HMNZS Manawanui

[Drunknsubmrnr]

You’d want to know if special sea duty men were on at that point, and if not why not.

If they were on duty, something very wrong happened with their training. They’re supposed to be hand-picked for situations exactly like this. If they weren’t on duty, why not?

[Rocket J Squrriel]

This really gets into the design philosophy of the ship or airplane. What is the proper behavior if the craft if the controls are moved when the autopilot is on? If the assumption is that the autopilot or computer is more likely to be correct, then the control systems ignore the input and continue with what they were doing. If the assumption is that the pilot/helmsman is generally correct, then the craft follows the inputs given while the autopilot may or may not attempt to correct during or after the control input, all the while an alarm is indicating that the autopilot is on.

In my opinion, if the helmsman gives a right rudder and medium back control input, I damn well better see the rudder move right and the engine go to medium back. There should not be a hunt to turn the autopilot off first. I'd like to see a force feedback to the helmsman in the direction the autopilot wants to steer the boat, but the helmsman should be able to override without excessive force.

If the autopilot is on with a ship this size, there should be a projector putting letters at least 20cm tall across the top of the bridge windows "AUTOPILOT ON", especially if it disables the helm control. There should be a Big Red Button at each station where the ship can be controlled that disables the autopilot when pressed and triggers a notice. If the Navy wants to be sure it's not pressed accidentally, fit a molly guard to the button.

Anyone designing the layout of a helm station must be qualified to stand a helm watch. Anyone designing the overall bridge layout of a navy ship must be qualified to stand at least a JOOD watch.

There have been several fatal air crashes involving autopilots and controls. Like the Eastern crash into the Everglades where a nudge of the control column turned the altitude hold off. The Air France crash in the Atlantic and a Russian Airbus in Siberia where the pilots where fighting each other and the auto pilot. The planes should have a nice light right above the front windows saying if the auto pilot is engaged or not and who is working the stick. Maybe have a button on the captain's that would override the copilot's and sound an alarm when it happens.

[James1978]

Final Report on Loss of HMNZS Manawanui | Timeline of Grounding, Abandonment and Sinking

What's Going on With Shipping? - Sal Mercogliano
5 April 2025

[Nik_SpeakerToCats]

On one side, you have the 'Three Mile Island' effect, where so many 'secondary' alarms became active, the operators could not see the [REDACTED] woods for the trees...

Versus the 'WTF ??' issue with those self-driving cars, whose algorithms simply did not 'Fail Safe'...

Per that Driver_101 caution, 'If in doubt, slow down-- To buy yourself thinking time / mitigate mayhem.'

Instead, the hapless vehicles maintained course and speed while their pasta-bowl of algorithms stumbled through a maze of options until impact occurred...

The bridge 'work-load' factor suggests there should be a 'simple' master-display, as in light aircraft so, when the 'smarts' go 'tilt', you may assess the situation at a glance before grappling with the serried 'Wurlitzer' boards...

Does similar consideration apply to that misbehaving F-35 ??

I'm also reminded of that 'recent' ship near Baltic that lost power in storm because lube-oil pressure dropped.
The sea-state so tossed ship that tank contents were frothed.
"Dipped', sight-glass etc etc showed 'ample', but engine controls became giddy on the bubbles...

IIRC, they escaped lee-shore disaster by a few hundred metres.
Literally, close enough to hear the breakers...
IIRC, their lube-system has acquired a better 'stilling' device and sensor set...

[Straker]

A couple of things in the report really stood out to me:

1) How does a navy command or personnel management system allow the captain and executive officer of a vessel to be not qualified to command it, "platform qualified", for an extended amount of time after taking up post? The same could be said about the watch stander who didn't realise the autopilot state who was also not fully "platform qualified". It feels like ineffective command or management but also says something about the personnel themselves who from what was in the report didn't push to qualify or question why.

2) How does perception of risk get pushed down to the point that you are deliberately surveying of a reef without extra precautions like having the ships anchor party closed up in case of a loss of propulsion. Or just things like increasing the damage control state so that watertight doors were left closed (I acknowledge in the event that this wouldn't have actually helped.)

3) Do smaller navies like the RNZN who want to do higher capability taskings like surveying or even "warfighting" at a serious level actually have the critical mass of personnel required to maintain the diverse responsibilities. E.g. the person in charge of the survey was reading between the lines of the report incredibly under experienced for the position and not qualified. Survey work is something the RN is concerned about losing core skills in and they are working from a much larger base.

[kdahm]

There's actually a long relevant bit in an Essay section post by MKSheppard last week, from the old board.

viewtopic.php?t=3234 Stuart on Aussie/NZ Strategic Policies, SSKs, and Nigerian Bordellos...

Essentially,the NZ navy is very small, doesn't need to do much more than fisheries protection and customs enforcement, and is chronically funded differently from it's needs. That means a tiny officer pool.

[James1978]

For anyone who is curious and wants to read the report for themselves - LINK: Court of Inquiry Report