The Bag in Washington - A piece of Swedish cold war trivia

[Micael]

The Cold War had its secrets, small and big. In the text below there’s ”money” mentioned, Bildt later clarified that it was in fact a ”substantial amount of gold coins”. Auto-translated:

The bag in Washington

New findings about Sweden's secret military cooperation with the West during the Cold War
Shortly before the 1994 election, Prime Minister Carl Bildt was contacted by Supreme Commander Bengt Gustafsson in a sensitive matter. A bag had been found in the defense department's security vault in connection with the move of the Swedish embassy in Washington from the premises in the Watergate complex it had had for a long time. No one involved knew whose bag it was or what it contained. Since the military attachés had a common vault, instead of their own safes, the bag could have been left without attracting attention; all the attachés thought the bag belonged to someone else among them.

According to Bildt, after the election he turned the matter over to the new defense minister, Thage G Peterson, who seemed uneasy about the matter. The bag was later transported under strict security back home to Sweden by people from KSI (IB's and T-kontoret's successor) and opened. It reportedly contained, among other things, maps, documents, crypto keys and money. The content was aged, but still useful.

The bag was most likely intended for the Swedish military collaboration group (so-called U-group) which, according to previous plans, would be sent to Washington in the event of war, or possibly for a Swedish government-in-exile. The operations and planning for the joint action groups had started in 1950, when suitable people were appointed under a cover, "Headquarters Command Reserve". Maps and documents were stored at the embassies in London and Washington, according to an entry in Chief of Defense Staff Nils Swedlund's diary.

The size, composition and tasks of U-groups appear in a document from January 1963. U-group A (America) would consist of 17 people, including two "specialists" (probably intelligence officers), and be commanded by a general. The information was stated as, among other things:

1. Cooperation with the US top military command
2. Cooperation with NATO's military committee and Standing Group
3. Cooperation with SACLANT (NATO's Atlantic Commander)
4. Main tasks: intelligence service, liaison service, air cooperation with NATO headquarters, convoy operations, maintenance service and materiel procurement.

In the most important direction (London or Washington), the U group would be led by a defense branch chief, who also functioned as deputy Supreme Commander. Normally, it was the Navy Commander who had this assignment.

The planning for the cooperation groups was apparently maintained until the mid-1980s, when these plans, as well as other remaining plans for military cooperation with the West, were destroyed. On his departure, Navy Commander Rudberg was not allowed to hand over the assignment to his successor, who was kept uninformed.

The bag found in the vault in Washington was thus a relic from the then close in time, but to almost all active unknown, past - Sweden's secret preparations for military cooperation with the Western powers in the event of war. The bag and its fate capture in capsule form the subject of this text – the lifeline to the west and why it was allowed to languish and be forgotten.

[Nik_SpeakerToCats]

Had the USSR 'Rolled West', demolishing BAOR etc, seems doubtful they would have respected Sweden's neutrality, or treaties with Finland...

[pandion]

Had the USSR 'Rolled West', demolishing BAOR etc, seems doubtful they would have respected Sweden's neutrality, or treaties with Finland...

Such matters would certainly have been completely superseeded by Soviet operational considerations. The strength of the SwAF (some 700 planes) would possibly have excluded Sweden from initial involvement while the issue was decided on the main European front - where the widespread use of nukes by the Soviets probably would have resulted in a strategic nuclear exchange. This would have further maginalized Sweden and Finland.

Thanks to Reagan and Gorbachov this never came to be.

[MikeKozlowski]

Had the USSR 'Rolled West', demolishing BAOR etc, seems doubtful they would have respected Sweden's neutrality, or treaties with Finland...

Such matters would certainly have been completely superseeded by Soviet operational considerations. The strength of the SwAF (some 700 planes) would possibly have excluded Sweden from initial involvement while the issue was decided on the main European front - where the widespread use of nukes by the Soviets probably would have resulted in a strategic nuclear exchange. This would have further maginalized Sweden and Finland.

Thanks to Reagan and Gorbachov this never came to be.

...FWIW, Sir John Hackett's Third World War novels postulated the Swedish ambassador being called into the Kremlin and being told that Soviet airborne forces were going to overfly Sweden and that they should sit down, shut up, and color. The Swedes have other ideas of course and although they take very heavy losses, the SwAF literally breaks the Soviet airborne attacks on NW Europe.

He also has the Soviet war councils seriously debating going into Finland as a matter of principle, but they decide that the Finns can be dealt with after the victory.

Mike

[pandion]

Had the USSR 'Rolled West', demolishing BAOR etc, seems doubtful they would have respected Sweden's neutrality, or treaties with Finland...

Such matters would certainly have been completely superseeded by Soviet operational considerations. The strength of the SwAF (some 700 planes) would possibly have excluded Sweden from initial involvement while the issue was decided on the main European front - where the widespread use of nukes by the Soviets probably would have resulted in a strategic nuclear exchange. This would have further maginalized Sweden and Finland.

Thanks to Reagan and Gorbachov this never came to be.

...FWIW, Sir John Hackett's Third World War novels postulated the Swedish ambassador being called into the Kremlin and being told that Soviet airborne forces were going to overfly Sweden and that they should sit down, shut up, and color. The Swedes have other ideas of course and although they take very heavy losses, the SwAF literally breaks the Soviet airborne attacks on NW Europe.

He also has the Soviet war councils seriously debating going into Finland as a matter of principle, but they decide that the Finns can be dealt with after the victory.

Mike

Westernmost Norway was a prime target for the Soviets as a base for air/missile attacks against the UK and SLOCs across the Atlantic. The rapid capture of this area was totally dependent on airborne troops overflying Sweden, which would have been a Casus Belli for a neutral country. The Soviets would certainly have tried to achieve this by intimidation, preferably including basing/transit rights in Sweden. This was one of the scenarios figuring in Swedish operational planning. One problem for the SuAF would have been the short operating radius of the MiG-21 (depending on the time scenario).