History, Politics And Current Affairs

Dark Earth Demographic and Economic History of Britain: Some Musings

I thought I'd collate and annotate some stuff on the historical population and economy of DE Britain to illustrate some trends.

Historical Britain (and Ireland) Population
1000: 2.28 million (England 1,250,000, Ireland 630,000, Scotland 300,000, Wales 100,000)
1200: 5.1 million (England and Wales 3.9 million , Scotland 400,000, Ireland 830,000)
1347: 6.5 million (England and Wales 4.8 million, Ireland 980,000, Scotland 700,000)
1400: 3.26 million (England 2.08 million, Wales 100,000, Ireland 680,000, Scotland 400,000)
1500: 3.79 million (England 2.2 million, Wales 200,000, Ireland 890,000, Scotland 500,000)
1600: 6.3 million (England 4.11 million, Ireland 1.05 million, Scotland 800,000, Wales 340,000)
1700: 8.63 million (England 5.2 million, Ireland 2.01 million, Scotland 1 million, Wales 420,000)
1750: 9.98 million (England 5.75 million, Ireland 2.5 million, Scotland 1.25 million, Wales 480,000
1801: 15.482 million (England 8.287 million, Ireland 5 million, Scotland 1.608 million, Wales 587,000
1851: 27.361 million (England 16,738,495, Ireland 6.58 million, Scotland 2.88 million, Wales 1.163 million)
1901: 41.06 million (England 30.072 million, Ireland 4.46 million, Scotland 4.472 million, Wales 2.012 million)
1911: 45,133,139 (England 33,561,235, Wales 2,421,000, Scotland 4,760,904, Ireland 4,390,000)
1921: 47,068,632 (England 35,230,225, Wales 2,656,000, Scotland 4,882,407, Ireland 4,300,000)
1931: 48,962,034 (England 37,359,045, Scotland 4,842,989, Ireland 4,210,000, Wales 2,550,000)
1940: 49,828,021 (England 38,084,321, Scotland 5,006,700, Ireland 4,250,000, Wales 2,487,000)
1951: 53,187,175 (England 41,164,356, Scotland 5,095,969, Ireland 4,330,000, Wales 2,596,850)
1961: 55,534,328 (England 43,460,525, Scotland 5,179,000, Ireland 4,250,000, Wales 2,644,803)
1971: 58,874,875 (England 46,411,700, Scotland 5,229,000, Ireland 4,510,000, Wales 2,724,175)

In the above data, we can see the absolute body blow of the Black Death (which came on top of early famine, poor weather and strife) and the slow recovery taking up much of the 15th and 16th centuries.

What is hidden after that, but can be perceived if you know what to look for is the impact of the English Civil War and associated conflicts, which tore a great big demographic hole in the middle of the 17th century; in its absence, we'd easily be looking at 10 million in 1700 and 20-25 million in 1800. At least 4 to 5% of the population in England alone died due to diseases or fighting (an equivalent loss rate to WW1), and in Ireland that figure is up to a staggering 40% of the prewar population.

We further see the big increase of the 19th century that came with the Industrial Revolution and urbanisation, with a substantial population on top of these figures migrating to the USA or the colonies. The Irish drop off post 1840s is stark, showing the dreadful long term impact of the Great Famine.

Dark Earth Britain Population History v 2.0
1000: 5.1 million
1200: 8.2 million
1350: 11.9 million
1400: 8.6 million
1500: 10.2 million
1600: 14.4 million
1700: 22.5 million
1750: 30 million
1801: 42 million
1851: 68 million
1901: 102 million
1911: 112 million
1921: 116 million
1931: 120 million
1940: 125 million
1951: 134 million
1961: 142 million
1971: 152,124,236 (England 97,521,382, Scotland 20,112,395, Ireland 18,508,143, Wales 8,965,364, Lyonesse 6,537,065, 479,887 Channel Islands and Isle of Man and outlying islands)


- Prior to the Agricultural Revolution and Industrial Revolution, population and the economy were very closely intertwined and further linked with the carrying capacity of the land or country. Britain was not as productive as France or Italy, so as on Earth, the population is less during this era.
- By the same token, Early Medieval Britain/the British Isles was reasonably productive and supported a reasonable sized population. The additional factor of Lyonesse, an island 2/3rd of the size of Ireland and positioned in more favourable climes, adds to the general figure of the total population
- When we factor in the size of the land mass and subsequent increase of natural population, there is still a figure of an extra 25% of population in 1000, which is covered by Lyonesse, a larger London and a bit larger general population of Southern England
- From that point, there is broadly similar growth in the High Middle Ages up to the Black Death. The total death rate there is around 30% compared to 30-50% in @, reflecting a bit more luck in constraining the spread of the disease/closing the ports, use of magic and other assorted reasons; the end result is losing an arm and a leg compared to two legs and an arm, which is still bally bad
- 1400 to 1500 sees growth of ~ 16% compared to ~ 14%, so there is little real difference in impact in that century
- From 1500 to 1600, there is actually less population growth in 1500s Britain and Ireland than historically, at 29% compared to 40%, but that may be due to sources low balling the 1500 population figures. In general statistical terms, fairly steady as she goes
- The next major change after the slightly less deadly Black Death comes in the 1600s, with the lack of the ECW and associated wars. The population rises by a steady 36% over the century compared to 26.63%, so again a bit more and it keeps on building upon a steadily increasing base. Even now, it is on the low end of what would be reasonable in the absence of a major war, but the confluence of the Great Plague and subsequent epidemic outbreaks (smallpox being most notable, but also a recurrence of the sweat), the relatively smaller but still significant military losses in the Thirty Years' War (~ 80,000 combat + 80,000 disease) and other smaller causes account for that
- In the 18th century, we see the first part of the Ag Rev charging up the population boom, with net growth of 46.43% compared to...44.26%
- In the 19th century, this increases to 58.82% in DE compared to 62.3% on Earth, but this is accounted for by the larger base they are starting from, which removes the distorting effect of a rise from a lower level
- Between 1815 and 1930, 36.2 million people emigrated from Britain and 18.4 million from Ireland to the USA, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, New Zealand, New Avalon, Rhodesia, Newfoundland and various other locations
- When we get to the 20th century, Dark Earth growth comes to 8.92% in 1901-1911, 3.45% in 1911-1921, 3.33% in 1921-1931, 4% in 1931-1940, 6.72% from 1940-1951, 5.63% from 1951 to 1961 and 6.58% from 1961 to 1971, compared to 9.02%, 4.11%, 3.87%, 1.74%, 6.32%, 4.23% and 5.67% on Earth. That is essentially statistically fairly even until 1931, lagging a bit behind Earth (due to migration) when DE pulls away in the 1930s, then has a slightly stronger and extended Baby Boom period post 1945

With regards to population, if anything, it has probably still been low balled a tad, what with the cumulative advantages of different events in previous centuries 'stacking up'. I'm going to say that, as things now stand, migration offsets whatever gaps seem to emerge, with the USA, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, South America and more places being large enough to take up a lot of the excess numbers in the 19th and 20th centuries.

And now (in the sonorous tones of Leonard Graves narrating Victory at Sea), onto the dark art of ...economics...

Historical British GDP

Firstly, it is really difficult to get an form of accurate figures before a certain time. Maddison gives $800 million for 1000, $2815 million for 1500, $6007 for 1600 and $10709 for 1700, before his first reasonably firm figure for Britain coming in 1820. Through some work for another thread, I've popped in rough figures for 1810 and 1800.

As with all Maddison derived figures, the above are millions of 1990 USD.

1000: 800
1500: 2815
1600: 6007
1700: 10,709
1800: 24,028
1810: 30,364 (+ 20.9%)
1820: 36,232 (+ 16.2%)
1830: 42,228 (+ 14.2%)
1840: 53,234 (+ 20.7%)
1850: 63,342 (+ 15.96%)
1860: 81,760 (+ 22.5%)
1870: 100,180 (+ 18.4%)
1880: 120,395 (+ 16.8%)
1890: 150,269 (+ 19.9%)
1900: 184,861 (+ 18.7%)
1910: 207,098 (+ 10.7%)
1920: 212,938 (+ 2.74%)
1930: 249,551 (+ 14.7%)
1940: 330,638 (+ 24.5%)
1950: 347,850 (+ 4.95%)
1960: 452,768 (+ 23.17%)
1970: 599,016 (+ 24.4%)

What story does this tell? The IR slowly kicking into gear and then going great guns around the middle of the 1800s, followed by the Long Depression seeing something of a comparative slowing of growth over the last two decades of the century (hitting around ~ 37% over 20 years being very small compared to the USA and Germany). Pre WW1 growth was all over the place like a mad woman's breakfast, before mobilisation lead to a reasonable rise to $254,000 million, prior of course to the post WW1 Depression.

The 1920s were a nothing decade, interrupted by recessions, the Great Strike and slow recoveries, followed by the huge impact of the Great Depression in the 1930s and the trials and tribulations of WW2 and its aftermath in the 1940s. The reasonable performance in the 1950s and 60s obscured some growing issues of concern regarding the underpinnings of the economy and trade behind the scenes, then well and truly in front of them - from Never Having it So Good in 1957 to devaluation in 1967 was just under a decade.

Dark Earth Historical British GDP v 2.0 (in 1990 USD for comparison to the above)

1000: $1.8 billion
1500: $7 billion
1600: $12 billion
1700: $25 billion
1800: $64 billion
1810: $75 billion (+ 14.67%)
1820: $92 billion (+ 18.48%)
1830: $115 billion (+ 20%)
1840: $150 billion (+ 23.3%)
1850: $193 billion (+ 22.28%)
1860: $256 billion (+ 24.6%)
1870: $329 billion (+ 22.19%)
1880: $417 billion (+ 21.1%)
1890: $533 billion (+ 21.62%)
1900: $652 billion (+ 18.25%)
1910: $792 billion (+ 17.68%)
1920: $893 billion (+ 11.3%)
1930: $1096 billion (+ 18.52%)
1940: $1420 billion (+ 22.82%)
1950: $1839 billion (+ 22.78%)
1960: $2699 billion (+ 31.86%)
1970: $4631 billion (+ 41.72%)

- There isn't a huge amount of variation in growth rates before we hit 1800, which reflects a primarily agricultural based economy and the larger size of Dark Earth
- Over the 19th century, there is a steadier rate of increase resulting in 902% compared to 770%, but no one decade stands out as outlandishly in advance of comparable periods; it is simply a matter of the power of cumulative growth, as well as starting from a larger base
- In the 20th century, we see a more solid first decade, and then enough growth from 1911-1914 so that the aftermath of the Great War doesn't quite wipe out the decade. The 1920s are a fair bit stronger, due to reasons discussed previously at length, whilst the 1930s numbers are a bit behind those of @, reflecting and balancing that performance somewhat
- It is from WW2 onwards that we see a difference. The exact numbers through that 'long decade' are in Appendix 1 below, demonstrating a sharper fall at the end of the war due to demobbing, but shorter one without the extension through the years where everything seemed to go awry
- So, where do we get that extra 8.69% from 1950-1960 and 17.32% from 1960 to 1970? For the 1950s, the combination of better placed industry, export markets, recovering trade partners and reconstruction easily account for the extra performance when spread out across a decade
-For the 1960s, broadly speaking, it comes from a confluence of

(a) better trade union/labour relations and laws 'in place of strife';
(b) greater productivity growth through technology, computers and advanced machinery;
(c) earlier exploitation of North Sea oil and gas, along with British oil companies maintaining a considerable degree of control of Middle Eastern oil in Persia, Iraq and Arabia;
(d) lower taxes, both on average and as a trend;
(e) continuing role of Imperial Preference and the Empire Common Market;
(f) consolidation in key industries into 4-5 groups to allow for maximal competition without saturation, whilst avoiding single 'national champions' who become stale and moribund through lack of competition;
(g) increasingly cheap and abundant electricity and modern, fast and efficient transport;
(h) the growth of relative domestic affluence driving demand for consumer goods and services within what is a rather large market;
(i) cumulative investment in technical education and encouraging growth in the engineering sector paying off;
(j) a lack of the same opportunity costs of the World Wars, and specifically the crushing burden of Debt to GDP;
(k) better performing aviation and automotive exports over the decade as demand internationally booms;
(l) getting a jump on some sectors of technology and making it count;
(m) having sounder fundamentals in terms of the Balance of Trade, invisible exports/imports and the fiscal situation;
(n) military Keynesian spending and rearmament playing their small part;
(o) the cumulative impact of better investment in infrastructure and efficiency of transport nodes over the last century;
(p) not 'missing the bus' on multiple promising technologies in energy, jet aircraft, transistors, computers, integrated circuits and other areas to the same extent;
(q) consistently high arms export earnings;
(r) the absence of a common market/economic community in Europe acting as a competitor in some areas;
(s) the cumulative advantages and information of Lapcat;
(t) an absence of the cumulative economic and fiscal woes of 1945-1970 that begat the mounting crisis of the late 1960s;
(u) more people going into tertiary education for the new higher technology jobs and in turn creating more value in their output;
(v) less expenditure funded by various forms of taxation as a percentage of GDP, freeing up funds for the private sector and investment;
(w) lower welfare expenditure due to better general economic times;
(x) the downstream payoffs of over 100 years of the space programme;
(y) specific laws, non-tariff barriers and obstacles to some imports entering the ECM;
(z) investment loans for businesses to invest in modern plant and capital equipment;
(æ) implementation of the first stage of a computing and cybernetics revolution;
(þ) some extremely broad reaching implementation of magitech;
(œ) a thriving cultural, creative and arts sector, extending to very successful cinema/film production, music, literature and television sectors.

If the combination of the above 29 factors doesn't add up to 17.32% or an extra 1.732% per annum over the decade, then nothing will.

Elsewhere , I described the British economy in the 1950s thusly:

"A marked recovery, but one that hid all the growing issues within the postwar British economy and was relatively small compared to the performance of Germany (+ 52.49%), France (+ 36.02%), Italy (+ 44.45%), Australia (+ 32.73%), Canada (+ 36.1%) and the USA (+ 28.87%). Whilst the European states did have the 'recovery boost', not every bit of growth can be put down to the exigencies of reconstruction"

The Dark Earth economy manages to get into gear and move along somewhere between France and Italy from @, with growth coming not from reconstruction (as there is comparatively little of that to do compared with the Continent), but from pushing hard in a number of sectors.

Appendix 1: DE British Economic Growth and GDP 1940-1974

1940/41: $1420 billion (+ 10.8%)
1941/42: $1592 billion (+ 9.96%)
1942/43: $1750 billion (+ 8.4%)
1943/44: $1897 billion (+ 5.08%)
1944/45: $1993 billion (+ 4.31%)
1945/46: $2078 billion (-19.62%)
1946/47: $1,670,766,489,131 (-4.23%)
1947/48: $1,600,092,645,313 (+ 4.97%)
1948/49: $1,683,739,129,007 (+ 4.52%)
1949/50: $1,768,633,538,873 (+ 3.86%)

1950/51: $1,839,643,789,134/£51,101,216,365 (+ 4.75%)
1951/52: $1,931,442,014,212 /£56,807,118,065 (+ 4.99%)
1952/53: $2,055,440,591,524 /£62,286,078,531 (+ 6.42%)
1953/54: $2,143,207,904,782/£66,975,247,024 (+ 4.27%)
1954/55: $2,204,503,650,859/£71,113,020,995 (+ 2.86%)
1955/56: $2,322,003,695,450 /£77,400,123,182 (+ 5.33%)
1956/57: $2,421,617,653,985/£83,504,057,034 (+ 4.29%)
1957/58: $2,391,347,433,310/£85,405,265,475 (-1.25%)
1958/59: $2,476,479,401,936/£91,721,459,331 (+ 3.56%)
1959/60: $2,597,083,948,810/£99,887,844,185 (+ 4.87%)

1960/61: $2,699,928,473,183/ £107,997,138,927 (+ 3.96%)
1961/62: $2,841,404,725,188/ £118,391,863,550 (+ 5.24%)
1962/63: $2,901,074,224,406/ £126,133,661,931 (+ 2.1%)
1963/64: $3,040,325,787,178/ £138,196,626,690 (+ 4.8%)
1964/65: $3,200,550,956,162/ £152,407,188,389 (+ 5.27%)
1965/66: $3,380,421,919,898/ £169,121,095,845 (+ 5.62%)
1966/67: $3,667,081,698,706/ £183,354,084,935 (+ 8.48%)
1967/68: $3,921,210,460,426/ £201,087,715,919 (+ 6.93%)
1968/69: $4,157,267,330,144/ £213,193,196,418 (+ 6.02%)
1969/70: $4,400,051,742,224/ £231,581,670,538 (+ 5.84%)

1970/71: $4,631,054,458,691/ £243,739,708,352 (+ 5.25%)
1971/72: $4,861,680,970,734/ £262,793,565,985 (+ 4.98%)
1972/73: $5,227,571,080,591/ £282,571,409,761 (+ 7.526%)
1973/74: $5,480,585,520,892/ £304,476,973,382 (+ 4.84%)
1974/75: $5,863,130,390,250/ £325,729,466,125 (+ 6.98%)


Appendix 2: USA DE Historical Population and GDP

USA Historical Population
1610: 350
1700: 250,888
1750: 1,170,760
1760: 1,593,625
1770: 2,148,076
1780: 2,780,369
1790: 3,929,214
1800: 5,308,483
1810: 7,239,881
1820: 9,638,453
1830: 12,866,020
1840: 17,069,453
1850: 23,191,876
1860: 31,443,321
1870: 38,558,371
1880: 50,189,209
1890: 62,979,766
1900: 76,212,168
1910: 92,228,496
1920: 106,021,537
1930: 123,202,624
1940: 132,164,569
1950: 151,325,798
1960: 179,323,175
1970: 203,211,926

USA Historical DE Population
1610: 500
1700: 425,000
1750: 2.4 million
1770: 3.8 million
1780: 4.7 million
1790: 5.3 million
1800: 6.4 million
1810: 8.8 million
1820: 12 million
1830: 17 million
1840: 24 million
1850: 32 million
1860: 44 million
1870: 54 million
1880: 70 million
1890: 95 million
1900: 129 million
1910: 156 million
1918: 169 million
1920: 174 million
1930: 196 million
1940: 225 million
1950: 254,378,208
1960: 287,569,463
1970: 331,262,928

US Historical GDP
1600: 600
1700: 527
1820: 12548
1830: 18219
1840: 27694
1850: 42583
1860: 69346
1870: 98374
1880: 160656
1890: 214714
1900: 312499
1910: 460471
1920: 593438
1930: 768314
1940: 929737
1950: 1455916
1960: 2046727
1970: 3081990

US Historical DE GDP

1700: $964 million
1750: $2.9 billion
1800: $8 billion
1810: $21 billion
1820: $33 billion
1830: $50 billion
1840: $74 billion
1850: $110 billion
1860: $165 billion
1870: $239 billion
1880: $392 billion
1890: $628 billion
1900: $851 billion
1905: $1.04 billion
1910: $1.29 trillion
1920: $1.83 trillion
1925: $2.41 trillion
1930: $2.84 trillion
1935: $2.15 trillion
1940: $2.97 trillion
1945: $4.52 trillion
1950: $3,994,215,523,812
1960: $5,624,082,781,544
1970: $10,608,144,009,891

Appendix 3: British Defence Spending 1960-1974 v 2.0

1960: $337,491,059,148/£13,499,642,366 (12.5%)
1961: $329,602,948,122/£13,733,456,171 (11.6%)
1962: $322,019,238,909/£13,117,900,841 (10.4%)
1963: $300,992,252,930/£13,681,466,042 (9.9%)
1964: $316,854,544,660/£15,088,311,651 (9.9%)
1965: $344,803,035,830/£17,250,351,776 (10.2%)
1966: $366,708,169,871/£18,335,408,494 (10%)
1967: $411,727,098,345/£21,114,210,171 (10.5%)
1968: $440,670,336,995/£22,598,478,820 (10.6%)
1969: $457,605,381,191/£24,084,493,736 (10.4%)
1970: $472,367,554,786/£24,861,450,252 (10.2%)
1971: $486,168,097,073/£26,279,356,596 (10%)
1972: $512,301,965,898/£27,691,998,157 (9.8%)
1973: $548,058,552,089/£30,447,697,338 (10%)
1974: $574,586,778,245/£31,921,487,680 (9.8%)

Appendix 4: Historical Populations of DE Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand

Canada
1756: 760,000
1800: 2 million
1810: 2.9 million
1820: 4.1 million
1830: 5.2 million
1840: 6.4 million
1850: 8.3 million
1860: 9.4 million
1870: 10.6 million
1880: 12.5 million
1890: 16 million
1900: 20 million
1910: 27 million
1920: 35 million
1930: 42 million
1940: 50 million
1945: 54 million
1947: 56.2 million
1950: 60 million
1960: 69,847,992
1970: 84,903,659

Australia
1788: 1256
1790: 3200
1800: 6479
1810: 15,842
1820: 64,000
1830: 156,000
1840: 328,000
1850: 762,000
1860: 2.1 million
1870: 2.9 million
1880: 3.9 million
1890: 5.8 million
1900: 7 million
1910: 9.5 million
1920: 12 million
1930: 14.5 million
1940: 16.2 million
1945: 17.4 million
1947: 18.3 million
1950: 20.1 million
1960: 25,536,978
1970: 32,887,795

South Africa
1781: 79,000
1800: 123,000
1810: 186,000
1820: 257,000
1830: 364,000
1840: 651,000
1850: 825,000
1860: 1.498 million
1870: 2.354 million
1880: 3.52 million
1890: 5.25 million
1900: 6.91 million
1910: 8.87 million
1920: 11.06 million
1930: 13.24 million
1940: 15.93 million
1945: 17.07 million
1947: 17.82 million
1950: 20.56 million
1960: 27,189,453
1970: 36,967,276

Appendix 5: Commonwealth GDPs 1960-1974

Canada
1960: $1,000,704,244,069
1961: $1,051,940,301,365
1962: $1,125,365,734,400
1963: $1,180,846,265,106
1964: $1,253,745,207,966
1965: $1,424,679,814,086
1966: $1,521,415,573,462
1967: $1,601,289,891,069
1968: $1,739,000,821,701
1969: $1,815,516,857,856
1970: $1,957,853,379,512
1971: $2,086,092,775,870
1972: $2,259,029,866,990
1973: $2,344,421,195,962
1974: $2,527,520,491,366

Rhodesia
1960: $109.05 billion
1961: $116,399,970,000 (6.74%)
1962: $122,091,928,533 (4.89%)
1963: $125,351,783,025 (2.67%)
1964: $137,322,878,304 (9.55%)
1965: $148,116,456,538 (7.86%)
1966: $160,573,050,533 (8.41%)
1967: $175,490,286,928 (9.29%)
1968: $185,352,841,053 (5.62%)
1969: $208,929,722,435 (12.72%)
1970: $231,264,301,763 (+ 10.69%)

New Zealand
1960: $102,960,000,000
1961: $109,024,344,000 (5.89)
1962: $113,505,244,538 (4.11)
1963: $122,540,262,004 (7.96)
1964: $131,546,971,261 (7.35)
1965: $142,688,999,727 (8.47)
1966: $154,075,581,905 (7.98)
1967: $162,179,957,513 (5.26)
1968: $171,618,831,040 (5.82)
1969: $187,648,029,860 (9.34)
1970: $200,633,273,526 (+ 6.92%)

New Avalon
1960: $262.3 billion
1961: $279,087,200,000 (+ 6.4%)
1962: $295,050,987,840 (+ 5.72%)
1963: $314,553,858,136 (+ 6.61%)
1964: $328,331,317,123 (+ 4.38%)
1965: $345,207,546,823 (+ 5.14%)
1966: $361,984,633,598 (+ 4.86%)
1967: $383,377,925,444 (+ 5.91%)
1968: $404,272,022,381 (+ 5.45%)
1969: $429,700,732,588 (+ 6.29%)
1970: $447,619,253,137 (+ 4.17%)

South Africa
1960: $349.625 billion (£13985 million)
1961: $371,011,561,250 (+ 6.117%)
1962: $396,685,561,289 (+ 6.92%)
1963: $431,673,228,795 (+ 8.82%)
1964: $464,437,226,860 (+ 7.59%)
1965: $495,275,858,724 (+ 6.64%)
1966: $525,735,324,035 (+ 6.15%)
1967: $569,476,502,995 (+ 8.32%)
1968: $608,143,957,548 (+ 6.79%)
1969: $646,761,098,852 (+ 6.35%)
1970: $682,203,607,069 (+ 5.48%)

Australia
1960: $465,730,000,000 (18,629 million) (7.68%)
1961: $504,339,017,000 (8.29%) 20,141,674,800
1962: $538,785,371,861 (6.83%) 21,517,351,189
1963: $577,847,311,321 (7.25%) 23,077,359,150
1964: $612,344,795,807 (5.97%) 24,445,077,491
1965: $670,517,551,409 (+ 9.5%)
1966: $712,760,157,148 (+6.3%)
1967: $749,966,237,351 (+5.22%)
1968: $798,181,566,750 (+6.429%)
1969: $845,433,915,502 (44,496,521,869) (+5.92%)
1970: $895,060,886,342 (+ 5.87%)

Israel
1960: $61,925,370,000 (£2476 million)
1961: $67,167,352,571 (+ 8.465%)
1962: $74,045,289,474 (+ 10.24%)
1963: $85,596,354,632 (11.56%)
1964: $93,890,641,395 (9.69%)
1965: $106,481,376,406 (13.41%)
1966: $121,974,416,673 (14.55%)
1967: $137,270,085,524 (12.54%)
1968: $153,704,746,513 (11.9725)
1969: $179,012,072,589 (14.14%)
1970: $197,378,711,237 (10.26%)


(The above data sets represent an update/retcon to some older numbers, which I'll fix up with some editing when I get a chance.)

Got a question for you about the US and Canadian populations, specifically the 1610 date. Its fairly safe to assume that the number is not in thousands because the next number for 1700 is in thousands. That pretty much means you're ignoring the native populations, correct? Similar question for Australia.

Also... The 1600 GDP value for the US is 600 million. That has to either take into account the native population or its gotta be wrong, doesn't it?

Thanks in advance.

Belushi TD

Correct. There is no firm data for native populations that can be employed in the same fashion as that of the colonial settlers.

The GDP is a very broad figure for such times, and is, as is my habit, in the 1990 USD employed in the works of the late Professor Angus Maddison. That $600 million is about £3.6 million in 1610 using the ‘real price’ value from Measuring Worth. However, we also have some sums regarding James I and ship money, whereby £40,000 charged to London in 1619 was worth $9,966,154 in 2023, or $4,285,446 in 1990.

Given what we know on taxation in early 17th century England, 3 million pounds is a heck of a lot of money. Jamestown, even with ships and settlers, wouldn’t be worth 3 million or even 300,000.

For that reason, I think that the 1610 figure is a vague general one spanning North America in the roughest of estimates, including natives.

In defence, the figures are from separate sources; my best advice is to avert your eyes from 1610 and nothing will hurt you.

Yeah, there's all kinds of risks involved in bringing together numbers from different sources.

Thanks for the clarification as well as the advice.

*averts eyes*

Belushi TD

You’re welcome.

The difference lay in the population data coming from some other sources, and GDP from Maddison. He is very good on 19th and 20th century stuff, as there were more records and generally a more modern understanding of economics, but the further back we go, the more things enter the realm of an estimate.

1975 Where Are They Now?

Ronald Reagan
President Reagan enters his third year in office at the height of his powers and popularity to date, with the impressive Republican gains in the 1974 midterms building upon a reputation for strength at home and abroad. The mood of sunny optimism is just what the American people are after following the years of war in Vietnam.

John F. Kennedy
President Kennedy has moved quite seamlessly in the traditional post-presidential role of elder statesman. At just 58, he feels he has plenty that he can offer the USA and the world, and he remains extremely popular for his role in leading the victory in the Vietnam War. The prospect of him becoming Secretary-General of the League of Nations is at this time a distant one, but not impossible

George H.W. Bush
Vice President Bush is managing to keep a high profile in the secondary office, and is increasing his already sound reputation as a foreign policy expert, which grew from his notable period as Ambassador to the League of Nations.

George W. Bush
The son of the Vice President is a graduate of Yale and recently successfully completed an MBA at Harvard Business School, but his most notable role to date was as a USAFANG F-102 pilot in the Vietnam War, where he was leader of the flight involved with the nuclear air to air engagement of December 31 1967; that night saw Bush become an ace in unique circumstances.

Prince Philip
The Prince Consort and Duke of Edinburgh is in the prime of his life at 54 (although he looks a good 15 years younger) and plays multiple roles in addition to his role as Queen Elizabeth II's consort and pater familias of the extensive Royal Family, including leading positions on the Committee of Imperial Defence, Joint Intelligence Committee, the National Security Council and the Privy Council, as well as his many civil and charitable roles. There is discussion currently underway as to the question of him being named King Consort for the Queen's Silver Jubilee.

Stanley Barton
Prime Minister since September 1964, Barton is in his third term in power and continues to dominate both the Labour Party and British politics in general with his combination of social traditionalism, Empire socialism, domestic economic growth and a strong defence and foreign policies. Where once her had a number of potential rivals and power bases that required appeasement, only Chancellor Denis Healey remains with any sort of internal power base; Barton having lead Labour since 1956 does mean that the party has largely been shaped in his image. Across Britain, he is continually popular due to his solid, plain speaking, his traditional family values, populist policies and sound economic management.

Sir Enoch Powell
The Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition stands poised to challenge Barton and Labour at the next general election (due in the second half of 1976), needing to flip a theoretical 39 seats across the United Kingdom to become the largest party in the House of Commons and having an even chance of returning to the Government benches when new seats across England are taken into account. Powell is popular in the Parliament, among the membership and across the country, with his combination of expansive oratory, sharp intellect and a growing appetite in some quarters for some sense of change.

Yukio Mishima
Prime Minister of Japan, he has made national rearmament and rejuvenation as his major policy, supported by the white-hot Japanese economy. Under Mishima, Japanese forces and diplomacy have started to branch out across Asia and the Pacific to demonstrate that Tokyo is willing and ready to play an active, major role in collective defence and security. He has also apparently been working on a new novel during his time in office.

Winston Churchill
The grand old man of the Free World, the Duke of London celebrated his 100th birthday on November 30th 1974, and is still active and relatively healthy, writing a new history of the Seven Years' War and introducing a new BBC series based upon his biography of Marlborough. He no longer regularly sits in the House of Lords and confines his political opining to back channels behind the scenes, spending his time writing, gardening, painting and indulging his most recent hobby, composing.

Anthony Wedgewood Benn
Socialist MP Benn is a little known but strong performer in the House of Commons, where the peripheral role of the Socialist Party (oft lamented as a victim of the British electoral system by its supporters) has kept him on the edges of general public perception. Undeterred, he keeps the faith for a fairer, more humane and socialist world.

Father Ted Crilly
A young charismatic Church of Ireland cleric who has recently been assigned to the relatively sedate parish of Craggy Island, after a spot of confusion regarding monies raised to send a poorly girl to Lourdes; apparently, the funds were just resting in his account.

Richard Nixon
Chief Justice Nixon is one of the most respected men in America, and is noted for his erudite and well-reasoned judgements. The Nixon Court has seen a number of interesting decisions thus far on a range of constitutional questions,

Clint Eastwood
Hollywood superstar Eastwood has carved out a niche in Westerns, war films and action pictures, with his taciturn and minimalist style being popular with audiences across the world. He has recently begun to branch out into directing and, rather less publicly, clandestine adventuring.

Steven Spielberg
Director of the recently completed Flipper, Spielberg has some expansive plans for future pictures, but their scope for execution will depend on the success of his first release in the upcoming summer.

Garfield
A rather sturdily built orange tabby talking Persian cat resident with his owner in Muncie, Indiana, he is an aficionado of Italian foodstuffs and something of an amateur sleuth in the tradition of his correspondent, Mr. Nero Wolfe of New York City.

Jonathan Netanyahu
The commanding officer of Israel’s premier special forces unit, the secretive Sayeret Matkal, he served with the Israeli contingent in South Vietnam and is regarded as a model soldier.

Lankester Merrin
A highly esteemed Roman Catholic priest and Jesuit of Irish extraction well known for his early work in Middle Eastern archaeology, and equally valued for his work as an exorcist and warrior against the dark. He is currently attached to the Archdiocese of Washington.

Arnold Schwarzenegger
Actor, bodybuilder, commando and Renaissance Man, Schwarzenegger is a star on the rise in American cinema, with his new picture Conan the Barbarian tipped to be a box office smash. His performance as Hamlet on stage in New York attracted many plaudits for the subtlety and range of his acting, whilst he recently starred in a national commercial for the USDA's healthy eating campaign, with the opening catchphrase "Put that cookie down! Now!" immediately becoming popular in schoolyards across America.

John Wayne
The Duke continues to attract new and interesting roles on the silver screen, and recently marked his debut in a television miniseries, where admittedly his acting and presence did seem a tad large for the milieu in the view of some critics. He is giving some thought to engaging more directly in politics, and is in discussions with a number of Reagan Administration officials on potential roles.

James Carter
Governor of Georgia, Carter is widely admired within the Peach State for his upright Christian character, personal integrity and humility.

Shah Kamar of Persia
The young Shah is dedicated to a process of gradual reform and modernisation of his country, having a dream of returning Persia to the mantle of regional dominance by the end of the century. His able advisors have counselled him against moving too fast on particular aspects of his programme, and he has heeded them to this point; foreign diplomats and royalty have observed that he seems to have an eminently sensible head on his shoulders.

Prince Charles
The Prince of Wales is currently serving as a Royal Navy officer, with his next promotion likely to be to command of a cruiser, and then possibly more, depending on his other commitments and planned service in the other Armed Forces. He has expressed interest in becoming the next Governor-General of Australia and this is seen as a possible scenario, when his current children are old enough for boarding school.

Abba Eban
Foreign Minister of Israel, the ebulient Eban (one of several Israeli politicians to Hebricise his name) is well known in diplomatic circles as a strong voice for peace and stability and advocacy for the Baghdad Pact and other regional collective security arrangements.

C. Montgomery Burns
One of America and the world's richest men, Burns has interests in over a dozen states and fifty companies, with the 'crown jewels' of his holdings being the Springfield Fusion Plant and the nearby Springfield Aerospace Manufacturing Complex, which is expanding as part of the U.S. starship programme.

Norman Mailer
A noted author, journalist and sportswriter, he is currently working on a biography of President Kennedy

Viv Richards
The rising star of West Indies and world cricket and seen by many as the heir apparent to the great Garfield Sobers, Richards is an aggressive, confident, powerful and stylish right hand batsman, capable bowler and cat-like fielder who currently averages 69.32 in Test cricket. He is one of a number of cricketers who have been courted for a potential professional 'World Series' of cricket to be staged in the United States during the offseason.

George Best
One of the finest soccer players across the Home Nations, Best qualified for England under a system that many foreign soccer journalists regard as an obscure technicality, but has subsequently excelled at the 1970 and 1974 World Cups and now, at 28, is at the height of his powers. After something of a wild period as a youth, his marriage after his National Service has acted to settle him down and he is well regarded for his discipline and professionalism.

Bob Hawke
Popular Prime Minister of Australia, Hawke has had the good fortune of enjoying sunny economic times and a reduction in the relative security threat to Australia with the peace agreement with Indonesia, which still holds steady. His policy approach has been to emphasise economic growth and performance in order fund education and social development programmes.

Gough Whitlam
Edward Gough Whitlam is Chief Justice of New South Wales, after a glittering career as a barrister and then judge; his early dalliances with attempting to gain Labour preselection came to naught, leading him to abandon that potential career path during the ALP's political nadir during the dark hours of the DLP split.

Sir George Smiley
Chief of the Circus/SIS, Smiley is perhaps Britain's greatest intelligence officer since the now retired and venerable Sir Sidney Reilly and one of the most valuable assets of the British Empire.

Hunter S. Thompson
Bohemian journalist and author Thompson has recently begun to branch out into the new discipline of psychonautic alchemy, and has apparently attracted the attention of a number of interesting entities.

Miss Piggy
Perhaps the greatest Hollywood diva of the modern age, 'America's Sweetheart' Miss Piggy is a muppet on the move, starring on stage, screen and film in a number of impressive productions over the last three years and being regarded as in the running for an Oscar for her role as Bertha Rochester in Jane Eyre. Her husband and longtime collaborator, Kermit the Frog, is at this time content to play the supporting role to her waxing star turn.

Delia Smith
A young television cook whose simple and friendly presentation style has taken Britain by storm in 1974, she looks poised for stardom.

Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State Kissinger is a well thought of diplomat and former academic whose characteristic German accent has been a considerable boon to imitators, particularly the ever-popular Vaughan Meader.

Thanks for the update.

You’re welcome. Any requests as to other people for WATN will be answered.

"The money was just resting in my account", that line still makes me smile

Halfway Across the 1970s and Turn Left: A World Overview and General Reflections (Part the First)
- The first and perhaps equal foremost difference to mention is the different end result of the Vietnam War. Both North Vietnam and South Vietnam remain as heavily supported Communist and Western proxies/aligned states, replete with large military machines, significant residual foreign garrisons and a heck of a lot of rebuilding and reconstruction to be done. There is then a strong resemblance to the @ Korean situation, but it is not a facsimile

- In the immediate neighbourhood of Vietnam, there is a split in Laos and no Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and their accompanying rivers of blood. In the near beyond, there won't be any outflux of Vietnamese 'boat people' in the late 1970s and 80s, which will have a flow on effect on the Vietnamese diaspora in many countries around the world

- Thailand and Burma both have their own residual issues with insurgencies both Communist backed and those with a more nationalist/separatist character (backed by Imperial China)

- Indonesia remains a Communist state, but one not overtly at (undeclared) war in Borneo, Malaya and the oceanic frontiers with the Dutch Moluccas and the tenuously independent Western New Guinea. There won't be any invasion of East Timor in 1975 as but one consequence of this, but this is offset by the general impact of a Djakarta still within Moscow's orbit and the consequences of Soviet naval and military bases at Surabaya, Makassar, Bengkulu and Balikpapan

- Globally, we see a USA with no 'Vietnam syndrome', which will have interesting consequences when the next crisis and regional war arises; a Free Europe and West that largely saw contingents go and fight a la Korea, including this time Japan, Germany and Israel; a Soviet Union that feels that it managed to get a decent draw this time, rather than a loss as in Korea; and an Imperial China who has seen her influence broaden considerably whilst also encountering some marked reconciliation with the West

- Second is the lack of a 1973 oil shock and the subsequent end of the Trente Glorieuses/Postwar Economic Good Time. This isn't to say that it is all going to be chocolates and roses, with there being continuing inflation (albeit less than the historical 1970s), and the scope for further stock market events and/or other catalytic occurrences that might set off another recession. There was a crash in 1973, but the lack of the accompanying stressors such as an ongoing Vietnam, stagflation and the Yom Kippur oil shock didn't exacerbate it into what really amounted to an effective depression/long U shaped recession. What is the impact of this upon the world? Quite huge, spanning economic, social, industrial, scientific and cultural spheres

- One factor behind the absence of said oil shock is the absence in turn of a Arab-Israeli War in 1973, or one in 1967 either. Why? There isn't a basis for a 1967 war in the aftermath of the DE 1956 War (which is delightfully confusingly known in-universe as 'The Six Day War' on account of its length ), as the Suez Canal Zone remains occupied by the British, with Israeli controlling the whole of the Sinai (which it had since its establishment in the 1930s - see the 1947 story 'Shaping the Middle East' for details) and Egypt being in no position to threaten her from the south, whilst in the north, Syria remains an unstable Hashemite monarchy rather than a belligerent Baathist republic armed by and aligned with the Soviets. As can be further deduced from the above, and the recommended story, there wasn't a 1948 War either, such that the general situation between the Arab states and Israel and Egypt and Israel (note the distinction whereby Egypt doesn't see itself as the paramount Arab state, but as something distinct in her own right) is very different indeed. Whilst there is a possibility of a military conflict in the Middle East at some point, it would be different in character and scope and occur for different reasons, not to mention involving Britain and the USA by virtue of their regional bases

- Flowing out from this, we are very unlikely to see the extremely consequential Iranian Revolution of 1979 occur, or even a variation thereof, with all that would entail and not entail; and it is slightly less unlikely, but still not probable that we will see any overt Soviet move into Afghanistan

- Strategic arms limitation talks and attempts at treaties were very much front and centre in the historical 1970s, but here, they are far more difficult to engineer, given the dual problems of a USA that did not curtail its growth in strategic arms in ~ 1965, the much larger arsenals of Britain and France (both of whom have eschewed a minimal deterrent strategy) and the many other independent Western nuclear arsenals that have sprang up due to nuclear proliferation. Among other effects, this means that the Soviets have a much bigger job to accomplish in order to play catch up; rather than passing the USA in the late 1970s, they are still significantly behind

- In a different nuclear sense, the advent of fusion power is a gamechanger, albeit one that will really take until the 1990s or 2000 to fully kick into gear and be profoundly felt. The impact will be significant economically, environmentally, industrially and eventually socially, with bountiful and very cheap electricity allowing a number of options not considered in some nations historically

- As of the beginning of 1975, the global temperature seems to be getting colder. This is more than a little confusing to the relatively few climate scientists around at the time, as to put it simply, the mathematics indicate that a different effect should be occurring. There is a strong suggestion in certain circles that what is being felt is a combination of some of the extremely dangerous things done by the Nazis in WW2 (yes, I've managed to postulate even more mad Nazis than historical) and something else very, very long term. In general, being a scientist in Dark Earth is both extremely interesting and intensely frustrating, as weird things and results abound

- Socially, this is a 1975 without the 1960s. Not that the previous decade did not occur, which would be a fairly rum thing indeed, but rather it is shorthand for what we would term and understand as 'the 1960s'. There was not a recognisable Sexual Revolution, no Rock and Roll, a lack of a cause for protest movements and countercultures to coalesce around, and a lack of the same shift of cultural and social power from the 'adult generation' to the nebulous 'youth' or Baby Boomers, depending on what label you wish to affix. This is not to say that it was simply the 1950s lasting forever, or that this would be a good or desirable thing - far from it. Rather, it follows through the consequences of earlier actions, lack of actions, lack of catalytic events and their precursors and the direction of particular social trends

- In some ways, 1975 is close enough to the early 1960s of @, minus the rallying standard of Civil Rights in the USA, whereby there is a growing sense of a bit of a Generation Gap developing; an extremely numerous new generation coming into their own in a new and prosperous world; a long and hard war having been wrapped up ~ 5 years previously; and questions being asked about what their 'Crusade' or Great Moral and Political Challenge will be. For the youth of 1975, aged between 16 and 20, Vietnam was the war of their older brothers and cousins and something that they saw (albeit in extremely well controlled and vetted propaganda pieces and televisual soundbites) on TV and in newsreels at the movies

- Accompanying this is a lack of disillusionment. This sprang historically from a host of different quarters, ranging from Suez, the Profumo Affair, other assorted sordid events and a general decline in Britain to the assassination of JFK, the subsequent wave of riots and unrest in the 1960s, the assassinations of MLK and RFK, the lies and twisting over Vietnam by Johnson et al, and then Nixon and Watergate in the USA. If we look back at that time, one phrase that comes to mind is a 'loss of innocence', which is chased and traced in half a hundred popular culture works, ranging from American Pie by Don McLean to many of the works of Stephen King and the bulk of the Hollywood film oeuvre of the 1970s. In Dark Earth, some of that innocence is retained. It is bruised in a lot of places, and tempered by what JFK himself would call 'a hard and bitter peace', but it still burns

- Change cannot be avoided or delayed necessarily, but it won't always happen in the same fashion in every world or version of a world, nor always bend towards a certain arc. There are quite a few twists and turns in the tale of the rest of the decade planned, with some of them already dangled out as signposts of things to come, along with some red herrings and other bits and pieces betwixt and between

- Industrially, there isn't quite a sense of general decline or growing 'rust belts' quite yet. There is some growing concern about Japan, but the policy of major 'old industrial powers' is not blasé or uninformed by...information...The British situation is described at length in the statistical post above, whilst in the United States, there has been a distinct impact of a larger industrial mobilisation for Korea and then Vietnam, which has skewed the line of a number of historical trends. On top of that, we have energy costs lowering when they started to rise historically, productivity increasing markedly due to the rise of robotics, computers and refinements in magitech, a lack of a steel crisis and about a dozen other factors. There is an extremely large project now underway which will drive some interesting levels of demand, so watch this space


​More to come, along with answers to any queries or reflections

Simon, I don't think you're having more mad Nazi scientists, you had more successful mad Nazi scientists. Which is actually scarier.

A request, is there any way of putting a line break in between topics to make it easier to read?

Who said they were all scientists...

As for the second, through the magic of television, it is done

Simon Darkshade wrote: ↑Tue Apr 22, 2025 3:31 pm Who said they were all scientists...

As for the second, through the magic of television, it is done

The first is scary

That is good, both in terms of the hint getting the intended human reaction, and in terms of the visceral nature and raised threat coming across.

In a story, if the writer buffs the protagonist to high heaven, then in order for there to be any drama or tension, he should balance it out by raising the threat, buffing the antagonist, or throwing in some unexpected and dangerous curve balls. That is what I try and do with DE WW2 and the other tales, with the exception of Fall and Rise, which is mainly a bit of fun and laughs that disguises some dry runs for when and if I actually get around to doing up WW2 in full.

Tilt too far in favour of the good guys/chosen side, you get a pretty flat recount, like one Crime based story that used to be around here.
Tilt too far in favour of the bad guys/general suffering, and it just ends up as torture/Grimdark nastiness for its own sake.

In all things, there needs to be a balance. In 1975, for example, we are going to see events such as:

- Yorkshire lorry driver Peter Sutcliffe goes out looking for a lady of the evening and ends up finding a thirsty one with rather sharp teeth
- The eradication of smallpox is complete, including the last samples held by the Americans and Soviets
- A group of people is helped to escape under the Iron Curtain from Poland by a rabbit who took the wrong turn at Albuquerque
- US Marine Lt John Patrick Ryan is injured in a Kaman Rotodyne crash on Crete
- Young Philly boxer Rocky Balboa gets a chance at the big time, whilst in New York, two sibling plumbers get wrapped up in a super adventure
- Harry Houdini disappears from a hospital ward and Pele is signed up to the National Soccer League
- Arthur Ashe becomes the first black player to win Wimbledon, the Red Sox break The Curse and Irish showband, 'The Miami Showband' begins a tour of the USA after being discovered by US troops on deployment to Ireland
- A purported ‘horror’ in Amityville is solved by a Great Dane and his gang of friends
- Godzilla returns with a bang…well, more of a chomp and a crunch, really
- Something big collapses
- Someone attacks an OPEC meeting (remembering who is in it here…)
- Spain horrifies and scares the world
- An Emperor is crowned
- The Soviets do something shocking

A little aside:
In respect to the vampiress who ‘bought Peter Sutcliffe’s career to an end before it could start’, it just so happens that she is the same one who killed Ted Bundy in the USA a few years before.

I present to you the world’s first undead pseudo-vigilante serial serial-killer killer; that she nabbed both before they started their ‘careers’ in earnest points more to the MO and prey of both wicked men. The number of serial killers, at least those who went after women, who picked on prostitutes is considerable.

I can definitely say that she will be trying to trawl for others, albeit the not entirely innocent types who try to brutalise or kill the seemingly very young lady of the evening with an exotic accent. Her backstory is yet another story hook planted so it can grow big and strong to support a quirky yarn in the fullness of time; her origins come from Gilles des Rais…

There is even a hint of a scintilla of a suggestion that in some cases, there might be some sort of unofficial government agent from a very secret agency clandestinely giving her tips of sorts…

I know I should feel sorry for them, but I'm finding it hard.

I don’t think there is any basis to feel sorry for them. Whilst they didn’t get to kick off their murderous rampages here, they ran into something very nasty in its own right not whilst out picking daisies, but whilst hunting for victims.

I’m not trying to craft anything particularly deep in these particular events, or trying ‘gotcha’ events on historical monsters but trying to put in place the bones of a story whilst also playing with the concept of there being predators that prey on other predators.

(In the early 1990s, there was a Swedish miniseries called ‘Fiendens fiende’ or ‘Enemy of the Enemy’ about spy stuff and murderers and the intrepid deeds of Jan Guillou’s Swedish action man/spy Carl Hamilton. As well as being an alright story, the alliteration did give me a little idea about ‘fiends’ preying upon ‘fiends’. I’ve always meant to play around with that concept and a joke around that title at some point.)

As well as all that, there are a few interesting drivers that make for a much shorter and thankfully less bloody heyday of the serial killer when compared to the historical 1970s.

During the run of the 90s version of the Twilight Zone reboot, there was story about twenty or so murders that took place over 40 years with the same gun.

Short version a victim of rape invented a time machine to go after serial criminals and kill them before they start.

That chapter reminded me of it.


Episode https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0667856/?r ... t_epp_sm_1

https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/ ... itchInTime

Halfway Across the 1970s: The Middle Bit
- Natural population increases continue across the West in the absence of the contraceptive pill, but this will eventually start to flatten down a bit more, with the circumstances of affluence to some extent, with some countries experiencing a less notable decline for cultural reasons. This is not to say that contraception through other means is absent, but no single form thereof quite amounted to the immediate impact of The Pill

- In Britain, there will be some new innovations to encourage saving, such as National Savings Bank free accounts for school children with reasonable annual interest, which may or may not render intended outcomes

- The population is getting to the level where the question of conscription numbers and requirements is starting to be asked a bit more often, with the universality of National Service starting to become a bit of a drain on the active military. This has been signposted in earlier years, and a possible interim solution is for the emergence of a few different tiers or classes of suitability, and possible eventual selection of the best for certain roles; this may be a circle that is difficult to square

- In general, Britain has a high trust society with quite low crime rates compared to our own history, but they don't have that baseline of comparison, only the examples of America and Europe and their own past data. It seems inevitable that, for a certain section of the population, there will always be a concern that crime is increasing and *something* should be done, even if this seems a bit off

- There has been a quite literal 'war on drugs' going on behind the scenes in Latin America and South East Asia, with herbicides and more concentrated sorcerous efforts to destroy illicit crops of opium and coca at their source, sponsored by a number of Western intelligence agencies. The other part of the effort has seen concentrated efforts against smuggling and strict legal sanctions for drug trafficking and drug possession in the Western world, partially informed by an erroneous belief that international drug smuggling post WW2 was being directed by the Kremlin; it is actually SPECTRE

- Insofar as sex, drugs and rock and roll are concerned, procreation still obviously happens, but there is an absence of the latter two from the mainstream of popular culture, with rock being a brief regional American musical style fleetingly popular in the 1950s before the next zany craze
- Incarceration rates in the USA, Britain, Europe and the Commonwealth are quite low, at between 0.1% and 0.25%, depending on the time of year, as it includes drunks and fools locked up for overexuberant behaviour at festive periods

- Britain has a general political consensus on defence, foreign policy, industry, energy, health, welfare and general economics, but some very small areas of difference are emerging around the peripheries of these, along with more marked ones on policy areas of tertiary importance

- Australia will have a far more sedate 1975, without the Whitlam government taking a ‘crash or crash through’ approach that culminated in The Dismissal. Many of the cultural and social moves pushed by Whitlam are consequently absent

- What further isn’t present is the same Aboriginal land rights movement or protests, which were largely a product of the previous two decades
- The earlier ascension of Hawke has seen his popularity in the 1970s put to maximal effect. Among his frontline policies are Medicare, free university, expanding national infrastructure (particularly Australian National Railways) and a strong, robust defence

- The economic boom times continue, without the same spikes in unemployment and inflation, with flow on social impacts

- Culturally, there is less of the ‘Ocker’ peak stereotype, both in practice and popular culture. In the absence of the particular drivers for its uptake by the middle classes, it will likely be confined to its natural areas

- In that absence of World Series Cricket, there will be less of the ‘ugly Australian’ culture in cricket and other sports

- Tracy never made it to Darwin

- There will be in air conditioning as electricity production vastly increases, which in turn will open up some more of the country to settlement

- Continuing Universal National Service in Oz is in many ways a social game changer, with 480,000 young men annually turning 18; of those, 450,000 are fit to be called up or haven’t been diverted to other tasks, with the Army getting 300,000, the RAAF 100,000 and the RAN 50,000 (a reasonable number of those going to the RAM). After 24 months service, there is a reserve service obligation out to 36 years old, which yields quite the reserve, which will soon be divided into the Army Reserve and AMF

- The White Australia Policy is both formally dissipated and still lingers in its practical effects, with security concerns driving the preference for European migrants at this time in the shadow of Vietnam and the Indonesian Confrontation. The general security implications of Red Indonesia next door, even whilst at nominal peace, are wide reaching

- Far from being having a nascent anti-nuclear movement, this is an Australia that is a nuclear armed state with atomic power plants. The latter will have a flow on effect upon the development of certain industries

- New Zealand continues to be Britain’s’ ‘farmyard’, with a large part of her economy and industry based around agricultural products for the the British market. There is increasing diversification, though, in the form of platforms in the Maui gas field, planned new aluminium and oil refineries, integrated steelworks and a deep-water port, with the nation's second atomic power plant promising to provide a further leap forward in available electricity

- The same degree of issues regarding the Maori population have not yet occurred, but the makings of their drivers are there. There will likely be a different perspective on the role of the Treaty of Waitangi, with Waitangi Day being changed to New Zealand Day in the aftermath of the Second World War

- It is likely that the William Sutch espionage case will have a different outcome

- Like many small countries with a larger neighbour, NZ will increasingly seek to define herself as a bit more distinct from Australia

A Lil 1975 Military Overview
- The Red Army remains the largest force in the world, with a 1975 strength of 324 divisions, comfortably ahead of the 296 divisions of the Imperial Chinese Army and the 72 divisions of the Indian Army. The armies of the Free World are rather smaller, with the US mustering 50 combat divisions, Britain 25, France 40, Germany and Austria-Hungary 32 apiece and Italy and Greece 24. These numbers can be somewhat deceiving, as there is still a perceived role for the traditional “leg” infantry division for many states, both in urban combat and in the tropical or expeditionary role
- The Red Army has increased its number of divisions over the last 15 years by a fifth, with the reformation of rifle divisions and the establishment of Light Motor Rifle divisions being the most notable steps. However, it is in equipment and technology rather than numbers that Moscow has made its greatest advances of late. The T-64, T-68 and T-72 have represented significant incremental advances in the process of trying to catch up the lead that the Western powers have in tank design, whilst the BMP and the BTR-60 and -70 have presented a major challenge in the area of armoured fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers and the modernisation of the Soviet artillery park has aroused considerable interest
- The Red Navy is in a slightly different situation, as the ocean going fleet built by Stalin and Kuznetzov ages and requires replacement, particularly their cruiser and destroyer forces. Soviet submarines continue to catch up to the West, and they are present in substantial numbers, but do not yet represent a decisive edge. The carrier fleet continues to improve gradually, but their Achilles heel remains the relative quality of their air wings
- The Red Air Force is the largest in the world and is well balanced, but again lags behind the West in the absolute quality and advancement of its aircraft in totality; the MiG-25 may be a decent competitor for the F-15 Eagle or the Spitfire, but the MiG-23 does not quite match the Phantom, and the mainstay MiG-21s of Frontal Aviation are generally outclassed. New aircraft offer the potential to change this paradigm
- The United States Army has begun pivoting away from South Vietnam back to Europe, as well as a more global reserve force posture, but anticipates that it will maintain a significant residual garrison there for the foreseeable future. The War Department is considering the utility of activations of further specialist light infantry units for contingency operations in a number of potential theatres
- The USN is riding the wave of modernity with deft success, replacing the wartime and Korean War era escort fleets effectively, and managing the transition from the Essex class carrier era to a new one. The advent of the new Standard missile and vertical launch systems is changing the capability of new USN ships just as much as their appearance. The last of the Second World War battleships, the Montanas, are now in reserve, replaced by postwar BBGNs
- The USAF is arguably the most powerful of the US armed forces, and expansive modernisation plans have paved the path for this to continue in the rest of the 1970s and beyond. The increasing role of the guided missile and ‘smart’ munitions will act as a force multiplier of the USAF’s capabilities, just as it will increase the cost of operations
- In Britain, the brief early 1970s dalliance with reduction in active forces was put paid by the exigencies of post Vietnam spot fires, and there is advanced planning for the formation of an air cavalry or airmobile division for the flanks of NATO and the global role, reflecting the increasing profile of helicopters, rotodynes and VSTOL aircraft in Army planning. The absence of The Troubles makes for a different Army in posture, structure and focus, and the urban operations doctrine has been driven by some different experiences in Aden and Vietnam
- The RN has a very well positioned force as of 1975, with the frigate programme of the last decade closing the gap caused by the retirement of wartime construction, and the new carrier and submarine programmes bearing bountiful fruit. A new wave of Coastal Forces craft are being designed, with the challenges of littoral warfare not being ignored
- The RAF is increasing its strength in some areas, whilst looking to make savings in others. The cost of maintaining a front ranking air force is starting to mount, but the response is to shift numbers around rather than cut them altogether. The next generation of aircraft looks to be ever more expensive and complex
- Germany has almost completed the second phase of her national rearmament, with a new generation of weapons systems in advanced stages of development and general 'deepening' of the force structure of the Heer; agreements with the Soviets and with NATO allies rule out increases to regular army divisional numbers, but there are a number of supporting formations and reserve units being activated almost every year
- France is looking to wind back her previously expansive Far Eastern forces in light of the successful outcome in the Vietnam War and the general 'changing of the guard' that accompanied that conflict in favour of the flanks of Europe and the Army of Africa. The general costs of maintaining extensive land, sea and air forces with a global capability are starting to bite, but d'Ambreville is nothing if not ambitious
- China came to the gradual realisation through the 1960s (and Vietnam) that her force structure and equipment procurement was more suited to that of the last world war, and the subsequent process of repositioning and modernisation is taking up a large portion of the Empire's defence budget and looks set to take at least the next 15 years
- The Scandinavia Defence Union, existing as a parallel structure to NATO and an echelon within that alliance, has seen increasing coordination in joint procurement and weapons systems development programmes since 1960, and this is set to continue to flourish; it has permitted some efficiency savings
- In the Middle East, both the Arab Union and Israel have spent the last 15 years gradually modernising and building up their collective military machines on the land and in the air. Israel maintains a decisive technological edge which, in concert with the forces of British Middle Eastern Command, has kept the peace in the Levant for almost twenty years
- India’s gigantic task of bringing her vast forces up to a modern standard still continues, but much progress has been made, even as a mighty task yet remains. Her military production continues to grow in scale and sophistication, but many of her reserve forces are equipped with the bounty of the 1940s
- In South America, Argentine Premier Rodriguez’s policy of building the continent’s mightiest military machine has begat reaction from Chile and Brazil in turn, with Buenos Aires now boasting of perhaps the most formidable army in the southern half of the globe and an air force of over two thousand warplanes
- Globally, the Missile Age is now in full swing, with all types of guided weapons finding their way into service on land, sea and air, at tremendous expense. The considerable advances in robotics seemingly herald their increasing inclusion in combat and non-combat applications, with remotely piloted aircraft being seen in service in the superpowers. Sensors, communications systems and electronic warfare never attract the attention of tanks or battleships, but represent a considerable area of costly development and enhanced capability
- In anti-aircraft warfare, guns and surface to air missiles are being augmented with man portable air defence missiles and with costly lasers and heat rays in some applications, and research into particle beam weapons is underway on both sides of the Iron Wall. In concert with advances in electronic warfare, the prospects for the utility of tactical airpower over the contested battlespace are seen as increasingly challenged