Some Collated Notes to Show Background Thinking (and to prod reaction) [Part the First]
Prospective Military Conflicts:
1.) First and foremost, there are the broad FRW, which will likely branch out to include Spain, and somewhat less likely to extend to Denmark-Norway. The main thrust of initial reforms and armament decisions will be largely dictated by the aim of victory here. There will be operations in Europe, the Med, the Windies, South America and the Far East.
2.) At the same time, it is very likely that there will be another war with the Maratha Confederacy in India.
3.) It is possible that there will be some sort of conflict between the USA and the British Empire due to unresolved issues/abutting interests, even as the direct circumstances that lead to 1812 aren’t likely to raise their head.
4.) Following on from these conflicts likely in 1794-1815, there will probably be a range of potential wars around the edges of British India - the Kandyan Wars in Ceylon, the Anglo-Nepalese War and the first moves towards Burma.
5.) There will likely be similar or greater British involvement in the Barbary Wars, whenever they kick off. The basis of interests in the suppression of that threat are too broad for them not to occur.
6.) Advice will be given to limit, as long and as far as possible, the sale of muskets by British and Australian traders to the various Māori groups. It won’t be possible to stop it happening in the medium term, but delaying the acquisition of even muskets can have a positive impact on the course of the Musket Wars. When NZ is settled/colonised, the forces operating there will likely have a more substantive overmatch in weapons technology, which can possibly/hopefully limit the scope, intensity and duration of later Māori Wars/Land Wars.
7.) Something will likely come up in Southern Africa, both in terms of a similar conflict to the @ Xhosa War and some issues with the proto Boers/Trekkers, and possible action against the nascent Zulus to circumvent, as far as possible, the bloodshed of the Mfecane. Addressing some of those issues earlier can prevent them simmering for decades and then boiling over later.
8.) Greece will likely be supported in her war of independence, as it was historically, but perhaps with a bit broader aims, looking towards the circumstances of the Eastern Med and the emergence of Egypt.
9.) An early start will be made to the suppression of the slave trade, with as much vigour as can be mustered. The wickedness of what occurred before the 1794 PoD cannot be changed or made up for, but things can most certainly be done better.
10.) It is difficult to forecast conflicts and wars beyond ~ 30 years after the PoD/ISOT event, as there will be substantive cascading changes rippling by this time.
Military Prospects
- In 1794-1810, there will likely be forces equipped with rifled muskets and slightly improved artillery, along with a handful of special ‘toys’ (small numbers of 20th century weapons) and small numbers of “Sharpe’s Rifles” equipping specific units
- The next stage of armament will be, as discussed upthread, the gradual development and introduction of breachloading rifles, repeating rifles, revolvers, better artillery and proto Gatlings. Forces equipped with that generation of weapons will likely have much better performance against the Zulus than an @ British Army, to pick out one example
- By the time we reach the ‘era of the question mark’, or more unknown potential conflicts, there will be further developments in service rifles and artillery, with the advent of longer ranged, faster firing steel breachloaders, as well as further developments of the Gatling ace in the hole
- I’m being fairly broad in terms of generations of armaments and fairly generic in terms of actual conflicts, as it will depend on what ways the storyline develops, and whether there is any interest as it develops (15 years’ experience in the Writer’s Forum has taught me to take nothing for granted)
- The further we go, the more change that will compound. Having aerial reconnaissance in some circumstances of conflicts that occurred in @ between 1850 and 1900 would cause a notable level of difference, for example
British Army thoughts
- Introduction of new service weapons/rifles will drive the introduction of different unit organisation, tactics, TOEs and consequently drill and training. What starts with a small change on a battlefield level reverberates backwards, sideways and up
- In turn, this will be accompanied by a fairly consistent rate of change, given the combination of an artificially kickstarted economy and technology, foreknowledge, secondary sources and the extra direct finance to do something about all of the immediately aforementioned factors. This will contrast to the essentially static British Army of 1815-1840, to use an example of a 25 year/1 generation period where there were only very minor and incremental changes
- If we look at the next generation after that, historically, we saw the introduction of the Pattern 1851 Minie and Pattern 1853 Enfield; the shrinking of the shako and replacement of the coatee with the tunic; the brief advent of the Armstrong Gun; and various other peripheral changes. However, by and large, the British Army of 1865 was not entirely unrecognisable from that of the epoch of Waterloo, with a host of accompanying caveats
- That won't be On the Cards here
- It is more likely that not only the pace of change will remain fairly constant, but that this will have an effect on the nature of the Army at large. There will be far less scope for it to be under the dominance of old Die Hards opposed to change
- At this point, it is worth canvassing that what emerges over multiple generations of cumulative change will be something different not just in equipment and philosophy, but also quite possibly in form and shape/size. There is an enormous caveat here that any force structure will depend on where I end up developing the story in terms of antagonists and threats, but with that in mind, it is possible to see a larger Army than what historically developed and became general practice during the 19th Century. Possible, but by no means definite
- One fundamental factor that will drive much to do with the Army is something similar to some other areas: The goal will be to get out in front, through the artificial measures made possible by the ISOT, and then progressively extend this lead over time. When rival armies during the FRW use muskets, there will be an introduction of the rifled musket and improved artillery; when they subsequently move to catch up, the next step up will be, as mentioned upthread, further improved cannons, Gatling Guns and breach loading rifles; then steel RBLs akin to Armstrongs/Krupps, Maxims and bolt action magazine rifles. The one constant is that the Rest of the World will seek to catch up; resting at any point will allow them to do so and negate one significant part of British advantage
- In terms of the Army, this advantage will permit rather smaller field forces to take on and defeat larger 'downtime' forces, be they European, Asian, African or otherwise
Royal Navy thoughts
- In every case, the Army will need the Navy to get them there. An advanced RN with the advantage of knowing the exact paths to take (and thus cancelling out the need for a great deal of exploration and experimentation) can not only concentrate its forces, but also concentrates its efforts, its funding and its building capacity
- It will not be enough to simply emulate @, but just a little earlier, but rather to perfect the best bits of @ development; add in appropriate paths not taken for good measure; and to take advantage of the confluence of opportunity, technology and a lack of tangible opposition
- What does this look like? Historically, we can look at the collated RN ironclads from Warrior to Devastation, which, spread out across various types, came to 17 broadside ironclads, 14 central battery ironclads, Monarch and Captain and 5 coastal defence ironclads. This covered the period 1861-1874. Over a corresponding ~ 12 year period, there would be an aim for a minimum of 42 'Warrior* type ironclads', or an average of 3.5 per year @ ~ £450,000
- Very often on this site, other sites and in AH in general, we get caught up in the technicalities of Gun X or Engine Y, but what is perhaps more significant is how the overall fleet is used, over multiple campaigns and years to impact wider policy. Here, having several dozen ironclads in the 1840s whilst the French, Russians, Americans and what not are still working with wooden sailing ships of the line and perchance a smattering of steam liner conversions is much greater than historical dominance
- A lovely ship can exert a lovely amount of force at sea in terms of how it can control an area, but the extra cherry on top is being able to project power inland through her guns
The Arms Behind the Army
- Neither the Army nor the RN, nor any other military force, will be able to properly function without that essential marriage of supporting elements: political will/strength, industrial capacity and depth, economic/financial coffers and technological knowhow
- Better economic growth through half a hundred 'stacking' factors creates a larger economy that can support strong, capable military forces in meaningful numbers
- Better fiscal policies, strong public finances and a more modern understanding of economics and budgeting can deliver the funds from said larger economy, particularly without one rather specific albatross on the figurative back of the nation
- The inter-relationship of industrial development and technology is one thing that has shone through my research on this thread and elsewhere. Some advances seem considerable, but when broken down into relatively straightforward steps over time, much can be achieved
- A single company could achieve a lot, but would be fundamentally limited by its nature and scope. 'Uplifting' a significant nation state that is already in the early heady throes of an Industrial Revolution permits the process to take place not just in one area or industry, but across an entire country
- Some changes, policies and moves made in the early stages will not appear to pay off, either to figures within the story or to readers, but some seeds will take a while to develop
- With the right moves and policies, so many of the ideologies, issues and conflicts that have blighted the last two and a bit centuries can have their trajectories profoundly altered. The Clean Dozen/the Travelers won't be entirely benign or doing things for purely altruistic reasons/'for all mankind', but there will be a not inconsiderable amount of cross-over between British interests and those ends, particularly as time goes by and more influence can be applied...
- There is a fascinating degree of interplay between society/social development of various kinds and the development of culture that I'd really like to explore; for example, having some different sports introduced will have some effects off field, just as sports are affected by social developments beyond the boundary. I don't seek to resolve this particular chicken and egg question, but to use it as one means of exploring things
- How art, literature, music and what we blithely term 'popular culture' develop will be very interesting. As of 1794, it isn't necessarily written that the future of popular music will be largely shaped by an offshoot of jazz and ragtime, for example
The Old Ancient Evil from the Dawn of Time - France
- The French invasion of Egypt and Syria of 1798 was in part due to Napoleon, but not completely so; there was enough thought going around amongst others in positions of power at the time to contemplate it. Weighed up against that is the circumstance whereby the French Mediterranean Campaign of 1798 was permitted in no small part due to Bonaparte's victory in Italy
- In the theoretical absence of Bonaparte, there are a number of other quite capable French commanders who could emerge, albeit not quite to the extent of Boney, with Massena coming to mind. Even if Bonaparte is off the scene earlier, there are other who could provide some measure of ambitious military leadership
- My first preference was to definitely move to capture Bonaparte as he tried to scarper from Egypt, leaving his army behind, and take him off the board prior to the 18 Brumaire and all that, but there is a certain attraction to an earlier opportunity...
- One flow on from that would be a different situation in Italy, with a continuing Republic of Venice
- Given the scope and aim of the story, setting up a contrived French opposition in the initial FRW period isn't the primary priority
- In any event, with strategic warning from the beginning of 1794, the ability to build ships and the funds to do so, there is scope to put the RN in general in a better position for any goings on in the Eastern Mediterranean
- By the by, I'm not necessarily inferring that Bonaparte will be killed off or anything like that. Whilst I'm not averse to historical figures meeting a sticky end for storyline purposes (having an idea for Hitler to possibly end up inside a wicker man in Fall and Rise), that isn't for every figure; he might not become Emperor, nor even serve France, but there is enough potential to at least consider working him in some respect
- Broadly speaking, without the extension provided by the transition into the French Empire, it is possible that the French Revolutionary Wars might burn out by the period 1805-1810. This will have some flow on effects, meaning that the circumstances that lead to the @ War of 1812 will likely not be on the cards; there is still scope for some sort of clash of British and American interests in the general time period of 1795-1820ish, but it will depend on a lot of other variables
- The impact of an earlier peace will be quite interesting, considering the subsequent years up to ~ 1815 vs the @ 1815-1820 period
- No matter what happens when, there will still be some sort of depression in the late 1810s because of the impact of 1816 on the British and European economies, which were still quite marked by the rhythms of agriculture and the harvests
- There is of course scope to prepare, to a small extent, for what will happen. In this, as in quite a few other known events or trends in the short and medium term, the utility of future knowledge will be reasonably significant. Once we move into the long term, beyond 1840 or so (or close enough to 2 generations, each of 20 years), then developments begin to become less certain; it is unlikely there will be the same bad harvest of 1846 and the Panic of 1847 contributing to 1848 being a notable year, for example
Food
- ‘Encouraging’ an earlier development of fish and chips is certainly an aim, possibly with other components to the classic components of the meal
- The full English breakfast will develop a bit differently, particularly as Georgian breakfasts were markedly different to the Victorian and Edwardian evolutions
- We shall see the creation of a few new dishes along the way, both from my own RL recipes and following on from some disappeared historical recipes
- In addition to encouraging the adaption of certain street foods into British cuisine, some other influences will spread through cookbooks, articles and being ‘showcased’, such as meatballs (both in their spherical Swedish variation and the more flattened frikadeller type from Denmark)
- The vertical rotisserie and subsequent @ kebabs/doner/yiros will come out of Britain a bit earlier than mid 19th century Ottoman Turkey
- Similarly, schnitzel will have a bit of an earlier ‘birth’/preemptive theft, and develop into various forms of breaded meat; a much earlier emergence of parmigiana (including a tomato sauce underneath melted cheese and some element of bacon, but not ham slices as done in Victoria, as that is yucky heresy straight from Lucifer’s own kitchen)
- A standard combination that will emerge will be meat and 3-4 vegetables, plus potatoes, developing something a bit more culinarily interesting (and probably nutritious) as well as circumventing later lewd use of the @ term
- Spaghetti, albeit with a different name, will develop a bit earlier (insofar as the modern, ‘industrial’ variety is concerned, as the word has been around for half a dozen centuries to this point in 1794), and, as an in-joke, the tool used to create it will be called a ‘tree’…
More random thought bubbles:
- Have swords come back into fashion as part of a gentleman’s attire
- Work in some variations upon the Grand Tour
- Make some nudges towards a unified system of meat cut nomenclature across the English speaking world, formalising what is meant by a sirloin, keeping the rump steak in the American lexicon and avoiding the Frenchified pronunciation of fillet
- Work in some different hats, including some returning from past popularity; consider the success of Walter Scott and his chums in other fashion areas
- Longer hair, along the lines of the early Regency period, might become fashionable
- The Glorious First of June will likely be a bit more glorious
- Beethoven might get enticed to another country, and have something done to his ear (perhaps a fish…)
- I have a notion of having Beethoven and later Wagner listen to some Iron Maiden, Rainbow, Ayreon and Rhapsody…
Foreign Policy
- France is, at this time, the enemy. The immediate goal would be to defeat the Revolutionary government and work towards some sort of restoration of the pre 1789 European situation, with the restoration of the young King being a ‘stretch goal’. A France without Bonaparte taking power will be a different one, to say the least. After peace, a Congress of Vienna analogue and some sort of settlement, policy would shift towards that of trade and as amicable relations as can be achieved, given France’s location and size/power/interest combination make it quite the foe. Some of her later colonial expansion will be preempted, but not that in North Africa; that is a bit enough meal to keep them chewing for some time
- Prussia is at this point more often a British ally than rival, but there is knowledge of her potential growth into the dominant German power. To that end, keeping Prussia as an ‘Eastern German’ state as much as is possible would be viewed as advantageous
- It is likely that the HRE will transition towards a different entity, with or without the Napoleonic coup de grace. A policy which works towards the ‘Germanies’ rather than a single Germany does have some attraction. Balancing out the major states (Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Hesse, Nassau and Oldenburg) will be an interesting task, with the Rhineland area ideally not going to Prussia, but to independent Westphalian and Rhineland-Palatinate states. Hannover will eventually leave the personal union due to Salic Law, but keeping it close, along with the rest of Western Germany, would be an advantage
- Permanently butterflying resolution of the German Question is unlikely, but it is difficult to map out events ~ 3 generations out from the PoD with ironclad certainty
- Austria is a useful collaborator in some respects, but her interests might differ in some areas. At best, she can be an entity that Britain can work with to counterbalance Russia
- Engineering some sort of Italian Confederation out of the FRW would be an interesting difference, but a lot of pieces would need to fall into place
- Spain holds a lot of areas that Britain will either want to snap up or see independent as markets. Beyond that, seeing Spain not become the relative sick man of Western Europe and remaining among the front rank of the powers would be interesting…
- Russia is the most obvious medium and long term rival, given the clash of interests over the Eastern Question and the broader Near East. Restricting Russian expansion (no Finland at a minimum and hopefully something with regard to Poland) is a likely aim, along with constraining their abilities to expand in the southern direction. As mentioned upthread, Central Asia/the heartland of the Great Game should not be won over by Russia so easily. In addition to the territorial interest clashes, the Russian Empire is possessed of the most profoundly anti-liberal/reactionary philosophical underpinnings, compounding the issues. Should dependence on Russian trade of certain goods/commodities be replaced by other sources, so much the better
- Sweden, by virtue of her position and general opposition to Russia, is a natural British potential partner, even ally. If they keep Finland, then the Baltic situation is shifted in a more advantageous direction. Their supply of various ores and timber can be valuable in the early days of the IR. A potential piece in the puzzle, even if Sweden's days as a Great Power are behind them
- A restored United Netherlands will be quite the buffer state, useful market and partner in various ways; divided Belgium and the Netherlands become much smaller, less formidable obstacles. Certain future areas of DEI expansion, such as Sumatra and Borneo, are likely to be on the 'British list' as well, involving some sort of preemption. It goes without saying that the Cape Colony, Ceylon and Dutch West Africa are on the chopping block
- Ottoman Turkey was historically a British ally of sorts for much of the 19th century, or rather, it ended up on the same side as Britain in opposition to the designs of Russia. There is little that they realistically offer in 1794 beyond the status quo and the accompanying cachet of residual authority, with the Greek Revolution very much on the near horizon and attracting a great deal of amicable support on political/ideological grounds, among others. The Ottoman position in Rumelia in general is the potential cause for considerable trouble with Russia and Austria. The importance of holding at the Straits against Russia somewhat dissipates once Britain takes control of Egypt/the Suez Canal, further detracting from the figurative points in the Sublime Porte's favour
- Persia under the early Qajars isn't too advanced, but is a bit too large to take, especially without precipitating a conflict with the Russians
- As referred to on a few occasions, opening China earlier is a goal, very preferably without opium. That will lead to an earlier acquisition of Hong Kong (with properly expansive boundaries) and another entrepot somewhere around Shanghai, getting various treaty ports opened and working for markets
- Japan, still in deep isolation, being opened somewhat earlier may or may not lead to the exact same Meiji Restoration parallel, but relations with Japan will be configured with a certain part of an eye on the future, and specifically to prevent the emergence of certain troublesome tendencies. Having a Japanese Hong Kong could be interesting, if needing a lot of ducks to get into an unlikely row
- Portugal is an old ally, but one that has some areas of future difference with Britain. Precluding the Pink Map affair through earlier expansion removes one area of conflict, whilst grabbing Delagoa Bay very early will also work towards useful ends. Buying the Azores would be useful, along with a few other islands here and there
- Denmark-Norway, aside from the conflict coinciding with the FRW/NW, is a generally friendly state. Coming to some arrangement for the purchase of the Faroes, Iceland and Greenland, in addition to the Danish Gold Coast and Danish West Indies, could be an area of interest, with the cryolite mines having potential
There aren't a great number of significant independent states above and beyond the above, with many of the smaller states not really meriting distinct pre-planned policy approaches as of the mid 1790s.
The smaller Italian and German states are generally covered within the broad outlines above, with appropriate room for flexibility - for example, backing the Two Sicilies as a Southern Italian bulwark against the French may well be a worthwhile short term strategy, without permanently tying British policy towards backing of the Bourbon monarchy there beyond the current wars. For the time being, supporting the principle of an Italian confederation of a number of parts would likely provide the advantage of available markets without the potential issue of a single independent entity in the Central Mediterranean
- In the Mediterranean, the maximal ambition would be for the Balearic Isles, Corsica, Malta (and nearby small islands such as Pantalleria), the Ionian Islands, Rhodes and Cyprus
- In the Indian Ocean, there would not seem to be particularly compelling arguments for the return of Reunion or giving the opportunity for the French to later claim the Comoros/Mayotte
- The Pacific is wide open as of 1794, with plenty of islands open to be claimed, including Clipperton, the Galapagos, Easter Island and the Revillagigedo Islands (with the latter perhaps suited to a theme park for cloned dinosaurs
)
- Related to that idea of the Pacific Islands, knowing exactly where the Bounty mutineers went will simplify an expedition to apprehend every man jack of the survivors, and, in the process, change the future of Pitcairn from a dark far off episode...
- Insofar as it is possible, what would be the earliest date for a Slave Trade Act and a subsequent Slavery Abolition Act?
- Hampering the rise of Boney beginning at the Whiff of Grapeshot is possible, but there is potentially more certainty from the Egyptian option
- Robespierre sticking around is unlikely, but interesting; the regicides will eventually get their comeuppance
- A unified Low Countries/UK of the Netherlands that lasts will make for a much more effective buffer state than the Netherlands or Belgium in their own right, albeit one much less likely to be screened behind the protection of internationally recognised neutrality
- The Old Swiss Confederacy may not yet be the subject of a French invasion; in any event, there are paths for different types of state to follow it in the backlash against any sort of republican entity
- With the 1790s starting date, quite a few of the dominant 'isms' of the 19th and 20th centuries can be butterflied or changed irrevocably, along with other significant ideological trends, such as that emerging in the Arabian Peninsula at this time
Several of the key shibboleths of 19th century British politics and foreign affairs are either aren’t as likely here or may occur under very different circumstances:
- The basis for ‘Splendid Isolation’ may not come about in precisely the same way, with disengagement from the Concert of Europe not really leading to the best outcomes from Britain’s perspective in the medium term. It is still likely that, eventually, Britain will shift the focus of her gaze from the Continent to the world, but it won’t be a direct expressway
- The Eastern Question will likely get a different answer. Propping up the Ottomans did not result in a useful ally, market or buffer, but rather ending up on the other side of a bloody war. If the end goal is a different result to a paradigm with a messy Balkans acting as a trigger to other tensions, then there is a argument that different measures should be considered. Broadly speaking, backing the Greeks for a larger Rumelian entity is one option, including Constantinople, whilst the other end of Ottoman possessions can be chewed away
- Russia is the most likely Big Bad, and some sort of Great Game is likely, but it will kick off earlier, and be won much more decisively. Circassia provides something of a pretext/trigger
- Having Sweden keep Finland opens up some interesting options in Scandinavia
- The notion that the British Army starts off conflicts as outnumbered, poorly armed/outgunned and with their backs to the wall doesn’t have to be the only path forward, just as there isn’t a need for it to be hidebound/backward in relation to technology
- Some sort of balance of power can be maintained in Europe with a bit of deft handling and strategy. France, Spain, a couple of Italian states, Austria, (united) Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, some sort of Polish state, Mega Greece, Portugal, Bavaria, Prussia and ten smaller German states is one possible combo
A few more ideas/points stormed from the brain:
- John McAdam will be given a few ideas to improve his road building material ideas
- Development of the idea of power stations (and turbines) will come earlier than the 1880s
- Around the World in 80 Days might have a real ‘race’ component to it, once the various elements needed for it are in place
- There will, in due course in the very long term, be a Severn Barrage project in the 19th Century, with interesting potential results/ opportunities
- In addition to the Master of the King’s Music and Poet Laureate, Astronomer Royal and other honourary positions in the Royal Household, there will be a few others, such as Architect Royal, Royal Chef, an author/writer, gardener, scientist, artist, historian and other roles
- There will be relatively fewer rookeries and slums that arise during the initial 19th century urbanisation, leading to a reduced subsequent requirement for slum clearance
- With a survival of Albert past 1861, the 'Widow at Windsor' period of Queen Victoria's reign will take on a distinctly different style and feel; getting some different education and role modelling into the Pragger Wagger will be interesting
- There will be an earlier and extended epoch of the airship, with the word 'zeppelin' never entering into the general international lexicon
- With slight cumulative changes, several battles will have different results, impacting on how they are marked in popular culture. This will mean that there will be a different Charge of the Light Brigade by Tennyson, a Vitai Lampada by Sir Henry Newbolt, Fuzzy-Wuzzy and The Young British Soldier by Kipling and Zulu, for starters
- Opening China to British trade will be seen as a goal, but not doing so through the trade of opium would be absolutely desirable, in order to make for a morally preferable outcome. Thoughts on this would be welcome
- Taking different courses of action in India (such as in regard to the Doctrine of Lapse), different policies over a few generations and removing some of the immediate triggers to the @ Mutiny, with the general aim to be a more smooth and rounded transition from Company Rule to Crown rule, as well as avoiding some of the mistakes made by the HEIC during their 19th century period of control
- There will be some thought to organising India into Bombay, Madras, Bengal, Punjab and Agra presidencies, along with the chief princely states
- Broadly speaking, getting a jump on the Russian Empire insofar as the Great Game is concerned would shift its nexus further away from British India
- In terms of military organisation, there will be an earlier move from the early 19th century/Napoleonic divisional structure of 2 brigades (each with 3-4 battalions) to the larger one of 3 brigades (each of 4 battalions); there will additionally be changes to the structure and nomenclature of the Royal Artillery
- There will be an earlier reintroduction/conversion of light dragoon regiments to lancers and hussars, along with another light/medium cavalry type. Additionally, there will be some thought given to expansion of cuirassiers and heavies, to create a light/medium/heavy split
- Whilst mortars won't replace field artillery as some suggested upthread, there is a role for lightweight updated Coehorn types in certain tactical scenarios. These won't replace the battalion guns/infantry guns, which will evolve over time, but still remain to provide organic firepower to infantry battalions in concert with Gatling guns and later evolutions
- The Congreve rocket will come along earlier, with the improvements added by Hale incorporated in their initial design
- Some developments will drive something more of an evangelical revival
- There won't be a parallel to the outlawing of privateering in the 1850s, and possibly not at all
- AGA cookers will appear ~90 years early
- There is the potential for a couple of states in the Southern Cone...
- A bit of a solution to the Chinese opium situation - have the Travelers arrive with tea seeds suitable for planting in Darjeeling and Assam so as to circumvent the early 19th century Chinese monopoly on tea production. This would obviate one of the drivers for the opium trade before it occurred, whilst not getting rid of the issue altogether, unfortunately
- Turning in a slightly different direction, we have the matter of Ireland
- With a 1794 start date, it is unlikely that 1798, or the underlying issues, will be avoided
- From there, the aim would be for Catholic Emancipation as soon as politically possible, and working for progress in the treatment and conditions of the Irish people
- With 50 years to work the butterflies of new crops, there will likely not be anywhere near the same experience of potato blight and the Great Famine
- There is scope for a lot of migration from Ireland over time that isn’t driven by the same necessity and desperation; there would still be a lot of the natural necessity and desperation found in every European country in the 19th century
- Without giving away the nature of all the rabbits in the figurative hat, there will be some things that keep some of that potential migrant population in Ireland
- With a different first half of the 1800s, it is possible that there won’t be quite the same drivers that lead to the @ Home Rule movement
- The bottom line is that real change will take time and won’t be down to 1, 2 or 5 changes to this or that
- On industry, historically, Britain in 1850 produced 2/3rds of the world’s coal and half of the world’s cotton textiles and iron. The aim will be to better that, in terms of hitting the mark earlier, doing it for longer and even raising those percentages/levels in the process
- That will entail the flow on from changes made from the 1790s onwards, Bessemer from ~ the 1810s, some of the ASB resource changes and, as for Ireland, the cumulative impact of changes upon changes upon changes
- Pushing free trade during the pomp of British manufacturing makes a great deal of sense, with some key parts of this approach to be informed by what is known of historical @ developments, policies and tariff protection employed by other rival states
- Getting a jump in certain industries will be useful, but being able to anticipate and map out where they lead will be even more powerful
https://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/facult ... 2-2005.pdf
Both for reference and an example of one of more simple texts that will be making the journey back
Stacking
One of the features that I've noticed over the years of research for this project is the value of 'stacking', or having multiple opportunities/individuals/inventions/knowledge combine into something greater still than the sum of their individual parts.
The classic case of this is what is referred to in the most recent academic link above, whereby steam power, advances in textile manufacture/spinning machines and iron combined to kickstart the First IR, then further developments in iron and steel let loose the railway boom and its consequent impact upon transportation of goods and prices.
There look to be opportunities to pursue this virtuous outcome through the aid of cheating/foreknowledge, the natural pace of knowledge development and some of the paths not taken. Picturing what Brunel and Stephenson could accomplish with the aid of Babbage engines, an earlier expansion of steel production driven by the Bessemer process and even a system for turning out more engineers and skilled draftsmen is an interesting idea.
The Opportunity of Peace
What does allow for the maximal development of technology and the civilian economy is peace and the absence of the overwhelming pressure of war. The cost of the FRW/NW hung over Britain in the 19th Century like a malign spectre, with the interest bill on the national debt being a truly major annual expenditure.
For example, in 1850, the interest bill was 28.5 million pounds. Defence came to 15.5 million pounds and all other central government expenditure came to 8.1 million. Economic growth over the 19th century shrank the value of the interest bill as a percentage of GDP, but it stuck pretty consistently around that 28-30 million mark until the latter half of the 1880s.
A shorter FRW period, by its very nature, will make for reduction in overall debt levels; when combined with some other particular features of the ASB contrivance, this will delivery a fiscally very, very different picture for Britain.
More Miscellaneous Fun and Games
- The discipline of archaeology will get a huge shot in the arm, not just through knowledge of where to look, but how to act and dig, We likely won't see the profligate use of dynamite here
- Troy, Mohenjo-daro, Macchu Picchu, Egyptian tombs, the Nazca Lines, the Dead Sea Scrolls, Easter Island, Tiwanaku, Çatal Hüyük, Göbekli Tepe and many many more will see some much earlier moves, likely after the development of photography
- Without the particular exigencies of the Canadian Rebellions of 1837/38, one Samuel Edison Jr is very unlikely to flee to Ohio, where his son Thomas was born in 1847
- Setting up a process of international scholarships/headhunting will provide a potential path for Nikola Tesla to end up in Britain
- There will be some interesting soil experiments that take place under the auspices of one of The Twelve (The Farmer)
- Pushing the envelope in chemistry will be driven initially by a need for fertilisers, with a view towards either pushing Wohler to an earlier artificial/synthetic development of urea, or someone else 'coming to the same process'. Putting Nicholson, Bennet, Dalton, Berzelius and Lavoisier in the same institution with funding and appropriate nudges will render some results
- Volta will merit an invitation to England in the absence of Boney
- Joseph Banks has some potential in a number of areas
- There is likely a basis for a Harvest Thanksgiving festival/holiday taking form in Britain, in some nudges as well as some conveniently timed associated victory celebrations
- With various inventions and technologies coming into play earlier, there will likely be some earlier bleeding over into foreign countries, in a case of the rising level of the bathtub floating all the toy boats that bit higher. However, in some cases, there won't be the viability for some sectors spreading quite quickly, entrenching that little bit of advantage
- Every time that others look like catching up, there will be a new burst of acceleration
Economics and Growth
British GDP OTL, with data drawn directly from Angus Maddison's effective work on historical GDPs in 1990 USD from 1820 onwards. For 1794-1820, I've taken the GDP figures from UK Public Spending , then adjusting using the inflation calculator here (
https://www.officialdata.org/uk/inflation/ ), then converting to 1990 USD using the December 1990 $: £ rate of 1: 1.89
1794: 22,345 million
1795: 24,609 million
1796: 24,259 million
1797: 27,060 million
1798: 29,168 million
1799: 28,682 million
1800: 24,028 million
1801: 22,855 million
1802: 25,778 million
1803: 26,842 million
1804: 27,794 million
1805: 26,201 million
1806: 27,534 million
1807: 30,198 million
1808: 28,357 million
1809: 28,346 million
1810: 30,364 million
1811: 29,891 million
1812: 26,730 million
1813: 28,034 million
1814: 30,795 million
1815: 35,461 million
1816: 34,532 million
1817: 31,485 million
1818: 32,696 million
1819: 31,273 million
1820: 34,957 million
1830: 42,228 million (+ 17.22%)
1840: 53,234 million (+ 20.67%)
1850: 63,342 million (+ 15.96%)
1860: 81,760 million (+ 22.53%)
1870: 100,180 million (+ 18.39%)
1880: 120,395 million (+ 16.79%)
1890: 150,269 million (+ 19.88%)
1900: 184,861 million (+ 18.71%)
FWIW, the USA was 12548 in 1820, 18219 in 1830, 27694 in 1840, 42583 in 1850, 69346 in 1860, 98374 in 1870, 160656 in 1880, 214714 in 1890 and 312499 in 1900, or percentage increases of 31.13% in the 1820s, 34.21% in the 1830s, 34.96% in the 1840s, 38.59% in the 1850s, 29.51% in the 1860s, 38.77% in the 1870s, 25.18% in the 1880s and 31.29% in the 1890s.
The inflation/deflation figures will be markedly different, what with different events, different wars and different policies, as well as other factors, but I'll use the general Maddison figures for the convenience of having a baseline figure.
Broad Plan of Economic Growth 'Wayposts'
1.) 1794-1800: Hit ~ a minimum $30,000 million by 1800, with growth not taking a dip with a 1799/1800 depression. 25% vs 7%, or 23.39% from the 1798 peak.
2.) 1800-1810: Reach ~ a minimum of $45,000 million by 1810 through the combination of butterflies/PoDs and resources kicking in; cumulative improvements in agricultural output through new crops and advanced animal breeds; further trade without a Continental System; and general technology approaching an 1820-1825 level in some sectors. Minimum growth of 33.33% vs 24.73%.
3.) 1810-1820: Keeping in mind that the volcanic eruption of 1816 will occur to everyone, there will be an effort to try and make hay whilst the (non volcanic) sun shines from 1810-1815. The FR Wars should be functionally ended by this time, or on the cusp of such, so that there will be the advantages of peace and the disadvantage of an inevitable postwar recession. This will ideally be the last decade where the vagaries of the harvest will have a significant bearing upon GDP. By 1820, general technological levels will be pushing around the late 1830s in some respects, as well as other inventions/areas 'opening up' markedly earlier. By 1820, minimum GDP should be ~ $65,000 million, and net growth in the neighbourhood of 30.77% vs 14.49%
4.) 1820-1830: Combining an earlier start to Railway Mania; better organisation of the earlier Canal Mania; earlier steamships stimulating trade, telegraphy starting to improve communications and other technologies starting to bleed into each other; cumulative improvements in iron and steel, steam engines, coal mining, textiles and machinery/machine tools; cumulative better positions in agricultural production; and exploitation of resources, both known historical ones and those part of the ISOT in order to increase growth to a minimum of 35% vs 17.22% and minimum GDP to ~ $88,000 million
5.) The 1830s will then be broadly equivalent in some ways to the 1850s, or the pomp of the 'Workshop of the World/Great Exhibition' period. Again, the stacking/cumulative impact of many different advances across a range of industries and sectors, increased foreign trade and domestic demand, exploitation of resources (including the first oil deposits), real expansion of the railways, and the latest probable opening of Japan and Korea should work towards net growth of ~ 37% and a GDP of $120,000 million
6.) The 1840s are likely to see a continuation of the growth of the previous decade, with the effective absence of any major concern from the possibility of a potato blight, the lack of the ability of other states to catch up as true competition (whilst still being hungry markets), expanded trade with the Far East, Australasia, North and South America and Africa, the heyday of railway expansion, the opening of a Suez Canal and the rise of petroleum should push net growth above the previous decade to the vicinity of 40% and $170,000 million
Forecasting accurate figures beyond that initial ~50 years is going to be highly speculative, (and something I'll thus leave until there is firstly an actual story at that point and secondly enough basis) but even with the @ 19.26% 1850-1900 average decade growth (which is unlikely to be directly replicated and quite possible to exceed), it would then be pushing around 1950 levels in 1900. The cumulative power of growth, even factoring in the likely occurrence of recessions, depressions and wars, is quite interesting.
Environments
Building effective sewer systems in London and elsewhere will not only permit cities to grow beyond size 12 (Civ II reference in 2024), but will act to improve public health by reducing disease vectors. In the case of London, not only will it be earlier, but it will be a bit more 'future proofed' for increased population.
Rat control is probably going to be something assisted by poisons rather than the older solutions of trained animals; certainly if a bloke rocks up with a pipe claiming to be able to charm rats, he will be politely but firmly turned away.
Forest restoration is something close to my heart, and can be engineered through something like the naval forest of Visingsö to begin with, followed by other measures to preserve other wooded areas. In addition to general preservation as preserves and very early national parks, there will also be some degree of afforestation and reforestation to provide for commercial timber plantations in the future. Working towards preserving hedgerows and preventing any rise of Dutch elm disease is going to be a small side interest of one of the twelve travelers; there is no point having a rich country if all is turned into dark satanic mills, so that there is a certain sense to pursuing a 'green and pleasant land'.
Invasive species are always worth watching out for, but some of the biggies aren't in Britain so much as the colonies; I've mentioned rabbits in Australia and cane toads, I believe.
Nothing wrong with preserving historical monuments, although a lot of castles were sadly slighted during the ECW.
They will be arriving with very accurate records of major natural disasters from 1794 through to the 2020s, which will allow for some amelioration of the shock effect of volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. The big one on the near horizon is the April-July 1815 eruption of Mount Tambora, which will trigger the 'Year Without a Summer'. Whilst stockpiling grain and food will ameliorate some of the immediate effects in the British Isles, I'd be very interested in any other ideas and suggestions as to how to approach that particular event.
Floods (such as the North Sea Flood of 1953) and more man-made issues such as the Great Smog can be either addressed way before they occur or their worst effects prevented through proper preparation. On the flip side of floods, we have droughts, which can be planned for and minimised through the Grand Contour Canal in Britain. In Australia, circumstances will be markedly different, with things being more a matter of breeding drought resistant crops and working margins a bit more effectively. However, in both cases, having the benefit of foreknowledge of historical rainfall will allow for some, ahem, preternaturally accurate weather forecasting that will help to reduce the shock/uncertainty associated with drought.
