Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

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jemhouston
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Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by jemhouston »

Should we stop piling Boeing?

https://archive.ph/5XK8e#selection-399.0-399.70
Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner
The capsule has yet to carry a human to space amid questions about what its future really will be

By Christian Davenport
October 2, 2023 at 7:00 a.m. EDT

The Boeing CST-100 Starliner spacecraft rolled out of the Vertical Integration Facility to the Space Launch Complex-41 in preparation for its second attempt to fly without astronauts on board. The flight was delayed because of problems with the spacecraft's valves, one of a series of problems Boeing has struggled with. (Jonathan Newton/The Washington Post)


Boeing had big plans for its new space capsule, even before it won a $4.2 billion contract in 2014 to develop a spacecraft for NASA to fly astronauts to the International Space Station. If space were indeed going to open to the masses, as many at the time were predicting, Boeing wanted to position itself as the premier spacecraft provider, the way it had with commercial airliners.

Nearly a decade later, those dreams have crumbled. Not a single person has flown Boeing’s spacecraft to space. No one has booked a private flight. The company has had to absorb about $1.4 billion in cost overruns, and NASA’s safety advisers have called for an independent review of the program. Meanwhile, SpaceX, which received a contract at the same time Boeing did, but for nearly 40 percent less money, has flown eight missions to the ISS for NASA, as well as additional private astronaut crews.

What went wrong? How could one of the world’s most legendary aerospace companies fail so miserably in its race with Elon Musk’s SpaceX and still be on the ground when its competitor has been launching astronauts to the space station since 2020? One top NASA official called Boeing’s inability to get its CST-100 Starliner capsule into regular use an “existential” challenge.

Some NASA officials think one cause may be the way the commercial crew program was set up — a fixed-price contract after years of cost-plus ones that allowed contractors to pass to NASA any excess expenses they encountered in developing the project.

“That commercial model is not exactly the way Boeing was structured,” NASA Deputy Administrator Pam Melroy said in an interview. “So, they’ve had to work through that and make sure that they’re resourcing it, and, you know, it’s tough. You’ve got to put a lot of skin in the game. That’s not the way they’ve been structured from the beginning.”
Chris Ferguson, Boeing director of Starliner Crew and Mission Systems and a former NASA astronaut, along with NASA commercial crew astronauts Nicole Mann, Bob Behnken and Sunita Williams, talked with Boeing employees moments after they assembled a portion of the first Crew Space Transportation (CST)-100 Starliner spacecraft. (Jonathan Newton/The Washington Post)

But NASA, which desperately wants Boeing to start flying so that it doesn’t have to rely solely on SpaceX, is hesitant to criticize Boeing.

“They’ve been great partners,” Melroy said. “They’re committed. They recognize it’s existential.”
John Shannon, who in December was appointed vice president of Boeing Exploration Systems, which has oversight of Starliner and the company’s space programs, said in an interview that despite the enormous costs, the company will not abandon the program — though he acknowledged that the $1.4 billion Boeing has had to eat on the program has been a major hurdle.

“For a government contract like that you just never see that kind of investment,” he said. “And trying to take the very top level view of it, it’s important, I think, to the country to have an American capability to fly crew. SpaceX is doing that now. We’ll be the second one.”
But asked whether Boeing plans to continue with the program long-term, he suggested that was in doubt. “It’s a great question. And I wish I had the answer to it right now,” he said.

The concern, he said, is that the private market for space travel is uncertain and plans for commercial space stations that would provide a need for regular launches have yet to materialize, even though NASA has started to invest in those and Boeing is a partner with Blue Origin and Sierra Space on one.

“They’re just not at a level of maturity where I can write them into any kind of a business case and say that yeah, this is something that’s going to kind of get us over the hump,” he said.
He added: “Probably the biggest challenge I have is defining how do I make this into a positive business case, given the market conditions as we see them right now.”
SpaceX, however, appears to have made a case that flying successfully can be good business. Since the original NASA contract, it’s won another, for five more missions to the space station, valued at more than $1.4 billion. It also has flown an all-private citizen trip to orbit that was financed by billionaire entrepreneur Jared Isaacman, who has chartered three more flights. SpaceX has also flown civilians to the ISS on missions chartered by Axiom, a Houston-based company.

Whatever the market conditions, though, many of Boeing’s problems are self-inflicted.
Over the years, the program has faced repeated delays, and technical challenges that have ranged from severe software errors to corroded valves. Earlier this year, Boeing delayed yet again what had been a hoped-for launch in July when it discovered problems with the design of the capsule’s parachute system and found that tape inside the craft was flammable.

Now, the flight isn’t scheduled until sometime next year — at the earliest. For Boeing, getting Starliner off the ground is now about more than flying — it is about whether the company can be relied upon to deliver on programs that are vital to the national interest.

The Starliner program had problems from the start.
In an effort to consolidate some of its major aerospace programs, Boeing in 2015 created a new division to oversee their development from concept to reality. Under the leadership of a senior executive, it brought together engineers from across the company, from commercial aviation, defense and space, to “more effectively apply engineering expertise, development program best practices, and program management and integration from across Boeing to our most important development activities,” the company said in a statement at the time.

Suddenly, the KC-46 aerial refueling tanker it was building for the Pentagon was lumped alongside the 777X commercial airplane, as well as the Space Launch System rocket and Starliner spacecraft it was developing for NASA. But instead of driving efficiencies, it created problems, according to industry officials familiar with the matter who were not authorized to speak publicly. The commercial airplanes designed to roll off the production line with some frequency had little in common with military aircraft designed for combat and even less with rockets and spacecraft, which would be built at a far slower cadence.

In a briefing in June, Mark Nappi, the third Boeing executive to lead the Starliner program, said some of the spacecraft’s problems stemmed from its early development days.

“It can be questionable — should we be catching these types of things this late?” he said. “And that might be because there was a certain sense of optimism when some of the designs were done. Some of the processes were created many years ago. And they led to some of these things kind of creeping their way through the system.”
Visitors watch from an enclosed walkway as astronaut Chris Ferguson practices for flight in the Boeing (CST)-100 Starliner spacecraft mock-up trainer at NASA's Johnson Space Center. (Jonathan Newton/The Washington Post)
Shannon pushed back on the idea that putting together different programs under one division was a mistake. Under the division, the programs could “work out all our engineering schedules to make sure that we weren’t stepping all over each other,” he said. “And if we were off in our individual divisions, trying to do it separately, we wouldn’t have had that communication. We’re also able to take engineering talent and flow it between the programs as it was needed.”

Even so, the problems with Starliner quickly mounted.

During a test of the Starliner’s abort engines in 2018, it suffered a propellant leak. The following year, only two of its three main parachutes deployed during a test because workers simply failed to attach one of the smaller, lead chutes to the main parachute.

The problems only continued — a list of severe errors and mishaps that compounded just as the company was also dealing with the fallout of the 737 Max disasters, two plane crashes in the space of five months in 2018 and 2019 that killed a total of 346 people.

In December 2019, Starliner was successfully launched to orbit during a test flight without any astronauts on board. But as soon as it was on its own, Starliner started behaving erratically, forcing ground controllers to scramble. The problem: The spacecraft’s onboard computers were 11 hours off, so the spacecraft was executing commands for a far different part of the mission. While dealing with that problem, ground controllers discovered another one that they feared could cause the service and crew modules of the spacecraft to collide upon separation.
Afterward, NASA officials were unusually blunt about the severity of the problems.

“We could have lost the spacecraft twice during this mission,” said Douglas Loverro, who was then NASA’s associate administrator for human exploration and mission operations. “So this was a close call.”

Over the next year, Boeing set out to fix its software, poring over all 1 million lines of code. A year and a half later, by the summer of 2021, it said it was ready to redo the test flight to the space station without astronauts on board. By then, SpaceX already had flown three astronaut missions to the station. Boeing was eager to catch up, but Starliner couldn’t get off the launchpad.

This time the culprit was not software but several stuck valves in the capsule’s service module. Another problem, another months long delay. In May 2022, Boeing finally did successfully fly Starliner to the space station. It was able to dock, then return home a few days later, landing under parachutes in the New Mexico desert, though still without astronauts
Earlier this year, Boeing said it was finally ready to attempt to launch the Crewed Test Flight (CTF) with two NASA astronauts on board, Sunita Williams and Barry “Butch” Wilmore, the same mission SpaceX had flown in 2020.

The Boeing CST-100 Starliner spacecraft launched on the United Launch Alliance’s Atlas V rocket from Space Launch Complex-41 in May 2022. The Boeing Orbital Flight Test-2 performed an autonomous docking with the International Space Station. (Jonathan Newton/The Washington Post)

Then, in June, the company announced it had discovered more problems, this time with the parachutes and the flammable tape. It would have to stand down again.

When Shannon was given oversight of Boeing’s space programs, including Starliner, he did a top-down review of the program.

“I could come in with a fresh pair of eyes,” he said. “We came in to make sure that we really understood systemically from the foundation up, was the program grounded well? We did a really detailed engineering review with the entire team.”
The result: “We didn’t find really anything. I think the issues we’ve had, while frustrating, come with the territory of trying to develop a system that is as complicated as a crewed space vehicle.”
He said the company was not going to rush or do anything to compromise safety. “There is no more sacred responsibility you have than keeping a spaceflight crew safe,” he said. “And that really drives a level of conservatism that I am very careful to make sure that I am constantly maintaining.”
NASA purposefully awarded two contracts in case one provider faltered, and the value of that strategy is now evident. If SpaceX had not been successful, NASA would still be relying on Russia to get its astronauts to the space station, as it did during the years after the space shuttle was retired and SpaceX started flying.

The space agency “desperately needs a second provider for crew transportation,” Steve Stich, NASA’s commercial crew program manager, told reporters in June. “Our ultimate goal is to have one SpaceX and one Boeing flight per year to rotate our crews to station. And so we support Boeing, and we’re doing everything we can during the investigation of each of these issues and trying to get to the flight as soon as we can.”
Initially, Boeing was considered the favorite to dominate even though Elon Musk’s upstart company was already delivering cargo and supplies to the space station on its Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon spacecraft. But flying astronauts was an altogether more difficult task, one more suited, many thought, for a company like Boeing with a long heritage in space that dated to the Apollo era. And SpaceX had struggled as well. In 2015, one of SpaceX’s rockets exploded while flying supplies to the ISS. Then another blew up on the launchpad during an engine test in 2016.

But in 2020, SpaceX successfully flew a test mission to the station with astronauts. And the company has been flying crews ever since, both NASA astronauts and private citizens.

“There is pride to it, and Boeing has a long history in human spaceflight programs,” said Todd Harrison, a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “If they were to throw in the towel on Starliner, they would be walking away from that history and basically ceding it to the new space companies.”
Rocket J Squrriel
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by Rocket J Squrriel »

Another issue is that the Atlas 5 is out of production with the last flights booked. The could launch on ULA's Vulcan but that's grounded until Jeff Bezos finally gets the engines up and running and in production. Those are YEARS behind schedule.

I wonder if Musk would give it a ride on Falcon 9. :D
brovane
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by brovane »

Rocket J Squrriel wrote: Thu Oct 05, 2023 3:40 am Another issue is that the Atlas 5 is out of production with the last flights booked. The could launch on ULA's Vulcan but that's grounded until Jeff Bezos finally gets the engines up and running and in production. Those are YEARS behind schedule.

I wonder if Musk would give it a ride on Falcon 9. :D
In theory Starliner should be compatible with the F9.

ULA has set aside a number of RD-180 engines to allow Boeing to complete it's contract with NASA which is 1 test launch with crew and 6 more crew flights. The Atlas-V is still in production just all the rest of the flights that ULA has RD-180 engines for are booked. At some point ULA will run out of it's stockpiled RD-180 engines but ULA anticipates that there will be several years of overlap between Vulcan and Atlas-V launches.

Flight Ready Vulcan BE-4 Engines have already been delivered by BO to ULA. Interesting enough, issues with the Centaur upper stage has pushed back the 1st Vulcan flight. Looks like the 1st flight is going to slip into early 2024.

https://www.ulalaunch.com/rockets/vulca ... -to-vulcan
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jemhouston
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by jemhouston »

I'd cancel the contract and start over with a new company. I'm just not sure who.
kdahm
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by kdahm »

Starliner is a bit larger in diameter, by a few tens of centimeters, than Dragon. A new upper stage adapter would have to be designed, manufactured, tested, qualified, adjusted, and flight hardware manufactured before it happens. That would take SpaceX about a month or two and less than a million dollars. It'd take Boeing three iterations, eight months at least, north of $20 million, and there would still be uncertainty if it would work when it's on the launch pad.

SpaceX would say: F-it. Build it, launch a capsule empty, see what happens. If ti works, we're out $50 million +/- and we know it works. If it doesn't work, it costs a bit more, but it's only money.

Boeing: It has to work the first time. If it doesn't, that's a $1 billion capsule (WAG) and two years.
brovane
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by brovane »

jemhouston wrote: Thu Oct 05, 2023 7:46 pm I'd cancel the contract and start over with a new company. I'm just not sure who.
That is the kicker there is no good alternative except to hold Boeing's feet to the fire. The good thing is at firm fixed price Boeing has to eat all the cost over-runs. I am kind of surprised Boeing hasn't said screw it and just decided not to finish the contract and walked away. However considering they are managing SLS, Boeing probably decided this wasn't a good look for them to just quit and frankly SpaceX is running laps around them. SpaceX has completed all 6 of the original contracted commercial crew flights and Boeing has yet to complete their first crew launch.
James1978
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by James1978 »

The surprise is not that Boeing lost commercial crew but that it finished at all
By Eric Berger - arsTECHNICA
5 May 2024

NASA's senior leaders in human spaceflight gathered for a momentous meeting at the agency's headquarters in Washington, DC, almost exactly 10 years ago.

These were the people who, for decades, had developed and flown the Space Shuttle. They oversaw the construction of the International Space Station. Now, with the shuttle's retirement, these princely figures in the human spaceflight community were tasked with selecting a replacement vehicle to send astronauts to the orbiting laboratory.

Boeing was the easy favorite. The majority of engineers and other participants in the meeting argued that Boeing alone should win a contract worth billions of dollars to develop a crew capsule. Only toward the end did a few voices speak up in favor of a second contender, SpaceX. At the meeting's conclusion, NASA's chief of human spaceflight at the time, William Gerstenmaier, decided to hold off on making a final decision.

A few months later, NASA publicly announced its choice. Boeing would receive $4.2 billion to develop a "commercial crew" transportation system, and SpaceX would get $2.6 billion. It was not a total victory for Boeing, which had lobbied hard to win all of the funding. But the company still walked away with nearly two-thirds of the money and the widespread presumption that it would easily beat SpaceX to the space station.

The sense of triumph would prove to be fleeting. Boeing decisively lost the commercial crew space race, and it proved to be a very costly affair.

With Boeing's Starliner spacecraft finally due to take flight this week with astronauts on board, we know the extent of the loss, both in time and money. Dragon first carried people to the space station nearly four years ago. In that span, the Crew Dragon vehicle has flown thirteen public and private missions to orbit. Because of this success, Dragon will end up flying 14 operational missions to the station for NASA, earning a tidy fee each time, compared to just six for Starliner. Through last year, Boeing has taken $1.5 billion in charges due to delays and overruns with its spacecraft development.

So what happened? How did Boeing, the gold standard in human spaceflight for decades, fall so far behind on crew? This story, based largely on interviews with unnamed current and former employees of Boeing and contractors who worked on Starliner, attempts to provide some answers.

The early days
When the contracts were awarded, SpaceX had the benefit of working with NASA to develop a cargo variant of Dragon, which by 2014 was flying regular missions to the space station. But the company had no experience with human spaceflight. Boeing, by contrast, had decades of spaceflight experience, but it had to start from scratch with Starliner.

Each faced a deeper cultural challenge. A decade ago, SpaceX was deep into several major projects, including developing a new version of the Falcon 9 rocket, flying more frequently, experimenting with landing and reuse, and doing cargo supply missions. This new contract meant more money but a lot more work. A NASA engineer who worked closely with SpaceX and Boeing in this time frame recalls visiting SpaceX and the atmosphere being something like a frenzied graduate school, where all of the employees were being pulled in different directions. Getting engineers to focus on Crew Dragon was difficult.

But at least SpaceX was in its natural environment. Boeing's space division had never won a large fixed-price contract. Its leaders were used to operating in a cost-plus environment, in which Boeing could bill the government for all of its expenses and earn a fee. Cost overruns and delays were not the company's problem—they were NASA's. Now Boeing had to deliver a flyable spacecraft for a firm, fixed price.

Boeing struggled to adjust to this environment. Regarding complicated space projects, Boeing was used to spending other people's money. Now, every penny spent on Starliner meant one less penny in profit (or, ultimately, greater losses). This meant that Boeing allocated fewer resources to Starliner than it needed to thrive.

"The difference between the two company’s cultures, design philosophies, and decision-making structures allowed SpaceX to excel in a fixed-price environment, where Boeing stumbled, even after receiving significantly more funding," said Lori Garver in an interview. She was deputy administrator of NASA from 2009 to 2013 during the formative years of the commercial crew program and is the author of Escaping Gravity.

So Boeing faced financial pressure from the beginning. At the same time, it was confronting major technical challenges. Building a human spacecraft is very difficult. Some of the biggest hurdles would be flight software and propulsion.

Struggling with software
There was no single flight software team at Boeing. The responsibilities were spread out. A team at Kennedy Space Center in Florida handled the ground systems software, which kept Starliner healthy during ground tests and the countdown until the final minutes before liftoff. Separately, a team at Boeing's facilities in Houston near Johnson Space Center managed the flight software for when the vehicle took off.

Neither team trusted one another, however. When the ground software team would visit their colleagues in Texas, and vice versa, the interactions were limited. The two teams ended up operating mostly in silos, not really sharing their work with one another. The Florida software team came to believe that the Texas team working on flight software had fallen behind but didn't want to acknowledge it. (A Boeing spokesperson denied there was any such friction.)

In a fixed-price contract, a company gets paid when it achieves certain milestones. Complete a software review? Earn a payment. Prove to NASA that you've built a spacecraft component you said you would? Earn a payment. This kind of contract structure naturally incentivized managers to reach milestones.

The problem is that while a company might do something that unlocks a payment, the underlying work may not actually be complete. It's a bit like students copying homework assignments throughout the semester. They get good grades but haven't done all of the learning necessary to understand the material. This is only discovered during a final exam in class. Essentially, then, Boeing kept carrying technical debt forward so that additional work was lumped onto the final milestones.

Ultimately, the flight software team faced a reckoning during the initial test flight of Starliner in December 2019.

OFT-1 misses the mark
This uncrewed flight test faced problems almost immediately after liftoff. Due to a software error, the spacecraft captured the wrong "mission elapsed time" from its Atlas V launch vehicle—it was supposed to pick up this time during the terminal phase of the countdown, but instead, it grabbed data 11 hours off of the correct time. This led to a delayed push to reach orbit and caused the vehicle's thrusters to expend too much fuel. As a result, Starliner did not dock with the International Space Station.

The second error, caught and fixed just a few hours before the vehicle returned to Earth through the atmosphere, was a software mapping error that would have caused thrusters on Starliner's service module to fire incorrectly. This could have caused Starliner's service module and crew capsule to collide. Senior NASA officials would later declare the mission a "high visibility close call," or very nearly a catastrophic failure.

A couple of months after the flight, John Mulholland, a vice president who managed the company's commercial crew program, met with reporters to explain what happened. He acknowledged that the company did not run integrated, end-to-end tests for the whole mission. For example, instead of conducting a software test that encompassed the roughly 48-hour period from launch through docking to the station, Boeing broke the test into chunks. The first chunk ran from launch through the point at which Starliner separated from the second stage of the Atlas V booster.

Mulholland insisted that Boeing did not cut corners and that the lack of an end-to-end test was not due to cost concerns. "It was definitely not a matter of cost," Mulholland said at the time. "Cost has never been in any way a key factor in how we need to test and verify our systems."

Had Boeing run the integrated test, it would have caught the timing error, Mulholland said. The mission likely would have docked with the International Space Station. It's worth noting that some of the people interviewed for this article say NASA should have pressed Boeing harder for such tests but did not, perhaps out of a sense that Boeing was a superior contractor to SpaceX.

The bottom line is that Boeing technically earned the flight software milestones in its commercial crew contract. But by not putting in the work for an end-to-end test of its software, the company failed its final exam. As a result, Boeing had to take the disastrously expensive step of flying a second uncrewed flight test, which it did in May 2022.

Prop problems
The heart of any spacecraft is its propulsion system. For its Dragon spacecraft, SpaceX developed its Draco and SuperDraco thrusters internally. This is consistent with its vertically integrated approach. Boeing took a more traditional path, turning to industry leader Aerojet Rocketdyne for Starliner's various thrusters. In turn, Rocketdyne had its own myriad subcontractors.

One of the big differences between new space companies like SpaceX and traditional space companies is vertical integration. If it works well, developing and building one's own technology is faster, cheaper, and much more efficient. Everyone is also on the same "team" and pulling in the same direction.

By contrast, partnerships between two large aerospace corporations are often cumbersome. Let's say you're a Rocketdyne engineer working on propulsion. If you want to design a widget that connects with the service module, you need to obtain information about the load limits from Boeing. This involves working with a Boeing engineer and a procurement officer. Rocketdyne engineers must then confirm this information. So you design the widget. Then someone else performs a structural analysis. You go through procurement to buy the materials for the part, then have to go through a manufacturing integrator and engineer to find a supplier to build it.

At the end of this process, perhaps a dozen different people in different departments at different companies have touched the part. It adds time and cost, and no one feels ownership of the process. At a new space company, the process can be much simpler: An engineer designs a part and writes a purchase order for the shop to build it.

"As an engineer, you're supposed to solve hard problems, but the structural inefficiency was a huge deal," said one person familiar with this process at Rocketdyne and Boeing.

It also didn't help that Rocketdyne and Boeing had a poor working relationship.

A test anomaly
That relationship was severely strained in June 2018 when the Starliner spacecraft experienced an anomaly during a hot-fire test of its launch abort system. During the test at a NASA facility in White Sands, New Mexico, the vehicle underwent a successful firing. However, due to a design problem, only four of the eight propellant valves closed at the end of the test.

This resulted in more than 4,000 pounds of toxic monomethylhydrazine propellant being dumped onto the test stand. There was no detonation or explosion, but a huge fireball engulfed the ground support equipment. The anomaly was caused, at least in part, by poor communication between Rocketdyne and Boeing.

"Boeing and Rocketdyne more or less hated one another," one person involved in the test told Ars. "Everyone was in super-defensive mode even before this happened. It had been classified as a risk, but the two sides weren’t talking openly and honestly about it."

What was the source of the animosity? After Boeing selected Rocketdyne, according to sources, it asked for changes to some system specifications. This prompted Rocketdyne to ask for a change order fee, as is customary in government contracts. That infuriated Boeing, which thought it had a partnership with Rocketdyne, but the latter company saw itself as a contractor. As a result, the Boeing and Rocketdyne teams were effectively walled off from one another and did not iterate together toward a more effective propulsion system.

Initially, Boeing kept quiet about the White Sands accident. The company did not even inform the commercial crew astronauts who were training to fly on the vehicle for a few weeks. It made no public comment until Ars reported on the anomaly nearly a month after it happened. (A Boeing spokesperson said the company immediately informed NASA).

Ultimately, the frayed relationship between Boeing and Rocketdyne reared its head publicly during the second half of 2021 when an issue with sticky valves in the propulsion system delayed the second uncrewed test flight. During its communications surrounding this issue, Boeing started to say it was working with its partners, including Aerojet Rocketdyne, to determine the cause of the valve issues. Effectively, this was the equivalent of throwing a supplier under the bus.

Asked directly about turbulence in the Boeing-Rocketdyne partnership, a Boeing spokesperson said, "We have a broad and diverse supply chain." For all of these suppliers, Boeing applies "the same values and expectations of product safety and product quality for our customers."

Boeing’s terrible, horrible, no good, very bad decade
All of Boeing's struggles with Starliner played out against a much larger backdrop of the company's misfortunes with its aviation business. Most notably, in October 2018 and March 2019, two crashes of the company's relatively new jet, the 737 MAX 8, killed 346 people. The jets were grounded for many months.

The institutional failures that led to these twin tragedies are well explained in a book by Peter Robison, Flying Blind. Robison covered Boeing as a reporter during its merger with McDonnell Douglas a quarter of a century ago and described how countless trends since then—stock buybacks, a focus on profits over research and development, importing leadership from McDonnell Douglas, moving away from engineers in key positions to MBAs, and much more led to Boeing's downfall.

It's estimated that, in addition to paying customers and the families of victims, the grounding of the 737 Max for nearly two years cost Boeing $20 billion since 2019. This critical loss of cash came just as Boeing's space division faced crunch time to complete work on Starliner.

There were so many other challenging issues, as well. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020 occurred when Boeing was dealing with the fallout from all the software issues on Starliner's debut flight. Additionally, the pandemic accelerated the retirement of experienced engineers who had brought spaceflight experience from the shuttle program. Boeing's best people were focused on the aircraft crisis, and the experienced space hands were leaving.

So it was all a pretty titanic struggle.

In late April, I asked Mark Nappi, a Boeing vice president and the manager of the company's commercial crew program, what he thought was the biggest challenge Boeing faced in its quest to fly astronauts.

"Design and development is hard, particularly with a human space vehicle," he replied. "There's a number of things that were surprises along the way that we had to overcome. And so I can't pick any one that I would point to. I would say, though, that it certainly made the team very, very strong."

Never doing that again
The Obama White House created the commercial crew program in early 2009, but Congress was reluctant to go along. It didn't see how companies like SpaceX could ever step up and put astronauts into orbit. According to Garver, the key advisor to Obama on space policy at the time, Congressional purse strings didn't really open up for NASA to support private spacecraft until Boeing indicated its willingness to participate. Suddenly, commercial crew became a legitimate program.

Boeing undoubtedly would like to have that decision back. In hindsight, it seems obvious that the strain of operating in a fixed-price environment was the fundamental cause of many of Boeing's struggles with Starliner and similar government procurement programs—so much so that the company's Defense, Space, & Security division is unlikely to participate in fixed-price competitions any longer. In 2023, the company's chief executive said Boeing would "never do them again."

A Boeing spokesperson pushed back on the idea that the company would no longer compete for fixed-price contracts. However, the company believes such contracts must be used correctly, for mature products.

"Challenges arise when the fixed price acquisition approach is applied to serious technology development requirements, or when the requirements are not firmly and specifically defined resulting in trades that continue back and forth before a final design baseline is established," the spokesperson said. "A fixed price contract offers little flexibility for solving hard problems that are common in new product and capability development."

There is a great irony in all of this. By bidding on commercial crew, Boeing helped launch the US commercial space industry. But in the coming years, its space division is likely to be swallowed by younger companies that can bid less, deliver more, and act more expeditiously.

The surprise is not that Boeing lost to a more nimble competitor in the commercial space race. The surprise is that this lumbering company made it at all. For that, we should celebrate Starliner’s impending launch and the thousands of engineers and technicians who made it happen.
Nik_SpeakerToCats
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by Nik_SpeakerToCats »

Launch scrubbed ? Apparently a first-stage LOX relief valve began chattering (!!) about two hours before 'Go'.

Could just need 'percussive maintenance', orbits 'come around' again Friday, or could indicate something that needs a full roll-back...

FWIW, I'm surprised the mission lacks a Boeing board-level 'suit' in jump-seat...
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jemhouston
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by jemhouston »

Nik_SpeakerToCats wrote: Tue May 07, 2024 10:31 am Launch scrubbed ? Apparently a first-stage LOX relief valve began chattering (!!) about two hours before 'Go'.

Could just need 'percussive maintenance', orbits 'come around' again Friday, or could indicate something that needs a full roll-back...

FWIW, I'm surprised the mission lacks a Boeing board-level 'suit' in jump-seat...
I'd make the quality assurance officer for the project ride in the jump-seat.
MikeKozlowski
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by MikeKozlowski »

jemhouston wrote: Tue May 07, 2024 11:17 am
Nik_SpeakerToCats wrote: Tue May 07, 2024 10:31 am Launch scrubbed ? Apparently a first-stage LOX relief valve began chattering (!!) about two hours before 'Go'.

Could just need 'percussive maintenance', orbits 'come around' again Friday, or could indicate something that needs a full roll-back...

FWIW, I'm surprised the mission lacks a Boeing board-level 'suit' in jump-seat...
I'd make the quality assurance officer for the project ride in the jump-seat.
Never forgotten my Dad's account of watching the first shuttle mission after Challenger's loss - Lewis Research Center had a massive video projection screen that showed all the camera views; not just the ones for public consumption. One of them zoomed close enough that you could clearly see the shuttle commander's face as they're going through the checklist, and as they're coming up on about T-10 minutes....a buzzard lands on the gantry, looking right at the cockpit.

Dad said the commander did a double take and busted up laughing.

Mike
kdahm
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by kdahm »

Starliner Crew Capsule is launched on their test flight. Everything seems nominal so far, about an hour in.

Next step is docking at ISS. Then coming down safely.

The success is only transitory. Starliner has only six more launches on Atlas rockets before it has to be recertified on another launch vehicle. Those launches are supposed to take place at only one a year until 2030. In that time span, how many brand new Dragon capsules can SpaceX build and does anyone want to bet against Starship becoming human-rated?
Johnnie Lyle
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by Johnnie Lyle »

kdahm wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 3:35 pm Starliner Crew Capsule is launched on their test flight. Everything seems nominal so far, about an hour in.

Next step is docking at ISS. Then coming down safely.

The success is only transitory. Starliner has only six more launches on Atlas rockets before it has to be recertified on another launch vehicle. Those launches are supposed to take place at only one a year until 2030. In that time span, how many brand new Dragon capsules can SpaceX build and does anyone want to bet against Starship becoming human-rated?
What an expletive-deleted waste of goddamn money.
Nik_SpeakerToCats
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by Nik_SpeakerToCats »

To paraphrase my NSFW disgust when Boeing announced their truly wondrous 'Starliner', it's but a LEO Coracle...

IMHO, the true wonder is that it has launched at all...

I hope it returns safely.
Perhaps with several embarrassing oopsies, a wonky chute etc etc, but safe enough...

FWIW, given such oopsies, I doubt any jury would convict the pilot for punching out several Boeing executives.
Defenestrating them ? 'Reasonable Force'...
kdahm
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by kdahm »

Johnnie Lyle wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 4:31 pm
kdahm wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 3:35 pm Starliner Crew Capsule is launched on their test flight. Everything seems nominal so far, about an hour in.

Next step is docking at ISS. Then coming down safely.

The success is only transitory. Starliner has only six more launches on Atlas rockets before it has to be recertified on another launch vehicle. Those launches are supposed to take place at only one a year until 2030. In that time span, how many brand new Dragon capsules can SpaceX build and does anyone want to bet against Starship becoming human-rated?
What an expletive-deleted waste of goddamn money.
It's actually not, right now. Boeing has committed to launching it six more times, under a fixed fee contract. Whether NASA wants it or not, the money has already been spent. The only thing canceling would do is prevent Boeing from losing more, because every launch is costing them more money than they gain. At $4.8 billion, it's also not that expensive compared to the alternatives right now. Sunk cost fallacy.

There's also the very small security blanket of having a second human launch vehicle as a backup to SpaceX that isn't Orion.

Of course, Boeing could have done this far better. They could have actually made money on the project, instead of losing their shorts. But all of that is on Boeing, and exposes Boeing management as a bunch of useless ignoramuses that couldn't manage their way out of a Starbucks shop.
Johnnie Lyle
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by Johnnie Lyle »

kdahm wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 5:22 pm
Johnnie Lyle wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 4:31 pm
kdahm wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 3:35 pm Starliner Crew Capsule is launched on their test flight. Everything seems nominal so far, about an hour in.

Next step is docking at ISS. Then coming down safely.

The success is only transitory. Starliner has only six more launches on Atlas rockets before it has to be recertified on another launch vehicle. Those launches are supposed to take place at only one a year until 2030. In that time span, how many brand new Dragon capsules can SpaceX build and does anyone want to bet against Starship becoming human-rated?
What an expletive-deleted waste of goddamn money.
It's actually not, right now. Boeing has committed to launching it six more times, under a fixed fee contract. Whether NASA wants it or not, the money has already been spent. The only thing canceling would do is prevent Boeing from losing more, because every launch is costing them more money than they gain. At $4.8 billion, it's also not that expensive compared to the alternatives right now. Sunk cost fallacy.

There's also the very small security blanket of having a second human launch vehicle as a backup to SpaceX that isn't Orion.

Of course, Boeing could have done this far better. They could have actually made money on the project, instead of losing their shorts. But all of that is on Boeing, and exposes Boeing management as a bunch of useless ignoramuses that couldn't manage their way out of a Starbucks shop.
The whole project has been a goddamn waste of money, especially when compared to what SpaceX is doing. We’re just at the end of the line where most of the money has been spent.

But that seems to be standard for a lot of our aerospace industry outside of SpaceX. They’re charging a lot of money for the relatively crappy products we get. Part of that is also NASA and Congress’ fault with constantly changing programs, specs and a disturbing willingness to accept expensive crap as a kobs program.

But it’s clearly looking like (as with many other aspects of the economy) our space programs are heavily dependent upon one crazy billionaire kicking his people in the ass to advance while everyone else is content to effectively spend tax dollars on anything but working spacecraft.
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jemhouston
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by jemhouston »

Nik_SpeakerToCats wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 4:49 pm To paraphrase my NSFW disgust when Boeing announced their truly wondrous 'Starliner', it's but a LEO Coracle...

IMHO, the true wonder is that it has launched at all...

I hope it returns safely.
Perhaps with several embarrassing oopsies, a wonky chute etc etc, but safe enough...

FWIW, given such oopsies, I doubt any jury would convict the pilot for punching out several Boeing executives.
Defenestrating them ? 'Reasonable Force'...
The judge would get on his case for not getting more astronauts to get in on the punching.
Micael
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by Micael »

Flight controllers in Houston are troubleshooting a helium leak in the propulsion system on Boeing's Starliner. According to a mission commentator the crew has closed all helium manifold valves in an effort to isolate the leak. Helium provides pressure to the propulsion system, which is used for manuevering and the braking burn needed to return the astronauts to Earth. A helium leak detected prior to launch delayed the mission by several weeks but was deemed safe to fly with.
David Newton
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by David Newton »

Do you think they'll get stuck at the ISS and have to be rescued by a Dragon mission?
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jemhouston
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by jemhouston »

David Newton wrote: Thu Jun 06, 2024 7:48 am Do you think they'll get stuck at the ISS and have to be rescued by a Dragon mission?
SpaceX has it planned for already.
Poohbah
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Re: Once seen as the future, Boeing struggles to make a case for Starliner

Post by Poohbah »

jemhouston wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 7:48 pm
Nik_SpeakerToCats wrote: Wed Jun 05, 2024 4:49 pm To paraphrase my NSFW disgust when Boeing announced their truly wondrous 'Starliner', it's but a LEO Coracle...

IMHO, the true wonder is that it has launched at all...

I hope it returns safely.
Perhaps with several embarrassing oopsies, a wonky chute etc etc, but safe enough...

FWIW, given such oopsies, I doubt any jury would convict the pilot for punching out several Boeing executives.
Defenestrating them ? 'Reasonable Force'...
The judge would get on his case for not getting more astronauts to get in on the punching.
Ahem!

That would be poor drills.

You're supposed to take those executives into the parking lot and beat them with canes!
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