutralization of enemy strengths instead of their complete destruction.
(5) Fuller consideration of all the effects of nuclear weapons and of overlapping effects of weapons programmed on adjacent DGZs.
(6) Establishment of a reserve force to be ready for operations required immediately after the effects of the initial assault have been evaluated.
Similarly, the CINCPAC representative criticized the methodology of SIOP-62 and protested its continued use in SIOP-63.
To him, except in minor instances, procedures remained unchanged. The result would be a conservative plan which gave the enemy every advantage, while downgrading U.S. capabilities.
If the philosophy of SIOP-62 continued, the next plan would be a capabilities plan which found use for all forces and weapons made available and committed them to the largest initial strike possible. He called for "a searching analysis of methodology and philosophy" before the next plan was produced.
When implemented, the SIOP-63 was to achieve the following objectives
[Task] 1. To destroy or neutralize the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, effective and controlled U.S. strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of U.S. military superiority
to the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war.
Task I would accomplish the destruction or neutralization of Sino-Soviet nuclear delivery forces. National level military controls were specifically excluded. Every effort would be made in this task to minimize damage to people and industry. It included the capability to withhold attacks on China and any or all commurist satellites.
[Task] 2. To minimize damage to the U.S. and its Allies, and in all events to limit such demage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.
In Task II other Sino-Soviet bloc military forces and resources came under attack, e.g., tactical air bases, military controls, transportation, etc. These targets were outside major urban areas, and care would continue to be taken to minimize the effect on people and industry.
[Task] 3. To bring the war to an end on the most advantageous terms for U.S. and its Allies.
Task III executed deliberate attacks on military forces and resources in urban areas, and selected critical elements of industry, technology, and government controls which would most effectively reduce Sino-Soviet capability to continue the war.
The above three tasks would be accomplished by a choice of one to five attack options, depending upon what conditions prevailed when hostilities began:
[Option I] Execute Task I under conditions of U.S. pre-emption, but keeping back for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.
[Option II] Execute Tasks I and II under same U.S. pre-emption condition, but withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.
[Option III] Execute Task I under tactical warning but holding back for subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III. -- It was acknowledged that the chances for using this option were remote, so forces were to be programmed for it as a last priority. GEN Lemnitzer, CJCS was reported as very critical of this option and doubted it would ever be executed.
[Option IV] Execute Tasks I and II under tactical warning but holding forces for Task III.
[Option V] Execute all three tasks under tactical warning.
The JCS set neither a maximum nor a minimum on damage to be inflicted; if forces available for the strategic mission could not achieve the prescribed level of damage, it could be lowered. Conversely, if capabilities permitted, higher expectancies of damage against certain targets could be achieved.
The guidance prescribed 90 per cent expectation of severe damage to aboveground facilities and aircraft on heavy and medium bomber bases, primary staging bases, and dispersal bases; on known missile sites and missile launching submarine bases; on primary nuclear and chemical storage production facilities; and on local control facilities for nuclear delivery forces known to exist and be active and which were outside major urban areas.
The allocation of forces for the above work would be done so as to permit the assignment of sufficient forces to Task III to inflict "significant damage" to 70 per cent of the floor space in the 100 largest cities in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Floor space was introduced only to define the size of the force to be allocated to Task III, not to define the targeting objectives.
Installations in the Data Base were then submitted to a process of weighing to get their relative worth or value within the three tasks prescribed in the guidance. After using a computer to group contiguous installations into target islands, the installations list was converted into a Desired Ground Zero (DGZ) list, again using computers to locate the minimum number of DGZs required to meet the damage criteria and to identify individual aiming points. From this investigation a group of DGZs emerged. A weapon was tentatively applied to each DGZ and an analysis made of its effects. Of course, many factors had to be considered in this process: restraints, i.e., minimizing damage to cities under certain conditions; constraints, limiting radiation dosage within satellite and friendly nations; vulnerability of the target and size of the target area; and the type of weapons available.
Weapon systems committed to or coordinated with SIOP-63 were:
SAC: B-47, B-52, B-58, Atlas D, E, and F, Titan I and II, and Minuteman.
CINCLANT: A3D, A4D, AD, A3J (carrier attack bombers) and Polaris A1 and A2 [5 SSBN on station].
CINCPAC: F-100D, F-100F, F-105D, B-57, A3D, A4D, Mace B, Regulus
SACEUR: F-84, B-66, F-100D, F-100F, F-101C, F-105D, AD, A3D, A4D, Valiant, Canberra, Mace A, Mace B, Jupiter.
(JSTPS Planning Manual, 15 March 1962)
SIOP-63 had the following force numbers in AUG 1962:
207 ICBMs on Alert, 40 on Non-Alert, Total of 247.
32 Cruise Missiles on Alert, 32 Total.
730 Aircraft on Alert, 982 on Non-Alert, Total of 1712.
Total of 1,896 nukes on Alert, 1,523 on Non-Alert for a total of 3,419 nukes.
An example of the targeting process of a single sortie will perhaps give the reader an appreciation for the complexity and magnitude of SIOP force application. A sortie was first chosen and a DGZ was selected from the DGZ Priority List. Enemy defenses were then analyzed and a preliminary route established. A sortie was tentatively committed when it could meet the requirements of the route, including penetration and delivery tactics. Then degrading factors were applied. If the result was a low probability of the sortie reaching the target, the flight was re-examined to see if any improvements could be made. If the sortie still failed, another one was selected for the DGZ, and another DGZ was selected for the failed sortie, if possible.
...
Force application was essentially completed 19 April [1962], although changes to the initial force application continued until late in May [1962] because new high priority installations were subsequently added to the target lists. By this time information on each sortie had been placed or machine processed cards (called X and Y cards) and sent to commands committing forces to the plan. Using these cards, the commands prepared detailed flight plans from takeoff to return to post-strike base.
[The X cards contained data on command and execution, vehicle, refueling, routing, weapon type, delivery tactics, and targeting information. The Y cards included routing information, e.g., corridor and time of arrival, entry point, early warning line tactics, major turning points, and post strike base.]
Returned to the JSTPS in late May [1962], the data was checked and then programmed into a computer to resolve time over target (TOT) conflicts. Strike timing sheets for each sortie were then prepared. These sheets were eventually distributed as Annex F to the SIOP-63.
One aspect of JCS guidance which created a problem for planners, however, and one which they were not able to conform to in all cases, was constraints or limiting fallout on friendly, neutral, and satellite areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union and Communist China.
The Joint Chiefs completed two days of briefings at Offutt AFB on 19 June [1962] by approving SIOP-63 to become effective 1 August [1962].
missile warhead dud factor ...
bomb dud factor ...
Aircraft Bombing Circular Error Probable (CEP) factor... The CINCSAC representative believed [DELETED] was the minimum which could realistically be applied for aircraft using radar for target identification.
Clobber Factor... The CINCSAC representative wished to use the SIOP-62 method of 1 per cent attrition per individual sortie for [DELETED] miles of [DELETED] flying. All others believed it should not be used at all.
Unknown Defenses Factor... The Penetration Tactics Committee (composed of representatives JSTPS and the CINCs) could not present a unanimous opinion on what factors to use in planning for destruction of weapon systems by unknown defenses. In SIOP-62 a factor of [DELETED] miles when penetrating an area of unknown defenses was used. The CINCSAC representative advocated its continued use. The CINCLANT and CINCPAC representatives did not believe it should be used at all.
Destruction Before Launch (DBL) Factor...
Weather/Darkness Factor... Neither the CINCLANT nor CINCPAC representative believed the factor used in SIOP-62 was valid and argued that it should not be used in the next plan. Essentially, the procedure had been to take a mathematical average between the probable assurance of delivery of a visual sortie when conditions were favorable (i.e., daylight and good weather at target) and the probable assurance of delivery when conditions were prohibitive (i.e., at night and with bad weather at the target).
Launch Reliability: The probability of a delivery vehicle launching as planned, excluding effects of enemy offensive action
Inflight Reliability: The probability of a launched delivery vehicle reaching the Bomb Release Line (BRL) or target area, excluding effects of enemy defensive action.
Weapon Reliability: The probability of a delivered weapon detonating; includes release, arming, fuzing, duds and human error.
Alert Readiness Reliability: The probability of a weapon system committed to the SIOP alert reacting to an execution order (applies to missiles only).
Weapon System Reliability: The probability of a delivery vehicle delivering a weapon which detonates as planned, excluding effects of enemy action.
(1) Weapon system reliability is the product of alert readiness reliability times launch reliability times inflight reliability times weapon reliability (applies to missiles only). (U)
(2) Alert weapon system reliability is the product of alert readiness reliability times launch reliability times inflight reliability times weapon reliability (applies to missiles only). (U)
Aircraft Reliability: The probability of an aircraft delivering a weapon to the BRL, excluding effects of enemy action. It is the product of launch reliability and inflight reliability which includes refueling reliability when applicable.
Pre-Launch Survivability: The probability that a delivery vehicle will survive an enemy attack under an established condition of warning.
)
