Iraqi Armed Forces

[James1978]

Iraqi Armed Forces

I. Iraqi Army and Republican Guard Forces Command

II. Iraqi Air Force

III. Iraqi Navy

[James1978]

By Matt Wiser

Iraqi Army and Republican Guard Forces Command
1 January 2005

I Guards Corps
HQ Al-Zubayr

1st “Hammurabi” Armored Division
11th, 12th Armored Brigades, 13th Mechanized Brigade (T-72M1/BMP-2)

6th “Nebuchanazzar” Armored Division
21st, 22nd Armored Brigades, 23rd, 24th Mechanized Brigades (T-72M1/BMP-2)

4th “Al-Faw” Motorized Infantry Division
31st, 32nd Motorized Infantry Brigades, 33rd Mechanized Brigade (BMP-2/T-72G)

8th Special Forces Division
81st, 82nd Special Forces Brigades, 83rd Motorized Brigade, 440th Marine Brigade

II Guards Corps
HQ Samarra, later Al-Busayyah

2nd “Medina” Armored Division
2nd, 10th Armored Brigades, 14th Mechanized Brigade (T-72M1/BMP-2)

9th “Al-Nida” Armored Division
41st, 42nd Armored Brigades, 43rd Mechanized Brigade (T-72M1/BMP-2)

7th “Adnan” Mechanized Division
71st, 72nd Mechanized Brigades, 73rd Armored Brigade (BMP-2/T-72G)

I Corps
HQ Mosul

4th Infantry Division

7th Infantry Division

8th Infantry Division

51st Armored Brigade (T-62/BMP-1)

II Corps
HQ Kirkuk

2nd Infantry Division

6th Infantry Division

15th Infantry Division

34th Infantry Division

52nd Armored Brigade (T-62/BMP-1)

III Corps
HQ Basra

3rd Armored Division (T-72G/BMP-1)

6th Armored Division (T-72G/BMP-1)

1st Mechanized Division (BTR-60/T-62)

5th Mechanized Division (BTR-60/T-62)

53rd Armored Brigade (T-62/BMP-1)

IV Corps
HQ Amarra

14th Infantry Division

18th Infantry Division

37th Infantry Division

54th Armored Brigade (T-62/BMP-1)

V Corps
HQ An Nasiriya

10th “Saladin” Armored Division (T-72G/BMP-2)

12th Armored Division (T-62/BMP-1)

51st Mechanized Division (BTR-60/T-62)

11th Infantry Division

55th Armored Brigade (T-62/BMP-1)

VI Corps
HQ Fallujah

52nd Armored Division (T-62/BMP-1)

17th Armored Division (T-62/BMP-1)

45th Infantry Division

56th Armored Brigade (T-62/BMP-1)

Baghdad Defense Region
- Under Direct Command of Iraqi GHQ

Special Republican Guard Division

5th “Baghdad” RGFC Mechanized Division
51st, 52nd, Mechanized Brigades, 53rd, 54th Armored Brigades (BMP-3/T-72M1)

3rd RGFC SF Brigade

1st Air Assault (Airborne) Brigade

_______________________________________________________________________
Reserve Infantry Divisions

20th (Palestinian) Infantry Division - Baghdad

21st Infantry Division - Baghdad

22nd Infantry Division - Baghdad

23rd Infantry Division - Ramadi

25th Infantry Division - Baghdad

26th Infantry Division - Basra

27th Infantry Division - Basra

29th Infantry Division - Basra

30th Infantry Division - Amarra

31st Infantry Division - Najaf

36th Infantry Division - Mosul

42nd Infantry Division - Kut

44th Infantry Division - Kut

46th Infantry Division - Karbala

47th Infantry Division - Karbala

48th Infantry Division - Diwinayah

49th Infantry Division - Hila

50th Infantry Division - Samawah

53rd Infantry Division - Amarrah

54th Infantry Division - An Nasiriyah

55th Infantry Division - Diwinayah

_______________________________________________________________________
Notes on the OB

Several of these divisions were destroyed in DESERT STORM, and not reactivated. In TLW, it is assumed that these units were reactivated. Also, the 1st, 5th, and 51st Mech Divisions, and the 3rd, 6th, and 10th Armored Divisions were destroyed in 1991, but were reconstituted. The RGFC’s 3rd “Tawaklana” Mechanized Division was destroyed and not reconstituted, though the 4th, 7th, and 8th RGFC Divisions were reorganized after being severely mauled in DESERT STORM. IRL they were deactivated, and did not appear in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. In TLW these divisions were reorganized with Soviet assistance and benefited from Iraq’s rearmament beginning in 1995.

While the RGFC had the bulk of Iraq’s T-72s, the Regular Army did have T-72s in 1991, and again in TLW, with the 3rd, 6th, and 10th Armored Divisions being so equipped.
The 10th Armored Division was considered in 1991 to be the best non-Israeli division in the Middle East, before being destroyed at the hands of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Each Iraqi brigade was organized along similar lines, with armored brigades having three armored and one mechanized battalion, and mechanized brigades having the reverse. Each heavy brigade also had an SP artillery battalion, air defense battalion (gun/missile) and engineer battalion. Infantry brigades had three infantry battalions (motorized or leg) with RGFC brigades having towed artillery, air defense and engineers as well.

RGFC Armored and Mechanized Divisions were well-equipped with T-72G or T-72M1 tanks, BMP-2 IFVs, and SO-122 122mm SP Howitzers, with the 152mm 2S19 at Division level. . Other RGFC units were equipped with T-72s and BMP-2s in their tank battalion. Each RGFC Corps had an artillery brigade equipped with either GHN-45 or G-5 155mm towed howitzers, and the RGFC Motorized and SF Divisions were equipped with the 152mm 2A65 Soviet howitzer. Either the Brazilian ASTROS or the BM-21 MRL was in RGFC divisional artillery. All RGFC divisions had the SA-11 at division level, and the SA-13/ZSU-23-4 at brigade. The 5th “Baghdad” Division had the Tunguska system at brigade level. The 5th “Baghdad” Division was the only Iraqi unit with the BMP-3, although it was planned to have the 1st RGFC Armored Division equipped also.
The Regular Iraqi Army Armored and Mechanized Divisions were a mixed bag in terms of equipment; while the 3rd, 6th, and 10th Armored Divisions were equipped with T-72s and BMP-2s, the three Mechanized Divisions and the remaining armored divisions were equipped with the T-62/BMP-1 combination. Artillery was the tried and true SO-122 at brigade level, and the SO-152 at division level. All divisions had the 122mm BM-21 MRL in Division Artillery. Infantry Divisions had the D-30 122mm at brigade, and the 152mm D-20 at division. Corps artillery was the Soviet M-46 130-mm and S-23 180mm. Air defense in the armored and mechanized divisions was the SA-6 or SA-8 at Division level, and the SA-9/ZSU-23-4 combination at brigade. Infantry divisions made do with the 57mm S-60 at division, and ZU-23s at brigade. All units, both RGFC and Regular Army, had extensive numbers of MANPADS, with the SA-7/14/16 being the systems most frequently encountered. Some RGFC had the SA-18 issued. Both Army and RGFC air defense units could tie into the national air defense system in peacetime.

Iraqi Special Forces are not the Western or Soviet type of SF. Instead, they are more often used as a reserve and counterattack force. Each Iraqi Army division had one SF battalion, and they were used to “stiffen” units who were defending, and as follow-up forces in an attack, paired up with the division’s tank battalion. Army SF was often the best-trained and equipped in that particular division. The RGFC SF units were more often used as elite motorized infantry, and were trained and equipped for that mission, with a secondary peacetime mission of suppressing any anti-regime uprisings. The Iraqi Army and RGFC units which had a Western-style SF mission were designated as Commando units. One RGFC brigade and five Army regiments were so organized, and many of the soldiers were combat veterans, and were made up of volunteers, with no draftees accepted. However, they were carefully watched by Iraq’s security apparatus.

Iraq’s single Air Assault Brigade was both trained for heliborne and airborne operations. It saw no action in 1991, and had limited use in the Iran-Iraq War. Considered an elite brigade, it too was made up of volunteers, and was the only Regular Army unit authorized to be deployed in Baghdad proper. However, it was carefully watched by both the GID (Iraq’s main secret police organization) and by the Special Republican Guard. As events transpired, such concern was more than justified.

The Special Republican Guard was the main defender of Saddam’s Regime, although there was jealousy between the SRG soldiers, the RGFC 5th Division, and the Fedayeen Saddam. The SRG numbered 15,000 men, and was essentially an armored division whose main role was to defend Baghdad against all threats, internal as well as external. All of its soldiers were from tribes loyal to Saddam, and had to swear a personal oath to defend him. Its main role before and during the war was to ensure that the large Shia population in Saddam (now Sadr) City remained obedient and docile, while also protecting the regime against a coup, and being the final defenders of Baghdad against a U.S, Israeli, or Iranian attack. It was commanded by Saddam’s youngest son, Qusay. (Both IRL and TLW)

The Fedayeen Saddam was essentially the Baath Party’s enforcers, bullies, and thugs. They were also, for all intents and purposes, Uday Hussein’s private army. (Uday, known in TLW and IRL for his sadism and brutality, organized the Fedayeen to be the enforcers for the Baath Party and to conduct light-infantry and guerilla action against an outside invader) Many of those in the Fedayeen were recruited from prison, being bandits, rapists, murderers, and others with equally dubious backgrounds. In exchange for service, they were given an amnesty for their crimes, and allowed to practice their trade against Enemies of the State both real and imagined. Their methods were savage and brutal, and became known as the regime’s most fanatically loyal fighters, with no quarter given or asked, and often fought literally to the last man. Allied POWs postwar reported that the Fedayeen’s handling of POWs was the worst of any of the Iraqi military or paramilitary forces, and a number of POWs required medical treatment when they were handed over by the Fedayeen to the Regular Army. Even Soviet advisors in Iraq were appalled at the Fedayeen’s behavior towards POWs and those Iraqis (either military or civilian) who crossed them. It was no surprise that after the fall of the regime that many Fedayeen members fled the country, as with so many domestic enemies looking for revenge, escaping Iraq was necessary if one wished to continue breathing.

Al-Quds Force: While sharing the name with the Iranian IRGC's special-operations and covert mission force, the Iraqi Quds Force was quite different. The Iraqi version was the Baath Party's milita and local security force, meant to be the first line of defense against any anti-regime uprisings. Those Baath Party members who were not either on active duty in the military or who were reservists, were obligated to join the Quds Force. In a rare situation in Iraq, both the RGFC and the Regular Army were opposed to the formation of the Quds Force in 1993, seeing the Quds as “rank amateurs whose leaders were chosen for their political reliability rather than any military competence.” One captured Iraqi General, the CO of the 12th Armored Division, told CENTCOM interrogators that the Quds Force “contributed little to the security of Iraq. It was merely another means of regime protection, not a serious combat force.” While the Quds were more than willing to slaughter rebels or bust heads of rioters, when faced with U.S., British, Australian, New Zealand, and Kuwaiti armored and mechanized forces, the Quds simply “melted like ice cream in the sun,” as the V Corps commander said after the war.

Command and Control: While a through examination of Iraq's command-and-control system is beyond the scope of this work, some comments can be made. While Saddam had been personally directing operations in 1991, especially in the Battle of Khafji, in 2005, he delegated the initial operations in Kuwait to General Mustafa Hamdani, the Deputy Defense Minister and newly appointed as Commander of the Southern Theater in Basra. It is strongly believed that Saddam began to listen to Soviet advice in 1995, which reportedly reminded Saddam that Stalin had acted similarly in 1941-42, and had met with disaster and had nearly lost the war as a result. Maj. Gen. Mikhail Kurchatov, an ex-Guards Airborne officer who had commanded the 234th Guards Air Assault Regiment, 76th Guards Air Assault Division, was appointed Commander of the Soviet Military Assistance and Advisory Group Iraq in 2002, and after meeting with Saddam on several occasions, stressed the need to act as Stalin had done, providing goals and broad outlines of operations, but leave detailed planning and execution to staff officers and the respective Corps and divisional commanders. And Saddam had apparently listened, for the attack on Kuwait, while approved by Saddam, was left to General Hamdani to execute and react as the situation developed. That changed, however, following the now-famous air strike on Baghdad on 28 April. Saddam began to override General Hamdani, insisting on a renewed offensive into Kuwait, and a third volley of missile attacks on the Gulf States. Saddam fell back into his old habit of micromanaging the military, much to the disgust of not only his Defense Minister and General Staff, but General Kurchatov and the Soviet advisors at the MAAG.

While the Military and RGFC had to report bad news, the news had to be spun so as to show to Saddam that Iraq was winning, as it was widely known that Saddam didn't like to hear bad news, and in extreme cases, had shot the messenger. A case in point is the near-annihilation of the 51st Mechanized Division, which had been practically wiped out by U.S. and Kuwaiti forces in a minor Allied operation. While the divisional commander reported truthfully to V Corps, and his report was duly passed up the line to Theater HQ in Basra and then on to the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad, a suitable lie had to be given to Saddam to give “a great victory”, though at the cost of nearly all of the division. The divisional Baath Party Political Officer gave a similar report to the Party, saying that “heavy losses were inflicted on the Americans and their Kuwaiti lackeys”, while glossing over the fact that two of their own brigades had been virtually wiped out.

It was worse to withhold information from Saddam, as the events of 28 April had demonstrated. Iraqi Air Force and Air Defense Command officers had reason to believe that a major Allied air operation was brewing, with a lack of U.S. Navy and Marine aircraft taking part in early-morning air operations over Kuwait, and reports from ground observers of Allied aircraft coming over the Iraq-Saudi border. A pair of Saudi Air Force strikes on Al Salman Airfield and the Najaf Intercept Operations Center did raise warning flags among a number of IrAF and IrADC officers, but no one wanted to pass the information along to Saddam, as he had ordered a parade of Allied POWs through Baghdad's Government District for that afternoon, and no one wanted to give bad news to the Iraqi leader on his “day of triumph.” Saddam was told of what appeared to be a failed strike on the air base at Kut, which had been a very successful decoy strike, and nothing else. The first sign of U.S. aircraft in Baghdad's airspace was when U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft went in on their attack runs against Baghdad's three major airfields, and their bombs began falling. Several POWs said after their repatriation that Saddam, who was watching the parade from his reviewing stand, was “apoplectic with rage” as the strike aircraft buzzed the parade, and saw two senior IrAF officers arrested right then and there. It turned out to be both the IrAF Commander and his deputy, and that night, they were shot. The IrADC commander and his deputy also met the same fate, and in all, 32 senior IrAF and ADC officers were executed for their “gross negligence, incompetence, and dereliction of duty.” The senior officers who were executed were replaced with yes-men, while a number of junior officers were promoted and found themselves in jobs that were way over their heads.

[James1978]

By Matt Wiser

Iraqi Air Force
1 Jan 2005
Air Force HQ
[Baghdad (administration), Baghdad-Muthenna AB (Operational)]

I. Air Defense Command

Al-Asad AB
39th Fighter Squadron: MiG-23ML
63rd Fighter Squadron: MiG-23ML
131st Fighter Squadron: MiG-21

Al-Taqquadim AB
96th Fighter Squadron: MiG-25PDS
38th AEW Squadron: A-50

Baghdad-Al Rashid AB
2nd Fighter Squadron: MiG-23ML

Baghdad-Muthenna AB
9th Fighter Squadron: MiG-29A

H-1 AB
23rd Fighter Squadron: MiG-29A

H-2 AB
1st Fighter Squadron: MiG-25PDS

Habbaniyah AB
6th Fighter Squadron: MiG-29A

Samarra East AB
73rd Fighter Squadron: MiG-29A
79th Fighter Squadron: MiG-29A

Saddam IAP
4th Fighter Squadron: MiG-29A

Salman Pak AB
84th Fighter Squadron: MiG-23ML
___________________________________________________

II. Support Command

4th Composite Bomber Wing

Al-Asad AB
18th Strike-Bomber Squadron: Su-24MK

Al-Taqquadim AB
7th Air Refueling Squadron: Tu-16
8th Strike-Bomber Squadron: Su-24MK

Balad AB
5th Fighter Squadron: Su-22M-4
44th Fighter Squadron: Su-22M-4

H-2 AB
28th Strike-Bomber Squadron: Su-24MK

Ubydah bin-al Jarrah AB
69th Fighter Squadron: Su-22M-4


10th Reconnaissance-Strike Wing - Al-Asad AB

Al-Asad AB
17th Fighter-Reconnaissance Squadron: MiG-25RB

Al-Taqquadim AB
118th Fighter Squadron: Su-25K
119th Fighter Squadron: Su-25K

H-2 AB
1st Fighter-Reconnaissance Squadron: MiG-25RB

Kirkuk AB
108th Fighter Squadron: Su-25K
109th Fighter Squadron: Su-25K

Kut al-Hayy AB
91st Fighter Squadron: Mirage F-1EQ
92nd Fighter Squadron: Mirage F-1EQ

Quyyarah South (Mosul) AB
111th Fighter Squadron: Mirage F-1EQ
112th Fighter Squadron: Mirage F-1EQ

Quyyarah West (Mosul) AB
102nd Fighter Squadron: Mirage F-1EQ

___________________________________________________

III. Transport Command

Saddam IAP
33rd Transport Squadron: Il-76MD
34th Transport Squadron: An-12

Al-Rashid AB
31st Transport Squadron: An-26

Salman Pak AB
36th Transport Squadron: An-26
___________________________________________________

IV. Iraqi Army Aviation Corps

Amarrah New AB
10th Assault Helicopter Squadron: Mi-25
42nd Transport Helicopter Squadron: Mi-17

Baghdad-Al Rashid AB
55th Transport Helicopter Squadron: Mi-17

Mudaysis AB
35th Transport Helicopter Squadron: Mi-8

Salman Pak AB
6th Assault Helicopter Squadron: Mi-24

Samarra AB
8th Assault Helicopter Squadron: Mi-24

Shayaka Mazar AB
14th Assault Helicopter Squadron: Mi-25
26th Transport Helicopter Squadron: Mi-8

Tikrit East AB
12th Assault Helicopter Squadron: Mi-25
15th Transport Helicopter Squadron: Mi-8

______________________________________________________________________
Notes on the OB

Iraq had 120 MiG-29As on order with the USSR in 1990, but only 36 were delivered before the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In the TLWverse, it is assumed that the USSR resumed weapons sales and deliveries to Iraq in the 1995-96 time frame. The units with MiG-23MLs were due to convert to MiG-29s; however, the events of World War III prevented the conversion from being completed. The 23rd and 73rd Squadrons made the transition, while the 79th FS converted from the Mirage F-1 to form a MiG-29 Wing at Samarra East AB, with the Mirages being redistributed to other Mirage squadrons.

Squadrons with Mirage F-1s suffered parts shortages after the Gulf War, and again after Operation DESERT FOX in 1999, when the French Government tightened enforcement of the embargo. It was Saddam’s intention to replace the Mirages with either Su-27s or Su-30s from the USSR as funding permitted, however, no Flanker variants were found in Iraq postwar. It is believed that Mirage parts were sourced from Libya or via Libya in the interim before the outbreak of war.

All MiG-21 squadrons were disbanded. The events of DESERT STORM found that the MiG-21, when faced against F-15s or F/A-18s, was clearly obsolescent unless upgraded. However, the Iraqi Air Force chose not to upgrade its MiG-21s once the USSR openly resumed its support, choosing instead to disband the squadrons and transition the aircrew to MiG-23s or MiG-29s. The aircraft ended their days as decoys at various bases.


Iraq had 30 Su-24s prior to DESERT STORM, planning to equip the 8th, 18th, and 28th Strike-Bomber Squadrons. The 8th and 18th received their aircraft, but were not combat-ready, and flew their aircraft to Iran, while the 28th was not formed prior to 2 Aug 1990.
In 1995, the USSR resumed arms sales and support to Iraq, and as part of its first package, Su-24s to fully equip all three squadrons were delivered. All three squadrons were part of the 4th Composite Bomber Wing, with the 7th Squadron (Iraq’s Tu-16 unit) being equipped with surplus Tu-16s from the USSR fitted as tankers for the Su-24 and Mirage fleet. The 8th Squadron received additional anti-shipping training from Soviet Naval Aviation, and was equipped with the AS-20 Kayak antiship missile. It was planned to purchase Su-24MRs to add a reconnaissance capability to the Wing, but the outbreak of war prevented the plan’s implementation. An export variant of the Su-24MP was under development for Iraq (along with Syria and Libya) to fill the ELINT and SEAD roles, but no examples were delivered prior to the outbreak of war. While most Su-24 aircrew were Iraqi (and were considered the best non-Israeli or non-Iranian attack pilots in the Middle East after the RSAF’s Tornado crews), several shot-down Su-24 aircrew were found to be either Soviet, East German, or North Korean. Whether this indicated eventual GDR or NK purchase of the Fencer is unclear at this writing.

Bases south of the 32nd Parallel were off-limits during enforcement of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. With Soviet assistance, the Iraqis did practice moving munitions, parts, fuel, and personnel to bases south of the line to rehearse their anticipated wartime roles. Although the H-3 complex is not in the zone, the Soviets advised the Iraqis not to resume basing at H-3, as it was likely to induce U.S., British, French, and possibly Israeli, action against the base complex. H-3 was used as the test and evaluation area for the forward basing concept, and supported TDY deployments of MiG-23s, MiG-29s, and Su-24s to test the concept. After Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1995, Iraqi access to Jordanian airspace for training flights from H-3 was cut off.

Iraqi Air Defense Command also included numerous SAM and AAA sites; Baghdad was considered the most heavily-defended target area in the Middle East, and even after the events of DESERT STORM, was considered more heavily defended than Murmansk.
Soviet assistance was essential in rebuilding Iraq’s air defense system, and included deliveries of additional SAM systems. ELINT sources before the outbreak of war, and aerial and satellite photography revealed SA-5, SA-10, and early SA-12 systems as a supplement to the SA-2 and SA-3 already in service. The SA-2s and -3s were given modest upgrades, but were not replaced. Army personnel manned the SA-6 and SA-8 systems, and reported to the Air Force’s ADC in peacetime to supplement the national air defense system. The Rolands supplied by France suffered from parts shortages, and a lack of reloads all throughout the 1990s and up to the outbreak of war. All of Iraq’s Rolands were concentrated in the Baghdad area. A number of SA-11s were also encountered in Iraq during the war, with several Republican Guard Divisions as part of their Air Defense Brigades, as part of an SA-11/SA-13 combination. A number of Crotales were still found in Iraq, as point defense systems at several airfields. Air Force personnel also manned SA-8 and SA-9 batteries at major air bases for base air defense, along with personnel equipped with SA-14/16/18 MANPADS.

Gun systems ranged from the ZPU-1/2/4 14.5mm all the way up to KS-19 100-mm heavy AAA, with the S-60 57-mm system being the most common. It was deployed at both the tactical level with army units, and as part of the national level air defense system. The ZSU-23-4 was the most common with the Republican Guard and regular Army armored and mechanized divisions, with the 5th “Baghdad” RGFC Mechanized Division being the only Iraqi unit equipped with the ZSU-30-2 “Tunguska” system. Confirmation of this system came with CVW-5’s low-level raid on Baghdad on Day 8 of the war, and the Tunguska was picked up by threat warning equipment on several VA-115 A-6Fs. A brigade from this division was later sent to southern Iraq, and several wrecked Tunguskas were later found on the battlefield, victims of A-10s or U.S., Kuwaiti, or Saudi AH-64s.

Iraqi Army Aviation was reequipped with Soviet helicopters after the USSR resumed weapons sales to Iraq, and supplies of parts for its French and West German made helicopters (SA-342s, BO-105s, and BK-117s) were unavailable. Limited numbers of these helos were still flying, however not in squadron strength. Several SA-342s and BO-105s were encountered by USAF and Navy aircraft during the war, with the Iraqi helos coming off worse for wear as a result of such encounters.

[James1978]

By James1978

Iraqi Navy

x0+1 Project 956A Destroyer
x2 Project 11540 Frigate
- al-Hammurabi
- Nebuchadnezzar
x10 Project 1241.8 FAC(M)
x2 Project 205 FAC(M)
Numerous mine craft and small craft

[James1978]

SPACE RESERVED

[James1978]

SPACE RESERVED

[James1978]

SPACE RESERVED