What went wrong with Force Z?

[Craiglxviii]

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1Big Rich
Post subject: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Sun Nov 13, 2011 9:32 am
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As with most disasters, cascade failure.

Failure of the strategy.
Churchill saw Tirpitz tying down RN assets and thought the same could be done to Japan. But RN was a navy with world-wide commitments, and the IJN had no commitments outside the Western Pacific. Further, the commitment of only a couple capital ships, even lacking proper escort, without any proportional commitment by the Army (additional infantry or armor) or the RAF (more and better fighters, additional medium bombers, or heavy bombers) to the threatre leaves the RN with the most capable assets for defense.

Failure of the Allies to form a cohesive Pacific strategy.
Morrison has some interesting snippets on the efforts of the Dutch, the British and the Americans to get together in the Pacific (April 1941, IIRC). The British were set on maintaining Singapore (defend the "Malay Barrier") and continuing to use cruisers to escort convoys in the Indian. This cost them the support of not only the Dutch and Americans, but the Australians and New Zealanders as well. They had already recalled their cruisers because of losses to German merchant raiders locally. They saw convoy duty in the Indian as a waste when ships were being lost at home. The Americans and Dutch didn't want their few ships off escorting convoys, unsurprisingly. The Dutch wanted a more uniform defense; what good was defending the "Malay Barrier" if the Japanese directly attacked the NEI? The Americans wanted to gather a more offensive force, they felt the best way to defend Malaya, Singapore the NEI and the Philippines was offensive action in the Western Pacific. The divides led the Dutch to call things off (somewhat surprising to me, in that they were already fighting alongside Britain), and call for all parties to engage in the disastrous 'local defense'. The Americans also felt that if the Japanese put airpower in Indochina, Singapore would be untenable, and warned the British of this. The political divisions, such as no guarantee the US would go to war if the Japanese attacked only Malaya and Burma, drove the Allies apart, but USN officers are not empowered to speak for the US Congress on declarations of war. Similarly, the Dutch felt abandoned by the British insistence on Malaya and the Convoys first. Hence their decision they'd rather die defending Dutch soil in the Netherlands East Indies than see it overrun while escorting British convoys. Finally, also note the ripples from these divisions by the time the ABDA is instituted. There is no agreement on codes, let alone signals, among the four allies, which could have been hammered out IF they had acted together earlier.

Failure of the deployment.
1. Inadequate numbers. Peter C. Smith makes the point in his book, "The Great Ships Pass" that in the Med, as long as the fleet was in formation, its firepower could afford mutual protection. It was only when ships like Fiji and Gloucester were detached in a hostile air environment, away from firepower of the fleet as a whole that air attack became seriously threatening. Sending only two capital ships, with no cruisers and only a handful of destroyers hardly constituted an "Eastern Fleet" (the actual title of Phillips command in Singapore). That Phillips was in Manila begging a DesRon from Tommy Hart is testimony enough to that. AA firepower worked in the Mediterranean and failed in the South China Sea because there was insufficient volume to actually protect the ships involved. In addition, while Durban, Dragon and Danae were in Singapore, they were unavailable to Phillips as they were committed to convoy escort, as were Exeter and Emerald in the Indian. So any hope of cobbling together a cruiser force was dashed by the insistence on committing cruisers to convoy. This later was a source of great irritation to Admiral Hart when he was in command of ABDA, as his cruisers and sailors were being overrun by the Japanese while the Admiralty still insisted on using cruisers in the Indian to escort convoys.
2. Inadequate ships. Of the ships that were deployed, Jupiter and Encounter were so badly in need of refit as to be unserviceable and did not sortie with Force Z. Also Mauritius and Vendetta were in harbor but were refitting, but neither had been committed to the Eastern Fleet.
3. Inadequate training. Tarrant makes the point in his KGV class book that Prince of Wales never got a real work-up period. She was on the Bismarck hunt, had her damage repaired, off to the Atlantic Conference, deployed to the Med for Halberd and was then off to the Pacific. Ironically, lack of a suitable work-up period was the EXACT logic for not sending the newly commissioned Duke of York to the Far East. I credit the inadequacy of the training to the panic in the Cipher Office after the second attack. The occupants heard escaping air, a sign of flooding, evacuated their compartment and warned the magazine crews for the after port and starboard secondary magazines to do the same. They failed to close the watertight hatch behind them, and water flooded into the shell and cordite rooms of the 5.25 magazines. I also credit it with the attempted restarting of the inner port turbine, which probably allowed further flooding.
4. Inadequate AA firepower. Prince of Wales alone of the ships sent had a modern AA suite, but even it wasn't up to peak performance; see the Failure of Equipment on PoW which may be caused by said Inadequate training. Her AA led with 16 x 5.25in DP in eight turrets, two four-barreled and four eight-barreled 2-pdr pom-poms, one 40mm Bofors on her quarterdeck and 11 single 20mm Oerlikons, four of which were fitted during her call at Cape Town. But even her powerful battery was hampered by the tropical conditions, such as three of the four close-range AA gunnery radar sets not working and difficulties with 2pdr ammo separating in the humidity. And the electrical failure (below) and the flooding of the after secondary magazines cost Force Z three-quarters of Prince of Wales' 5.25in firepower after the second attack; there was no other ship that could lend her protection as the Fleet had so often done in the Mediterranean. Which leads to the comment where Midshipman Henry Leach called the AA battery of Repulse "...laughable." I'll post a quote of his later, but Repulse at the time had an AA battery of six hand-operated single 4in, three eight-barrel 2-pdr pom-poms and eight single 20mm Oerlikons.

Failure of Intelligence.
1. Recognition of the tactical threat. Phillips was a staff officer, and had studied the war to date, particularly in the North Sea and Mediterranean. Adm. Phillips considered Kuantan too far away from Indochina for torpedo attacks to be launched (p. 108, description of the "Council of War" held aboard PoW by Phillips, recalled by Captain L. H. Bell in Tarrant's KGV Battleships book). Also, Phillips thought that level bombers would only be able to hit his ships if he were unlucky, and that level bombers would probably be Army planes not equipped with anti-shipping bombs (ibid.) And he thought that fighters were the best defense against torpedo planes. (And he had requested fighter cover for the 10th.) Captain Bell recounts that Phillips stated that "no shore-based torpedo-bomber attack on ships at sea had been delivered at a greater range than 200 miles. As Singora was nearly 300 miles, and Kota Bharu 250 miles, form the nearest Japanese air bases, his ships would be operating outside the effective range of torpedo Bombers." This was based on German and Italian attacks on Mediterranean Fleets and convoys.(ibid) That the Japanese were using those same long-ranged level bombers as torpedo bombers was an unknown to the Allies. While I think his request for fighter cover shows he at least suspected, or wanted insurance for torpedo bomber trouble on the 10th, Phillips was unaware in a factual sense. That was not his failure, it was a failure of Intelligence.
2. Signal intelligence failures. Phillips was sighted by I-65 at 1345 on the 9th. Also, Phillips was sighted by I-58 at 0211 on 10 December. Phillips considered surprise key to success, and had he known he had been sighted so early, the operation would have been called off.
3. Inadequate verification of events. Palliser's (Phillips' Chief of Staff, Admiral Palliser) untimely and completely false signal of enemy landings off Kuantan kept Phillips at sea farther north than he should have been after the operation had been called off.

Failure of equipment in Prince of Wales.
1. Failure of radar. Only one of the four Type 282 close-range AA gunnery radar sets on Prince of Wales operating at the time of the attack. Further, fuses for the Type 281 air search radar were blown due to shock of the AA fire. The Type 284 radar had been mounted on shock-absorbing supports. This was not extended to the Type 281. The fuse problem was repaired between the first and second attacks on Force Z.
2. Failure of ammunition. The 40mm ammo for the pom-poms separated, shell from cartridge, IN the feed belts.
3. Failure of the electrical system. Steering, pumps, three-quarters of the secondary armament, and internal communications were all taken out by the electrical failure. There were no or inadequate steam powered back-ups, for some systems, and simple alternatives, such as sound-powered phones, were not part of her fit. In addition, after the initial torpedo hits, the loss of electricity created a loss of the forced ventilation of the intact engine rooms, A and X, causing temperatures to rise to 150 degrees F. Men collapsed in the heat and humidity, and both were evacuated, with the turbines left running, the engineering officers or senior ratings making only 5-minute visits after the electrical failure.

Failure of the RAF.
Phillips asked for three things from the RAF:
- Recon 100 miles north of his ships during daylight on the 9th
- Recon 100 miles of the coast with Singora as the midpoint, 10 miles from the coast starting at first light on the 10th
- Fighter cover off Singora for daylight of the 10th.
The RAF provided NONE of these. He was informed as he sailed that fighter cover would not be provided. On the morning of the 8th there were 72 Birtish fighters in theatre, and about 50 were serviceable. When Force Z sailed, three airfields in northern Malay that might have provided fighter cover had been captured or rendered unusable by bombing. One does wonder if the RAF could not protect their own bases, how were they going to protect Phillips as well? Finally, when Force Z was engaged, fighter strength in Singapore was 11 Buffaloes. See also Failure of the Strategy: Where were the Spitfires, Tomahawks, and Hurricanes (beyond the late-arriving 60 Hurricanes that had no impact on the outcome)? Where were the additional medium bombers or any kind of commitment of heavy bombers?

Failure of the Admiralty.
1. Failiure to respond to Phillips or make decisions in a timely manner. Phillips told the Admiralty he intended to attack the enemy forces off Kota Bharu and eight hours later, he sailed, 1005 on the 8th London time. The Admiralty did not reply to his message, and at 2200 on the 9th London time, when Force Z had been at sea for some 36 hours, there was a staff conference on naval dispositions in the Pacific. Churchill, Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Pound were in attendance. Churchill favored withdrawal, but at the late hour, it was decided to settle things in the morning. It was already too late.
2. Failure to provide Phillips with indigenous air power. Though this could go under the Failure of the deployment, I think it is more of a failure of Phillips' superiors. Indomitable went aground 3 November. Prince of Wales had sailed on 25 October. Indomitable wasn't scheduled to join until January after the grounding. The failure to provide Phillips with any kind of ships with aviation aboard, even cruisers, denied him the ability to use his own air reconnaissance. As it was, he husbanded his single asset, Prince of Wales' lone Walrus, until the last possible moment, after the report of landings at Kuantan. He used it to search for enemy activity inland, while Express searched the harbor. Had a carrier (Hermes was being docked in Durban when Phillips was in Cape Town) or even the aviation assets of a few aircraft-equipped cruisers been available, Phillips might have detected and engaged the ships in one or more of the landing zones, and/or Ozawa, and/or Kondo. He certainly would have had a better appreciation of where the enemy was, as well as where the enemy was NOT.

Henry Leach was a midshipman in Mauritius. The latter was refitting in Singapore when his father's ship arrived.
Some might remember Henry Leach as an Admiral, of Operation Corporate fame, but I digress. He recalled this on the situation in Singapore:

Quote:
I had been appointed to the Prince of Wales, but before I joined her, my father had been made captain, so I ended up in the cruiser Mauritius, which in fact was in dock in Singapore naval base at the time Prince of Wales and Repulse cam out for their final voyage. It had been a very public voyage at every stage, round the Cape, at Mombassa, Colombo, then Singapore. Each stage was scheduled so the world knew, and this was thought to be a deterrent. So this brand new ship, very powerful, very capable, but not yet fully worked up, and Repulse, a marvelous ship, but old, and with an anti-aircraft armament that was frankly laughable, virtually might not have existed, arrived.
And these two ships and a couple of pretty elderly destroyers were to take on the entire Japanese Navy. I would call it arrogance, and a thoroughly misplaced arrogance. I know that my father and the captain of the Repulse regarded their mission as one-way. They didn't think they had an earthly chance, and of course they hadn't.
I had dinner with my father, in Prince of Wales. I suppose it would have been two nights before she finally sailed. We hadn't seen each other for inside a year, so we had lots to talk about. And he obviously didn't like the situation. He asked me what I thought about it. In my youthful arrogance I remember saying, Oh, let em come, lets have a go at them. And he turned a very sad face to me saying, I don't really think you have any idea of the enormity of the odds were up against. And I hadn't. Well, we talked about this and that and he sealed up a letter to my mum saying that I was with him and all that stuff, and that was that.
I've always, been a very poor swimmer, and I was just sploshing about in the pool to keep cool and my father swam over to me and said, "I promised Bill Tennant [captain of the Repulse] Id give him a drink before we went back on board." I asked if I was included in this, and he said, "Yes, of course." Just before he got out of the pool he made a remark which I thought nothing of at the time, but I recalled subsequently: "I'm just going to do a couple of lengths in the bath; you never know when it may come in handy." They were prophetic words. Later I joined them for a glass of good stuff. I detected even at the time, these two great men were talking at each other across the table, because they did not want to discuss with me the hideousness of the situation. That was the last time I saw my father.


If his flag captain and his most senior captain did not think they had an earthly chance, Phillips would have to have been delusional at best to think his ships were invincible.

Avoid the trap of the armchair admirals/amateurs, including the published, that label Phillips a 'battleship admiral', making disparaging comments such as 'he was smugly confident in the ability of his ships to take on aircraft'. He knew torpedo planes were the real threat to his ships. He also knew fighters were the real answer to the threat of torpedo bombers, hence his request for air cover on the 10th, even though he thought he would be out of range of the Japanese torpedo planes. Also, had he thought his force adequate for the task ahead, he wouldn't have been asking for reinforcement with American destroyers. I think it was Mark Bailey several years ago who commented that few officers have ever been put in as tough a situation as Phillips. He sailed anyway. If Singapore was to be saved, the Japanese stopped or at least delayed, only the Navy had the capability to do so. Not going was not an option.

Finally, a note on nomenclature. When Phillips in Prince of Wales with Electra and Express in escort, sortie on 25 October from the UK, the ships were codenamed "Force G." They called at Freetown (24 hours refueling) on 5 November, departing on the 6th. On 16 November, Force G entered Table Bay for a 28 hour call at Cape Town. Phillips met with Field Marshall Smuts, PM of South Africa. Force G refueled at Mauritius and Addu Atoll before arriving at Colombo on the evening of 28 November. Phillips was ordered by the Admiralty to fly ahead to Singapore to confer and acquaint himself with the situation. Repulse with Jupiter and Encounter were off Trincomalee, and joined south of Colombo on the 29th, Captain Bill Tennant in Repulse being the senior officer present and in command of Force G. Singapore was reached on 2 December, and on the 3rd Phillips command was officially the Eastern Fleet. "Force Z" was the codename for the six ships (Prince of Wales, Repulse, Express, Electra, Vampire, Tenedos) that Phillips sorties with on the evening of 8 December.


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KDahm
Post subject: Re: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Wed Nov 16, 2011 9:53 pm
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I think this is too much criticism of the RN. You may have neglected one other factor:

Overwhelming Japanese Force

Given the opposing numbers of aircraft, and the capability to shuttle bomb and bring more aircraft in, even a similar sized force composed of 1945 USN ships (but without radar or VT fuses) would have had a difficult time surviving.

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p620346
Post subject: Re: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Sun Nov 27, 2011 9:06 pm
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I believe that if you could replace the 1941 Force Z with a 1945 Iowa, Alaska and four Gearing class destroyers armed with 5-in/38 VT shells that no Allied ships would have been sunk. What a difference just 3,5 years would make.


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1Big Rich
Post subject: Re: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Sun Dec 11, 2011 8:14 pm
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KDahm wrote:
I think this is too much criticism of the RN.


Criticism? I call it statement of fact.

Quote:
You may have neglected one other factor:

Overwhelming Japanese Force


That would be the "Failure of the Strategy" category; sending 2 capital ships to 'deter' an enemy with 1,000,000 tons of naval vessels, including 10 capital ships and 9 aircraft carriers and no naval commitments outside the Western Pacific. Perhaps also "Failure of intelligence" with regard to local superiority in the South China Sea theatre.

Quote:
Given the opposing numbers of aircraft, and the capability to shuttle bomb and bring more aircraft in, even a similar sized force composed of 1945 USN ships (but without radar or VT fuses) would have had a difficult time surviving.


Those numbers of aircraft managed to MISS a 794 ft. long, single-rudder battlecruiser with 24 of the first 25 torpedoes they launched at her. Even the vaunted, so-called 'hammer and anvil' attack was only successful because the second group of planes initially dove on Prince of Wales, only turning to Repulse after Bill Tennant committed to combing the torpedoes dropped by the first group. And even then, they scored only one hit. No surprised it immobilized a 1916-era design and overwhelmed her TDS, allowing a later strike to deliver the coup de grace.

As I recall the ONLY successful Japanese torpedo hit on an American battleship AT SEA was accomplished not by air nor surface forces, but by submarine, I-15 on North Carolina. West Virginia, California, Oklahoma, Arizona, Nevada, Maryland and Pennsylvania were all at anchor when torpedoed by Japanese aircraft.

I would also note that the RN had not previously, nor subsequently, committed capital ships in a hostile air environment without fleet strength around them (see Failure of the Deployment, part 1). This was something neither the Americans, nor the Italians, nor the French did. Nor the Japanese for that matter while they still had a fleet and the oil to run it.

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PMN1
Post subject: Re: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Mon Dec 12, 2011 6:43 pm
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1Big Rich wrote:


Those numbers of aircraft managed to MISS a 794 ft. long, single-rudder battlecruiser with 24 of the first 25 torpedoes they launched at her. Even the vaunted, so-called 'hammer and anvil' attack was only successful because the second group of planes initially dove on Prince of Wales, only turning to Repulse after Bill Tennant committed to combing the torpedoes dropped by the first group. And even then, they scored only one hit. No surprised it immobilized a 1916-era design and overwhelmed her TDS, allowing a later strike to deliver the coup de grace.



Was that switch a deliberate pre-planned move or a switch when they saw the situation arising?

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1Big Rich
Post subject: Re: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Wed Dec 14, 2011 1:37 pm
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PMN1 wrote:
Was that switch a deliberate pre-planned move or a switch when they saw the situation arising?


My understanding is it was completely intentional. The group approaching Prince of Wales waited until Tennant had committed Repulse to combing the torpedoes of the first group before targeting the battlecruiser. I would say it was pre-planned because of the futility of the previous attacks on Repulse.

Regards,

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nomad990
Post subject: Re: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Thu Dec 15, 2011 9:34 am
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1Big Rich wrote:
PMN1 wrote:
Was that switch a deliberate pre-planned move or a switch when they saw the situation arising?


My understanding is it was completely intentional. The group approaching Prince of Wales waited until Tennant had committed Repulse to combing the torpedoes of the first group before targeting the battlecruiser. I would say it was pre-planned because of the futility of the previous attacks on Repulse.

Regards,


I believe I read on the Force Z survivors website that the men in the main range finder were holding on for dear life because Capt Tennant conned HMS Repulse like a destroyer. At one point, they looked out a side door and saw only water because the turn was so hard.


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Timbo W
Post subject: Re: What went wrong with Force Z?PostPosted: Wed Jan 04, 2012 2:18 pm
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Not being terribly up on naval things, but I've heard somewhere that the weather was a major factor in the demise of Force Z.

It was forecast to be stormy, so the gamble was taken to sortie in the hope of catching Japanese shipping while their planes were grounded. Unfortunately the gamble didn't pay off as the weather cleared up at just the wrong time. With the respective aerial strengths of both sides, you wonder what else they could have tried, short of withdrawing completely?

Anyone know if this is a tall tale or accurate?


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[Rocket J Squrriel]

I've read that the survivors from HMS Repulse's main range finder said that they saw mostly the ocean from the port/starboard hatches instead of the horizon as the skipper dodged torpedoes. He was handling the old girl like a destroyer.

[1Big Rich]

Thanks Craig.

I don't recall who asked the title question these years later, but Stuart thought my response belonged in the "Essays" section. I cleaned it up a little (too many typos in the original answer ) and posted it there...

I've read that the survivors from HMS Repulse's main range finder said that they saw mostly the ocean from the port/starboard hatches instead of the horizon as the skipper dodged torpedoes. He was handling the old girl like a destroyer.

Indeed. No small feat, given the number of torpedoes launched at her; depending on the source between 15 and 24 before she was hit. Prior to Repulse, Tennent had been on the beach coordinating things during Operation Dynamo, and after the loss of Repulse he became an Admiral and commanded a cruiser squadron in the Med, IIRC.

Regards all,

[Timbo W]

Can anyone who knows about these things comment on the weather question I asked way back?

[Rocket J Squrriel]

Thanks Craig.

I don't recall who asked the title question these years later, but Stuart thought my response belonged in the "Essays" section. I cleaned it up a little (too many typos in the original answer ) and posted it there...

I've read that the survivors from HMS Repulse's main range finder said that they saw mostly the ocean from the port/starboard hatches instead of the horizon as the skipper dodged torpedoes. He was handling the old girl like a destroyer.

Indeed. No small feat, given the number of torpedoes launched at her; depending on the source between 15 and 24 before she was hit. Prior to Repulse, Tennent had been on the beach coordinating things during Operation Dynamo, and after the loss of Repulse he became an Admiral and commanded a cruiser squadron in the Med, IIRC.

Regards all,

During the Bismarck chase, Repulse ran low on fuel and had to break off for Conception Bay, Canada to refuel. While there the captain found out that the local people were in dire straights because the Britain, for whatever reason, wasn't buying the local iron ore. They were also a fishing community with a large amount of salmon that also couldn't be sold. To help the community and provide a treat for his crew, Tennent bought enough of the catch out of his own pocket to give his a hearty meal of fresh salmon.

At the end of the war with Japan, he tried to meet up with all the survivors of the the sinking of Repulse that had also endured the horrors of the Japanese POW camps as they were going home to Britain.

He was a damn fine officer and human being.

[Craiglxviii]

Thanks Craig.

I don't recall who asked the title question these years later, but Stuart thought my response belonged in the "Essays" section. I cleaned it up a little (too many typos in the original answer ) and posted it there...

I've read that the survivors from HMS Repulse's main range finder said that they saw mostly the ocean from the port/starboard hatches instead of the horizon as the skipper dodged torpedoes. He was handling the old girl like a destroyer.

Indeed. No small feat, given the number of torpedoes launched at her; depending on the source between 15 and 24 before she was hit. Prior to Repulse, Tennent had been on the beach coordinating things during Operation Dynamo, and after the loss of Repulse he became an Admiral and commanded a cruiser squadron in the Med, IIRC.

Regards all,

During the Bismarck chase, Repulse ran low on fuel and had to break off for Conception Bay, Canada to refuel. While there the captain found out that the local people were in dire straights because the Britain, for whatever reason, wasn't buying the local iron ore. They were also a fishing community with a large amount of salmon that also couldn't be sold. To help the community and provide a treat for his crew, Tennent bought enough of the catch out of his own pocket to give his a hearty meal of fresh salmon.

At the end of the war with Japan, he tried to meet up with all the survivors of the the sinking of Repulse that had also endured the horrors of the Japanese POW camps as they were going home to Britain.

He was a damn fine officer and human being.

That bears out everything I have ever heard of him.

[1Big Rich]

Can anyone who knows about these things comment on the weather question I asked way back?

Timbo,

General weather patterns



There are always exceptions depending on what's happening in a particular place, though.

AFAIK, on the 10th and during the actual attacks, the weather over Force Z was clear, making the detection and attacks easier.

I don't recall any source stating what the weather was like over Indochina, or how the British in general or Phillips in particular would have any idea what that weather forecast would be, unless there happened to be an odd wind from west to east reported out of Burma. But I've never seen that in print.

My thoughts,

[Timbo W]

Thanks Rich,

I've remembered this from somewhere, but exactly where I don't remember . As you say, have never come across anything to back up the theory. I'd guess they might have had a Met office in Singers?

[Craiglxviii]

Thanks Rich,

I've remembered this from somewhere, but exactly where I don't remember . As you say, have never come across anything to back up the theory. I'd guess they might have had a Met office in Singers?

The Andrew most certainly would, yes.