…”Intelligence branch now have grave concerns about the ability of the Belgians to resist the Boche for any length of time. The KW line is upon inspection only partially built, and one of my officers who was able to examine it closely described it as resembling the Hindenberg line of the last war far more closely than the Maginot line. While there are some strong, modern fortifications such as Eben Emael, we are concerned that without our support the Germans will be able to bypass them and neutralise them at leisure. ”
“Another of my officers was able to call on a friend from the last war, now very senior in the Belgian Army, and talk at some length about the co-operation we would be likely to receive in the event of a German invasion. This officer’s opinion (corroborated by informal contacts with other serving Belgian officers) was that it would take 2-3 days from a declaration of war before we got full cooperation from the Belgians. He expected the course of events would involve a call for help and permission to enter the country being immediately granted, but due to the current strict neutrality policy it would take much longer to achieve any sort of unity of command. 2-3 days is the minimum for some sort of co-operation, and our contact thought it might be several weeks (depending on the level of German pressure) to get it working to an acceptable standard.”
“Finally, regarding fixed defences in the Gembloux gap. My officers spent two days in Gembloux on a ‘walking holiday’ and could find little evidence of work on fixed defences having started. On consultation with the Chief Engineer we estimate that it would take a minimum of two weeks to build the field defences there up to an acceptable state.”
Gamelin and Georges looked over at each other when the presentation finished. This was far worse than either had suspected, particularly around Gembloux. Gamelin then cleared his throat.
“Colonel Vallory, has your branch made an assessment of how likely it is that the Belgians can hold off the Germans for at least three weeks in the event of a major attack?”
“A lot depends on how well the Belgian troops fight Sir, but we aren’t sanguine. There are of course a wide variety of estimates, but most seem to centre on reaching the Dyle line approximately 10 days after invading, and the Escaut line 2-3 days after that. This is of course for the first troops – we do not believe the enemy would be able to deploy their full strength for some time after that as we anticipate forts like Eben Emael will be restricting their supply routes for some weeks.”
General Gamelin’s Office, 10 minutes later
“One of the first principles of diplomacy, Vallory, is that you must know something of the truth in order to lie convincingly. What the hell do you think would have happened if the Belgian government found out you had invaded them, and without my knowledge to boot? If you ever do something so mind-numbingly stupid ever again you’ll spend the rest of your miserable career counting cabbages on Kerguelen. Now get out of my office.”
“Sir!”
As his intelligence officer scampered out, Gamelin reflected that the man was turning out rather well. No doubt he had arranged everything in advance with Belgian Intelligence, but like all new staff officers his enthusiasm needed reining in now and again.
The information he’d brought back though, that was very valuable. If he was to stick with the Dyle plan, he needed to find sufficient forces to hold off a full-scale German attack for at least a week while his engineers finished fortifying Gembloux. To do so would take all his reserves, and probably a bit more besides – and he winced at the thought of what Georges would say about that. He’d be right to do so, too – thinking what he’d say to any new cadet at St Cyr who committed all his reserves before the enemy even arrived on the field of battle!
No, his original instinct some months ago now had been right: defend along the Escaut and abandon the rest of Belgium. It made his future invasion of Germany harder, and gave up all chance of keeping contact with the Dutch. No matter. If the Belgians were so pig-headed as to believe that the Germans would just leave them alone, having swallowed Czechoslovakia and Poland already then let them be. He would not have the time or the men to save more than a sliver of their country in the event of invasion, although perhaps he could save some of their army.
Next, his staff needed to come up with a plan to thin the line out somewhat to get him his full reserve, both in the North and along the Maginot Line. In some ways it was a pity he couldn’t use the BEF in its entirety as part of his reserve – being fully motorised it was far more mobile than most of his troops. Sadly, the minister would probably have a fit – muttering about ‘Perfidious Albion’. As if Gort had anywhere he could go! Still, he should speak to Gort about this soon – perhaps he could send a Corps into the reserve, and his Navy might be able to do something about keeping contact with the Dutch across the Escaut.
11th December 1939
“The overall plan has two Corps of the BEF and Seventh Army advancing into Belgium to set up defensive positions along the Escaut in the event of a German invasion of Belgium, with the BEF on the right flank up to the Escaut estuary. Second and Ninth Armies will be holding the fixed defences along the Belgian and Luxembourg borders, down to the junction with Second Army Group along the Maginot Line.
The entirety of First Army will be held as a mobile reserve along with a Corps of the BEF in the vicinity of Amiens. To support this, the 1st and 5th Corps will change armies, such that the First Army will consist of the Cavalry, 1st, 3rd and 4th Corps.”
“Along the Maginot Line, 5th Army will be withdrawn in its entirety to form a reserve based around Nancy, with the borders between the Second and Third Army Groups adjusted accordingly. Of the existing reserves, the Corps in the North will be added to Seventh Army and the two in the South to Second Army Group as a Ninth Army to partially compensate for the withdrawal of 5th Army.”
“The intention of this is to provide powerful mobile reserves capable of reinforcing whatever area comes under attack within a few days. As Napoleon said, were we to distribute our forces evenly along the frontier all we would prevent is smuggling. Accordingly, the intention is for the forces along the border to hold for a few days until powerful reserves can be brought in to reinforce them. After much consideration we have confirmed that the main line of defence in Belgium will be the Escaut line. We hope the Belgian army will resist for long enough to allow field fortifications to be built along it. The Dyle has been extensively considered as an alternative, but it was decided that it formed too weak a line, and would require the commitment of all our reserves to hold it.”
“General Gort, you have a question?”
“Several immediately if I may General Gamelin, and no doubt my staff will have further questions in the days to come.
Firstly, why do you want to split my force? While we have trained with you for some time now, we will still be more effective working with ourselves.
Secondly, how will I exercise my right of appeal to London if I have two Corps next to the Schelde and a third God alone knows where?
Thirdly, surely the decision to abandon most of Belgium is a political one – has this been agreed with Paris and London?
Finally, when will this decision become effective and the troop movements take place?”
“The first is simple: you have the most mobile force available to me, with all your troops being motorised. If I had a free choice, I would use the entirety of the BEF as my reserve with one French motorised Corps attached to it since the purpose of this reserve is to travel to any threatened area of front as fast as possible, without having to rely on potentially sabotaged Belgian railways. Unfortunately, the Minister would have a fit if I did so, and start asking questions as to whether the British are really here to fight with us at all. Accordingly, I am compelled to use the majority of the BEF in the line. As my most mobile force, assigning them the longest advance to the Escaut estuary seems appropriate.
If your political masters should find it possible to provide a fourth Corps, I would be extremely happy to have that as part of my reserve and keep your original three Corps together.”
“So far as your right of appeal to London goes, I would suggest that this right be given directly to the command of the Corps you assign to the reserve. I am very conscious of your position, and will ensure that General Blanchard does not overreach himself.”
“As for the decision to abandon Belgium, I consider this to have been forced upon me by military necessity. The Belgians will not permit us to reinforce them along the line of the Albert canal prior to a German invasion, and in the opinion of my staff the only line we can reliably hold within Belgium without the cooperation of their army is the Escaut one. I am briefing the Supreme War Council tonight on this plan.”
“My intention is for the troop movements to start on Wednesday, and to be complete by the 1st of April.”
13th December 1939
FROM: Viscount Gort, GOC-in-C British Expeditionary Force
TO: General d’Armee Gamelin, Commander in Chief, French Army
- Revised deployment plan accepted by Whitehall after some disagreement. Expect strong pressure to advance beyond the Scheldt line in the event of any German offensive in Belgium bogging down for more than a few days.
- II Corps under General Brooke assigned to your general reserve. Movement to be complete by 8th January 1940.
- I will be able to provide a further corps in France from the 20th of May 1940, consisting of the 1st Armoured Division, 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division and 46th Infantry Division. They will not be able to take part in any advance into Belgium for at least another two weeks after this.
- Further to your subsequent signal, from the 1st of May 1940 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade can be shipped into Antwerp or Flushing within 4 days of a German attack, for the purposes of defending Walcheren and South Beveland.
Reading the signal, General Gamelin’s first reaction was that the British Army could be a great deal easier to work with at times than his own government, even if Brooke was defeatist and a monumental pain as a subordinate. When he had presented the revised plan to the Minister, the reaction had been violent and one of the deputies present had even accused him of being a secret communist! They had eventually accepted it and gone back to fighting among themselves or coming up with plans to attack Moscow from Syria, but he was sure that he would be fending off attacks from that quarter for at least a month.
Indeed, one of the other orders he had been given at the meeting was that for the second time suspected Communists were to be discharged from the army and returned to their ordinary places of work. The politicians were obsessed with a Communist Fifth Column within the Republic, and could never make up their minds whether the suspected PCF members were more dangerous in the army or at their ordinary workplaces!
Still, he was cautiously optimistic about his chances of holding any German attack. The Poles had been outnumbered and stretched over a huge area, so their defeat was no great surprise. While his forces were not yet strong enough to invade Germany, they were strong enough to deny the Germans the traditional 3:1 margin of superiority they needed for a successful attack. Furthermore, the Maginot line forced them to attack through Belgium – giving him several days warning before the enemy reached French soil, and hopefully blunting any German attack before it reached his lines.