History, Politics And Current Affairs

The simplest (and cheapest) alternative to US ABM would be to develop a conventionally powered ICCM (intercontinental cruise missile).

The biggest constraint on cruise missile performance has been for cruise missiles to fit inside existing launch systems.

In the case of the US Tomahawk missile – the constraints of 21 inch torpedo tube launch require the use of sub-optimal folding wings with a span of only 2.65m (8.69 ft) and an area of approximately 0.88m2 (9.47 ft2); giving it an aspect ratio of 7.97, wing loading of 283.3 lb/ft2 and a L/D ratio of about 2.425.

I've done the maths using the Breguet equation:

1.) Option 1: TLAM with modern engine with JP-10 Boron Slurry fuel -- 3,500 nautical mile range. Impressive but not enough to reach CONUS.

BTW, you might not know it, but the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile used JP-10 "Zip" Boron Slurry to get a TSFC of 0.25 compared to 0.66 for the original TLAM engine. You might remember Boron fuel from the B-70. Boron Fuel has a lot of health problems (cancer etc) so this might be why we never saw AGM-129 actually used operationally in the conventional role.

2.) Option 2: TLAM with modern engine with JP-5 and V-1 scaled wings -- 4,460 nautical mile range, enough to hit most of the Eastern US from north of Moscow.

3.) Option 3: TLAM with modern engine with JP-5 and SM-62A Snark scaled wings -- 9,400 nautical mile range -- enough to easily hit any point within CONUS, even after flying long evasive patterns.

With Option #3, you have tons of trade space -- you can trade off range for more optimized VLO signature reduction and try to get that range back by using JP-10 Boron "Zip" fuels which is acceptable for a nuclear-only weapon.

Essentially, it's clear that you can make intercontinental cruise missiles with conventional technologies and not be much larger than a Tomahawk (or small General Aviation aircraft).

So why did the Russians go with SKYFALL -- a nuclear powered cruise missile?

I've had time to think about this, and I think that when you look at the other technical approaches they've taken for strategic force modernization:

A.) Instead of uploading 10 to 15 MIRVs on their existing ICBM/SLBMs, they've chosen to develop Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, which cut payload down to something like 1 to 3 HGVs per missile.

B.) Gigantic 2 metre diameter nuclear torpedoes -- you'd need a totally specialized submarine to launch them instead of MIRVing existing SLBMs or taking existing 533 mm torpedoes and adding a nuclear warhead to them.

It's only when you look at conventional forces modernization (or lack thereof) that you start to be able to make sense of what's going on in the Russian MIC.

Before the Ukranian war, they had about 2,900 tanks on active service. They could have cut back to 1,000 tanks to save money to allow force modernization to T-14 Armatas -- and it would still be more tanks than the majority of top-line NATO members:

France: 222
Germany: 266
Italy: 197
UK: 227
Poland: 119 Leopards (plus 400+ older tanks)

Total: 1,031 modern first-line tanks

But this wasn't proceeded with, because I believe that Russia is caught in a vicious cycle.

1.) The Russian Military Industrial complex completely collapsed in 1991 and never recovered. Massive corruption makes it impossible to effectively execute any kind of force modernization - look at the Ratnik radio modernization program to see what I mean.

The Russian MIC can produce just enough equipment each year for export and a small amount for internal consumption at boutique rates of about 15-20 units per year. They can't "scale up" to the kind of quantities needed for genuine force modernization.

Designing a slightly enlarged Kh-101 with large fixed wings for ground launch from an airfield 200 miles north of Moscow is entirely feasible, but not done, despite it being cheaper and more technically ready than any of the crazy off the wall ideas they chose.

Why? Because doing so would expose the Russian MIC as a shallow facade when it takes them six years or more to get to about two hundred missiles deployed.

If, however, you go with the bizarre off the wall choices -- unmanned turret tanks, Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, giant nuclear torpedoes and nuclear powered cruise missiles....

You can Potemkin Village the whole thing...

...make a few dozen of each as the complexity lets you plausibly explain the low production rate while the hype does the rest as you pocket the money.

2.) Internal politics make downsizing impossible. A major factor in Khrushchev's removal from power was that he was pushing his own version of Eisenhower's force posture – “more rubble for the ruble” – which de-emphasized mass conventional forces in favor of nuclear forces. Putin does not have the level of support that Khrushchev had within the Soviet nomenklatura.

3.) External politics make downsizing doubly impossible. The late John McCain famously quipped that Russia was a "gas station with nukes". Russia's entire cachet to global power politics (besides her nukes) is that she is part of the select club of countries that can project power globally, even with her reduced post-Soviet forces.

Russia is essentially in the same position the West was in the lead-up to Duncan Sandy's 1957 Defence Review and Robert McNamara's reign as Secretary of Defense.

Defense spending in 1955 was:

USA: 11.2% of GDP
UK: 9.3%...
France: 7.8%...
Canada: 7.7%...
Germany: 5.3%...
Italy: 4.7%...

In the UK conscription was becoming increasingly unpopular and would end soon with a phase-out in 1957 to 1960. This would cause the UK's personnel costs to increase, making it increasingly unaffordable to maintain the early 1950s UK military.

Meanwhile, the huge orders of military equipment during the Korean War were finally being completed -- the West was now being flooded with military equipment -- US Strategic Air Command now had 1,086 B-47s and 679 KC-97s by which it could wage nuclear warfare and the first B-52s were coming online. Elsewhere the US Army was nearly done with producing 12,000 M48 Pattons from 1952 to 1961 and 265 batteries of NIKE-AJAX SAMs from 1954 to 1958.

McNamara and Sandys both have received a large amount of hatred (most of it well deserved) over the years; but now that I've had time to think about it, a decent portion of their actions were counter-reactions to unreasonable military demands; and for that the Generals and Admirals never forgave them.

One of the best cases in the US was on 23 March 1962 when President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara visited Vandenberg AFB to watch an Atlas D launch. Afterwards, SAC chief Thomas Power chatted with both of them and referred to the Minuteman program:

"Mr. President after we get the ten thousand Minutemen..."

Kennedy interrupted with: "Bob [McNamara], we're not getting ten thousand Minutemen, are we?"

Later, after seeing a Bureau of Budget report that said 450 Minutemen could do the job, McNamara set the fleet at 1,000 missiles.

The late Stuart Slade over twenty years ago, pointed out that in the UK, of the Service Chiefs, only Mountbatten of the Royal Navy was astute enough to propose a realistic plan forwards for the RN (go for a small modern surface fleet of ASW ships backed up by amphibious ships for brushfire interventions and Polaris SSBNs for the strategic role). The other services (the RAF and British Army) didn't offer up anything equally realistic and they suffered the brunt of Sandy's defence cutbacks.

The Russians had a choice similar to McNamara and Sandys (somewhat) back in 2008, when Serdyukov proposed his reforms.

Serdyukov wanted to cut the number of ships in the Russian Navy from 240 to 123, while proceeding to purchase 100 warships (20 x submarines, 35 x corvettes and 15 frigates) by 2020.

If it had worked, it would have been nice. Instead, he was ousted and his reforms largely negated.

As a result of no Sandys/McNamara being able to make cuts, the Russian Armed Forces are a shibboleth of decrepit Soviet-era equipment kept around for show.

What use do the Slavas, Kirovs and Kuznetsov offer the Russian Navy, other than being decrepit mobile smoke screens? The only reason they're seriously considered "combatants" despite spending years in "overhaul" is because the Russians are desperate to believe that they're still the superpower of 1990 and having those ships lets them lie to themselves.

Once you understand this, their actions start to make sense.

Russia is basically Dick Jones from Robocop.

"I had a guaranteed military sale with ED 209 - renovation program, spare parts for twenty-five years... Who cares if it worked or not?"

BZ Shep, I like your cruise missile discussion especially.

warshipadmin wrote: ↑Mon Aug 21, 2023 12:49 am BZ Shep, I like your cruise missile discussion especially.

The most effective Russian naval units in this war have been the Admiral Grigorovich frigates of 4000t full load displacement; they routinely launch Kalibr cruise missiles and survive Ukrainian attacks.

Meanwhile, the only Russian naval unit with the S-300F missile system is at the bottom of the Black Sea from a subsonic cruise missile attack.

I suspect there is a strong correlation between the fact that the Grigorovichs had a relatively smooth construction campaign (laid down 2010-2012, entered service 2016-2017) instead of a chaotic one where construction was suspended for years.

The problem with the cruise missiles is time of flight. To get the range, they have to be subsonic. To get to the US East Coast, they have to fly either over Scandinavia or down and across Iceland. At minimum altitudes of 10,000 feet, probably up to 40,000 ft, they'd be very visible on radar systems. They are not going to be a first strike weapons system.

In some respects, the trajectory for them looks better targeting the Midwest. From about Cleveland to Minneapolis, the Great Circle route may be slightly longer, but is farther away from places that actively looking for them. Of course, it's also taking the old B-52 routes and reversing them, but that's neither here nor there.

As far as the Admiral Grigorovich frigates, a lot of their advantage is that they are in the Black Sea and Ukraine doesn't have a lot of over-the-horizon search capability. If they could be localized, something like 10-15 ASM with the right range could get a few hits, and Russian damage control is only impressive to the North Koreans. There are only three of them in service, with two more building for the Indian Navy and subject to appropriation. Very much of glass cannons.

A tactical version would make more sense wouldn't it? Particularly in light of the war in Ukraine I am expecting the "Shaheed" version of a cruise missile any time.

Pulse jet engine and all commercial components for easy production. If anything the war has shown the quality of having stuff in quantity. Even if it's not the best, as long as you respect its limitations and have plenty, you should do fine.

The Ukrainian suicide drone has shown up already. Let's hope we won't have to wait much longer for a CM.

M.Becker wrote: ↑Mon Aug 21, 2023 2:10 pmPulse jet engine and all commercial components for easy production.

You can parametrically determine the major performance characteristics of interest for anti-surface missiles such as land attack cruise missiles (BGM-109 Tomahawk, V-1 Buzz Bomb) or anti-tank missiles (BGM-71 TOW) with the Breguet equation; courtesy of this paper which showed me the light:

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs ... .tb01931.x
Naval Engineers Journal Volume 109, Issue 1 p. 57-73
Subsonic and Supersonic Antiship Missiles: An Effectiveness and Utility Comparison
J. F. McEachron
First published: 18 March 2009

I took the information from that article, and gathered other stuff to crank out this page:

Parametrically determining the Performance of Anti-Surface Missiles through the Breguet Equation

If we assume:

400 knot cruise velocity -- a little bit faster than V-1 since we've got 80 years of advancement we can make.

A TSFC of 2.9~ -- about the same as 1940s Pulsejets....

A L/D of about 6.5 -- in between the 4.6 of the V-1 and the 9 of the Snark -- emphasizing that this is 2023 and we can do computational fluid dynamics testing on our PCs to skip wind tunnel testing to find a happy medium between optimized for production and optimized for performance...plus with 3D printing we may be able to optimize to get both performance and value.

A W1/W2 weight ratio of about 1.852 -- equal to the SM-62 Snark where 12.5% of GLOW was warhead and 46.9% was fuel.

You can get 500 to 550 nautical miles range from something like this.

If you replace the engine with an expendable turbofan of early to mid 1970s provenance -- the TLAM's F107-WR-400 with 0.68 TSFC, you can extend range to 2,300 nautical miles.

If we use the same ratio as the SNARK (12.5% of GLOW = warhead mass), and we choose a 200 lb warhead; total mass at the start of cruise would be about 1,600 pounds.

If you get really crazy and put the semi latest expendable turbofan from the late 1980s -- the F121 from the cancelled AGM-136 Tacit Rainbow with 0.34 TSFC; range bumps up to 4,700~ nautical miles.

EDIT -- The best we can do with current "pop out" wings (from an advanced 8-fin ATGM design tested CFD-wise) is a L/D of 3.0 at 5 degree AOA

LINK to paper on ATGM characteristics

MKSheppard wrote: ↑Mon Aug 21, 2023 7:55 pm
400 knot cruise velocity -- a little bit faster than V-1 since we've got 80 years of advancement we can make.

You can get 500 to 550 nautical miles range from something like this.

If you replace the engine with an expendable turbofan of early to mid 1970s provenance

If we use the same ratio as the SNARK (12.5% of GLOW = warhead mass), and we choose a 200 lb warhead; total mass at the start of cruise would be about 1,600 pounds.

More speed is always good as it reduces the reaction time for AD. IMO vital considering 1945 AA was capable of dealing with V-1.

The range and thus size is probably a case of one size doesn't fit all. One of the advantage of the Shahed is it's relatively small size. All the launch equipment and several drones fit into a regular truck.

As far as a larger CM goes, how much of a warhead to make it effective against large bridges? Or large buildings like barracks? The one from the original V-1 should do but that's a big CM. Might not be able to launch it easily. Thought the Tu-141 is even heavier by 50%.

Something with a 50 kilo warhead and a 300km/170nm range would allow for some many things to be targeted. Not just ammo and fuel dumps but refineries, chemical plants, railway depots and signal towers. Plus the usual military targets though they have AD to protect them.

Engine wise the pulse jet impresses me because I have seen videos of people building them in their garage. The proper industry of a country like say Poland should be able to turn them out in masses. And quantity also helps with enemy AD at say the airbase with the pesky Ka-52 attack helicopters. Overwhelming numbers at the target.

Last but not least is the electronics. SATNAV, INS, radar altimeter and for the anti bridge version a camera. Though I have no idea how much complexity the latter adds. But it seems necessary for attacking bridges.

Concerning Serdyukov: It can be noted that Russia actually went through with one part of his reform, the removal of personnell/infrastructure for mobilizing large scale reserve conscript formations (ie the cadre formations they had before). While not implementing the parts where the regular force gets rehabbed and sharpened. So this actually made their capability worse than say pre-2010. This made the current mobilization much more difficult and generated even less capable formations than before. Brilliant.

The cruise missile side track made me lose sight of things.

Russia never really went through BRAC.

In 1991-1992, the prototypical NIMITZ Air Wing had roughly:

2 x F-14A/B Squadrons (18)
2 x F-18A/C Squadrons (20)
2 x A-6E Squadrons (20)
1 x E-2C Squadron (5)
1 x SH-3H Squadron (6)
1 x EA-6B Squadron (5)
1 x S-3B Squadron (5)
1 x C-2A Detachment (2)

Eighty-one (81) aircraft of seven (7) different types (F-14, F-18, A-6, E-2, SH-3, S-3 and C-2)

Now, the prototypical 2020s carrier air wing is:

3 x F-18E Squadrons (26)
1 x F-18F Squadron (9)
1 x EA-18G Squadron (5)
1 x E-2D Squadron (4)
1 x MH-60S Squadron (5)
1 x MH-60R Squadron (5)
1 x C-2A Detachment (2)

Fifty-Six (56) aircraft of four (4) different types (F-18, E-2, MH-60 and C-2).

Entire weapons systems have been retired (AWG-9 and AIM-54) in favor of standardization (AIM-120D whatever).

A brief list of US weapons systems retired since about 1980:

RA-5C Vigilante: Retired 1979
M60A2 Starship: Retired 1981
F-105: Retired 1983
CG Albany: Retired 1985
F-4 (USN): Retired 1986-1987
A-4 (USMC): Retired "Mid 1980s"
RF-8G: Retired 1987
F-106: Retired 1988
EA/KA-3 Skywarrior: Retired 1991.
F-4 (USAF) Retired 1992 (Fighters) to 1996 (Weasels)
F-4 (USMC): Retired 1992
M48 Patton: Retired "Mid-1990s" (aka M48A5)
A-7 (USN): Retired 1992.
A-7 (USAF): Retired 1993.
F-111 Series: FB-111 in 1993, F-111 in 1996, EF-111 in 1998.
M60 Patton: Retired 1994 -1997
A-6 Intruder: Retired 1997.
AH-1 Huey Cobra (Army): Retired 1999 (active) and 2001 (Army Reserves)
F-18C (USN): Retired 2018-2019
UH-1 Huey (Army): Retired 2005 (active) and 2016 (Reserve/Guard)
SH-3 Sea King (USN): Retired 2006.
AH-1W (USMC): Retired 2020

Then there's the great "combatant massacre" of 1993-98, which saw:

Long Beach, Bainbridge, Leahy, Belknap, Truxtun and half of the Virginias retired by 1995. By 1998, the last Virginia CGNs were gone, as were both of the California CGNs.

Pretty much every destroyer without VLS retired -- even the (newish) Spruances began to retire by 1998, with the last by 2006. Also heading off was the retirement of the entire Kidd DDG class; despite them being NTUed and having a relatively modern engineering plant based off the Spruances.

By contrast...Mother Russia NEVER throws anything away.

That made sense from 1993-2008 as The Fall was so complete and utter that anything with a marginal combat capability had to be kept, no matter what.

But by 2010? There should have been massive divestments of equipment; which to be fair apparently happened for some things -- the T-62 and T-55 fleets were divested of in 2012 -- but they didn't go far enough.

Why do you need 3,000~ active T-80s + 1,400~ reserve T-80s?

Particularly when the big bits (engine, fire control etc) are unique to the T-80?

The only rational reason I can come up is that they needed to keep up tank fleet numbers to show that "Russia Stronk".

When you understand the need to show "Russia Stronk", then the idea of sending the equivalent of an unmodernized 1991 era KIDD class DDG into a combat zone with half her systems nonfunctional starts to make sense, because it's all about saving face.

A-4 was in service with the USMCR until 1994. Last active units were the OA-4M dets with MAG-12 and MAG-13, retired in 1990 (replaced with the F/A-18D "Delta Dog").

This needs to be moved into the Essays section.

Nearest Admin, please can you do the honours?

Btw Mark. THANK YOU. This is fascinating and exactly the stuff that makes TBO unique.

Done.

Meanwhile, the russians have placed SATAN II on "combat duty".

This is a missile that failed 50% of the two tests it has conducted.

Again, POTEMKIN VILLAGE

MKSheppard wrote: ↑Sat Sep 02, 2023 3:07 am Meanwhile, the russians have placed SATAN II on "combat duty".

This is a missile that failed 50% of the two tests it has conducted.

Again, POTEMKIN VILLAGE

We hope.

MKSheppard wrote: ↑Sat Sep 02, 2023 3:07 am Meanwhile, the russians have placed SATAN II on "combat duty".

This is a missile that failed 50% of the two tests it has conducted.

Again, POTEMKIN VILLAGE

Sounds like the US magnetic torpedo detonator for the pre-WW2 subs.

Russia is a country with GDP of Italy, massive corruption and resource heavy economy. While it can do some things cheaper than Italy, it's also massive geographically and so numerical needs are much greater, nevermind the corruption. Add the need for keeping a massive standing force, ground, navy, air and nuclear semi-operable, and they don't have much funding left for procuring large amounts of modern replacement hardware.
If we assume Armata is an Abramski, there isn't much of a miracle to be expected here, it will cost similarly to an Abrams, Russia can't produce most of the nice electronics that would make it an Abramski in the first place and so has to pay international market price for them.
Add replacing the whole spare part reserve, training infrastructure, the reservists...
Every 1000 of them would be close to...
Poland's deal for 250 new M1's totals to about 5 billion USD, so we are talking 15-20bn for every 1000 tanks, while their force structure would need more, and the military budget is stuck being badly stretched in maintaining a massive force operational, and that's before accounting for the corruption and R&D costs of hammering out the childhood illnesses of such a new model, those are very serious sticker prices for a country with the GDP of Italy indeed, and a major fraction of yearly military budget.

Meanwhile all the old stuff is already paid for by the Soviet Union, they only need to pay for maintenance, readiness and occasional modernization, and they are half assing all of that already due to how much of it they are keeping.
Moreover, they could be reasonably scared to what their personnel, most of it used to half assing things and corruption, would do to more complex, western style weapons over time in terms of incompetent use, stealing, and bad maintenance practices. With a BMP-2, a conscript tractor mechanic forced to serve for a few rubles can at least fix up many of the critical systems to at least make the vehicle semi combat ready, letting them maintain the large force semi-functional on a shoestring budget (with half the shoestring stolen along the way).
But you can't do that with an Abramski filled with electronics, the conscript would leave barely after getting trained to even try handle that.

Russian Air Force and its relatively low activity in Ukraine compared to its "paper size" i think is a good analogy to what their whole military would look like if it went high tech.

I only just realized today (two years later) that I missed a huge pointer -- the Tu-160M production restart decision.

Modernizing the Tu-160 makes sense as it's a very capable platform (more of the B-1A than B-1B in performance); but building new build Tu-160s? At the time, the last Tu-160 was made in 1992 after Yeltsin cancelled it's production.

Rough timeline:

January 2008: Russia announces plans to build Tu-160s again, to bring fleet up to about 30+ PAA; some 16 years after production ended. It's worth noting that the B-1A/B-1B interruption was only four years in between.

January 2018: First new build Tu-160M flies for first time.

December 2022: Second new build Tu-160M starting flight tests.

etc.

The money and manpower involved in the Tu-160 production restart would have been better spent on either:

PAK-FA (Su-57) which supposedly finished the R&D stage in 2007
or
Su-34 FULLBACK production

Yes, there's prestige in producing heavy intercontinental bombers; and that probably was a major factor in the restart decision; but by the time the first new article rolled off the line, it was a 25 year old design.

Russia doesn't have the "maneuver" space to make these kinds of silly mistakes anymore in the name of maintaining 'great power' prestige.