Repost: BAGHDAD THUNDER

[Matt Wiser]

A more in-depth look at the Baghdad Raid on 28 April:

Five Minutes Over Baghdad: Operation BAGHDAD THUNDER
Based on the History Channel documentary Target Baghdad


During the Third World War, several U.S. and NATO air operations had an effect beyond their intended objectives, whether it was the killing of the KGB Chairman during Operation MOSCOW MULE, or the neutralization of CINC-WEST and his headquarters by the RAF that same morning, as well as the initial NATO air response to the Warsaw Pact attack on Europe. However, there was one operation that, while initially intended as an embarrassment to the Iraqi regime, contributed to the premature end to Iraq's offensive in Kuwait, and paved the way for U.S. and Coalition offensive operations in Kuwait, and ultimately, the drive to the Euphrates. While some historians still feel that it was an operation planned and pushed by a naval aviator with a personal score to settle with the Iraqis, most observers, including Soviet/Russian ones, feel that an operation similar to this one would have been executed sooner or later. The author of the raid simply had an outline of a mission plan and a tentative strike template. Detailed planning at the Carrier Air Wing level, and ultimately at CENTAF, made sure that the mission went from a paper concept to a mission whose execution that is still being studied and reflown via computer simulation at air academies and Air War Colleges today. It became known as BAGHDAD THUNDER.

Operation BAGHDAD THUNDER had one primary author, although those at Carrier Air Wing 5 and at CENTAF fleshed out the plan and made it a viable concept. Lieutenant Commander (now Capt.) Matt Wiser was the acting Executive Officer and Operations Officer for Attack Squadron 115 (VA-115) aboard the carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. He became acting exec after Cmdr. Don Gilfry was shot down on the H-2 mission on 25 April 2005, and was also in his previous job of Squadron Operations Officer when he saw a replay of an Iraqi TV broadcast of interviews with Coalition Prisoners of War on CNN. When he saw his girlfriend, Lieutenant Commander (now Cmdr.) Lisa Eichhorn on TV, he became enraged and had to be forced out of the VA-115 ready room. Calming down later, he went back to his cabin, and then returned to his squadron commander, Commander. John Compton, with a mission proposal and a strike template. Commander Compton was impressed enough to take the plan to his opposite number in VA-185, Commander Amanda Lowry. Both squadron commanders asked the VA-115 Exec if his mind was clear and that this proposal wasn't about a newly-developed grudge or having scores to settle. Reassuring his two superior officers that he wasn't out to settle any grudges, and pointing out that the Iraqis had been bragging about how the Allied Air Forces were cowards in avoiding Baghdad's Air Defenses. Hitting two or three of Baghdad's main airfields would remind the Iraqis that the Allied Air Forces could hit whatever they wanted, and whenever they wanted, and hitting the Al-Rashid Air Base would also give a morale boost to the Allied POWs held at the nearby Al-Rashid Military Prison. A side effect would be a likely purge by the Iraqi dictator of his air force and air defense commanders, regardless of who was really at fault. Impressed with Lt. Cmdr. Wiser's presentation, both squadron COs took the plan to Capt. Charles Seavey, CAG-5. After reviewing the plan, Seavey gave the plan to his Air Wing staff, and after consulting with Lt. Cmdr. Wiser, fleshed out the plan and presented it to Rear Admiral Roger Freeman, Commander of TF-77 and the Multinational Battle Force Middle East. After the plan gained their approval, it was sent on the line to CENTAF.

CENTAF's planners added some ideas of their own. The USAF had a number of its own aircrew who were now POWs in Iraq, and they wanted in on the action. Similarly, the two newly-arrived USMC squadrons, which had already seen some combat, and the A-6 squadron already had lost a plane and a crew, with one known POW and one MIA, also wanted to join the party. The RAF's Middle East Force also had a score to settle, and they too, to quote a CENTAF planner, “joined the fun.” The Royal Saudi Air Force also wanted in, and they were assigned strikes in support of the main effort.
The plan also involved every Allied tanker in the Middle East, including Navy S-3s rigged up with buddy stores, Marine KC-130s, Saudi KC-130s and KE-3As, RAF VC-10s, and USAF KC-135s and KC-10s. Tanker tracks were assigned south of the Iraqi-Saudi border, in an area where Iraqi radar had already been neutralized, and a maximum effort would go the morning of the mission. Not to be left out were the Combat Search-and-Rescue forces, with U.S. Navy helicopters on alert in the Northern Arabian Gulf, U.S. Army “Night Stalkers” on standby in Kuwait, and both USAF and RSAF helicopters and USAF HV-22 Ospreys on alert at Saudi bases near the border.

When finished, the plan was a much more detailed and expanded version of Commander Wiser's initial proposal, which envisioned a full Air Wing Alpha Strike. Instead, the bulk of CENTAF's strike elements, and its entire tanker force, was committed to the mission. After the final plan was issued to the squadrons that would execute it, and VA-115 received its official Air Tasking Order for BAGHDAD THUNDER, as CENTAF titled the mission, Lt. Cmdr. Wiser told his CO, “Skipper, I planned a small party for a few close friends. Now the whole neighborhood's coming along for the ride.” Commander Compton laughed, and said “Guru (Wiser's call sign), no plan survives first contact with the planners, let alone the enemy.”

Lieutenant Commander Wiser had not even given a date to launch the mission, simply asking “as soon as the ATO allows.” The Iraqis inadvertently gave a prime date to execute the strike, announcing a parade of POWs through Downtown Baghdad on 28 April. CENTAF Intelligence picked it up via monitoring Iraqi State TV and Radio, and the planners in Doha decided that the strike should be timed for just after the start of the parade, with time-on-target scheduled for 1305 local Baghdad Time, or 1005 Zulu, five minutes after the parade's beginning, with launch time set for 0900 local.

The mission called for two main supporting strikes by the Saudis, and the RSAF drew the airfield and Intercept Operations Center at As-Salman Air Base, and the An Najaf IOC, co-located with the An Najaf Civil Airport. The Saudis contributed eight Tornado IDSs for the As-Salman strike from their No. 83 Squadron at Dhahran, four with JP-233 anti-runway munitions, and four with GBU-10E laser-guided bombs for the IOC, with four F-15Cs from No. 13 Squadron flying top cover. The Tornados would also carry ALARM antiradar missiles for any SAM-suppression, along with ECM pods and Sidewinder missiles for self-defense. The RSAF's No. 92 Squadron at Taif got tasked with the An Najaf IOC, and they too, carried GBU-10Es to deal with the bunker. Two Tornados carrying ALARM missiles would support the strike, from No. 66 Squadron at Dhahran, while four more Eagles from No. 13 Squadron would escort the attack birds, though the F-15S crews felt that they didn't need any escort.

While the RSAF was taking down the two IOCs, the RAF and the Marines would play their part. Just after the IOCs were to be hit, the Marines would send eight A-6Fs from VMA(AW)-121 and eight F/A-18Cs from VMFA-235 in on a decoy strike. They would carry a mix of TALD decoys and HARM missiles, and would launch some decoys in towards the Baghdad MEZ (Major Engagement Zone), but would launch the majority of their decoys against the air base at Kut Al Haay East. Hopefully, any airborne MiGs in the Baghdad area would be committed against the decoys, enabling not only the RAF birds, but the two main strike packages, a clear shot into the Baghdad area. The RAF, meanwhile, had the job of knocking out Iraq's known SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12 SAM sites. The weapon chosen was the Storm Shadow-B, a submunition variant of the basic Storm Shadow, and ideal for dealing with SAM sites. The Tornados would also carry ALARMs to deal with any SAM radars that did come up. Five known heavy SAM sites were targeted, and the remaining Storm Shadows were intended for some of the SA-2 and SA-3 sites that also ringed the Iraqi Capital.

The main event would be strikes on three targets in the Baghdad metro area proper. CVW-5 would attack both the Al-Rashid and Al-Muthena Air Bases in Southeast and Northwestern Baghdad, while the Air Force was tasked against Saddam International Airport, which also housed Iraqi Air Force interceptor and heavy transport squadrons. CVW-5's A-6 squadrons would pack a pair of GBU-24 laser bombs and a pair of HARM missiles, along with single Sidewinders and AMRAAMs for self-defense. The Navy's Hornets would play a key role, as eight Hornets were tasked with Strike Escort, with a mixture of AGM-65 Maverick Missiles and Mark-20 Rockeye CBUs, and four other Hornets were tasked with IRON HAND, or SAM-suppression, with each Hornet packing a pair of JSOWs and a pair of HARMs for dealing with SAM or AAA sites. Four other Hornets would also launch decoys, hoping that the SAM radars would come up and reveal themselves for HARM shots, while also acting as a CAP in the area for any MiGs that appeared. Four EA-6B Prowlers would provide ECM support, with two acting as standoff jammers and two escorting the strike in and out of the target area. Finally, F-14Ds would provide the MIGSWEEP and TARCAP (Target Combat Air Patrol) needed to cover the strike force.

The Air Force, meanwhile, for their strike on Saddam International Airport, brought a dozen F-15Es, armed with GBU-10 variants for either hard or soft targets, while both F-15Fs and F-16CJs provided WILD WEASEL and strike escort, but F-16s would also launch decoys as well, to bring up SAM sites so that the Weasels could “troll for SAMs.” F-15Cs would ride shotgun on the Air Force element, providing their own Target CAP for not only their own strike, but the egressing Navy planes as well. In addition, two USAF EF-111Bs would provide standoff ECM support, and act as additional HARM shooters if necessary.

On egress from their respective target areas, all three strike groups would overfly not only the Al-Rashid Military Prison, where Iraq was holding the POWs, but also the Parade Ground and reviewing stands at what some maps called the Victory Arch, or the Hands of Victory on others. It was expected that the POWs being paraded would be right on the parade ground at the time, and not only would this be a boost to their morale, but would embarrass the Saddam regime, and the loss of face would be sufficient to compel the Iraqi dictator into a purge of his Air Force and Air Defense Command.

Once their assigned missions were completed, each strike element would meet up and head south back to Saudi airspace and the tankers, before returning to base. All aircrew were also reminded of a 25-NM “No-Rescue Zone” around Baghdad, as the CSAR people felt that any closer to the Iraqi Capital and its defenses would be too much of a risk to the Search-and-Rescue helicopters. Otherwise, the CSAR crews were willing to go in anywhere and attempt recovery of downed aircrews.

The planners of BAGHDAD THUNDER faced a formidable defense. Baghdad, according to the Gulf War Air Power Survey published in 1992, had twice the density of the most heavily defended target areas in Eastern Europe, and was considered more heavily defended than Murmansk. While the Capital's air defenses had suffered during the Gulf War and the immediate years afterward, the Soviet refusal to renew the arms embargo on Iraq in 1995 opened the door for Iraqi rearmament, and not only was Iraq's Army and Air Force reequipped, but the Air Defense Command as well. Soviet advisors came into Iraq to help rebuild the air defense infrastructure, and Soviet Air Force flight instructors arrived to help the Iraqi Air Force retrain and reequip its interceptor squadrons.

The Iraqi Capital was right in the middle of the 1st Air Defense Sector, with the National Air Defense Operations Center located at Al-Muthena AB, adjacent to Air Force Headquarters. A Sector Operations Center was at the Al-Taiji Air Base, north of Baghdad, and Intercept Operations Centers were at Taiji, Al-Taqaddum, Salman Pak, Kut, Nukhayb, and An Najaf. These controlled SAM sites, AAA batteries, and airborne interceptors against inbound air threats. While Iraq's air defense system had largely been integrated by the French, it had been dismantled by the Gulf War, and the Soviets rebuilt it, though the Iraqis insisted that the system's outline conform to what it had been in 1990.

Iraq after 1995 began receiving Soviet SAMs that were very capable systems. Although a 1960s-70s era system, the SA-5 was more than capable of medium-to-high altitude air defense, and was a threat to USAF U-2s and to UAVs that patrolled Iraqi airspace since the end of the Gulf War. Two batteries had been situated near Basra, four more that guarded both Mosul and Kirkuk, and four more around Baghdad itself. Meant to shoot down B-52s and B-58s, the SA-5 was also a potential threat to AWACS and ELINT aircraft, but against maneuvering targets such as strike fighters, it was less of a problem. In addition, Allied ELINT and EW systems were very familiar with the SA-5's Square Pair radar, and that radar was easily jammed. Furthermore, the reprisal attacks on Iraq for its use of CW ensured that the Basra and Baghdad SA-5 sites were visited by cruise missiles, but one of the Baghdad SA-5 sites was still considered a threat on 28 April.

Iraq was also one of the first Middle East customers for the SA-10 Grumble. It received its SA-10s in 1999, after Operation DESERT FOX, and observers widely believed that the Soviets sold the SA-10 to Iraq to show their displeasure with the U.S. and Britain over the operation. Four SA-10 batteries were sold to Iraq, with the export version (SA-10f) the system delivered. With a range of up to 93 miles, and an effective altitude up to 88,000 feet, the SA-10 was a very dangerous missile system to defeat, and NATO airmen in Europe had already learned by 28 April that the Grumble was a capable weapon. CENTAF had already learned on D-Day that the Iraqis were using it, shooting down an F-15E on the afternoon of D-Day, and later on, killing a second Strike Eagle on 26 April. While normally used by the Soviets as a mobile system, the Iraqis developed fixed battery sites that their SA-10s would move to at random, complete with hardened revetments for launchers and radars, bunkers to provide living quarters, and munitions storage for reloads.

Iraq, fearing Iranian and Israeli missile attack, also received the SA-12 system, the only Soviet ally outside the Warsaw Pact to do so. The SA-12a Gladiator was used for inner Antimissile defense, while also being very capable of engaging aircraft from low level up to 100,000 feet. The SA-12b Giant had a range of 62 miles, and the same effective altitude. While used as an Army- and Front-level air defense missile in Soviet and Warsaw Pact service, Iraq's SA-12 battery was mainly employed to defend Baghdad, and while often sharing battery sites with SA-10s, four dedicated battery sites were built for the SA-12 in the Baghdad area.

Complementing the SA-5s, SA-10s, and SA-12s were the “old reliables”, the SA-2 and SA-3. The SA-2s provided medium to high level coverage, while the SA-3 handled the low to medium altitudes. While dated, the Soviets had provided upgrade programs, installing new radars, improved fire control, and more ECCM to both systems, making them relatively capable threats. However, a major Allied ELINT effort targeted at Iraq had detected most of the work, and Allied ECM systems were able to counter the threat posed by the upgraded SA-2 and SA-3. Both strike escort and SAM-suppression aircraft would be able to deal effectively with the newer SA-2s and -3s.

For local defense of the Baghdad area, the Iraqis had concentrated their remaining Roland launchers, along with SA-6s and SA-8s belonging to the Republican Guard Forces Command. The Roland, a French-made weapon, had proven effective in the Iran-Iraq War, and had accounted for several Coalition aircraft in the 1991 conflict, but the effects of the embargo and the cutoff of spare parts, replacement missiles, and maintenance support from the manufacturer, had crippled most of the Roland launchers Iraq had, but enough were still usable, that they were a potent threat to any low-level penetration into Baghdad's airspace. Alongside the Rolands were the Soviet SA-6 and SA-15, both operated by the RGFC, with the SA-6 being used to defend Baghdad proper, and the SA-15 being the divisional SAM used by the RGFC's 5th “Baghdad” Mechanized Division. The SA-6, the scourge of Israeli aircraft in 1973, had its fangs removed by the Israelis in 1982, and was well-known to the Allies. The same could be said for the SA-8, which in Soviet service in the 1980s, was a divisional-level SAM for the Soviet Army and the Warsaw Pact. The Iraqis had purchased the system as a weapon meant for not only RGFC and Army heavy divisions, but was also used by the Iraqi Air Force for base air defense, with single batteries deployed at each of Baghdad's three airfields. The SA-15 was a more recent weapon, being a replacement for the SA-8 in Soviet and Warsaw Pact service, and the Baghdad Division was the only Iraqi unit equipped with the system. A much more modern system than its predecessor, the SA-15 not only could fire on two targets simultaneously, but had EO backup fire control if the radar was jammed or decoyed. CENTAF's Intelligence had conflicting information on whether or not the Iraqi SA-15s were operational, but they were assumed to be so, and the strike escort aircraft were advised that SA-15 launchers, along with both Tunguskas and ZSU-23-4s, were priority targets.

Besides the SAMs, there were the guns. Baghdad was literally filled with antiaircraft artillery, with calibers ranging from the 14.5-mm ZPU heavy machine gun mount all the way up to the 100-mm KS-19, with the 57-mm S-60 being the most common. All three major airfields had several batteries, as well as the lighter guns, such as the ZU-23, being mounted on rooftops, and were often partnered with soldiers equipped with MANPADS. The ZSU-23-4 was also available, used by the Special Republican Guard, while the Republican Guard's 5th Division had become the first Iraqi unit to be equipped with the 2S6 Tunguska gun/missile system. This system, which mounted two 30-mm guns and eight SA-19 SAMs, had proven to be lethally effective in Europe, as many NATO aircrew had found out to their sorrow, but whether or not the Iraqi systems were fully operational was an unknown quantity to the mission planners.

The Iraqi Capital's other air defenses were its MiG and Mirage Squadrons of the Iraqi Air Force's Air Defense Command. Three squadrons were directly responsible for defending Baghdad, with the 4th Fighter Squadron based at Saddam IAP with the MiG-29, the 9th Fighter Squadron at Al-Muthena AB, also with the MiG-29, and the 2nd Fighter Squadron at Al-Rashid AB with the MiG-23ML. Backing up these three squadrons were the 96th FS at Al-Taqaddum AB with the MiG-25PDS, the 6th FS at Habbinyah AB with the MiG-29, and two additional MiG-29 squadrons at Samarra East AB, the 73rd and 79th. Two Mirage F-1 squadrons belonging to the Iraqi AF's Support Command were based at Kut Al Haay East AB, the 91st and 92nd, and they could be called upon if needed. The Iraqi AF had spent the time between the resumption of Soviet and East European arms shipments and the outbreak of war training, under the watchful eye of Soviet AF and Voyska PVO advisors, and Voyska PVO had also helped in the reconstitution of Iraq's air defense system.

The Soviets had rebuilt the Air Defense System with its radars, guns, missiles, and interceptors, but instead of replicating the Soviet system, the Iraqis insisted on their 1990 setup, and the Soviets reluctantly agreed. One item that the Soviets did insist on, and it took a lot of persuasion by Soviet Advisors, was that training, both of air defense units, and of fighter squadrons, be as realistic as possible. Saddam Hussein was still deeply suspicious of the Iraqi Air Force, but the Soviets reminded him that if he wanted a military capable of avenging his 1991 defeat, retaking Kuwait and moving into the Gulf States, a well-trained military was needed, and effective training was what was needed to achieve that goal. However, as the events of the first few days of war showed, that while the Iraqi AF was somewhat effective in attacking targets in Kuwait and providing some close air support to ground troops, it was not very effective in either intercepting Allied air attacks or in attacking Allied Warships. And CENTAF's planners took note. Only two Allied aircraft had fallen to MiGs so far, and that figure was not expected to grow very much, much to the disgust of both the Iraqi AF and their Soviet instructors/advisors.

The Allies, meanwhile, brought three main strike aircraft into Baghdad's airspace on 28 April. Despite the lion's share of Allied resources going to NATO's Central Region, CENTAF had at its disposal some of the best strike aircraft in the world to execute the mission. The U.S. Navy's A-6F Intruder was the latest, and last, variant of what many considered the best naval strike aircraft of all time, and two squadrons were available aboard the carrier Kitty Hawk for the mission, along with a shore-based USMC squadron. Capable of carrying up to 18,000 pounds of ordnance, and with new F404 non-afterburning engines, a new nav/attack system, multimode radar, advanced EW system, and one extra weapons station on each wing for self-defense AAMs, the F model Intruder was a much more capable and survivable aircraft than the E model that it had replaced. Intruder aircrew loved their aircraft, and felt that it was more capable than the Air Force's F-15E in the strike arena.

The F-15E was flown by both the USAF and by the RSAF (in the S version) on BAGHDAD THUNDER. A version of the legendary F-15 Eagle, the E was optimized for precision strike and interdiction, while retaining the deadly air-to-air capability of the C model air-superiority fighter. With the LANTIRN (or Sharpshooter system on RSAF aircraft), multimode radar, and a versatile EW system, the Strike Eagle was more than able to handle its own on deep-strike missions. While the Saudis flew a slightly “downgraded” variant, the RSAF proved during the 25 April reprisal strikes that their Eagles were more than able to do the job, and CENTAF was more than willing to bring them into the mission. In all, one USAF and one RSAF squadron each flew Strike Eagles on 28 April.

The Panavia Tornado was the third key striker to fly the mission, flown by both the RAF and the RSAF. The RAF flew the modernized GR.4 variant, with upgraded radar, avionics, and additional weapons systems, such as the Storm Shadow stand-off missile. RSAF Tornados had been scheduled for a similar modernization and upgrade program, but the outbreak of war had halted those plans, with only one squadron's worth of aircraft upgraded. However, there was nothing wrong with either the RSAF's planes or its pilots, as demonstrated on 25 April. The RAF would contribute four aircraft to strike Baghdad's SA-10 and -12 sites, along with the SA-3s and -5s, while the RSAF would contribute aircraft from two squadrons to deal with the supporting strikes on Al Salman AB and the Najaf IOC.

Going into Baghdad's airspace required extensive EW and SAM-suppression support. The USAF provided Wild Weasels for the mission with the F-15F. While the F was essentially a rebuilt B two-seater, the avionics had been upgraded to handle SAM-suppression, with many of the systems previously having been used in the F-4G. The F was also given airframe upgrades, and was still capable of defending itself if necessary, with the Sidewinder and AMRAAM. The HARM antiradar missile was the weapon of choice for the “Weasel Eagles” and could strike radars from over 80 miles away, depending on altitude of the launch aircraft and its EW system. Weasel EWOs could even program HARM to attack specific radars, such as SAM, AAA, early warning, air traffic control, or even weather radars. Many Iraqi air-defense operators who overheard Weasels on the radio dreaded hearing the “Magnum” call, as that signified a HARM launch, and frantic operators would try and shut down their radars before the HARM arrived to do that job for them. On some occasions, that worked, but often, the HARM would remember where the threat radar was located and strike anyway.

While neither the U.S. Navy and Marines, nor the RAF and RSAF, had a aircraft similar to the F-15F, existing platforms were more than capable of dealing with SAMs. The Navy and Marines made do with either A-6Fs or F/A-18s carrying HARMs, while the RAF and RSAF used the ALARM missile for their SAM-suppression. The ALARM could be used as a direct-fire weapon, going straight for the threat radar, but if the radar shut down, the missile would deploy a parachute and its seeker would look for radars still operating. If a threat was detected, the rocket motor would fire again and send the ALARM down to the target. Alternately, the missile could be launched in the loiter mode, and the seeker would be preprogrammed to hunt for specific radars, and if one of the preprogrammed threats came up, the missile would attack that target radar.

For EW, the U.S. Navy brought the EA-6B Prowler to the scene. First deployed in 1971, and continuously upgraded and modernized over the years, the Prowler was one of the most capable EW aircraft in the world. Able to carry up to five ALQ-99 jamming pods, the Prowler carried a four-person crew, and if the mission profile called for it, substitute HARM missiles for ECM pods to give a hard-target kill capability, as opposed to the ECM system's “soft kill.” The Prowler was easily able to perform as either a standoff jammer, or fly as a strike escort ECM platform, and on 28 April, did both.

The EA-6B's counterpart in the USAF was the EF-111B. The EF-111s were rebuilt F-111As, and carried the same ECM system as the EA-6B, but instead of being on external pods, the whole system was mounted internally, and thanks to automation, could be handled by a single EWO, as opposed to the Prowler's two. An upgrade in the 1990s resulted in improved avionics, additional airframe modifications, and a HARM missile capability similar to the Prowler.

Two multirole fighters also played a part in BAGHDAD THUNDER. The F-16C was flown by two USAF squadrons on the mission, with one squadron with the CJ version acting as backup to the F-15Fs, mounting the HARM Targeting System (HTS) pod, and a pair of HARM missiles. Another squadron flew the CG version, which could carry LANTIRN pods, although on this day, that was not necessary. The CGs on 28 April would launch ITALD decoys to fool SAM and AAA operators into turning on their radars, and reveal their locations for HARM shots by the Weasels or strike escorts. The F-16s were also packing Sidewinders and AMRAAMs, for after their primary mission, they would handle TARCAP and BARCAP for the Air Force.

The U.S. Navy and Marines flew two variants of the F/A-18 Hornet on 28 April. The USMC's single squadron, VMFA-235, flew the F/A-18C, while the two Navy squadrons aboard Kitty Hawk flew the improved, and more deadly, F/A-18E. The C model had 25% less fuel than the E, and two fewer weapons stations, but was still a very capable strike fighter. The Marine Cs that flew on 28 April would also carry ITALD decoys in their decoy strike against Kut Al Haay East Air Base, while still carrying Sidewinders and AMRAAMs for air combat. The two carrier-based squadrons, meanwhile, flew the much more capable E model. A new radar and nav-attack system, improved EW and avionics, two more weapons stations, and more internal fuel, made the E model live up to its nickname of “Super Bug.” Eight Navy Super Hornets would fly the IRON HAND mission, which was the Navy's equivalent of the Wild Weasels, carrying both HARM missiles and JSOW stand-off glide bombs to deal with SAM sites, while four more would act as launchers for ITALD decoys, and after launching their decoys would take up a BARCAP station. Eight more Hornets would act as strike escort for the Intruders, with AGM-65 Maverick missiles for use on any SAM or AAA vehicles, and Mark-20 Rockeye CBUs for flak suppression. All still would carry Sidewinder and AMRAAM missiles for aerial combat should that be necessary, and the Super Hornet had already demonstrated that the plane could easily switch from air-to-ground to air-to-air combat and back again, to the Iraqis' sorrow.

As far as purely fighter escorts, with no air-to-ground ordnance to concern them, there were two very capable fighters in the Gulf Region that escorted the 28 April strike. The F-14D Super Tomcat, with its F110 engines, APG-71 radar, digital avionics, and the deadly AIM-54 Phoenix missile, had demonstrated repeatedly since D-Day that, in the words of several Tomcat crew members, “messing around with this cat was not to be advised.” The two F-14D squadrons aboard the Kitty Hawk had begun to run up kills on both defensive CAP to protect ships in the Gulf, and on MIGCAP to protect strike aircraft. So much so that there were two all-female ace teams in squadron VF-154, and as one Soviet advisor said after the war, “if one heard female voices coming from F-14s, the Iraqis were in for a bad day.” While the Iraqis had had experiences with Iranian F-14As in the Iran-Iraq War, the D Tomcat, with its improved Phoenix (both the AIM-54C and D), had proven to be a very unpleasant surprise, and the Tomcat crews took full advantage of their aircraft, giving the Iraqis numerous lessons in what the F-14D was able to do.

The USAF and RSAF brought the F-15C to BAGHDAD THUNDER to complete the picture. While the USAF could have sent an F-22 Raptor squadron to the Middle East, the Raptors were mainly involved in both Europe and Korea, and the F-15C was considered sufficient for the Gulf Region's threat level. Both USAF and RSAF F-15C pilots demonstrated the capabilities of their aircraft repeatedly since D-Day, and while their kill totals were not as high as the Navy's, both USAF and RSAF Eagle drivers had sent a respectable number of Iraqi aircraft and helicopters crashing to the desert floor. The USAF and RSAF “Albino Eagles” would fly both MIGSWEEP and MIGCAP, flying ahead of the strike elements, and giving direct cover to their respective strike packages. One thing all of the fighter pilots on the mission had in common was a hope that the Iraqi Air Force would indeed come up and react to the strike, giving the Allied Fighter Pilots chances to kill Iraqi aircraft within sight of Baghdad itself.

Part II: The Mission

28 April 2005 dawned as D+7, and at bases in the Gulf Region and on the carrier Kitty Hawk, air and maintenance crews began to stir. At bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, tanker crews were already preparing to take off and proceed to their refueling tracks south of the Saudi-Iraq border. At other bases, and on the carrier, maintenance and ordnance personnel were going over the aircraft assigned to the mission, checking and double-checking aircraft systems, seeing that ordnance was properly mounted, and verifying that each aircraft was ready for the day's mission. Meanwhile, the aircrews assigned to the strike aircraft were being awakened, and they began to stir.

On the Kitty Hawk, whose Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5) would strike two of Baghdad's airfields, premission activity had gone on since the previous night. While ordnance personnel began arming aircraft the night of 27 April, aircrews were already meeting in their squadron ready rooms to become familiar with their targets. Most of the mission planning at the squadron level was taken care of at these meetings, and taking the advice of their squadron commanders, most aircrew retired early. Aircrew wakeup on the ship was at 0500 local time, though some, having awakened earlier and been unable to get back to sleep, had been up since 0330. Breakfast for the aircrews had been more exciting than usual, as they were treated to a CNN broadcast of the SAC cruise missile strikes on Moscow, and the usual rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy came up, as some felt that “anyone can fire cruise missiles, but the Navy's going downtown today.” After breakfast, the crews went to their ready rooms, where final briefs were conducted. VA-115's crews were tasked for Al-Rashid Air Base, and they were reminded of not only the POW prison, but also the Al-Rashid Military Medical Center, also located on the base. A 1,000 yard “No Bomb Zone” had been drawn around both facilities, and aircrew were reminded that if positive ID of their targets was not possible, they were to hold on to their bombs. Similarly, VA-185's crews, assigned to Al-Muthena Air Base, were also reminded of a similar zone around the Al-Muthena Air Force Hospital. VFA-192's Super Hornet pilots had drawn both the IRON HAND and decoy missions, and locations of SAM and AAA batteries were drilled into the pilots' heads, while VFA-195 was tasked with Strike Escort, and four Hornets would accompany each A-6 squadron as they made their runs on their respective air base targets. These Hornets would kill any SAM or AAA vehicles, and attack any flak sites that threatened the strike aircraft. VAQ-136 would send four Prowlers on the mission, two with the job of standoff jamming, while each strike element would get a single Prowler to handle strike escort ECM. Finally, both F-14 squadrons would contribute Tomcats to the strike, with VF-154 sending eight of their Tomcats for the MIGSWEEP, while VF-21 would launch four for TARCAP.

While the Naval Aviators were eating and going over their final briefs, their land-based counterparts were also busy. At Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain, both USMC and USAF aircrew were going through similar premission preparations. The Marines of VMFA-235 and VMA(AW)-121 were tasked with the decoy side of the mission, with the F/A-18Cs of VMFA-235 launching ITALD decoys into the Baghdad area, and also against the Kut area, to simulate a strike aimed at the air base at Kut Al Haay., while the Intruders from VMA(AW)-121 would be packing additional decoys, as well as HARM missiles to kill any SAM sites that came up. The Air Force at Sheikh Isa would send the 34th TFS, with their F-16CGs, with a similar mission for the Air Force strike wave. Many of the Air Force pilots decided to eat with the Marines, as the Marine mess officer had decided that a special breakfast was in order for the first Baghdad strike of the war, and both the “jarheads” and “blue-suiters” dug into a meal of steak and eggs.

Off to the east, other aircrews were also engaged with premission activities. The USAF and RAF shared the large air base at Al Udaid, outside the Qatari capital of Doha, along with both the Qatari AF and the French contingent. While the Qataris and the French would be handling CAS in Kuwait, the Americans and British were getting ready for Baghdad. The F-15E crews of the 9th TFS, along with the F-16CJ pilots of the 17th TFS, and the RAF, all had scores to settle this day, as all three had lost planes and aircrew, and two from each squadron were now listed as POWs. The Strike Eagles were tasked with hitting the Military Area of Saddam IAP, while the “Weasel Vipers” would handle the strike escort and flak-suppression mission, with HARMs and CBU-87s. The main SAM-suppressors this day would be provided by the F-15Fs of Detachment 1, 563rd TFS, and their “Weasel Eagles”, as well as the RAF's 1440 Flight, which would send four Tornado GR.4s just behind the Marines. Their job was to take out Iraq's SA-10s and lone SA-12, with their Storm Shadow-B missiles, and then kill two SA-3 and one SA-5 sites on the second volley. They would also launch ALARM antiradar missiles in loiter mode, to kill SAM and AAA radars as they came up. The MIGCAP and MIGSWEEP would be handled by the F-15Cs of the 60th TFS and their “Albino Eagles,” with eight each for both tasks.

The Saudis, also, were getting ready for their part in the operation. At Dhahran and Taif, Saudi aircrews were going over their two supporting strikes, at As-Salman and at An Najaf. F-15C and S crews were busy coordinating with their Tornado brethren, while their ordnance and maintenance crews were busy with final checks on the armed and fueled aircraft. The RSAF, despite their performance on 25 April, and in CAS/BAI missions since, still felt that they had to prove to their American and British allies that they were equal to their assigned tasks, and wanted to show that they could do the job. So much so that the respective Wing Commanders at both Dhahran and Taif decided to fly the mission, something that gave the USAF advisory mission at RSAF Headquarters the jitters. However, both Colonels were experienced F-15 or Tornado pilots, and were veterans of DESERT STORM in 1991, so their experience was not in doubt. While no one openly said that the two were pulling rank to fly the mission, it was a quiet assumption by both the USAF advisors and the RSAF brass.

One thing on the minds of all the aircrew who would be penetrating Baghdad's airspace was the Iraqis' treatment of the POWs. The raid had been intended not only as a message to Saddam's regime, but was also meant as a morale boost to the Allied prisoners, twenty-two of whom were going to be paraded through the Government District of Baghdad. In fact, all three strike elements, after bomb release, were to overfly the parade route as well as the Al-Rashid Military Prison, where it was assumed, correctly as it turned out, where Iraq was holding the POWs. In VA-115's ready room, the XO, Lt. Cdr. Wiser, besides the mission brief, had something to pass out to the crews: POW-MIA bracelets made by the Kitty Hawk's machine shop. The bracelets had been made by the enlisted machinists, and given to VA-115's senior CPO, who in turn gave them to the Exec. He took one with Lt. Cdr. Eichhorn's name on it, gave one with Eichhorn's B/N to his own Bombardier/Navigator, Lt. Lucy Porter, and the rest of the squadron got one at random. VA-185 also got the bracelets, and everyone who put one on swore that the bracelet would not come off until the person whose name was on it was either released or otherwise accounted for. The Air Force, Marine, and RAF crews also had similar bracelets made for them by their respective maintenance shops, and numerous bombs were appropriately tagged with graffiti for those now “serving in Baghdad”, as Lt. Col. Joel Greenway, who commanded the USAF's 17th TFS, put it.

It wasn't apparent until after the war, but BAGHDAD THUNDER could have been seriously compromised. Maj. Gen. Mikhail Kurchatov, Commander of the Soviet Military Assistance and Advisory Group Iraq, had been advised by his senior Air Force Intelligence Officer of three developments that had taken place since the previous evening. First, there had been a marked reduction in Allied CAS and BAI missions flown into Kuwait and Southern Iraq, with USAF A-10s, along with U.S. and Kuwaiti AH-64 Apaches only supporting troops in contact with Iraqi ground forces. Second, a joint Iraqi/Soviet SIGINT Station adjacent to Tallil Air Base near An Nasiriya had picked up signs of some kind of impending operation; chatter between a destroyer captain and an airborne helicopter, with the former reminding the latter of “needing the helo for BAGHDAD THUNDER tomorrow”, along with a lack of chatter between tanker crews and the aircraft they normally served. Finally, the SIGINT Station noted that the tanker tracks normally established near the Kuwaiti-Saudi Border had not been established on the morning of 28 April, and they were unable to figure out where the tankers were now orbiting. General Kurchatov was not in a mood to share this intelligence with the Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence, as he was furious over Iraq's (mis)treatment of the POWs, and he felt that the Iraqis were going out of their way to act like the barbarians the Western Media portrayed them to be. The Soviets were also unhappy with the planned POW parade, as the foreign press would assume the Soviets had a part in it, and if the Soviet Ambassador, or other Soviet diplomatic and military personnel attended, the damage to the Soviet Union in world opinion would be very serious, possibly even irreparable. And so Soviet personnel, along with those from the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, were ordered not to attend, despite Iraqi invitations to do so. When Colonel Valery Nastin, his Chief of Staff, asked Kurchatov whether or not the intelligence information was to be shared with the Iraqis, Kurchatov asked in reply “Have the Iraqis acquired this information themselves?” When Nastin said that it was possible, Kurchatov ordered him to hold the information, and only release it if asked by the Iraqis if they were seeking confirmation of what they already had. Kurchatov himself would be on the rooftop of the MAAG's building on the grounds of the Soviet Embassy, along with his staff, as he expected that the Allies would make some kind of appearance in the Baghdad area that day, and he wanted to see any attack for himself.

As Allied Aircrew wrapped up their briefings and headed to man their planes, Wing and Squadron COs gave pep talks to the crews about to fly the mission. Maj. Kevin Lorence, who was acting CO of the 9th TFS after the squadron CO had been shot down and captured on D-Day, told his squadron that “Nothing in Baghdad is worth dying for. If you can't ID your target, keep your ordnance. And nobody, and I mean nobody, joins our friends in Baghdad today.” Squadron Leader Bill Graham, who commanded the RAF's SEAD element from 1440 Flight, told his people that “We're not going right into Downtown Baghdad today, but we're giving those who are a smoother run to their targets. While we give Saddam a poke in the eye, they'll be the ones giving him a good kick in the balls.” At sea, Lt. Cdr. Wiser had been asked to say a few words by his squadron CO, as both Navy A-6 squadrons gathered beneath the carrier's Island. Some compared the VA-115 Exec's words to the pep talk given in the movie Flight of the Intruder by Danny Glover's character; “All of us, whether from the Eagles (VA-115) or Knighthawks (VA-185) have shipmates in Baghdad right now. They're probably in pain, cold, afraid. They don't know when they're going home, and what we do today is motivated by them. We're going to make that SOB in Baghdad know that our POWs aren't his toys to show off on TV, and that one of these days, we're going to go and get them out of there. It may be a few weeks or months before we can do that, but we're going to do it! Are you guys ready to go?” And when the A-6 crews responded “YEAH!” Lt. Cdr. Wiser told the A-6 crews “THEN LET'S GO DOWNTOWN!” and a cheer went up from the crews, and not only did they applaud, but those on deck and on the Island, did so as well. After that, the call came to for the crews to man their planes.

The preliminaries had already begun, with tankers launching from their bases as early as 0600, to establish the tanker tracks west of the Wadi-al-Batin. The land-based elements began launching at 0845, with the carrier Kitty Hawk launching at 0900. All strike elements formed up and headed for the refueling tracks, which was in an area of Saudi Airspace that was blind to Iraqi radar, as several early-warning radars along the Saudi Border had been knocked out on 25 April, and had not been replaced. The Saudis, who would be first in, refueled and went in at low level, followed by both the Marines and the RAF, with the Navy and then the Air Force following up.

The Iraqis, meanwhile, had some indication that something was up, although their border radars were out. Iraqi Army and Republican Guard units reported that there were no U.S. Navy or Marine aircraft flying CAS missions, and that USAF F-111s, normally flying deep-strike and interdiction missions, were flying BAI. In addition, there were no RSAF or RAF aircraft over Kuwait, and some Iraqi Air Force officers began to wonder if something was up. Although their suspicions could be (and were) raised with their superiors, especially at Iraqi Air Force HQ, they fell on deaf ears at the Ministry of Defense and in the Presidential Palace, where Saddam Hussein's military aides were instructed not to give the Iraqi leader anything but good news.

Saddam had ordered a parade of Coalition POWs for the television cameras, not only to celebrate another “Day of Triumph”, even though the Iraqis had not even overrun Kuwait, but also to portray himself as the “Supreme Military Leader” of Iraq. His foreign ministry had sent invitations to a number of foreign embassies for their ambassadors and military attaches to attend, but had only a few responses. The Syrians, Libyans, North Koreans, Sudanese, Yemenis, and some representatives of various Palestinian groups did accept the invitation, but the Soviets, the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, and both the Cubans and Vietnamese, declined. The Soviets feared that if their personnel attended, the Soviets would be viewed as having a hand in the parade, and would lose in their battle for world opinion, especially in the neutrals in Africa, South Asia, and in Latin America. The Warsaw Pact countries simply followed the Soviet lead, and both Soviet and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact personnel were ordered not to attend. Likewise, the Cubans and Vietnamese were in a delicate situation with the U.S., for their own reasons, and forbade their people in Baghdad from attending.

The prisoners themselves had been hauled from their cells and told to get cleaned up; for what, they didn't know. Some thought a VIP was coming to inspect the prison, while others felt that a TV crew was coming to film the prisoners. Instead, all twenty-two of the POWs at Al-Rashid Military Prison were handcuffed in pairs in their respective cell blocks, blindfolded, and were loaded onto trucks for the drive into Baghdad's Government District, and a park near the Tigris River, which served as a staging area for the parade.

At 1015, the RSAF strike packages turned for the run-ins to their targets, with No.83 Squadron's Tornados and No. 13's F-15Cs peeling off for the strike on Al-Salman Airfield and Intercept Operations Center, while No. 92 Squadron's F-15S Strike Eagles, No. 66 Squadron's SAM-Suppression Tornados, and No. 13's F-15Cs headed for the An Najaf Intercept Operations Center. Both had a Time-Over-Target at 1030, and both strikes were on time and on target. The attackers achieved complete surprise at Al-Salman, with the lead flight of four Tornados spraying JP-233 submunition dispensers to cut the runway and leave antivehicle and antipersonnel mines to hinder repair, while four other Tornados planted laser-guided GBU-10E penetrating bombs onto the IOC. No SAMs came up to meet the strike aircraft, although one plane in the last element that hit the runway was hit by 57-mm AAA as it came off target. The pilot managed to get the aircraft over the Saudi border before ejecting, but he was killed in the ejection, although the WSO did make it, and was soon picked up by a CSAR Cougar from the RSAF's No. 99 Squadron.

The second RSAF mission hit the An Najaf IOC, which was co-located with the Najaf Civil Airport. No. 92 Squadron's F-15S crews accurately placed their laser bombs on the bunker, blowing it and its occupants apart. While the two SAM-Suppressor Tornados watched for any SAM threats, none arose, and the four TARCAP F-15s likewise saw no MiGs coming for them. As the final F-15S pulled off target, the Saudis headed for the border, their part in BAGHDAD THUNDER done, but they had also accomplished their other mission: CENTAF began to assign tougher missions to the RSAF, as the mission, along with that flown on 25 April, proved that the RSAF could get the job done. And as the war progressed, the RSAF showed time and again that they were just as professional as their American or British counterparts, and that they could handle any mission assigned to them.

While reports of the raids on Al-Salman and Najaf went up the Iraqi chain of command, the two main strike packages entered Iraqi airspace, with the Marine and RAF elements leading the way. The two advance elements then separated, each heading into its own target area, and the Marines were there first, as the Intruders of VMA(AW)-121 climbed to 10,000 feet to release their ITALD decoys. These simulated a strike inbound to the air base at Kut Al Haay East, with a few directed into the Baghdad area to get the Iraqis' heavy SAMs to come up for the RAF. The Iraqis responded immediately to the Marines, scrambling two Mirage F-1s from the 91st Fighter Squadron to intercept. The escorting Hornets from VMFA-235 moved in to challenge the Mirages, and locked onto the Mirages at 25 miles. Both Mirages continued in, and at 20 miles, AWACS told the Hornets, “Cleared to arm, cleared to fire.”

Lt. Col. Rob Satriano, the squadron CO, fired an AIM-120 immediately, and his wingman, Capt. Ron Evertson, waited until his Mirage got to 17 miles before firing. The first Mirage missed Colonel Satriano's first shot, but a second launched at 12 miles didn't, blowing the Mirage apart. Evertson didn't miss with his shot, and both Mirages went down, with no chutes being observed. Meanwhile, the Marine A-6s launched their ITALD decoys, and soon, AWACS called in, “Bandits inbound Kut”, as four MiG-29s came out of the Baghdad area and headed towards Kut. Both Hornet and Intruder flights dropped to the deck, and raced back south to the border, their job done.

At the same time, the RAF got into play, as its four Tornados from 1440 Flight got into range of the Baghdad area, and each launched a single Storm Shadow-B missile, aimed at Iraq's SA-10 and SA-12 sites around Baghdad. After firing the Storm Shadows, the Tornados lauched ALARM antiradar missiles in the loiter mode, waiting for SAM sites to come up for the ALARMs to attack. The Tornados then fired their second Storm Shadows, going after known SA-3 and SA-5 sites around Baghdad, before turning for the border. As they headed south, two SA-10s and an SA-12 did come up, to try and engage the decoys, and the ALARMs went down on all three, knocking the radars out of action, before the Storm-Shadow-Bs arrived, putting all of the batteries out of business for good.

The increasing Allied air activity was beginning to be noticed by the Iraqi Air Defense Command, and their Soviet advisors, and several Iraqi officers began to suspect that something aimed at Baghdad was a possibility. Those feelings were shared by both Soviet Air Force and Voyska PVO (Air Defense Forces) advisors at both Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Air Defense HQs, and those went up the advisors' chain of command to General Kurchatov, at the MAAG's Baghdad office. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, while Saddam had been informed of the strikes on Al-Salman and Najaf, and that “An American raid on Kut had been turned back,” the misgivings that his Air Force and Air Defense commanders were not shared with him. As Col. Hossein Jaber, the duty Operations Officer at the Iraqi ADC put it after the war, regarding the possibility of an American strike on Baghdad, “No one wanted to inform Saddam or his advisors of the possibility, as Saddam wanted nothing to interfere with the parade, as it had been highly publicized.” Saddam's tendency to shoot the messenger when bad news was being delivered no doubt paid a part, and on that day, the Iraqi Air Defense Command's top leadership was paralyzed by fear: fear of an Allied strike, and fear of their own leader's reaction to any suggestion that the parade be put off due to the likelihood of such a strike. For that fear, several high-ranking Iraqi Air Force and Air Defense Command officers would pay-dearly.

As the clock passed 1200, the remaining ALARMs were still descending by parachute, when two missile sites, one an SA-2, and the other an SA-3, came up. Both attracted the attention of ALARM missiles, and both radars were quickly knocked out. The path was clear for the strike packages, now an hour away, to move in on their targets. Word of the SAM sites being neutralized got to the Soviet MAAG, and this was confirmation enough that the Americans were coming. General Kurchatov and his staff were on the roof of the Embassy, with lawn chairs, refreshments, and both still and video cameras. They had a professional interest in the upcoming event and, the SAF and V-PVO advisors especially, didn't want to miss a thing. Final confirmation that a strike was inbound came from of all sources, the news media. Several English-speaking GRU officers were monitoring such channels as CNN, Sky News, Fox News Channel, and MSNBC, and all had noticed one thing: the news crews on the carrier Kitty Hawk, and those embedded with the Coalition Air Forces in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, were blacked out, with no communications possible between the networks and the news teams. Two other GRU agents, posing as reporters for the Novosti news agency, were at the Palestine Hotel, across the Tigris River, and they reported that although one of the CNN crews had gone to the parade, the other CNN crew, and the other Western Media, had gone to the roof of the hotel and set up their cameras and satellite equipment. One of the Russians asked a Sky News cameraman what was happening, and was told that the reporters “had a feeling” that something was up, and not just the parade. When the GRU man called General Kurchatov with that information, that was enough for the General, and final confirmation that he had been right that morning, and the Americans were coming-today. And very soon.

In the air, both the Navy and Air Force strike packages began to make their preliminary moves into the target area, as the flights tasked with decoy launching went in and released their ITALD decoys. The Navy aircraft, after launching their decoys, took up a BARCAP station south of Baghdad, waiting on a MiG scramble out of Al-Rashid Air Base, while the Air Force F-16s did the same, launching their decoys, then taking up CAP stations southwest of Baghdad, waiting on a MiG scramble from either Saddam IAP or from Habbiniyah AB. As the decoys went in, the IRON HAND and WILD WEASEL flights went in, with F-15Fs and F-16CJs “trolling for SAMs”, and the F/A-18Es from VFA-192 did the same, launching their JSOWs against several SAM and AAA sites, and waiting for any additional SAMs to come up. Finally, the standoff jammers, both EA-6Bs and EF-111s, took their stations, and began blinding the remaining Iraqi radars. The stage was now set for the main strikes to come in. It was 1245, and both strike leaders gave their respective strike commit calls, and both the Air Force and Navy strike packages began moving in to make their runs on Baghdad.

Below, the Iraqis gathered the POWs at the entrance to the park, and began marching them on the parade. For the downed aircrew among the prisoners, this reminded them of their survival training, and films of the North Vietnamese marching POWs through the streets of Hanoi. But to them, the parade was a blessing in disguise, as none of them knew if the videos shot of them after their capture had been aired, so it would be a way of showing that they were still alive. To Lt. Cmdr. Lisa Eichhorn, the senior ranking female prisoner, “The parade was a form of life insurance. The Iraqis would have to account for us when the war ended, so the parade was another way for the Intel people to see that we were alive. The air show that came in, though, was a welcome bonus. And it made our day.” Lt. Col. Larry Fleming, a USAF F-15E pilot shot down on D-Day and the overall senior POW officer at the time, said afterward, “There were only two good days in Baghdad. The second was release day. The first was 28 April and the parade.” It was 1200 when the parade began, and the crowd, while large, was restrained, shouting pro-Saddam and anti-American and anti-NATO slogans, and waving signs in both English and Arabic,praising Saddam and denouncing both the U.S. and NATO.

Above, the TARCAPs, both Navy and Air Force, were now in position, and the strike elements were moving to their initial points, preparing to make their runs on Baghdad. The SAM-suppression people were not encountering any SAM launches, and neither AWACS, nor the various CAPs, were picking up any MiG scrambles. It appeared that surprise was complete. Down below, the prisoners had been marched onto the parade ground, and were passing under the western “Hands of Victory”, and were approaching the reviewing stands. Commander Eichhorn, shackled to Army Pfc. Jessica Lynch, managed to steal a glimpse at a guard's watch, and noticed the time. It was 1305. The first prisoners were just opposite the reviewing stands when, as one of them, Capt. Rick Thurman, said postwar, “all hell broke loose.”

At 1305, the two A-6 squadron commanders called “Intruders in Hot”, while Maj. Lorence, leading the Strike Eagles, called “Beagles in Hot.” BAGHDAD THUNDER was now fully underway.

In Southeast Baghdad lay VA-115's target, the Al-Rashid Air Base. Home to No. 2 Squadron of the Iraqi AF, as well as being a major maintenance and training base, and also housing not only the Military Prison, but the Al-Rashid Military Intelligence Center and the Al-Rashid Medical Center, the base was a prime target. The Intruders of VA-115 were targeted at the control tower, alert Hardened Aircraft Shelters, maintenance hangars, and the runways, all with GBU-24 laser-guided bombs. While Commander Compton blasted the control tower, and his wingman took out two parked An-26 transports next to a hangar, Lt. Cmdr. Wiser and his wingmate each took out an alert HAS, complete with MiG-23, before the Intruders banked away to buzz the prison and overfly the parade ground. Two more A-6 elements struck hangars and the runways, ripping the hangars apart and blasting holes in the runways, with those aimpoints being the runway/taxiway intersections, before the Intruders, with their Hornet and Prowler escort, flew by the POW prison and headed to the parade ground. Lt. Cmdr. Wiser, talking to his Bombardier-Navigator, Lt (j.g.) Lucy Porter, said it best: “This is too easy. Where's the dammed flak?”, as not a SAM, nor any AAA, came up to meet the strike aircraft.

A minute after Al-Rashid was hit, VA-185, with its escorting Hornets and Prowler, hit the Al-Muthena Air Base. The assigned targets were similar to those hit at Al-Rashid, with a bonus that none of the VA-185 crews found out until after the war. One of the A-6s hit a hangar that was used by the Soviet MAAG to house a pair of An-26 transports and a pair of Mi-17 Hip helicopters to fly around the country, and one of the helicopters that was burned to the ground happened to be General Kurchatov's personal transport. The VA-185 strike aircraft then turned for the parade ground, buzzing the POW prison on the way out of the target area. As with VA-115's strike on Al-Rashid, no defensive fire was encountered at Al-Muthena.

The sound of explosions from the southwest halted the parade, and to the prisoners, it seemed as if the guards didn't know what to do. To several of the POWs, who looked into the reviewing stands, the assembled VIPs seemed to be dumbfounded as to what was happening, when one of the British POWs yelled “Incoming!” and all of the POWs dropped to the ground. The prisoners looked up and saw the lead A-6 and Hornet flight from Al-Rashid fly over, with the aircraft waggling their wings. Pfc. Lynch asked her SRO, Lt. Cmdr. Eichhorn, “What's happening, Commander?” And the female SRO replied, “I think my shipmates just spoiled Saddam's party, Jessica.” The next flight came over, waggling its wings, and Eichhorn somehow knew that her boyfriend was leading that flight. “I don't know how I knew, but I just knew”, she said after the war (As it turned out, she was right, as Lt.Cmdr. Wiser was leading the second flight of Intruders and Hornets). The other two VA-115 elements, and their escorts, quickly passed over the parade ground. And then VA-185 and its escorts flew past, and they too, were waggling their wings to show their support to their friends below, and to the prisoners, the sound of jets “was the sweetest sound we heard that day.” Pfc. Lynch tugged at her SRO, and asked, “Commander, is that who I think it is?” Eichhorn turned to look where Lynch was pointing, and there he was: Saddam. And to Commander Eichhorn, the Iraqi dictator was apoplectic with rage, tearing into two Iraqi Air Force Generals. The other VIPs, to her, looked just as angry, seeing American aircraft flying over their capital with impunity.

Just after the Navy strikes went in on their targets, the Air Force went in on Saddam International Airport, hitting the military side of the sprawling facility. Just as at both Al-Rashid and Al-Muthena, the control tower, hangars, HAS, and the runways were targeted, along with the military side's fuel storage, and GBU-10 laser bombs tore into their targets. Although one bomb “went stupid,” as 1st Lt. Ken Simmonds, WSO for Capt. Troy Lockett, put it, all other bombs ripped into their targets. As each F-15E element came off target, they saw the the Intruders and their escorts clear the parade ground, and the Strike Eagles, with their “Weasel Eagles and Vipers, “ went in to buzz the parade ground and then the POW prison. Just as at the two other bases, attacking aircraft met with no resistance, with not a single SAM, or AAA battery, firing back. Unknowingly echoing Lt. Cmdr. Wiser, Major Lorence asked his WSO, Capt. Duncan Tyler, “Where's the dammed flak?”, as he pulled off target and headed for the parade ground.

At the parade ground, the POWs had just began to pick themselves up, when a guard shouted in English, “Down!”, as the lead F-15Es came over. Colonel Fleming turned to Commander Eichhorn and told her, “Beagles, Weasel Eagles, and Vipers. No way it'd be an all-Navy show.” Strike Eagles, F-15F Weasels, and F-16s came over, just as their Navy counterparts did, waggling their wings to show solidarity with the POWs below. Several of the POWs exchanged smiles, while others gave the “thumbs up”, noticing that the guards had their weapons pointed not at them, but away from the prisoners. Seconds after the final aircraft, an EF-111, passed over, the Baghdad Air Defenses finally began to react, and AAA fire began going off in all directions. It was too little, too late.

At Al-Rashid Military Hospital, four other American POWs had a ringside seat to the raid. All four had been injured before their capture, either in ground combat, or after bailing out of their aircraft, and had been taken to the hospital instead of the MI Center. The staff had treated them as patients first and prisoners second, for which all four were grateful. One of the prisoners, Navy Lt. (j.g.) Chris Larson, saw the A-6s come in, and told his roommate, a U.S. Army specialist, “The Navy's paid old Saddam a visit.” A couple of minutes later, they saw VA-185 and its escorts blow by, and then the Air Force, and Larson said later, “That raid made every POW's day.” Only after the Air Force F-15s went by did the four at the hospital hear and see any AAA fire.

For the Russians on top of both the embassy building and the MAAG building, the raid was like an air show. Colonel Nastin, Kurchatov's Chief of Staff, was a rated flight instructor on both the MiG-23 and MiG-29, and also wore another hat as the Senior SAF Advisor in Iraq. He had been looking forward to the raid from a professional point of view, and not only Colonel Nastin, but the other SAF officers, were very impressed with what they saw. General Kurchatov was also impressed, though he was angry when the F-15s and F-16s blew over, as Soviet SIGINT had only mentioned the Navy as being on the strike. Much to the Soviets' disappointment, the Baghdad air defenses didn't react until after the last USAF plane, the strike escort EF-111, had left the area, and then AAA fire went in all directions, and some 23-mm fire nearly sprayed the embassy rooftop. Colonel Nastin then went down to where the reports from the SIGINT station at Tallil Air Base were being collected, and found that the intercept operators there had picked up the tanker tracks and some of the chatter between tanker crews and strike aircraft, but that it had been given a low priority, as the main concern was the Iraqi ground campaign against Kuwait.

Over at the parade ground, the Iraqis quickly gathered up the prisoners and began to hustle them out of the area. Before they left the parade ground, Commander Eichhorn and Pfc. Lynch noticed two Iraqi AF officers talking with Saddam, and then saw both officers dragged away by the Iraqi dictator's security men. The prisoners were soon back at the park, where they were blindfolded and loaded back onto trucks, and returned to Al-Rashid Prison, and their respective cell blocks, where they were tossed back into their solitary cells.

As the Navy and Air Force packages headed back south, the aircrews were cautious not to get sloppy on the egress, and not too ecstatic. While the Navy strike aircraft didn't run into any opposition on the way out, two of the Air Force“Weasel Vipers” got SA-8 indications on their warning receivers, and each fired a single HARM antiradar missile. The SAM warnings went off after the HARM launches, and both strike packages egressed out of Iraqi Airspace without further incident. As it turned out, the Iraqi Air Defense Command was in a state of shock over what had just happened, and thus the egress was much easier than was expected. All aircraft cleared the border by 1500, and met up with the tankers for their post-strike refueling. After refueling, the Navy aircraft headed to Kitty Hawk, while the Air Force elements made for their bases in Bahrain and Qatar.

While the strike planes were returning to their bases, the Iraqi leadership was in an uproar over what had happened. Saddam's “Day of Triumph” had been ruined, and the Iraqi leader was determined to find out who had failed him. Iraqi propaganda had been calling the Coalition Air Forces cowardly for not testing the capital's air defenses, and now the Coalition had returned the favor, blatantly embarrassing Saddam in front of the Baath Party faithful, and he was determined that someone should pay. Saddam ordered his youngest son Qusay, the head of both the Special Republican Guard and the Special Security Organization, to “Investigate the Air Force and find out who is responsible for this atrocity.” He also directed the Mukhabarat, or General Intelligence Department, to conduct a similar investigation at the Air Defense Command, with the Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence, or DMI, to be kept informed. Saddam didn't have to go far, as the Commander of the Iraqi Air Force, General Hamid al-Gafur, along with his deputy, Lt. General Mustafa al-Salih, had been arrested at the reviewing stand after the raid. Qusay's thugs took charge, and they proceeded to Air Force Headquarters to conduct their investigation. Ten other officers, from the rank of Colonel to Major General, were arrested, including the base commanders at Al-Rashid and Al-Muthena Air Bases (both Brigadier Generals), and taken to Abu Gruhaib Prison. The GID, meanwhile, had arrested twenty senior officers in the Air Defense Command, among them General Amir al-Maruf, the ADC commander, and Lt. Gen. Hussein al-Ghafar, and took them to Hakimaya Prison in Baghdad. After what one of Qusay Hussein's aides called “atrocious torture”, all were made to confess that their forces had not been on alert and prepared for any eventuality. That night and the following morning, after summary court-martials for “Dereliction of Duty, Gross Negligence, and Failure to Defend the State,” all thirty-two officers were shot. Their replacements were either political yes-men, or were their executive officers, promoted to fill slots for which they were not fully ready. The Soviets were aghast, as many of those executed had been trained by the Soviets since the mid-1990s, and had been sources of information on Iraq's military performance, and in some cases, these sources were irreplaceable. By contrast, the CINC-Voyska PVO was not relieved for failing to properly defend against the U.S. and RAF missile attacks on Soviet targets that same morning, although there was one high-level execution as a result, with the Soviet Defense Minister facing a firing squad on the General Secretary's orders.

The POWs at Al-Rashid Prison suffered the least. Although they were allowed to eat, and use their waste buckets, they did receive some punishment for the day's events. The prisoners were all blindfolded, had their hands cuffed behind their backs, and were forced to kneel on the floors of their cells, and forbidden to talk or sleep. The POWs were left in this position for two days, before being freed from punishment on 1 May. And the four POWs in the prison ward at Al-Rashid Military Hospital reported that they had suffered no reprisals for the raid, although a few staff members “shot some angry looks at us,” as Lt.(j.g) Chris Larson said after the war.

The various strike aircraft began returning to their bases as the day went on, with the Saudis being first back around 1200. Their gun-camera videos and estimated BDA were sent to RSAF Headquarters in Riyadh for evaluation and were then passed on to CENTAF in Qatar later that day. Both the Marine and RAF strike elements arrived at their respective bases in Bahrain and Qatar around 1445, while the Navy strike force arrived in the vicinity of Kitty Hawk around 1630 and the Air Force returning to Qatar at 1700. All of those who had penetrated Baghdad's airspace were tired from the long flight, and traffic patterns went out the window as controllers on both the carrier and at land bases ran open patterns, as aircraft low on fuel were given priority. All aircraft were back on their bases by 1745, and the Combat Search-and-Rescue forces were thus released from their alert at that time. BAGHDAD THUNDER was over.

The results of BAGHDAD THUNDER had been worth it, as far as CENTAF and the Navy were concerned. All three airfields in the Baghdad area had been hit, the Iraqi regime had had a serious loss of face, and CENTAF had demonstrated that Coalition aircraft could go anywhere in Iraq and attack whatever targets they chose. There was one other objective, and that concerned the POWs, as they had been given something that they had lacked since their capture: hope. Hope that someday, someone would come and get them out of the nightmare that was captivity, and a return home to family and friends. And to the POWs, hope was something that in the previous few days, had been in short supply. Now they all felt that despite the punishment, everyone would make it.

As far as damage to targets, all three air bases had taken some major damage. All three had lost their control towers, with the loss of not only the air traffic-control radars, but the radio equipment. It would take a few days for temporary replacements to be set up, but they would not be as efficient as the facilities that had been destroyed. Aircraft shelters and maintenance hangars had also been targeted, with all three bases reporting aircraft destroyed either in shelters, in hangars, or adjacent to hangars. Runway damage at all three bases meant that they were out of action, grounding the remaining aircraft on the bases. And at Saddam International, the military side's POL storage had also been hit, torching some 200,000 gallons of jet fuel, and the resulting fire burned for over a day, before it could be controlled.

By contrast to the Iraqi reaction, the Allied reaction to BAGHDAD THUNDER was more than positive. West Berlin had fallen the same day, Copenhagen was about to fall, and the news of the Baghdad raid was a useful counter to the bad news. Many of the aircrews who flew the mission were decorated for their part, with those who actually penetrated Baghdad's airspace being awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, and many others were awarded the Air Medal. While some of this was clearly political, those who flew the mission realized that the mission was a morale boost not only for their friends among the POWs, but for the folks back home. And there were other awards: Carrier Air Wing 5 would be awarded a Navy Unit Commendation, and the original architect of the raid, Lt. Cmdr. Wiser, would be recommended for early promotion to full Commander, which was approved in early May. And the news media clamored for interviews with those who flew the strike, with embedded reporters on both the carrier and shore bases talking with crews about their time over Baghdad.

The Soviets were impressed with the raid, noting that the “Coalition attack aviation obtained total surprise”, and contrary to Iraqi media accounts, only bombed the three airfields in the Baghdad area, “along with associated air defense targets around Baghdad.” Lt. Col. Sergei Birzyanov, a Soviet Air Force advisor and MiG-29 instructor pilot, had been at Al-Rashid air base, discussing the state of the war with several other Soviet advisors, when the attack came in, and he noted that there had been no warning at all, just the appearance of the A-6s and their Hornet escorts, followed by the bombs going off. He noted that while some of the Iraqi officers were dumbfounded about what was happening, several MiG-23 pilots, to their credit, ran to their alert shelters to man their aircraft, while antiaircraft gunners made for their posts. However, two of the alert MiGs were destroyed in their shelters, and the runway hits prevented No. 2 Squadron's remaining MiGs from taking off. In addition, the AAA gunners, while ready, had no orders to engage, and only opened fire as the last of the Air Force strike aircraft flew by the base. Other Soviet advisors had similar stories, with senior Iraqi officers waiting for orders, while junior officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers were more than willing to fight back. The Soviets were also impressed with the Allied use of decoys and standoff weapons to deal with SAM sites, and in the use of the hard-target laser bombs to hit targets such as aircraft shelters, underground fuel storage, and runways. The Voyska PVO advisors, though, were clearly disappointed, as none of Iraq's heavy SAMs, the SA-5s, SA-10s, and SA-12s, had survived the raid, and that they had been destroyed before being able to fire. The PVO was also not happy with the AAA response, noting that it was only after the last aircraft flew over that the antiaircraft defenses opened fire, and by that time, there was nothing to hit. Maj. Viktor Kazanov, one of the PVO advisors to the Iraqi Air Defense Command, said later that all of the damage to civilian areas that the Iraqis claimed were the result of Coalition bombs were actually contact-fused antiaircraft shells and SAMs launched without radar guidance falling back to earth. As one of the Allied planners put it, “All that stuff has to come down somewhere. And hope that you're not in the wrong place when it does come down.” The Soviets' own after-action report blamed the paralysis in the Iraqi Air Defense Command for not reacting to indicators that the raid was coming, and that once the raid was coming in, “serious indecision at the higher levels of command in how to react.” And the Russians added this, “A fear of the Supreme National Leadership's reaction to news that was contrary to the leadership's expectations led to the lack of defensive measures against the raid.” Which meant that Saddam's tendency not to be burdened with bad news, and his occasional summary execution of those bearing such news, led to the paralysis and indecision in the Iraqi command structure that morning and afternoon. Finally, the Soviets did pay a compliment to the Coalition, saying “the attack on the Iraqi capital was well planned and well executed”, and they gave an estimate of losses inflicted by the Iraqis: “Estimated enemy losses to Iraqi Air Defenses: None.”

Just what did BAGHDAD THUNDER accomplish? While some postwar historians and academics (mainly apologists for the Soviets and Iraqis) dismissed the raid as a propaganda stunt, designed to divert attention from the bad news from West Berlin and Copenhagen, most other observers had a different take. The military results of the raid were that three major Iraqi air bases were knocked out of action for several days, and that several gaps were torn in Baghdad's air defense system. Gaps that could be, and were, exploited later by the Coalition air forces in further strikes on Baghdad as the war progressed. The raid also had results that the mission planners expected, but were not so obvious, namely the purge in the Iraqi Air Force and Air Defense Command. With that purge resulting in the replacing of a number of very senior and experienced officers with either political hacks or junior officers promoted to fill jobs that were, in some instances, way over their heads. And it gave a boost to the morale of a group of Allied Servicemen and women who clearly needed one, the POWs held in Baghdad. In the squadrons that had lost friends to Iraqi antiaircraft fire and SAMs, and seeing those friends in footage released by the Iraqis to the media, to those aircrews, that was reason enough to fly the mission. And that feeling was universal throughout the Gulf Region, on every air base and on the carrier Kitty Hawk. RAF Flight Lt. Paul McGregor, who was an exchange pilot with the 9th TFS, and thus the only RAF pilot to penetrate Baghdad's airspace, said it this way; “While the strike had military targets and military objectives, we knew there was another reason. We flew the strike not only for Queen and Country, or for Uncle Sam, but we also flew it for our friends.” Lt. Cdr. Kathy Evision, who flew an F/A-18E on strike escort and flak suppression, told an interviewer, “We did it for the POWs. Some of those in Baghdad are my shipmates, so I did it for them, just as they'd do it for me.” And Commander Compton, who personally led VA-115's strike, summed it up like this: “Up until bomb release, we flew for Uncle Sam. After bomb release, we flew for our prisoners, and after clearing Baghdad, we flew for ourselves.”

[jemhouston]

One of the stories I read when I need a pick me up.

[Wolfman]

Nice work, Matt.