General Discussion thread.

[Matt Wiser]

Correct, along with the treaty banning CBUs.

[Jotun]

Correct, along with the treaty banning CBUs.

I was quite certain especially considering the kind of ordnance that has been chucked about, but wanted to confirm. Thank you.

[James1978]

For anyone who wants to read the referenced article on RN mine laying plans:
LINK: "We Must Prevent A Minefield Gap" - Royal Navy Mining Plans for WW3

And here is an old article written by Stuart about naval mines.
LINK: Mine Warfare, By Stuart Slade

And Navweaps has a list of historic UK mines.
Only the Mark 5, Mark 12 and Mark 17 were in service as of the @ early 1990s.
From the link: "Britain has not manufactured mines for some years, probably since the 1950s. In 1982, a modernization program was announced for about 1,500 mines, some of them dating back to World War II. In 1984 it was reported that the entire program might have to be abandoned as inspection showed that the TNT or RDF fillings had crystallized, causing at least two mines to explode prematurely. The solution was to X-ray each mine and discard those that showed cracks or crystallization. As of 1994, only Mark 12 mines had been modernized, mainly by adding the British Aerospace microprocessor sensor and processing unit (SAP) described above."

Having said that, UK industry did build modern sea mines.
BAE developed the Sea Urchin mine in the 1980s, though never fond any buyers.
Marconi developed the Stonefish family of mines, which I believe did find some buyers in @. And I'm pretty sure they eventually developed and air-laid variant.

I know I'd mentioned it to Bernard ages ago, but old Tigerfish torpedoes could be repurposed into a big CAPTOR mine.

It appears the two RORO ferries the RN planned on using were retired without replacement. And once the channel tunnel opens, most of those ferries are probably gone - the older ones scrapped and the newer ones sold.
The article does mention a proposal to convert old County class destroyers intro mine layers. Great idea - if all but one of them weren't already gone* pre-POD.
* Only Kent (D12) hadn't been scrapped, sunk as a target, or sold pre-POD. Though she would have required a LOT of time of money to bring back into active service.

The article also discusses how the UK never really invested in air-laid sea mines. The US did, and it's their principle means of laying sea mines. See the Quickstrike family. USN tactical aircraft and P-3s can deploy them, and USAF B-52s and B-1s have trained for the mission. In the story, we've seen B-1s laying minefields off Zealand. Interesting side note - USN crews actually assemble the mines when used by USAF heavy bombers. I know the capability to lay a mine field by dropping mines out of a C-130 or similar aircraft also exists.

[James1978]

Just as an aside to the mentioned essential non-existence of British mine warfare...

Every vessel of the West German mine flottilla had mine laying capacities of between 20 (Type 332) and 60 (Type 343 and 352) full-sized sea mines. Interestingly, the ten Type 143A FACs also had a minelaying capacity of a dozen or so full-size sea mines. They would most likely have mined the approaches to the Danish Belts before goinf on their death ride.
Each Type 206A submarien could carry 24 DM 41 or DM 61 mines in two removable external mine containers, and it stands to reason the same capability would have been afforded the 212A.

Couple of related questions.
1) When is the decision to start mine laying made, and how long does it take to complete?
1a) Once the decision is made, how many trips does it take to lay the planned fields?

2) Do the FRG and Denmark decide at the same time? Reading between the lines, I get the impression the Danes may have dithered/been delayed in starting to lay their fields, or at least the ones in Køge Bay and Fakse Bay.

3) Re. the highlighted bit. How much of the FRG and Danish surface fleet in the Baltic survived the initial fighting and made it out of the Baltic?

Timeline recap:
5 April - NATO receives first war warning
14 April - NATO's M-Day
22 April - War breaks out

[Bernard Woolley]

James, the Channel Tunnel didn’t kill off the Cross-Channel ferry. There are still a lot of ferries plying various routes to France. There also also a lot of ferries operating in the Irish Sea.

[Jotun]

Just as an aside to the mentioned essential non-existence of British mine warfare...

Every vessel of the West German mine flottilla had mine laying capacities of between 20 (Type 332) and 60 (Type 343 and 352) full-sized sea mines. Interestingly, the ten Type 143A FACs also had a minelaying capacity of a dozen or so full-size sea mines. They would most likely have mined the approaches to the Danish Belts before goinf on their death ride.
Each Type 206A submarien could carry 24 DM 41 or DM 61 mines in two removable external mine containers, and it stands to reason the same capability would have been afforded the 212A.

Couple of related questions.
1) When is the decision to start mine laying made, and how long does it take to complete?
1a) Once the decision is made, how many trips does it take to lay the planned fields?

2) Do the FRG and Denmark decide at the same time? Reading between the lines, I get the impression the Danes may have dithered/been delayed in starting to lay their fields, or at least the ones in Køge Bay and Fakse Bay.

3) Re. the highlighted bit. How much of the FRG and Danish surface fleet in the Baltic survived the initial fighting and made it out of the Baltic?

Timeline recap:
5 April - NATO receives first war warning
14 April - NATO's M-Day
22 April - War breaks out

I'd say that the available MCM vessels and all other vesels capable of laying mines would - just in case, you know, it is only an exercise with live ammunition, honestly, wink wink, nudge nudge - load up at Kiel-Jägersberg and Olpesibirsk (Olpenitz) in the week before NATO M-Day and begin mining as soon as it becomes clear that Ivan does not intend to back down, so maybe four days before D-Day, most importantly the western part of the Lübeck Bight, all other stretches of Schleswig-Holstein's coast to the east of Kiel and then go lend a hand to the Danes.

The distances involved aren't that big, the distance from the Naval Munitions Depot Laboe ammunition pier to the Lübeck Bight is about 60nm to the northern half (Heiligenhafen - Dahme) and 70-odd nm to the southern part (Dahme - Grömitz). It is perfectly possible to go at least once per day, maybe twice if you really go all-out and you decide to sleep when you are dead. The southern entrance to the Langelandbelt is 30nm from Kiel, and the Fakse Bight is 140-odd nm. We aren't talking about US distances, after all. It is all in the neighborhood.

The MCM craft can manage 18 knots max, and damn it, they would "put the Hebel on the table" (yes, this is a verbatim German Navy expression for going to flank speed, German-English mix and all ). So they would almost certainly start a frantic shuttle run for several days, and then hightail it out of the West German Baltic in the nick of time.

In any case, I had the Bundesmarine outfit all immediately available submarines with their mine-laying belts and stand out to sea between 10th and 15/16th-ish April in my "German Way to War" fact file, with the leading units tasked with mining the most important Warsaw Pact ports from Baltiysk to Rostock-Warnemünde. That would be what, at least twelve boats out of eighteen total and maybe two or three wrenched out of their refit cycle and brute-forced into something approximating combat-worthiness. I forgot how many 212A there are supposed to be in TLW (was it ten? A dozen?), but the principle is the same.

I don't want to be disrespectful, but I can imagine that Jan simply did not know about the intended minefields in Fakse Bight and the hand-in-glove cooperation between the Danish and West German navies in that regard. If in doubt, it is easy to retcon in a regiment or two worth of mine-related casualties during the landing on Zealand, just add more troops to the OOB of the invasion force, with the mention of a few more REDFLT transports falling victim to mines (maybe Quickstrike mines dropped by bombers, or a surviving 206A or two sneaking in after rearming in Norway.

As for the losses of NATO FAC in the Baltic? Ballpark number is maybe 50-60 percent sunk.

As an aside, if there are still Type 148 FAC left, they had a minelaying capacity of eight per.

[James1978]

James, the Channel Tunnel didn’t kill off the Cross-Channel ferry. There are still a lot of ferries plying various routes to France. There also also a lot of ferries operating in the Irish Sea.

So what was so special about those two particular ferries in @?

[James1978]

I'd say that the available MCM vessels and all other vesels capable of laying mines would - just in case, you know, it is only an exercise with live ammunition, honestly, wink wink, nudge nudge - load up at Kiel-Jägersberg and Olpesibirsk (Olpenitz) in the week before NATO M-Day and begin mining as soon as it becomes clear that Ivan does not intend to back down, so maybe four days before D-Day, most importantly the western part of the Lübeck Bight, all other stretches of Schleswig-Holstein's coast to the east of Kiel and then go lend a hand to the Danes.

The distances involved aren't that big, the distance from the Naval Munitions Depot Laboe ammunition pier to the Lübeck Bight is about 60nm to the northern half (Heiligenhafen - Dahme) and 70-odd nm to the southern part (Dahme - Grömitz). It is perfectly possible to go at least once per day, maybe twice if you really go all-out and you decide to sleep when you are dead. The southern entrance to the Langelandbelt is 30nm from Kiel, and the Fakse Bight is 140-odd nm. We aren't talking about US distances, after all. It is all in the neighborhood.

The MCM craft can manage 18 knots max, and damn it, they would "put the Hebel on the table" (yes, this is a verbatim German Navy expression for going to flank speed, German-English mix and all ). So they would almost certainly start a frantic shuttle run for several days, and then hightail it out of the West German Baltic in the nick of time.

In any case, I had the Bundesmarine outfit all immediately available submarines with their mine-laying belts and stand out to sea between 10th and 15/16th-ish April in my "German Way to War" fact file, with the leading units tasked with mining the most important Warsaw Pact ports from Baltiysk to Rostock-Warnemünde. That would be what, at least twelve boats out of eighteen total and maybe two or three wrenched out of their refit cycle and brute-forced into something approximating combat-worthiness. I forgot how many 212A there are supposed to be in TLW (was it ten? A dozen?), but the principle is the same.

I don't want to be disrespectful, but I can imagine that Jan simply did not know about the intended minefields in Fakse Bight and the hand-in-glove cooperation between the Danish and West German navies in that regard. If in doubt, it is easy to retcon in a regiment or two worth of mine-related casualties during the landing on Zealand, just add more troops to the OOB of the invasion force, with the mention of a few more REDFLT transports falling victim to mines (maybe Quickstrike mines dropped by bombers, or a surviving 206A or two sneaking in after rearming in Norway.

As for the losses of NATO FAC in the Baltic? Ballpark number is maybe 50-60 percent sunk.

As an aside, if there are still Type 148 FAC left, they had a minelaying capacity of eight per.

Appreciate the detailed reply.

I guess what I'm still wondering is to what degree was laying minefields pre-war a COMBALATAP military decision versus a FRG and Danish political decision? And at what level is laying offensive minefields pre-war a SACEUR level military decision versus a North Atlantic Council political decision?

Rummages through stuff I saved . . .
Bundesmarine has 24 U-boots
X12 Type 206A
X12 Type 212

X10 Type 148A FAC are still around

In theory, and not accounting for vessels in maintenance, NAVBALTAP had the following available when war broke out:
X30 SSK
- X12 206A (FRG)
- X12 212 (FRG)
- X6 Tumleren (Denmark)

X46 FAC(M)
- X30 FRG
- X16 Danish

Has anyone worked out how many Danish and FRG frigates and corvettes were in the Baltic, and what their losses were.
Somewhere in a recent chapter, I think their was a reference to the % losses among Danish and FRG submarines. It was high.

[Jotun]

The frigates (Type 122 onwards) were never really meant to serve in the Baltic in case of war. They were specifically built for the convoy battle in the North Atlantic and basically built around the sonar set. The TLW Battle of the Baltic Exits that sank, among others, FGS Hamburg was basically a fluke.

The frigates were specialized for cold waters to the point that at least the Type 122 had difficulties with the warm sea water in more southerly regions because the engines overheated and in extremis this led to a general case of "black light" and the failure of every system but one navigation radar (It happened to FGS Rheinland-Pfalz in 2004 in the Red Sea...it is a shitty feeling when a warship is suddenly turned into a haze grey cruise liner in a region replete with idiots...).

[Rocket J Squrriel]

At the end of the war it might be easier to count the ships left rather then the ones sunk. The Baltic Sea battles would probably be a series of knife fights ending in bloodbaths.

[jemhouston]

At the end of the war it might be easier to count the ships left rather then the ones sunk. The Baltic Sea battles would probably be a series of knife fights ending in bloodbaths.

You mean Iron Bottom Sound North?


Knife fights, one sides dies, the other one loses.

[Belushi TD]

At the end of the war it might be easier to count the ships left rather then the ones sunk. The Baltic Sea battles would probably be a series of knife fights ending in bloodbaths.

That was CERTAINLY true for the WARPACT navies.

Belushi TD

[Rocket J Squrriel]

At the end of the war it might be easier to count the ships left rather then the ones sunk. The Baltic Sea battles would probably be a series of knife fights ending in bloodbaths.

That was CERTAINLY true for the WARPACT navies.

Belushi TD

A short, but VERY exciting life.

[Bernard Woolley]

So what was so special about those two particular ferries in @?

Probably a mix of being available and suitable for the role.

[Simon Darkshade]

Some interesting stuff on British Army late Cold War mobilisation plans and numbers:

1.) Annex D to this report https://assets.publishing.service.gov.u ... t_2024.pdf
There is a 7 page mini history by Professor Vince Connolly on "Cold War 'Whole Force' Planning 1980-1990 in the British Army' which particularly from Page 44 onwards, deals with specific numbers, REDRUM and Regular Reserve roles.
On Page 47, under the section on 3rd Echelon forces, we get one section of pertinence to TLW: "Over time the Regeneration function would allow the build-up of a "General Reserve" division with equipment stripped from the UK training base and available for a range of contingencies including relieving BAOR Divisions in the line or even supporting the extraction of BAOR from the continent following conventional defeat."

2.) From Post #659 onwards of this thread https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threa ... 36/page-44
We see specific numbers on total Army strength, including the Regulars (+ Reserve reinforcement), TA and other individual Reserve.

The latter is interesting in the context of TLW, with the mooted increases in size to the British Army, both in the Regulars and TA/HSF. With the extra time of having larger Regular and TA contingents, there would be in turn more Reservists 'cycling through the system', giving scope for more manpower during a protracted conflict that wouldn't need to be trained from scratch.

Another interesting feature of the ARSSE thread is a mention of Regular Army units deployed to Northern Ireland in peacetime being rotated out during mobilisation for possible BAOR reinforcement or other NATO roles.

[Lordroel]

So i am trying to organize the chapters per day and while on the index it says April 25th 2005 is D+3, Chapter 70 says it is already D+4, is this a mistake ore am i wrong.

[James1978]

So i am trying to organize the chapters per day and while on the index it says April 25th 2005 is D+3, Chapter 70 says it is already D+4, is this a mistake ore am i wrong.

If you're going off of an old/personal archive, many of the earlier chapters were off by a "D+X" day.
Just go by the Date of the chapter and correlate with the TLW Calendar.

[Lordroel]

If you're going off of an old/personal archive, many of the earlier chapters were off by a "D+X" day.
Just go by the Date of the chapter and correlate with the TLW Calendar.

A that makes sense, otherwise Bernard was behind a day, which is not bad, we could have claim it is a Leap day after almost 20 years of World War III.

[James1978]

If you're going off of an old/personal archive, many of the earlier chapters were off by a "D+X" day.
Just go by the Date of the chapter and correlate with the TLW Calendar.

A that makes sense, otherwise Bernard was behind a day, which is not bad, we could have claim it is a Leap day after almost 20 years of World War III.

Yea. If memory serves, the early chapters went right to D+X, forgetting that day one was D Day, day two was D+1, etc.

[Lordroel]

If you're going off of an old/personal archive, many of the earlier chapters were off by a "D+X" day.
Just go by the Date of the chapter and correlate with the TLW Calendar.

A that makes sense, otherwise Bernard was behind a day, which is not bad, we could have claim it is a Leap day after almost 20 years of World War III.

Yea. If memory serves, the early chapters went right to D+X, forgetting that day one was D Day, day two was D+1, etc.

So what are M-Day then in the index, Mobilization Day.