Civil Protection in the United Kingdom 1990 – 2005 (repost)

[Bernard Woolley]

Civil Protection in the United Kingdom 1990 – 2005.

Introduction.
The origin of post-war Civil Defence in the UK can be traced back to the passing of the Civil Defence Act (1948), which revived many of the CD organisations that had existed during the Second World War, such as the Civil Defence Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service as well as creating some new ones such as the Industrial Civil Defence Service and the National Hospital Service Reserve.

In the early 1950s, when many of these organisations were being set up, the belief amongst official circles was that the next war would be very similar to the war against Germany, with the addition of limited use of atomic weapons against Britain. This official belief was to change fairly rapidly, especially once the Soviet Union had developed and deployed thermonuclear weapons.
The greater destructive power of these weapons was used as an excuse to stand-down (in effect disband) all civil defence organisations, though it is arguable just what effect that the Civil Defence Corps could have had in the event that nuclear war had broken out (the film ‘The War Game’ suggested perhaps not much).

Civil defence was not revived in any great way until the 1980s, when the Thatcher government renewed civil defence under the new name ‘Civil Protection’.
However in the tight financial climate of the 1980s there was not much money available in the Home Office budget to do much more than take basic precautions.

*

Much has already been written about civil defence between 1948 and 1990, and this author does not intend to inadequately recreate what other more talented persons have already written.
Those who are interested in reading more detailed information on the background to the current level of Civil Protection are directed to a number of excellent sources.

Campbell, Duncan. ‘War Plan UK – The Truth about Civil Defence in Britain.’

Clarke, Bob. ‘Four Minute Warning – Britain’s Cold War.’

Cocroft, Wayne D, and Roger C. Thomas. ‘Cold War – Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946 – 1989.’

Dewar, Michael. ‘Defence of the Nation’.

Fox, Steve. ‘Struggle for Survival – Governing Britain after the Bomb.’

This last mentioned book is available online at the Sub-Brit website here.

McCamley, N.J. ‘Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers.’

The Subterranea Britannica website is also worth a visit for info on Cold War sites.

*

Early Nineties revival.
The revival of an organised volunteer civil protection organisation owes its existence to two very different men, one, Alun Davies M.P, a left-wing member of the Labour Party, the other, James Hastings M.P, a Thatcherite Conservative and retired Colonel.

Davies might be considered a strange figure to be involved in the promotion of a civil protection organisation, especially since he was a notorious anti-nuclear campaigner. However, as Davies said himself being nuclear free wouldn’t help you if someone dropped a bomb on you. Davies was also a passionate believer in democracy, liberty and freedom of speech, which made him something of a thorn in the side of the government on a number of issues regarding secrecy, but it also made him an implacable enemy of Soviet Communism, which embodied all of the things he hated the most.
He came to believe that no matter what the West did to disarm, the Soviet Union would always pose a threat, and that therefore the British people should be protected against whatever war either side might provoke. The only way to do this, he believed, was through a volunteer civil organisation – a modern equivalent of the old Civil Defence Corps.

Davis found an unusual soul mate in Colonel James Hastings M.P, a former Commanding Officer of The Blues and Royals. In his own time Hastings had conducted a survey of civil protection, which had since 1968, become the responsibility of local authorities. What he had found had rather alarmed him. At one end of the scale some councils took their responsibilities very seriously, making detailed plans, and constructing well built emergency centres (some councils were lucky enough to have inherited old bunkers), while at the other end of the scale some either did not seem to take the threat seriously, doing little planning, or were incompetent in what they had done. [1]
Although Hastings was a fervent patriot, it was the level of incompetence that most offended him as a former army officer. He soon realised that in most cases it was caused by ignorance of what was needed and bad advice from the Home Office. He too saw the need for a later day Civil Defence Corps; even if it was just to provide expert advice to council officials.

Quite how Davis and Hastings got together is unknown, but both men were known to be regulars in Annie’s Bar in the House of Commons, and although they were in opposing political parties it is conceivable that both men discussed the issue of civil defence over a pint.
However they got together the effect was the creation of a new organisation that was named the ‘National Emergency Volunteers’ in February of 1990, the name emphasising that the NEV’s role would not be limited to dealing with wartime emergencies, but would also be able to assist in peacetime emergencies, such as floods or industrial accidents. [2]
Both men were able to use their influence to gain a great deal of support for the fledgling NEV, both within their respective political parties and the wider population. Within a year enough people had been recruited to create at least a skeleton of an organisation.

Money, as always with anything in Britain, would prove to be the main stumbling block in creating an effective organisation.
However by 1993 the Home Office had decided to give the NEV statutory recognition, which brought with it a modest annual budget to defray the costs of buying equipment, defray administrative and training costs and allow them access to Home Office civil defence equipment.
As with its predecessor, the NEV was issued with a Royal Warrant, and the Queen was appointed as its titular head, though, as with the Civil Defence Corps there would be no ‘Royal’ in its title. [3]

Outside of the mainland United Kingdom both the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands had retained their civil defence organisations, so although they were on a much smaller scale, provided a model of how a modern civil defence agency might be organised in a British context.
However much of the duties of the civil defence organisations in these islands related to the monitoring of fall-out, a task carried out in the UK by the Royal Observer Corps. It was therefore clear that the NEV would have to take on a much more extensive task.
A good model would be the the Isle of Man and Irish Civil Defence organisations, which would forge strong links with the NEV. That the Isle of Man and Ireland had civil protection organisations was also used as an argument that Britain should have one. The West German Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) would also be a heavy influence. [4]

Initially the NEV concentrated on training personnel to provide expert advice to council staffs and to provide watchkeepers for council emergency centres. The aim was to provide at least two civil defence advisers and watchkeepers for every council in the UK, and by and large by 2005 this was achieved. Taking Fife Council as an example by 2005 the NEV had provided the council with one Civil Defence adviser, two deputies, and enough watchkeepers to provide a 24 hour watch in both the council’s main emergency centre and the stand-by.

The NEV very quickly made themselves very useful, throughout the Nineties its personnel were to be seen assisting in the clear up after floods, the provision of extra trained manpower being one of its most important functions. The NEV also came to national prominence after one of its Heavy Rescue squads assisted the Strathclyde Fire and Rescue Service after an explosion in a plastics factory in Maryhill, Glasgow, while the NEV was also prominent in lifesaving efforts in Boscastle during the flood.

Organisation of the NEV.
The NEV was organised into a number of sections, each with a different, but mutually supporting role.

Headquarters Section.
This section provided the watchkeepers to local authority emergency centres, as well as providing the Civil Protection advisors who would provide local authority Controllers with expert advice.The Headquarters Section also manned some mobile controls, which could take over from the fixed sites, should those be put out of action.

Warden and Welfare Section.
The Warden and Welfare Section was the part of the NEV that most members of the public would come into contact with on a daily basis.
In a war, or peacetime emergency the wardens would provide the public with advice and would be responsible for seeing that those injured or left homeless got the help that they required. They would also be equipped with RADIAC and chemical detectors to supplement the Royal Observer Corps. The wardens were also prominent in organising many of the local community emergency plans. [5]
Welfare officers would be responsible for the emergency feeding of those made homeless and would be responsible for finding accommodation for these same people. In an emergency they would man the rest and emergency feeding centres that would be set up in schools and community centres; they would be assisted in this task by other voluntary organisations, such as the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service.

Rescue and First Aid Section.
This was perhaps the most visible part (and certainly the most expensive from the perspective of the Home Office) of the NEV.
There were three basic units within this section. The Search and Rescue Unit, which was the backbone of the Rescue and First Aid Section, was similarly equipped to Fire Service Urban Search and Rescue Units. Each of these sections was equipped with five vehicles carrying a different module; the first module was designed to support the first few hours of a rescue operation, being equipped for scene assessment, technical search, electrical generation, scene safety, lighting, safe working at height, timber cutting, and concrete cutting and drilling. The second module contained heavy cutting, heavy lifting, confined space and rope access equipment suitable for moving collapsed buildings, or other rubble, this module could also be used to assist in dealing with train, or aircraft crashes, should fire service resources be inadequate. The third module was designed to support the first module at structural collapse incidents, and includes timber support, heavy breaking and breaching tools, heavy lifting and moving equipment, access platforms and lighting, all of which would be useful in the aftermath of an air attack. The fourth module carried the logistics and servicing structure and a four-wheel drive multi-purpose vehicle, which can be used for transporting equipment to an incident site, unloading modules and moving rubble to clear sites. This module could also be used as a lorry or tipper to remove rubble from a site. The fifth module carried a flat bed unit containing 10 tonnes of pre-cut timber for shoring and cribbing unstable structures. The Search and Rescue Units were also equipped to carry out waterborne rescue, being generously equipped with rigid inflatable boats and other similar equipment.

The second type of rescue section was the Heavy Rescue Section; these units were equipped with mobile cranes, bulldozers, and other heavy lifting gear. They also had the necessary flat bed lorries to move the equipment to the scene of an incident. Heavy Rescue Sections were capable of clearing blocked roads and lifting objects beyond the capability of SAR Units. The HR Sections were also equipped with High Volume Pumps, which could be used to assist with fire-fighting, or with pumping floodwater.

The third and rarest type of unit was the Mixed Rescue Section. This was a fusion of the SARU and the HRS, being equipped with all of the rescue modules of the SARU and a proportion of the heavy lifting gear and bulldozers of the HRS.

Within the Rescue and First Aid Section there were also the Mass Decontamination Units (MDU) equipped to decontaminate 400 people an hour after a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. These units were highly mobile and designed to operate alongside the MDUs of the fire service. [6]

Every member of these sections was also trained in first aid, and the sections were generously equipped with life saving equipment. Moreover a proportion of the personnel in each section were trained paramedics. During the 1990s the Rescue Sections were the part of the Volunteers that was kept most busy, being called out on numerous occasions.

The ROC and local authority controls.
Details of the organisation of the Royal Observer Corps can be found elsewhere (see Derek Wood’s official history and the relevant pages of Subbrit).
The ROC structure and the number of underground monitoring posts remained static during the ‘90s, though improved communications equipment was installed in both the group headquarters and within the posts themselves, much use being made of computers and secure ISDN lines, though the original equipment was retained in case the computer based equipment failed. However the biggest change that most observer would experience was the installation of generators in all ROC monitoring posts, which had previously relied on 12-volt batteries, meaning that they tended to be rather cold in wintertime.

The situation with regards to local authorities was rather different, as the re-organisation of local government resulted in many changes at this level, as many new emergency centres had to be constructed and many others changed hands. Both the existing and new emergency centres were also provided with the latest communications, similar to that installed in the ROC and government bunkers.

The decline of ‘Nuclear Free Zones’.
During the 1980s many left-wing local authorities who were opposed to what they saw as ‘warmongering’ by the Thatcher government, these councils declared themselves to be ‘Nuclear Free Zones.’ Councils that were ‘Nuclear Free Zones’ opposed civil defence planning as it then stood, linking it to the nuclear deterrent, which they, of course, opposed. These authorities might have chosen to participate in civil defence planning if Britain had abandoned the nuclear deterrent, left NATO and declared herself neutral, but that was out of the question, and besides many on the hard left would only be happy when the UK went Communist.

The first steps towards the decline of the ‘Nuclear Free Zones’ came in the late 1980s when Neil Kinnock became leader of the Labour Party. In an effort to make the party electable, he started the process that eventually led to ‘New’ Labour, and much of the credit of the Labour victory in 1997 must go to the early work that Kinnock did. As part of these reforms Kinnock took on the Hard Left, eventually after much internecine fighting he was able to oust many of them, though at some cost to himself. His successor, John Smith, elected to the leadership after the 1992 General Election, continued the process of reform, and would lead the party for the first eighteen months after its 1997 victory, until his untimely death in 1998; the first Prime Minister to die in office for many years; his reforms were bitterly opposed by many in the party, but they eventually led to the decline of the Hard Left as a serious political force within the Labour Party, much to the regret of many, not all of them in the United Kingdom.

The decline in the likelihood of nuclear war, especially after the START III and Tactical Weapons Treaties, also drove the decline in the movement and contributed to the decoupling in the minds of many between civil protection, which had relevance in peacetime and conventional war, and the nuclear deterrent, which many on the left still opposed. Many of the former opponents of civil defence realised that being a ‘Nuclear Free Zone’ would not help one if a bomb, conventional or otherwise, landed on the city one were living in. There was also the realisation, as Alun Davies himself pointed out, that even if one were opposed to war there was no reason not to protect oneself from the possible effects.

It was also at this time that the majority of the British left became rather disillusioned with the Soviet system and rather decided that while they might not particularly like the United States its political system was the ‘least worst’ of the two.

The Civil Protection (Emergencies) Act (1998).
As part of its more general reforms and improvements to the countries defence the new government tackled the issue of civil defence.
Many were dissatisfied with the amount of secrecy that surrounded much of the issue, and the poor levels of advice that were being issued to local authorities by the Home Office, despite the good work that the National Emergency Volunteers was doing. The secrecy previously involved in the issue would hamper local authority preparation in a crisis, either a peacetime or wartime one.

The government decided that most of the secrecy should be swept away and a new more open system introduced.
The act introduced a new two stage emergency warning – Phase One: ‘Warning Stand-by’ and Phase Two: ‘Action’.
As well as directing local authorities to update their emergency plans, which would be subject to approval by government inspectors, the act also directed that each level of authority down to ward and street association should plan and equip to be self-contained at immediate notice and to survive for at least a week without outside assistance. These plans should provide for the appointment of a controller and emergency committee with the necessary powers to run the parish/community and co-ordinate survival measures for a considerable period.

The year after the act was passed the government also drew up a new booklet to advise the public what to do in the event of war, or other emergency. The booklet ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ was rather better received than its predecessor ‘Protect and Survive’ which was widely ridiculed, despite arguably being the best advice in a difficult situation, attracting only a single spoof website. ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ was also the first civil protection booklet to be issued to every household, rather being held back for issue in the final stages of a crisis, unlike its predecessors additional copies of the booklet could be obtained free of charge; by 2005 most households had at least one copy of ‘Preparing for Emergencies’.

Public shelters, the missing link?
The issue of public fallout and blast shelters has always been a thorny one in Britain. Opponents of the nuclear deterrent and other ‘peace activists’ have made much mileage out of the fact that while there are shelters for government ministers, bureaucrats, military men and the ‘Great and Good’ there was nothing similar for the general public. However, as others pointed out, a public shelter building programme would have been tremendously expensive and for a nuclear power possibly provocative. [7]
The last time Britain had undertaken a major shelter building programme had been before and during the Second World War. Very few of the public shelters built during that period survived more than a few years after the war, the Deep Level Tube shelters in London being some of the few exceptions, though they were very quickly put to other uses. [8] Throughout the Cold War the policy of successive governments, both Labour and Conservative was to advise the population on how to build ‘do it yourself’ shelters. The designs for various DIY shelters can been seen in government publications, such as ‘Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack’, ‘Domestic Nuclear Shelters’ and in the (in)famous ‘Protect and Survive’. [9]
Whether a shelter constructed of doors taken from the interior of a house would have given adequate protection against the blast and fallout from a nuclear explosion is debateable. However it was the main advice given to the general public throughout the Cold War. Indeed the advice given in the final government pamphlet published during the Cold War, ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ was not fundamentally different from that given in the Nineteen Sixties.

As with so many areas of civil defence in the United Kingdom the job of identifying potential public shelter was devolved to local authorities in England and to the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The key word here was ‘identify’, there were no obligations under any of the various civil defence acts for local authorities to prepare these sites as shelters, or to stock them with food, or other supplies. For example the Scottish Executive identified a disused railway tunnel which ran between Waverly Station and Scotland Street in Edinburgh as a potential shelter, indeed it had been used as such in World War Two, but that was as far as the Executive went, they had no money, or will to do anything else, despite grants being available from Central Government to fit-out potential public shelters. [10]
The exception to this was the Greater London Authority. The GLA decided to requisition most of the old Deep Level shelters and modernise them by adding blast doors, modern air filters and stock them with emergency supplies. They also prepared many of the deeper Tube stations to serve as blast and fall-out shelters. Most British cities, unfortunately, were not as well served by underground tunnels as London, which seems to be rather like a Swiss cheese underground.

As with the formation of the National Emergency Volunteers and so much else in British civil defence the provision of blast/fall-out shelters would fall to the voluntary and private sectors. However one measure that the government took would help a great deal, the Treasury agreed that the costs of buying and constructing private shelters should be VAT exempt. This greatly reduced costs of constructing private shelters.
Many developers now found that they could incorporate a shelter into new housing at little initial extra costs to themselves and market the result as a multi-use cellar/wine cellar/fall-out shelter. Many new housing estates were built with large underground communal car parks which were designed to also act as communal blast and fall-out shelters, much as many car parks in Sweden were.
Quite a number of communal shelters were built by groups of private individuals during this period, who were often helped and advised by NEV wardens. However despite the efforts of voluntary groups, private industry and members of the general public there was in 2005 still an inadequate number of blast and fall-out shelter spaces and most people would still have to rely on the sort of DIY shelter seen in ‘Protect and Survive’.

Conclusion.
On entering the 1990s the United Kingdom had a workable, although somewhat inadequate civil protection organisation. Much of it would have functioned very well, though this rather depended on the competency of the local authority that was responsibility for implementing them on the ground. Civil protection was also rather hampered by the lack of manpower on the ground; even the best-laid plans would have been seriously hampered by the lack of trained manpower on the ground to implement them.

Fifteen years later Britain had one of the best civil protection organisation in Europe, fully comparable with the extensive Swiss system, which was often held up as the acme of civil defence. The majority of local authorities now had workable civil protection plans, and thanks to the National Emergency Volunteers there were now trained personnel on the ground to implement these plans and advise on how they should be drawn up in the first place. The only missing part in Britain’s otherwise excellent civil protection system was a lack of public shelter spaces. It was, then, fortunate that this shortage did not in the end become the crucial issue it could have.

While the peacetime emergencies between 1990 and 2005 afforded the emerging system much experience, it still faced a tough test when war broke out in April of 2005, though it certainly mitigated the effects of the Soviet attacks on Britain, and in a relatively low-key fashion contributed to the eventual result. The contribution of civil defence workers, who went about their arduous tasks without any of the publicity afforded by the media to the armed services, would be recognised post-war when all civil defence workers would be awarded the same ‘Defence Medal’ given to the military forces engaged in Home Defence duties.

Perhaps also in recognition of its efforts in defending Britain from attack, unlike after the end of the Second World War, the Coalition government that ruled Britain for a year after the war did not dismantle the organisation so painfully created between 1990 and 2005.
However in the years since the Third World War civil protection began to be more weighted towards dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack, which became the major threat to the United Kingdom in the unstable world that emerged from the war.
The retention of the civil defence infrastructure was also paralleled by the retention of most of the Territorial Army’s Home Service Force, which also saw much of its role directed towards anti-terrorist operations.

Most Britons would have cause to be thankful for the improvements made to civil defence in the 1990s, especially once war came in 2005. They would have further cause to be thankful on a number of occasions in the ten years that followed the end of the war.

***

[1] An otherwise excellently constructed bunker in Aberdeenshire was ruined by one room having an ordinary window in it, making a mockery of the blast and fall-out protection.

[2] Those who created the NEV specifically avoided using the old name of ‘Civil Defence Corps’, which had the wrong connotations in the minds of many people.

[3] A copy of the Warrant for the National Emergency Volunteers is reproduced below.

‘National Emergency Volunteers Warrant, 1993.

1. The National Emergency Volunteers shall be formed as a civil protection force for Great Britain.

2. The NEV shall consist of volunteers enrolled by the Secretary of State or such authorities or persons as he may authorise to act in this respect on his behalf.

3. Members of the Volunteers may be discharged (whether at their own request or otherwise) or be dismissed before the termination of the period of their enrolment by the Secretary of State or by such authorities or persons he may authorise on his behalf.

4. Local divisions of the Volunteers shall be organised by local authorities under the direction of the Secretary of State, except where they have been organised before the issue of the warrant.

5. Local divisions so organised shall assist authorities charged with responsibilities in connection with civil protection (whether under the Civil Protection Act (1993), or otherwise) in the performance of those responsibilities.

6. Members of a local division may with their consent be transferred from one local division to another by the Secretary of State or such authorities or persons as he may authorise to act in this respect on his behalf.

7. The Volunteers shall be maintained, equipped and trained in such manner as the Secretary of State may from time to time decide.

8. The conditions of service of members of the Volunteers shall be such as the Secretary of State may from time to time promulgate.’


[4] Information on the IoM Civil Defence organisation can be found here. Information on its Irish and West German counterparts can be found here and here

[5] It is estimated that around sixty percent of rural communities and fifty percent of urban communities had a workable emergency plan by 2005.

[6] Information on Urban Search and Rescue Units and Mass Decontamination Units taken from here. With more information here.

[7] But it was not, for some reason, provocative for the USSR, or the PRC to undertake a large scale civil defence shelter programme.

[8] See link for more details on the Deep Level shelters.

[9] Example of the last two pamphlets can be found this website.

[10] See this link for details of the Scotland Street tunnel.

***


Appendix

Example of a report to the Emergency Planning Department of the Home Office.

From: [Name redacted]
To: Emergency Planning Department, Home Office.
Date: 13/11/1995
Subject: Inspection of Civil Protection measures taken by [redacted] District Council.

At the time of the inspection [redacted] District Council was controlled by a [redacted] administration, and thus it might have been expected to have pursued civil protection measures with some vigour, however this local authority is avowedly anti-nuclear, and has decided that it will not co-operate with Central Government civil defence plans.

At the moment [redacted] council’s emergency plans verge on the farcical. Their ‘emergency centre’ consists of two portacabins pitched in the middle of a field far from anywhere at the council Barleyland depot. In the event of conflict they would be surrounded by rubbish skips filled with earth and piled two high, with RSJ covered with earth propped between them.
These measures are clearly inadequate protection for any occupants of this ‘emergency centre’, the experts on my inspection team being far from convinced that the protective measures would prevent fall-out from entering the portacabins. Admittedly the earth filled rubbish skips and RSJ covered in earth would provide some degree of protection from radiation.
However these protective measures provide scant protection from blast, which would accompany any nuclear or conventional explosion.
The inspection team also found that the communications equipment within the ‘emergency centre’ was far from adequate, despite offers both from the Home Office and the RAYNET organisation to provide up-to-date equipment.

While the failure of [redacted] council to provide an adequate emergency centre is bad enough, the council has also decided not to co-operate with the local division of the National Emergency Volunteers based within its area, which has hampered the efforts of the local NEV to plan for civil emergencies.
The [redacted] division of the NEV has been forced to purchase its own premises, and has seen no rebate on the council tax on these premises. This is in contrast to many other local authorities who have allowed local NEV divisions to take over surplus council depots, or have offered them rebates on council tax.
This inspector is rather glad that [redacted] has not suffered any serious natural disaster, or industrial accident, as the response of the local NEV, which has trained for such peacetime emergencies, would be seriously hampered by the refusal of the local authority to co-operate in planning. I shudder to think what the effects could be in a conflict situation if strong measures are not brought to bear against [redacted] council.

Having inspected the so-called ‘emergency centre’ my team also inspected the council’s civil protection plans. Council officials were unhelpful at best and downright obstructive at worst, and council officers had to be reminded of the legal sanctions that would be applied should they further hamper an official Home Office inspection.
Once located the emergency plans were found to date back to the Nineteen Seventies, and despite the dates on many of the documents, had not been updated since then.
What is clear to my inspection team is that [redacted] District Council has not been entirely truthful when it has informed the Home Office that it has been keeping its emergency plans up to date in accordance with the Civil Defence Act (1948), the Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations 1983, and the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986, which all require local authorities to keep their plans up to date. A close inspection of the documents given to us by [redacted] District Council officers reveals that all the council has been doing is to republish old plans with a new date added to them, possibly in the hope that no one will examine them too closely!
At no point in the plans is there a mention of the NEV’s role in civil protection, further reinforcing the fact that the council has undertaken a policy of non-cooperation with this voluntary organisation.

In the five years that I have been a Home Office civil protection inspector my team and I have examined the emergency plans of dozens of local authorities up and down England and Wales. Some of them have been exemplary, some have been less so, however in all of my time I have yet to come across any local authority with such poor plans, and disregard for emergency planning as [redacted] District Council.
Their ‘emergency centre’ is a farcical joke that would not be out of place on a ‘Fast Show’ sketch, while their planning documents are older than some members of my team! They refuse to co-operate with the National Emergency Volunteers, a stance that puts lives in danger in peacetime, never mind in a conflict, and they are deliberately obstructive to attempts to inspect their plans.
The best that can be said for [redacted] District Council’s plans is that they are likely to result in the deaths of those responsible for them as well as the unfortunate residents of [redacted], who the council has so inadequately planned to protect.

It is the unanimous opinion of this inspection team that the Home Office must use all legal sanctions available to it under the various Civil Defence and Civil Protection Acts to force [redacted] District Council to comply fully with the law as it stands.
Failing that only a council reorganisation can undo the damage done in this area.

‘Editor’s note: This document, one of hundreds of reports by civil protection inspection teams held in ‘The National Archives’, was released in 2015, along with many other civil defence documents after a Freedom of Information request by a historian who was writing a history of civil defence in the United Kingdom.
Of the documents released only those which gave a favourable report still contained the name of the council inspected, those that were unfavourable, such as the extreme example above, had the name of the council removed to save the local authority, many of which were still run by the same administrations, from severe embarrassment.
‘In the end the historian was still able to track down the majority of the councils mentioned despite the removal of their names, as those who had redacted these portions of the documents had often left clues behind, the name of the council depot in the above extract being an example. Some have speculated that this was done deliberately by those in the Home Office responsible for vetting the documents prior to release; it would certainly explain why in most cases the redaction was less than complete.’

[Bernard Woolley]

SPACE RESERVED

[Bernard Woolley]

SPACE RESERVED

[Bernard Woolley]

SPACE RESERVED

[James1978]

What precisely is a "council depot"?

[Bernard Woolley]

It’s a base where local councils store things. Like road signs, salt, etc. Also, where vehicles are based. Have included a pic of a local one below.

[James1978]

Thanks. I suspected it was the equivalent of a local public works or highway department storage yard. But being two peoples separated by a common language, sometimes I just don't know.

[Cihatari]

When I put Barleylands into Google, it came up with details for Basildon Council.

Was that one of the helpful clues left unredacted, or a little misdirection?

[Bernard Woolley]

Thanks. I suspected it was the equivalent of a local public works or highway department storage yard. But being two peoples separated by a common language, sometimes I just don't know.

I think on your side of the Pond it would be a storage yard owned by the city, or county. I have two near me (including the one pictured).

When I put Barleylands into Google, it came up with details for Basildon Council.

Was that one of the helpful clues left unredacted, or a little misdirection?

It was a 'helpful clue'.
Basildon Council in @ really did plan it's ‘emergency centre’ as described. Despite being traditionally Tory, it was anti-nuclear.
Two of my favourite stories from the '80s in the area of civil defence was the Tory councilor who voted against the planning application for a new council building, because it would involve cutting down a tree. Her vote meant the application was rejected. She then found out the building included a new emergency centre bunker, which would include a place for councilors on the Emergency Committee. Perhaps unsurprisingly, she changed her mind, but by then it was too late! Also, Aberdeenshire Council (IIRC) built a really well constucted, well equipped bunker, protected against blast, radiation etc. Then then ruined all the blast protection by including an ordinary window in the exterior of the bunker!

[Cihatari]

Aberdeenshire Council (IIRC) built a really well constucted, well equipped bunker, protected against blast, radiation etc. Then then ruined all the blast protection by including an ordinary window in the exterior of the bunker!

I bet Balamory had a better designed bunker.

Colour-coded, obviously!

[Bernard Woolley]

Miss Hoolie as Controller, and PC Plum as Police Liaison Officer. Though, I’d love to see him dealing with looters!
I’m guessing Dr Ollie would also have to treat human!