US Space Force News

[James1978]

Air Force picks Colorado for more Space Force missions
By Tara Copp, Associated Press
May 31, 2023

The Air Force announced the permanent location for many more U.S. Space Force units Wednesday — and none of them are in Huntsville, Alabama, suggesting the service may be moving ahead with at least part of the design it originally sought for the new force before it became entangled in politics.

Four more Space Force missions will now be based in Colorado Springs, a notable choice during a larger and now politicized battle over where to locate the permanent headquarters of U.S. Space Command. Colorado Springs, which is housing Space Command’s temporary headquarters, was the Air Force’s preferred location, but Donald Trump, in the final days of his presidency, selected Alabama instead.

While the Pentagon and White House have said the decisions are not directly linked, Alabama has strict anti-abortion laws, and its Republican Sen. Tommy Tuberville earlier this year announced he would hold up all military nominations until the Department of Defense rescinds a new policy that would allow female service members to be reimbursed for travel costs if they have to go out of state for reproductive care.

Tuberville’s office was not immediately available for comment Wednesday evening.

The Space Force announcement came as President Joe Biden left for Colorado Springs to speak during Thursday’s commencement ceremony at the nearby Air Force Academy.

Colorado Democratic Sen. Michael Bennet said he’ll be using the president’s visit as another opportunity to press for the command.

“As President Biden and his administration near a final basing decision for Space Command, we urge them to restore the integrity of this process and make a decision in the interest of our national security — to keep Space Command in Colorado Springs,” his office said in a statement.

Meanwhile, the Air Force has been moving forward with getting fully dug in at Colorado Springs, where more than 20 of the military’s space missions are now based. The Air Force Academy now has a space curriculum and graduates Space Force Guardians alongside its Air Force cadets.

“Colorado Springs continues to prove itself as the premier location for our nation’s space defense operations,” Colorado Republican Rep. Doug Lamborn said in a statement announcing the selection.

The Space Force, founded in December 2019, is the smallest of the military branches, with just under 8,400 personnel. But it has seen its budget rapidly rise as the U.S. has scrambled to defend against a rapid militarization of space, such as North Korea’s failed Wednesday launch of a ballistic missile believed to be carrying a spy satellite.

The four new missions in Colorado Springs include Delta 15, a headquarters unit for the service’s space operations command; Space Delta 12, a test and evaluation unit; and two surveillance squadrons.

Other locations announced Wednesday as new permanent homes for Space Force missions are in Florida and New Mexico.

[MikeKozlowski]

...The orbital warfare unit will be called 'Stormbringers'.

PLEASE tell me that Sabaton is working on a march for these guys.

Mike

[jemhouston]

...The orbital warfare unit will be called 'Stormbringers'.

PLEASE tell me that Sabaton is working on a march for these guys.

Mike

Something on this vein https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-Q_eju64tI

The record label is Napalm Records.

[James1978]

Space Force's STARCOM HQ Preferred Location Is Florida Base, Service Says

31 May 2023
Military.com | By Thomas Novelly

The Department of the Air Force selected Florida's Patrick Space Force Base on Wednesday as the preferred headquarters location for STARCOM, the service's training and education command.

Space Training and Readiness Command had been temporarily headquartered at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado since it was organized under the then-newly created Space Force in 2021. The decision, announced in a press release Wednesday, has been deliberated for years and was quickly praised by Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis.

"From Project Mercury to today's privatized spaceflight, Americans look to Florida's Space Coast to see history in the making," DeSantis said in a press statement. "We are honored to host the Space Training and Readiness Command headquarters and continue Florida's history as America's gateway to outer space."

STARCOM's Space Delta 10, the group underneath STARCOM that is responsible for doctrine and war gaming, will also be located at Patrick, according to a Space Force press release.

The locations for two other Space Deltas, which are overseen by STARCOM, were also announced.

Space Delta 11, which "delivers realistic, threat-informed test and training environments through the provision of live, virtual and constructive range and combat replication capabilities," is expected to be located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, according to the press release.

Space Delta 12, a unit responsible for testing and evaluating space systems, is expected to be located at Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado.

"The decision to host STARCOM HQ and the three Deltas at their respective bases came after conducting site surveys at each location to assess their ability to facilitate the mission and infrastructure capacity, while accounting for community support, environmental factors and cost," the Space Force said.

The Department of the Air Force's next step will be to conduct an environmental impact analysis at the bases for STARCOM and the Space Deltas, which is "expected to be completed later this year before final decisions are made," according to the press release.

The STARCOM headquarters announcement comes as lawmakers in Alabama and Colorado continue to squabble over where U.S. Space Command, the unified combatant command that oversees all military operations in space, will ultimately be based.

A decision on whether the headquarters for U.S. Space Command will remain in Colorado or move to Alabama has been held up because the Department of the Air Force is doing an extra layer of review, delaying a final announcement that has dragged on since the Trump era.

Two watchdog reports, requested by members of Colorado's delegation in Washington, D.C., followed the official announcement of Huntsville as the preferred location in 2021. They did not point to any major issues with Huntsville as a location for the base, but did scrutinize the process for choosing the location.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told Military.com in March that the final decision will come "fairly soon" but further analysis is needed.

The Supreme Court's ruling last year to overturn Roe v. Wade -- known as Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization -- has also been seen as potentially impacting the decision to move Space Command from Colorado to Alabama and was also seen as a possible factor for STARCOM.

STARCOM's finalist locations included Space Force bases in either California or Colorado -- where abortion access is widespread and mostly unrestricted. Patrick Space Force Base is located in Florida, where last month DeSantis signed into law a bill to ban abortions after six weeks of pregnancy.

Rose Riley, a spokeswoman for the Department of the Air Force, which oversees the Space Force, did not directly answer when Military.com asked this past August whether the Supreme Court decision to overturn Roe was being considered in the basing choice.

But Riley said at the time that officials were looking at how the issue affects the quality of life and options for all airmen and Guardians.

"The Department of the Air Force is conducting site surveys at each candidate location to determine which is best suited to host STARCOM based on factors related to mission, infrastructure capacity, environmental considerations, cost, child care, housing affordability and access to military/veteran support," Riley said.

She added, "Air Force leaders are working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review the impact on the force of the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Dobbs."

[James1978]

Coming in 2024: Patrick Space Force Base Picked for STARCOM Headquarters
June 2, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

The Department of the Air Force has selected Patrick Space Force Base, Fla., as the preferred location for Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM) headquarters—and hopes to start moving in by fall of next year.

STARCOM, one of three field commands under the U.S. Space Force, is responsible for educating and training Guardians, developing the service’s nascent doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, and testing Space Force capabilities.

Roughly 350 personnel are expected to make up STARCOM headquarters once it reaches full operational capability, a Department of the Air Force spokeswoman told Air & Space Forces Magazine. An environmental impact analysis is set to take place later this year, followed by a final decision, according to a department release.

The spokeswoman said personnel are then expected to start arriving in fiscal year 2024, which ends in October of that year.

Patrick is located just a few miles from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station and the Space Force’s main launch facilities on the East Coast. The Florida location beat out five other bases for STARCOM headquarters—Buckley, Peterson, and Schriever Space Forces Bases in Colorado; and Vandenberg Space Force Base and Los Angeles Air Force Base in California.

The field command will be the first headquartered on the East Coast after it relocates from its temporary home at Peterson, in Colorado Springs, Colo. The Department of the Air Force is planning to construct new facilities to house STARCOM, the spokeswoman said.

“Until then, personnel will utilize existing and temporary facilities at Patrick Space Force Base,” she added.

In addition to STARCOM, the department announced preferred locations for six other Space Force organizations this week, including three of the five Deltas under STARCOM.

* Space Delta 10, which develops Space Force doctrine and conducts wargames, will also be at Patrick Space Force Base.
* Space Delta 11, responsible for Space Force ranges and aggressors, will be at Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.
* Space Delta 12, which handles test and evaluation, will be at Schriever Space Force Base, Colo.
* Space Delta 15, which provides command and control capabilities to the National Space Defense Center, will remain at its current location of Schriever.
* The 75th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Squadron, responsible for the “federated targeting mission” using different satellites across orbits, will also remain at Schriever.
* The 74th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Squadron, which provides threat analysis and intelligence for tactical space operations, will be based at Peterson Space Force Base, Colo.

About 100 personnel are expected to be part of Space Delta 10, which will also start moving to Patrick in fiscal 2024, the department spokeswoman said.

The announcement that bases in Colorado will get four more permanent Space Force missions comes as debate continues to rage over the home for U.S. Space Command—while not a Space Force organization, SPACECOM’s basing decision has been led by the Department of the Air Force, which identified Redstone Arsenal, Ala., as its preferred location in 2018. Accusations of political favoritism instantly followed and a final decision is still pending years later.

Alabama lawmakers have recently upped their pressure on the Pentagon to finalize its choice and proceed with Redstone, while Colorado legislators are fighting to keep the combatant command headquartered at Peterson Space Force Base.

Last month, media reports indicated President Joe Biden’s administration may halt the move to Alabama, citing the state’s abortion laws as negatively affecting female service members.

Florida recently tightened its own abortion restrictions, but the Air Force spokeswoman said that “reproductive healthcare is not a criteria in the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process” before noting that the process used to select U.S. Space Command headquarters is different in that “parts of that process were dictated by the Department of Defense.”

[James1978]

How the Space Force Will Avoid a ‘Pearl Harbor’ in Space, According to Its No. 2 Officer
June 12, 2023 | By David Roza

In its official song, the Space Force touts itself as a ‘mighty watchful eye’ keeping watch on both the Earth and space—and the service now has what it needs to live up to that description and avoid any surprise attack, Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. David D. Thompson said June 12.

“We’ve gotten to the point where we now have the tools: they’re there, they are either in place or building up,” Thompson said in a livestreamed discussion with retired Gen. Kevin Chilton, Explorer Chair at the Mitchell Institute’s Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence. “If we’re operationally or strategically surprised, shame on us.”

Thompson’s remarks came in response to a question from Chilton on how the Space Force plans to avoid a “space Pearl Harbor,” where an adversary might attempt an operational or strategic surprise in the space domain, on the ground, or in cyberspace.

The Space Force has several capabilities which Thompson said would make it difficult for an adversary to get the drop on the U.S., including an operationally- and tactically-focused space intelligence enterprise; a broad understanding of space domain awareness; joint cyber defense forces; and the branch’s emerging ground moving target indicator capability.

“It’s not just in space, but there is soon to be nowhere on the globe where we won’t be able to see, sense, monitor and take action as required,” Thompson said.

When the Space Force first launched in December 2019, the U.S. government lacked a space intelligence enterprise that was operationally and tactically-focused, Thompson said. There was a robust strategic space intelligence enterprise in the form of the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, but Space Force leaders sought to make the budding service the 18th member of the Intelligence Community, and one that tracks not only the technical details of foreign space capabilities, but also their doctrine, training, methods of employment, and the development of counter-tactics.

“That is probably the first thing that we needed to do and are doing well,” Thompson said.

Underscoring Thompson’s point, the House Armed Services intelligence and special operations subcommittee proposed establishing the National Space Intelligence Center as a field operating agency of the Space Force. The center would “analyze and produce scientific and technical intelligence on space-based and counterspace threats from foreign adversaries,” according to markup language for the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

The National Space Intelligence Center already exists in the form of Space Delta 18, which was launched in June 2022. Establishing the center as a field operating agency would give it the authority to conduct field activities “beyond the scope of any of the major commands” according to the Air Force definition of such agencies.

The second important factor Thompson listed is a new understanding of space domain awareness, one which focuses on possible threats rather than “managing the traffic,” he said. The military is in the process of shifting responsibility for overseeing safe space flight for civil and commercial satellite operators to the civilian Office of Space Commerce.

The third factor is the military-wide build up of cyber defense forces, which should prevent adversaries from gaining the element of surprise in that domain, Thompson said.

The general emphasized effective space domain awareness involves not only detecting suspicious behavior in space but also determining what party was responsible for that behavior. Thompson praised U.S. Space Command for publicly criticizing bad behavior, such as Russia’s 2021 anti-satellite test, which created a dangerous debris field in orbit.

“Calling out those sorts of behavior and making sure that people understand we can and will observe and attribute,” is an important part of maintaining order in space, he said. But space is not the only domain under Space Force’s eye. As the branch takes on the mission of ground moving target indication, the goal is for the U.S. to able to observe and call out bad behavior anywhere on or above the planet.

As the government and private sector expand into cislunar space, the vast area between geosynchronous orbit and the moon, so too will Space Force surveillance. The 19th Space Defense Squadron is specifically tasked with cislunar and extra-geosynchronous domain awareness.

“Our role is space domain awareness and that starts … as low as satellites can operate and goes to infinity,” Thompson said. “As the human race continues to expand out into the solar system and beyond, we believe our responsibility is to understand what is happening in the domain.”

Beyond the Space Force’s observational capabilities, Thompson also highlighted the service’s work on satellite proliferation as key to preventing a devastating surprise attack. Though proliferation is often used in the context of large numbers of satellites, Thompson noted it also refers to distributing capabilities across multiple orbital regimes, multiple domains, and multiple partners.

“The first thing you do is distribute those capabilities across multiple [orbits], which means that an adversary, if they’re going to attack you in space, has to have a very sophisticated and synchronized means of attacking,” he said. “The second is that you look at ways to augment and/or perform the mission in other domains—air, maritime, cyberspace—such that it is not just space that is the way by which missions are executed.”

It also helps to distribute capabilities among allies, partners, and even commercial services so that an adversary seeking to target those capabilities might say “even if I execute the way I want to, I’m unlikely to have the desired effect,” Thompson said.

However, growing these capabilities to keep up with demand requires hardware and manpower, and Chilton noted that acquiring more of both would become difficult under a defense budget which may face slower growth over the next few years. Thompson said the Space Force has been “blessed” to enjoy double-digit budget growth over the past several years, but he agreed a lean future could inhibit the branch’s ability to keep pace with its expanding mission.

“Either the department may need to look at its priorities for various investments, or we will have to throttle the growth that we have seen and the delivery of capabilities,” he said. “It will simply be incumbent on us to make sure that our leaders inside the Department of Defense and in the White House and Congress understand the risks we’ll take if in fact we cannot continue that.”

[James1978]

Space National Guard Gains Steam in House
June 13, 2023 | By Greg Hadley

The House Armed Services personnel subcommittee advanced legislation June 12 to establish a Space National Guard and to pave the way for part-time Guardians, rather than form a Space Force Reserve.

Subcommittee members voted to turn the 14 units and 1,000 space-focused Airmen in the Air National Guard into a new Space National Guard. Lawmakers also offered a measure that would require the Space Force to maintain a single personnel management system, rather than creating a separate Space Force Reserve.

To become law, the proposals must first clear the House Armed Services Committee when it meets June 23 to vote on amendments, then survive a vote by the full House, and finally survive a conference committee that must reconcile any differences between the House and Senate versions of the final National Defense Authorization Act.

So while still far from certain, the plan represents the most far-reaching step yet in a debate that has been argued since the Space Force was born: Whether or not the National Guard would have a Space mission, and whether or not the Space Force could carve a path to a simpler force management construct than that of the Air Force, with its active and two reserve components.

The question of a Space National Guard has been hotly debated for years. Proponents—including the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), the Air & Space Forces Association (AFA), and lawmakers from states with space-focused units—say a separate Guard is needed because Air National Guard units with space missions are “orphaned” in the current organizational structure, unattached to the Space Force but left with no corresponding Air Force units.

National Guardsmen already provide an indispensable core capability for the Space Force and Space Command. Specifically, “…Airman assigned to 16 units across seven states and one territory provide 60 percent of [our] … space electronic war [capabilities], [and] 50 percent of [our] protected satellite communications.”

“Air National Guard personnel provide fundamental capability to the Space Force today,” said AFA President & CEO Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, USAF (Ret.) “Logically, moving those Guardsmen into the Space Force is the right thing to do, ensuring space remains under the control of a single service. A New Space National Guard does not need to be large and unwieldly. It can comprise just those units we have today. And it can do so without a lot of complicated infrastructure.”

Critics—including the White House and multiple Senate leaders—argue a Space National Guard would cost too much, create added layers of bureaucracy, and is unnecessary since there are no specific missions for which states need military space forces.

The House has approved Space National Guard proposals before, only to see them die later in the process. In the 2022 and 2023 NDAAs, Space Guard passed the House but were killed in conference when Senate and House leaders reconciled their bills.

The White House and the Pentagon, meanwhile, want a single component and have held to that position for months. What makes this year’s plan different is that the HASC personnel subcommittee appears to have incorporated elements of both ideas.

“We authorize the establishment of the Space National Guard and set a new personnel management benchmark by authorizing the creation of an innovative personnel management system for the Space Force,” subcommittee chair Rep. Jim Banks (R-Ind.) said in a hearing.

The language on the Space National Guard is lifted from the Space National Guard Establishment Act, introduced by Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.) earlier this year. The bill looks to address some concerns about cost by specifying that it does not “authorize or require the relocation of any facility, infrastructure, or military installation of the Space National Guard or Air National Guard.” Critics have argued creating a new Guard would require new facilities that would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

The portion creating the single personnel management system is extensive—140 or so pages—as it adjusts sections of U.S. law dealing with how Reserve forces are typically managed to account for the Space Force’s proposed new structure.

At its heart, the legislation would get rid of the idea of a “Regular Space Force” and a “regular reserve” and create one unified system consisting of full-time, part-time, and inactive Guardians. Those on active status who work full-time will be referred to as on “sustained duty,” while part-time personnel on active status will still need to either:

* Participate in 48 drills or training periods and spend 14 days on active duty
* Spend at least 30 days on active duty

Proponents say such an arrangement would benefit the Space Force by allowing Guardians to more easily switch from full-time to part-time and back again, as compared to the Reserve forces of the other military branches.

The language also clarifies that members of the Air Force Reserve with space-related jobs could transfer over into the Space Force. The Air Force Reserve’s main space-focused unit is the 310th Space Wing, with roughly 1,100 military and civilian personnel.

Still, there are some parts of the legislation that will have to be clarified—while the bill states the Space Force “shall be managed … without component,” the section on the Space Guard states that it will be designated as the “reserve component” of the Space Force.

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are both reserve components for the Air Force, but the Reserve is always under federal control, while the Guard can be activated for state-level missions. A single personnel management system for the Space Force would reduce the number of organizations on the federal level.

[James1978]

Lawmakers Pressure Air Force to Finally Make Space Command HQ Basing Decision

13 Jun 2023
Military.com | By Thomas Novelly and Rebecca Kheel

Lawmakers are dialing up pressure on the Air Force to make a final decision about the permanent home for U.S. Space Command as service officials drag on deliberations that have existed since the Trump administration.

In a pair of must-pass bills released this week, House lawmakers would freeze funding for building out the Space Command headquarters, which is temporarily being housed at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The language was pushed by powerful Alabama lawmakers who want the Air Force to stick with its preliminary decision to move the headquarters to their home state.

The House Armed Services Committee's draft of the sweeping annual defense policy bill, the National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, released Monday, would pause construction spending on the temporary headquarters until a final location is announced and justified. Additionally, half of Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall's travel budget would be cut until the location of the permanent headquarters is reported to Congress.

On Tuesday, the House Appropriations Committee also added language into its separate 2024 military construction funding bill that would similarly bar funding from being used on Space Command's headquarters until a final decision is made. The accompanying, nonbinding bill report also calls on Kendall to "announce a decision expeditiously."

Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee who wrote the NDAA draft, was concerned that Space Command has been building infrastructure and signing new leases in Colorado while the final decision is pending, a congressional aide told reporters Monday evening.

"The chairman wants the Air Force to make a decision. They keep telling us, 'We're close, we're soon,'" the aide said on condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the Armed Services Committee.

"The chairman's view is why should you be using taxpayer dollars to build up all this infrastructure when the Air Force made a decision. It has been reviewed by two different reviewers and found that Huntsville, Alabama, won and won fairly," the aide added.

Meanwhile, the amendment to the separate military construction appropriations bill was championed by a senior member of the House Appropriations Committee, Rep. Robert Aderholt, R-Ala. The language is intended to "incentivize" Kendall to make a decision "as quickly as possible," he said during the committee's consideration of the bill Tuesday.

Kendall said in response to a Military.com question at the Air and Space Forces Association's conference in Colorado in March that the final decision will come "fairly soon" but further analysis is needed.

"I hoped to make a decision and make an announcement earlier," Kendall said during a roundtable discussion at the Air and Space Forces Association's Air Warfare Symposium. "We're doing some additional analysis. We want to make very sure we got this right and have a well-defended decision."

In January 2021, during the last days of the Trump administration, the Department of the Air Force selected the Army's Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville as the preferred location for Space Command's permanent headquarters.

Since that announcement, members of Colorado's congressional delegation in Washington have been fighting to have the decision reviewed in hopes of keeping the base, as well as 1,400 jobs and millions of dollars of economic impact, in their home state.

As that decision has languished for two and a half years, the fight over whether the HQ should move to Huntsville or remain in Colorado Springs has become increasingly political. Notably, the Supreme Court's ruling last year to overturn Roe v. Wade -- known as Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization -- has also been viewed as a potential factor impacting the decision, according to Colorado and Alabama lawmakers.

Moving Space Command from Colorado, where abortion access is unrestricted, to Alabama, where it is illegal with limited exceptions, has raised concerns.

Sen. Michael Bennet, D-Colo., told Military.com in an August interview that a potential move of U.S. Space Command to Alabama concerns him for a variety of reasons, but among them is the impact the Supreme Court's ruling has on service members who have to relocate.

"I'm deeply concerned about how the Dobbs decision and state abortion bans will affect Space Command's workforce and readiness if the command leaves Colorado," Bennet said in an emailed statement.

Most recently, in March, Bennet alongside 36 Senate colleagues issued a statement "to consider abortion access in major personnel and basing decisions."

But the Department of the Air Force told Military.com in an emailed statement last week that state laws regarding abortion or LGBTQ+ communities are not a factor considered by the service when deciding where to place bases.

"Reproductive health care and state laws regarding the LGBTQ+ community are not currently part of the criteria considered in the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process," a department spokesperson told Military.com. "However, the Department of the Air Force recognizes that various laws and legislation are being proposed and passed in states across America that may affect reproductive health care and LGBTQ+ airmen, Guardians, and/or their dependents in different ways."

The spokesperson added that the department has worked to "inform and educate our members on the assignment [and] medical, legal and other resources available to support airmen, Guardians and their families."

Pentagon policies that allowed service members to more easily travel to other states to obtain abortions have come into the crosshairs of Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala. Tuberville has single-handedly delayed hundreds military promotions over the issue, though he has been careful not to connect his blockade to the Space Command basing fight.

The Space Command decision has been under intense scrutiny since shortly after President Donald Trump's announcement.

In August 2021, while speaking on an Alabama radio show, Trump said the move was his decision, which sparked speculation that the former president may have intervened in the process for choosing the base, something that could give ammunition to legal challenges.

"Space Force -- I sent to Alabama," Trump told the "Rick & Bubba" radio show at the time. "I hope you know that. [They] said they were looking for a home, and I single-handedly said, 'Let's go to Alabama.' They wanted it. I said, 'Let's go to Alabama. I love Alabama.'"

Two watchdog reports, requested by members of Colorado's delegation in Washington, followed. The reports did not point to any major issues with Huntsville as a location for the base, but did scrutinize the process for choosing the location.

In May, the findings of a Defense Department inspector general report said that, while the selection process was marred by shoddy recordkeeping, the ultimate decision to choose Huntsville was "reasonable."

And in June, the Government Accountability Office released a report saying that Space Command's move from Colorado to Alabama was driven by an unorganized and unclear process. While that report did not comment on or analyze whether the choice of Huntsville as the home of Space Command was acceptable, the congressional watchdog organization did express concerns about "significant shortfalls in its transparency and credibility," as well as the "appearance of bias" in the decision.

The GAO report did not address whether Trump, or any senior military official, was responsible for the ultimate selection of Redstone Arsenal.

Meetings that Space Command chief Gen. James Dickinson held last week with the Alabama and Colorado congressional delegations did little to quell the fight.

Alabama lawmakers contend Dickinson confirmed the command "belongs on Redstone Arsenal," while the Colorado delegation said he "emphasized that he has no preference in the headquarters location nor is it his responsibility to make a final basing decision."

[James1978]

Debris from ASAT tests creating ‘bad neighborhood’ in low Earth orbit: Analyst
Russian and Chinese anti-satellite tests are responsible for "pretty much 20 percent" of "conjunction" warnings, that is predictions that two space objects are likely to collide, in 2022, said the State Department's Eric Desautels.

By Theresa Hitchens
June 16, 2023

NEW YORK — A trio of satellite breakups — two caused by anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests — are responsible for a large percentage of dangerous debris in the ever-more popular real estate of low Earth orbit, creating an especially “bad neighborhood” there, according to space traffic observers at LeoLabs.

“This is why ASAT tests are bad,” Rachit Bhatia, LeoLabs’ space safety analytics & research lead, told the Secure World Foundation’s 5th Summit for Space Sustainability on Wednesday.

Data from the company, which uses a radar constellation and sophisticated software to track objects and LEO and predict the likelihood of dangerous collisions, highlights the increased risks to operators caused by: the destruction of China’s Fengyun-1C satellite in a 2007 ASAT missile test; Russia’s similar destruction of the Cosmos 1408 in 2021; and the non-deliberate collision of Cosmos 2251 with an Iridium satellite in 2009.

Together, these three on-orbit breakups account for 15 percent of debris cataloged in all near-Earth orbits since the US military started keeping tabs in the late 1950s, Bhatia said. US Space Command, which currently is responsible for monitoring the heavens, is tracking some 41,000 pieces of space junk bigger than 10 centimeters, Gen. James Dickinson said in February.

Further, the space junk pile up has created what Bhatia called a “bad neighborhood” in the 700 to 900 kilometer band of LEO, a region that is increasingly crowded due to advent of mega-constellations such as SpaceX’s Starlink communications satellites. That orbital altitude also is being used by the Space Development Agency for its planned Transport Layer of 300 to 500 high-speed, high-volume communications birds.

A number of US government and military officials speaking at the Secure World event here did so to double down on Washington’s push for a voluntary ban on testing of destructive ASAT missiles in the run up to the final meeting of the UN Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats, that runs Aug. 28-Sept. 1. That working group is attempting, for the first time, to reach agreement on a set of norms that would constrain military actions in space to try to keep the peace in space.

For example, Eric Desautels, deputy assistant secretary of arms control, verification and compliance at the State Department, also wheeled out some scary data on the dangers caused by ASAT-created space junk during his keynote Wednesday at the summit.

The Russian and Chinese tests are responsible for “pretty much 20 percent” of “conjunction” warnings, that is predictions that two space objects are likely to collide, in 2022, he said.

Desautels said that Space Command data shows that there were 1,486 conjunctions involving the International Space Station in 2022, “which was a 233 percent increase from 2021. And that increase was largely conducted because of the debris from the anti-satellite missile tests, and also required us to maneuver the International Space Station two times last year.”

Further, he said, “that debris is going to reduce the life of satellites because they’re using fuel to maneuver. It’s going to increase the cost to companies and to governments. … That is something obviously we want to avoid.”

The White House body for coordinating science policy, the National Science and Technology Council, in late March put the State and Defense departments in charge of “prioritizing sustainable access” to LEO — as part of a new interagency strategy for supporting government-wide research activities in the lowest band of space, from about 2,000 kilometers in altitude down to about 100 kilometers.

The US government also is pushing a voluntary moratorium on destructive ASAT missile tests, putting forward a UN General Assembly resolution calling on states to individually commit that passed in December with 155 of the UN’s 193 member states voting yes.

Desautel noted that there were nine “no” votes on the resolution: “Russia and China and then their close allies, [including] Cuba, Iran, Syria, Nigeria.”

However, as the National Security Council’s director of space policy, Audrey Schaffer, pointed out in a keynote to the Secure World summit on Tuesday, the resolution does not represent a binding promise on signatories.

“It doesn’t commit states to the norm. It encourages states to make national commitments to this norm,” she said. “To truly establish an internationally recognized norm banning destructive DA-ASAT [direct-assent ASAT] missile testing, we need a critical mass of nations to actually make the commitment.”

Up to now, 13 nations have joined the US in formally pledging themselves to the testing moratorium.

Lt. Gen. John Shaw, SPACECOM deputy commander, told the Secure World Summit on Wednesday that the Pentagon also strongly backs the idead because it is the military’s interest.

“DoD was one of the biggest, earliest proponents of the test moratorium,” he said.

In addition, the US government is pushing states to commit to the testing ban at the OEWG.

Desautel reiterated that the US government has put forward seven norms for consideration at the OEWG, and is hoping others will support them. This includes, he noted, one that would take the ASAT testing moratorium “a step further” by calling on countries to “consider refraining from all experiments or activities that could result in the creation of debris, including the intentional creation of debris.”

While government officials and experts involved in the OEWG say the meeting faces and uphill challenge in getting a truculent Moscow to approve of any new norms, there is a sense of optimism that things are going in the right direction.

One idea that may well win out during the final OEWG meeting is the idea to have a follow-on series of OEWG meetings to build on the ideas with a lot of support, these sources said, such as the need for states to act with “due regard” for others in space and improved consultative measures.

“And that’s not a bad thing,” Secure World’s Victoria Samson told Breaking Defense.

[James1978]

House lawmakers back Space Force fees for use of launch ranges

By Courtney Albon
June 22, 2023

WASHINGTON — A provision in the House Armed Services Committee’s version of the fiscal 2024 defense policy bill would approve a U.S. Space Force proposal to change the way it charges companies that launch from its ranges.

Committee members signed off on the legislation June 22, which proposes $874 billion in defense spending. The full House is slated to vote on the bill in July.

Included in the bill is an amendment offered by Rep. Salud Carbajal, D-Calif., that would allow the Space Force to collect fees from companies for the indirect costs of using the military’s launch ranges, like overhead infrastructure or other charges that a traditional port authority might impose on its users.

Today, per the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, the service is limited to collecting fees for direct costs like electricity at a launch pad. The law also restricts the Space Force from accepting in-kind contributions from commercial companies to upgrade its ranges.

The committee’s bill, if approved, would require commercial launch companies to “reimburse the Department of Defense for such indirect costs as the Secretary concerned considers to be appropriate.”

“The contract may provide for the recovery of indirect costs through establishment of a rate, fixed price, or similar mechanism,” the bill states.

The language comes as launch rates surge at the Space Force’s two major ranges — the Eastern Range at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida and the Western Range at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. The complexes, which once supported a just handful of missions annually, flew a combined 73 missions in 2022.

Much of that increased activity comes from commercial launch companies, and as the service eyes continued growth in that market, officials want to change the way they operate their ranges — viewing them more as spaceports that provide services to customers. Securing changes to policies that impede that transition is a key part of moving toward that business model.

The bill also includes an amendment from Rep. Mike Waltz, R-Fla., that directs the Space Force to consider options for commercial providers to perform “day of launch” services that support range operations, including security, payload processing and integration.

The provision highlights the growth of the commercial launch sector and proposes that allowing commercial companies to perform these tasks could help meet launch demand.

Protecting launch ranges
Rep. Doug Lamborn, R-Colo., offered an amendment that would require the Space Force to report back to the committee on what actions the service is taking to mitigate disruptions to launch ranges, whether from natural causes like weather events or from man-made threats.

“The committee understands that successful space launch depends on multiple factors including the security of the launch range and installation,” the bill states. “The security of launch sites and protection of outside interference are necessary for assured access to space.”

Lamborn’s amendment would also call on the service to explore options for acquiring “Dod-approved, proven-off-the-shelf” capabilities that can track and target air, ground and surface systems that pose a threat to Space Force ranges.

Col. Mark Shoemaker, vice commander for space operations at Space Launch Delta 45, told C4ISRNET the service is most focused in the near term on addressing issues like power outages and ensuring that if a hurricane hits, it can recover quickly from any impact.

“What we’re challenging the teams to think through is how to be more proactive,” Shoemaker said in an April 20 interview.

[James1978]

Space Force to open launch business to a third provider

By Courtney Albon
July 14, 2023

WASHINGTON — The Space Force’s solicitation for the next phase of national security launches will likely seek to distribute its most demanding missions among three providers, a change of course from its plan to choose just two companies to meet its space lift requirements.

Space Systems Command, the Space Force’s acquisition arm, announced the update to the next phase of its National Security Space Launch program July 14.

“We are confident that this approach will secure launch capacity, enable supply chain stability, increase our resiliency through alternate launch sites and streamlined integration timelines, and enhance affordability for the most stressing National Security Space missions,” Col. Doug Pentecost, deputy program manager for assured access to space, said in a statement.

The Space Force in 2020 opened up its launch program to competition after years of relying solely on the United Launch Alliance to carry its satellites to orbit. That year, the service selected ULA to launch 60% of missions between fiscal 2022 and 2027 and SpaceX to fly the remaining 40%.

Ordering for those launches is set to end after fiscal 2024, so the Space Force is preparing for the program’s next bulk launch buy and expecting a significant increase in planned missions.

The service released an initial draft solicitation for the next set of procurements, dubbed Phase 3, in February and plans to issue a formal call for proposals later this summer. It will start ordering launches for Phase 3 in fiscal 2025.

The draft issued in February laid out a dual-lane approach to buying launches. Lane 1 is for commercial-like missions and small launches and will have room for an unlimited number of companies who won’t have to meet all certification requirements.

Lane 2 is reserved for more demanding missions with more challenging requirements, similar to the current contract. The previous draft limited this lane to two providers, but Pentecost said input from launch companies since February convinced Space Systems Command to rethink its plan.

“Based on industry feedback and the need to increase resiliency in the face of the pacing challenge from countries like China, we refined our strategy to fortify assured access to space by ensuring that the government has three launch providers capable of meeting all NSSL requirements by the end of Phase 3,” Pentecost said.

While SpaceX and ULA are the only companies with rockets that meet the requirements for Lane 2, other companies are developing rockets that could be approved in the coming years. That includes Blue Origin, owned by billionaire Jeff Bezos, whose New Glenn rocket is in the midst of the certification process.

Meanwhile, ULA is grappling with a slowdown in its schedule to certify its new Vulcan launcher to fly national security missions. The rocketwas expected to log its first flight in early May, but its recovery from a March testing anomaly has taken longer than anticipated, pushing its expected first mission to late this year.

Because the rocket must conduct two launches to gain Space Force approval, ULA now expects Vulcan to be certified in the second quarter of next year.

[kdahm]

https://arstechnica.com/space/2023/08/b ... e-command/

Biden administration reverses Trump decision to relocate US Space Command
The Air Force recommended during Trump's final days in office basing Space Command in Alabama.

Stephen Clark - 8/1/2023, 12:44 PM
A US Space Command flag is displayed outside the White House during a 2019 ceremony announcing the command's re-establishment.
Enlarge / A US Space Command flag is displayed outside the White House during a 2019 ceremony announcing the command's re-establishment.
Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images

President Biden plans to keep the headquarters of US Space Command in Colorado Springs and not move it to Alabama as the Air Force proposed under the Trump administration in 2021.

It took two-and-a-half years for the decision to come down from the White House, following what the Pentagon said was a "thorough and deliberate evaluation process."

"Locating Headquarters US Space Command in Colorado Springs ultimately ensures peak readiness in the space domain for our nation during a critical period," said Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the Pentagon's press secretary. "It will also enable the command to most effectively plan, execute and integrate military spacepower into multi-domain global operations in order to deter aggression and defend national interests."

Space Command was originally set up in 1985 as an independent combatant command but was dissolved in 2002 and placed under the umbrella of US Strategic Command during a post-9/11 reorganization of the military's command structure. President Trump reestablished Space Command in 2019, months before Congress passed legislation to make the Space Force the nation's newest military branch.

It's important to note that Space Force and Space Command are separate entities, with the former responsible for supplying personnel and technology for military use, and the latter charged with carrying out military operations in space.

In its previous incarnation, Space Command was headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs. And that's where Space Command has been temporarily garrisoned since it came back online three years ago. The permanent headquarters of Space Command will come with numerous military and civilian jobs and a positive economic impact.
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In the final days of President Trump's tenure, the Air Force recommended basing Space Command at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, beating out finalists in Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Texas.

That decision drew the ire of Colorado's congressional delegation, and some lawmakers suggested the decision was political. Alabama, after all, is a reliable red state that twice voted for Trump. Colorado is not. Lawmakers also raised concerns that relocating Space Command from Colorado to Alabama could disrupt military operations.

Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.), who represents Colorado Springs, asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate the Trump-era decision. The government watchdog's investigation concluded the Air Force did not follow "best practices" in its decision-making process to put Space Command in Alabama, leading to "significant shortfalls in its transparency and credibility."

A separate report in 2022 from the Pentagon's own inspector general concluded the basing decision process was "reasonable" and complied with military policy and federal law, but criticized the decision-makers' record-keeping.

The Biden administration's review left Space Command in a kind of limbo. Last week, the general nominated by Biden to be the next head of Space Command told lawmakers in a confirmation hearing that a "decision is needed" on the question of Space Command's headquarters.

"I welcome this final basing decision," said Army Gen. James Dickinson, the current head of Space Command, in a statement. The Associated Press reported Dickinson privately argued to keep his headquarters in Colorado Springs over concerns that moving it to Alabama would jeopardize military readiness. Frank Kendall, the secretary of the Air Force, supported the move to Alabama, according to The Washington Post.

Now with a permanent home, Biden administration officials say Space Command is on track to reach full operational capability next month.

Alabama's representatives in Congress are not happy with Biden's decision.

Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) said the Air Force's top three choices in 2021 for Space Command's headquarters were all in red states, adding that the decision to bypass the three top-ranked finalists "looks like blatant patronage politics."

"This is absolutely not over," he said in a statement.

Tuberville has put a hold on nominations and promotions of senior military officers whose positions require Senate confirmation, protesting a Pentagon policy of granting leave and reimbursing travel expenses for military personnel who must travel out of state to obtain an abortion or fertility treatment. The hold has so far delayed the promotion of more than 200 military officers.

"President Biden has irresponsibly decided to yank a military decision out of the Air Force’s hands in the name of partisan politics,” said Sen. Katie Britt (R-Ala.).

Alabama's senators don't have the influence on Capitol Hill that was wielded by former Sen. Richard Shelby, who retired from Congress earlier this year. Shelby alternated roles of chairman and ranking member of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee for the better part of the last decade, directing funding for federal projects with a presence in Alabama.

Not surprisingly, Colorado's lawmakers welcomed Biden's decision. Lamborn, the Republican from Colorado Springs, said Biden's decision prioritized national security above political interests.

“For two and a half years we’ve known any objective analysis of this basing decision would reach the same conclusion we did, that Peterson Space Force Base is the best home for Space Command," said Sen. John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.). "After two investigations and rigorous review by the Department of Defense, the administration has made the decision that’s in our country’s best interest."

While members of Alabama's congressional delegation promise to fight Biden's selection of Colorado Springs for Space Command, there's broad consensus that a final decision was long overdue.

"This has gone on too long," Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) said last week. "These decisions impact our members, their families, local communities. It impacts the mission and the national security of the United States. So we shouldn't let indecision, bureaucracy, and politics impact our national security like this."

Other than the gratuitous use of Trump and Biden in the headline and article, the decision looks fair. Of course, it is Ars Technica, which veers somewhat left, so it's pandering to its readers.

Should be: "After Senator Shelby (R-Ala.) resigned, Space Force reversed it's 2021 decision to move it's headquarters from Colorado Springs to Alabama."

[James1978]

Space Force Gets Its First Targeting Squadron. Here’s What It Will Do
Aug. 17, 2023 | By David Roza

A new unit activated recently at Peterson Space Force Base, Colo., is the branch’s first-ever targeting squadron, designed to scope out adversary space capabilities and present options to the joint force on how to neutralize them.

“Today is a monumental time in the history of our service,” Lt. Col. Travis Anderson, commander of the 75th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Squadron, said in a press release about its Aug. 11 activation. “The idea of this unit began four years ago on paper and has probably been in the minds of several U.S. Air Force intelligence officers even longer.”

Space systems are made up of three elements: the satellite, the ground station that commands and controls it, and the signal that connects the two, retired Space Force Col. Charles Galbreath, senior resident fellow for space studies at the Mitchell Institute, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“My interpretation of space targeting is understanding all of those elements for an adversary system and then being able to make recommendations on what would be the best way to counteract that threat system,” he said. “In some cases, that may mean sending a jamming signal from our Counter Communications System, or it could mean putting a JDAM on a building somewhere to destroy the command and control or the end user.”

The 75th ISRS is part of Space Delta 7, the operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) component of the Space Force. While its sister squadrons also perform ISR and likely have targeting elements, the 75th consolidates targeting expertise and acts as a focal point for stakeholders who need that information, Galbreath said.

Before the Space Force launched in December 2019, Air Force intelligence officers often served just a single assignment in space, which precluded a robust corps of experts in the field, he said. The 75th is likely one of several new stand-ups to occur in the near future as the Space Force develops ranks of specialized experts.

“Having a squadron like this creates an opportunity for true depths of understanding of the threat environment,” he said.

Assessing space systems can be a difficult task. For example, dual-use satellites may present a challenge for intelligence officers trying to assess threats—China may claim that a robotic arm attached to a satellite is intended for space debris removal, but it could also be used to grab and disrupt other satellites.

Air Force space operators-turned commercial space executives expressed a similar concern during a panel discussion hosted by the Hudson Institute in July.

“Commercial operators become targets when they support the DOD,” Even Rogers, former Air Force space operator and CEO of the space technology company True Anomaly, said at the discussion. “In fact, I suspect that there are some incentives that would cause commercial operators to be targeted first as a strategic off-ramp in a broader conflict, because it is a gray zone, there is uncertainty about whether the United States intends to defend and protect … commercial providers.”

Other challenges include locating a satellite and its ground station, and determining what information its crew needs to operate and where its orders come from. Working together, the 75th ISRS and other intelligence organizations can fuse “a consolidated picture of what makes an adversary threat system tick, and therefore how can we best defeat it?” Galbreath said.

As adversary space capabilities become more sophisticated, so too must U.S. counterspace capabilities. Future operators may need to use cyber or electromagnetic spectrum weapons to target enemy satellites, especially when ground stations are tucked away behind an anti-access/area-denial environment such as mainland China. The problem is that the U.S. does not have many counterspace weapons at its disposal, especially compared to its main rival.

“China has already fielded an alarming array of operational counterspace weaponry” including ground-launched kinetic weapons and lasers, cyber capabilities, and electronic warfare weapons, Galbreath wrote in a June paper on counterspace capabilities. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is also developing space weapons that could attack with robotic arms, electronic warfare, or lasers.

The U.S. defense against such weapons must include establishing international norms of behavior in space, resilient space system architecture that can withstand attack, and exceptional space domain awareness, Galbreath said. But it must also include strong counterspace capabilities.

“The United States has largely shunned the thought of fielding space weapons since the end of the Cold War,” the retired colonel wrote. “However, recognizing space as a warfighting domain means any serious effort to achieve space security must include space weapons.”

At least one such system is on the way. In April, Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman promised Congress a “substantial on-orbit capability … in full spectrum operations” by 2026, though he did not provide many details on what that capability might look like. Galbreath argued that the U.S. needs an architecture of multiple new counterspace systems to protect its space enterprise.

In the meantime, the 75th ISRS will analyze existing threats and how to counter them—the latest addition to the “mighty watchful eye” lauded in the Space Force official song.

[James1978]

Space Force plans to ‘guarantee’ future launch missions with 3 providers faces near term challenge
While Space Systems Command hasn't publicly expressed concerns, outside observers point out that there is a real possibility that only Elon Musk's SpaceX will be able to undertake National Security Space Launches in the next few years.

By Theresa Hitchens
July 24, 2023

WASHINGTON — Amid growing concerns about the potential for Elon Musk’s SpaceX to virtually monopolize the US government space launch market in the near- to medium-term, the Space Force has drafted a new plan to expand the number of heavy-lift rocket providers for its future must-have satellites to three — as opposed to its earlier draft plan issued in February that called for only two.

The issue, sources say, is that there may not be any competitor actually able to provide a second option for the initial timeframe sought by the Space Force, let alone a third.

The expanded plan, floated in a July 14 draft request for proposals from industry regarding Phase 3 of the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program was described by a Space Force official as a way for the government to “guarantee” that critical satellites can get into space when needed — especially those destined for more difficult to reach geosynchronous orbits (GEO).

“We looked at the market, we looked at the capacity,” Col. Douglas Pentecost, deputy head of Space Systems Command’s (SCC) Assured Access to Space directorate, told reporters on July 14. “We made the determination that in order to really ensure access to space, that adding a third provider into what we’re calling Lane 2 is what was good for the nation.

“We just wanted to protect ourselves … over this next five years,” he said.

Both SSC’s February draft request and the new one include proposed requirements for providers hoping to win Lane 2 contracts for launches of high-priority space missions to higher and/or more precise orbits that require a heavy-lift rocket, as well as a new acquisition path, called “Lane 1,” to allow the bevy of emerging small launch companies to compete for Space Force launches to lower orbits.

“Lane 2 is for those more critical payloads — the bigger ones, the ones that we want to go direct inject to GEO so that we save the fuel on the satellite so that we can maneuver in space,” Pentecost said. “And so you can imagine that that type of capability is unique to what the military needs.”

But the question is whether there actually will be three competitors ready to blast off in time under Lane 2 — at least for the start of NSSL Phase 3, since the first contracts need to be awarded in fiscal year 2025 for launch in 2027. NSSL Phase 3 will cover launches between 2027 and 2032.

Currently, only two firms are certified by the Space Force to lift national security payloads into orbit under the NSSL program, SpaceX and the Lockheed Martin-Boeing joint venture ULA, or United Launch Alliance — SpaceX with its Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy rockets, ULA with the Atlas V and Delta IV Heavy.

ULA and SpaceX nabbed the ongoing NSSL Phase 2 awards in 2020, under an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity award covering all Space Force and NRO launches between 2022 and 2027. ULA was awarded a 60 percent share of all the launches, and SpaceX 40 percent.

However, both of ULA’s rockets are being phased out by the end of this year, and their promised successor, the Vulcan Centaur, is years behind schedule to complete even the first of the two launches required to be certified for NSSL launches. (Pentecost said that the Space Forces now expects the first of the qualifying launches to lift off in December.) That makes very real the chance that SpaceX may be the only certified provider for military space launch as soon as early 2024 — the exact kind of risky, one-option-only monopoly that SpaceX successfully argued ULA of being in the mid-2010s.

Of Musk And Monopolies
SpaceX on Jan. 15 [PDF] launched its first NSSL mission to geosynchronous orbit (GEO, some 36,000 kilometers above the Earth) using its Falcon Heavy booster, then on Jan. 18 [PDF] launched a separately contracted GPS III satellite to medium Earth orbit on a smaller Falcon 9. It also launched the Space Development Agency’s first set of test satellites for high-volume data relay and missile warning/tracking on April 2 using a Falcon 9.

The company further this spring began orbital testing — although so far without success — on its Starship super-heavy lift launch vehicle that Musk has been designing to carry humans to Mars. The Space Force already is eyeing Starship to potentially launch cargo through space. NASA also in 2021 chose the company’s Starship Human Lander spacecraft (a variant of Musk’s planned Mars lander) for its first mission to put astronauts on the Moon under the Artemis program.

The other potential competitor for NSSL Phase 3, the New Glenn rocket under development by Blue Origin, is owned by Amazon billionaire and Musk rival Jeff Bezos. Blue Origin supporters in Congress long have pushed for an NSSL on-ramp for New Glenn, so far the rocket has yet to fly. Under its first NASA launch contract awarded in February, Blue Origin is supposed to send New Glenn to Martian orbit by late 2024.

“In terms of the potential for three competitors in the U.S. medium/heavy launch market, that is entirely possible but still uncertain. The most likely competitors by 2027 would be SpaceX with its Starship vehicle fully operational, Blue Origin with New Glenn, and ULA with Vulcan. But progress on Vulcan has been slow, and we don’t know much about the status of New Glenn,” Todd Harrison, a space expert who is now managing director of Metrea Strategic Insights, told Breaking Defense in an email.

Nonetheless, Harrison opined, “I think it is smart to allow more than two competitors, because it sends a strong signal to the market and makes it more likely that three (or more) competitors will materialize.”

Already, the market predominance of SpaceX has led to a number of current and former government officials to begin raising questions about the possibility of a near monopoly by the company on US space launch in the short- to medium- term — thus subjecting the Defense Department and NASA to the whims of the firm’s notoriously mercurial owner Elon Musk.

SpaceX currently is the leader in global launch to low Earth orbit (LEO) — “accounting for 60 [percent] of the effective launch capacity (metric tons to LEO) of the global market in 2022,” Harrison said, adding that the company now is poised to possibly do the same in the heavy launch market with Starship rocket.

“Starship will fundamentally change everything because of its size and the launch rate SpaceX is projecting. We could see SpaceX’s annual effective launch capacity triple from what it is today within the next five years,” Harrison said.

“The only thing worse than a government monopoly is a private monopoly that government is dependent on,” former NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine told a conference sponsored by The Aerospace Corporation and George Washington University on June 29. While Bridenstine was talking about NASA’s current reliance on SpaceX, a number of current and former Pentagon officials and outside experts have similar concerns regarding the Space Force.

Responding to questions at the annual Aspen Security Forum about DoD’s commercial space dependence, Gen. James Dickinson, the head of US Space Command, said that the key if for the military to maintain a “balance” of commercial versus military acquisitions for all types of space missions.

“We’re not going to be all commercial. We may not be all military, but as we look at our missionaries within US Space Command and the Department of Defense, there is a balance between what is purely military and what might be relied upon as a service, for example from the commercial sector.”

SSC’s Goal: Secure Access To Space
All that said, SSC officials haven’t publicly expressed concerns about potentially being beholden to Musk for future national security satellite launches.

The addition of a third provider, Pentacost said, was prompted by a determination by SSC that more Lane 2 launches will be needed than it had originally estimated. Further, he explained, there is a growing market for commercial launch that could erode the Space Force’s future access if it fails to plan accordingly.

Under the new draft plan, Pentecost said, SSC intends 58 Lane 2 launches during that time frame rather than the 38 estimated in the February draft. Another 30 are planned for Lane 1. SSC intends to release a final request for bids in September and award the three Lane 2 contracts in October 2024, along with the first individual mission contracts under Lane 2.

For Lane 2, where the big money will be, two competitors will be chosen to undertake 51 of the planned launches: the winner will be awarded 60 percent and the second will take 40 percent. The remaining seven launches, which will include five GPS satellite launches to medium Earth orbit and two direct-to-GEO orbit, Pentecost said, will be contract to the third place provider. Each contract will cover five years.

SSC did not provide a top line budget for the draft plan, but as with previous NSSL manifests Phase 3 is expected to involve billions of dollars.

[James1978]

24 hours to launch: Space Force, DIU kick off new ‘Tactically Responsive Space’ mission
The program, called Victus Haze, builds on the on-going Space Systems Command Victus Nox mission to rapidly launch a prototype satellite for keeping tabs on objects in low Earth orbit.

By Theresa Hitchens
August 25, 2023

WASHINGTON — The Space Force and the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) today kickstarted a follow-up to the service’s Tactically Responsive Space-3 (TacRS-3) mission to launch a prototype satellite, called Victus Nox, within 24 hours of a “go” order.

The new effort, called Victus Haze and announced today in a call for industry proposals, is being managed by Space Systems Command’s Space Safari program office and is designed not just to very rapidly turn around a launch of a prototype satellite, but also quickly perform an up-close on-orbit inspection of a (simulated) threatening spacecraft. Space Safari was established to directly respond to urgent launch needs of US Space Command and other combatant commands.

“The number and complexity of adversary threats in space is constantly growing. To rapidly respond to those threats, we need to deliver the most advanced TacRS capabilities the U.S. has to offer,” said Lt. Col. MacKenzie Birchenough, Space Safari material leader, in a joint statement with DIU. “VICTUS HAZE will help provide the advantage we need to assess the threats and continue our ability to freely maneuver in space.”

The solicitation comes as the Victus Nox satellite, built by Boeing’s Millennium Space Systems, is awaiting the starting gun to launch to low Earth orbit on a Firefly Aerospace Alpha rocket. Space Safari has been planning to launch by the end of the year, but could spring the notice on the contractors as early as the end of this month.

Victus Haze’s mission parameters are building on those set up for Victus Nox, and keep the 24-hours-after-“go” mandate. “The program includes the logistics, ground segment, launch service, on-orbit operations, and spacecraft bus; which is the main body and structural component of a satellite or spacecraft that holds the payload and all scientific instruments,” the solicitation explains.

At the annual Space Symposium this April, Birchenough said her office wants to see TacRS capabilities up and running in the “2025-2026 timeframe.” The Space Force’s fiscal 2024 budget request included a first-time ask for tactically responsive space, a total of $60 million over two years.

DIU’s mission is to seek out already commercially available capabilities that can be easily on-ramped to meet Defense Department mission needs — thus Space Safari’s interest in partnering. The winning vendors will have to show that their solution has a commercially viable business plan and would not be solely reliant on DoD funding.

DIU and SSC previously have teamed up on responsive space activities, noted DIU’s space portfolio head Steve “Bucky” Butow, in the joint announcement.

“We started a Small Responsive Launch program in 2017 with SSC to leverage low-cost, high-cadence launch to quickly put small payloads into low Earth orbit, and to deliver a payload to a specific address,” he said. “TacRS is taking this to the next level, tapping into the ability for the commercial space industry to provide risk reduction for dynamic space systems to conduct their missions while demonstrating a contingency response capable of inspecting and characterizing a threat on urgent operational timelines.”

Interested commercial firms are being asked to make proposals that include “the end-to-end capability to rapidly launch within 24 hours of notice” as well as to match the orbital plane of the simulated threat satellite, “conduct rendezvous and proximity operations,” and “inspect and characterize a simulated threat on an operationally relevant timeline,” the solicitation adds.

To be chosen, vendors will need to prove that their prototype satellite can be “flight ready” within 12 to 18 months, and that it will be able to start providing threat assessments to the Space Force within 48 hours of reaching orbit.

SSC and DIU intend to issue contracts this fall, although neither the press release nor the industry solicitation provide their value or how many vendors are expected to be chosen.

[James1978]

Space Force, NRO launch ‘Silent Barker’ space observation satellites
By Courtney Albon
10 September 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office launched their newest space observation satellites today in a largely classified mission called “Silent Barker.”

The joint mission flew Sept. 10 on a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket from Cape Canaveral Space Force Base in Florida. Once operational, the satellites will track objects — and potentially nefarious activities — within geosynchronous orbit, about 22,000 miles above Earth.

“Working together, we’ve developed a system in a relatively short amount of time that is going to provide us with unprecedented coverage of what’s going on in the GEO belts,” NRO director Christopher Scolese told reporters during an Aug. 28 pre-launch briefing.

The mission had been planned for Aug. 29, but was delayed due to weather conditions.

Tracking activity in space, and particularly in GEO, has been a growing priority for the Space Force and the NRO as adversaries like Russia and China have shown signs of possible aggression in the regime. In 2020, then-Chief of Space Operations Gen. Jay Raymond revealed that two Russian satellites were trailing a U.S. spy satellite and called the behavior “unusual and disturbing.”

Most of the Space Force’s space observation capabilities come from ground-based sensors, which can view larger, basketball-sized objects, but can’t provide the level of visibility and detail the agencies hope to get through Silent Barker. Commander of Space Systems Command Lt. Gen. Guetlein told reporters in the same briefing that having intelligence sensors closer to the area they want to watch will allow operators to better follow an object’s movement.

“By actually moving the sensor into orbit with those objects, they can not only detect smaller objects, but maintain custody of them,” he said.

The agencies announced in December of 2017 they would partner to develop Silent Barker as a replacement for the older Space-Based Space Surveillance System satellites, which are set to reach the end of their life span in 2028. Scolese said the team put an acquisition plan in place in 2020 and took about three years to build the satellites and prepare for launch.

The Space Force’s fiscal 2024 budget request includes $115.6 million for Silent Barker, which is expected to be fully operational by 2026.

Scolese and Guetlein declined to discuss in detail how the new sensor design differs from SBSS, though Scolese offered that Silent Barker is “very, very different” from its predecessor constellation. The officials did not disclose how many satellites launched on the Sept. 10 mission — except to say there is more than one — and would not confirm how many spacecraft will ultimately comprise the constellation or what companies are involved in building them.

Though details on the program are slim, Guetlein noted that the agencies were intentional about making the existence of Silent Barker known in order to deter bad behavior in space.

“A huge element of deterrence is the ability for the adversary to know what we can and cannot see,” he said. “We actually want our adversaries to know that we have eyes in GEO, that we can see what’s happening.”

[James1978]

Building US Space Force’s Counterspace Capabilities
August 31, 2023

Americans have possessed unrivaled advantage in the space domain for a generation, but now, that advantage is at risk. Not only are potential adversaries developing their own space-based communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, they are also actively working on ways to defeat U.S. space assets. China’s counterspace capabilities are the most advanced and present the largest threat, but Russia also has demonstrated intent to deny its adversaries access to commercial and international space systems. Both share the same aim: to nullify U.S. military advantages in space.

Operation Desert Storm, now more than 30 years in the past, made clear to China and other potential adversaries how critical the space domain is to the U.S. military. China sees attacking space systems as essential to prevail in a conflict with the United States and is actively fielding the most extensive collection of counterspace threats of any nation. To counter Chinese aggression in space, the U.S. must build a credible, effective Space Force with the right capabilities and force capacity.

The enormous responsibility to protect expanding U.S. interests in space, deter aggression in space, and create effects from space that are crucial to the success of all U.S. military operations now falls on the youngest, smallest, and least-funded military service. The Space Force must be prepared and armed with sufficient resources and clear governing policies to conduct credible and decisive defensive and offensive counterspace operations.

Changes to perceived threats and vital interests have historically shaped U.S. policies on space weapons. For example, the United States pursued the development of weapons in space to defend against Soviet nuclear ballistic missile attacks as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as the “Star Wars” program. Then, from the end of the Cold War until recently, the U.S. government believed there were few serious threats requiring it to pursue space defenses. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) canceled its Cold War-era space weapons programs.

The “Space Commission” voiced significant concern on this issue in early 2001. Their report cited threats posed by China to U.S. space systems and called for new policies and space capabilities to defend U.S. assets in orbit. But in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and DOD’s subsequent focus on counterterrorism operations,U.S. freedom of action in space did not get the attention it needed. Discussions on whether the U.S. should develop space weapons were all but taboo, as many U.S. national security professionals continued to believe they were too futuristic, too costly, or too bellicose for a still relatively permissive domain.

While some continue to shun the topic of space weapons, the fact is there are remarkably few explicit limitations on their development. The “Outer Space Treaty of 1967” prohibits placing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. While there are conventions related to liability of actions, there are no formal internationally recognized agreements prohibiting the development and fielding of space weapons. Furthermore, since international law originates from a combination of international conventions, general principles of law, and international custom or practice, Russia‘s and China’s placement of weapons in orbit and their fielding of direct-ascent kinetic interceptors are, in fact, laying the legal framework to normalize space weapons.

Our decades-long view of space as a sanctuary profoundly impacted the development of U.S. systems and associated operations, leaving them ill-suited to today’s reality, where space is a warfighting domain. The U.S. military’s space architectures developed around small numbers of highly capable, very expensive satellites without on-board defenses and ground systems, because man-made threats were believed to be negligible. Now those satellites are “big, fat, juicy targets,” lacking even the maneuverability to avoid threats.

Adversaries can also exploit lengthy delays between observations and existing regional gaps in U.S. space sensor coverage to conduct counterspace operations. Growing congestion in space, as more countries became spacefaring, and as irresponsible anti-satellite (ASAT) tests by Russia and China created long-lived debris, has stretched the limited capacity of the space surveillance network (SSN). That means fewer and less frequent observations per object and increasing opportunities for adversaries to exploit the limitations of the legacy SSN.

Similarly, it became standard practice for satellites in predictable orbits to go long periods between contacts as long as they were conducting routine operations. Longer “no contact” periods, however, increased the windows of opportunity for adversaries to attack and degrade satellite capabilities.

China’s Growing Threat

According to the Director of National Intelligence’s most recent intelligence estimate, “China is steadily progressing toward becoming a world-class space leader, with the intent to match or surpass the United States by 2045.” While that may seem like the distant future, it is only 22 years away—the same amount of time that has elapsed since the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. China accelerated its efforts to compete with the United States during that span, developing its own capabilities and fielding multiple offensive weapons to target U.S. and allied satellites. Notably, China does not distinguish between its military and civil space programs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has purview over planning and direction for all Chinese space activities, even the scientific missions, meaning that any growth in China’s space programs is effectively an expansion of its military space capability.

According to the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), China believes space deterrence is achieved through forceful persuasion.“Space deterrence signifies having powerful space forces as backing and threatening to use or actually using limited space forces to awe and contain the opponent’s military activities,” notes Air University’s CASI in its “Lectures on the Science of Space Operations.” China would employ four escalatory stages to achieve its “space deterrence” objectives:
* The first stage is a “show of space strength,” which is seen as a means of deterring would-be adversaries from taking aggressive actions, in space or on Earth.

* Next, as a potential crisis escalates, China would demonstrate its prowess through “space military exercises.” This is consistent with Chinese activities in other domains, such as a 2023 PLA naval exercise encircling Taiwan.

* China’s third stage is to change the disposition of its space forces by launching additional space assets or repositioning its existing space capabilities. China considers this a medium-high deterrence action, with the added benefit of creating a favorable space posture if the situation escalates to combat.

* Last, China would launch an “over-awing space strike” that could potentially simultaneously attack multiple U.S. space systems using a variety of weapons—what the Space Commission warned as a “Space Pearl Harbor.”

China has the most rapidly developing ASAT and counterspace capabilities of any nation, according to a 2020 report, “China’s Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities,” prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. China has already fielded an array of counterspace weaponry, including cyber, ground-based electronic warfare capabilities, lasers, and ground-launched missiles carrying ASAT kinetic kill vehicles (KE-ASATs). The PLA has demonstrated that its KE-ASAT weapons can threaten U.S. space systems located in low Earth, medium Earth, and geosynchronous orbits. It also has operational units using radio-frequency jamming to disrupt satellite communications, navigation, missile warning, and other vital space capabilities. Additionally, the PLA fielded ground-based lasers in at least two sites capable of temporarily blinding or permanently disabling satellites. In 2006, the PLA deliberately lazed a U.S. satellite, which U.S. officials characterized as a “test.” These types of tests are not limited to lasers. In 2021 Gen. David “D.T.” Thompson, the Vice Chief of Space Operations, said Russia and China now conduct laser, RF jamming, and cyberattacks against U.S. satellites “every single day.”

The PLA is also developing and testing additional space weapons. They have demonstrated satellites that can rendezvous with orbiting U.S. satellites and attack them using robotic arms or electronic warfare. Reports indicate China has a megawatt-class solid-state laser and high-powered microwave systems mountable on satellites. It also developed a miniaturized power source for 10-gigawatt microwave weapons enabling attacks on satellites from mobile ground systems. Finally, in 2021, China demonstrated a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), which can launch weapons such as hypersonic glide vehicles into orbit and then de-orbit them to destroy ground targets, according to Pentagon reports.

It’s not just China’s counterspace systems causing concern. China is now the second most active country in space behind the United States. From 2015 to 2022, China consistently conducted more launches per year than the United States. In 2022, China placed 45 military payloads in orbit compared to 32 payloads by the United States. These Chinese payloads include intelligence, navigation, communication, and potentially counterspace systems, all of which are now integrated into PLA military operation plans. Between 2019 and 2021 alone, China expanded its space architecture by more than 50 percent, giving it 541 operational satellites, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The multitude of Chinese counterspace threats is directly in line with its escalation-based view of deterrence. China has demonstrated its willingness to resort to shows of force, and it has exercised its capabilities and ability to maneuver its space assets. The United States must now be ready for a Chinese over-awing space strike, which could launch a major conflict.

The U.S. Response

The United States is making concerted efforts to normalize global space operations to promote stability. The recent growth of the commercial and international space industries, and corresponding congestion in space, underscore the importance of adopting common standards for all spacefaring nations. As in any domain, the development of standards of responsible behavior and norms—like air traffic control procedures or international rules for navigating ships at sea—promotes safe utilization of that domain for all.

One of the most pressing norms sought by the United States is an international agreement to forgo destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. In early 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris announced the U.S. commitment to prohibit such tests and called on other nations to voluntarily make similar commitments. Such tests leave behind long-lived debris affecting all spacefaring nations. Unlike other domains where debris from explosions or impacts eventually settle in a relatively confined area, debris in space persists as a hazard, threatening satellites and increasing the probability of collision, while forcing launch vehicles to travel through congested regions in space.

The past four decades have provided multiple examples of accidental and intentional debris-generating events highlighting the criticality of this issue. Intentional acts rightfully garner the most attention. In 2008, the United States used an SM-3 missile to destroy a non-functioning satellite carrying a fuel tank of hazardous propellant, to eliminate the risk of the tank impacting populated areas. By carefully selecting the geometry of the engagement, the United States destroyed the fuel tank and ensured the resulting debris did not persist or pose a threat to other satellites, according to an unclassified DOD summary. This event only generated 175 pieces of debris, all of which reentered the atmosphere by late 2009. In stark contrast, China tested its KE-ASAT weapon in 2007, generating 3,536 pieces of debris, most of which remain on orbit more than 16 years later. Only 750 of these objects had reentered the atmosphere as of February 2023. The international condemnation of China’s test was nearly universal, and while China has conducted seven more direct-ascent anti-satellite tests since then, none created debris or resulted in impacts on other satellites.

The U.S. declaration that it would not conduct additional debris-generating, direct-ascent anti-satellite tests led 12 other nations to make similar pledges. The United Nations General Assembly also passed a resolution for countries to forgo debris causing direct-ascent KE-ASAT tests, with 155 nations voting in favor, nine against, and nine abstaining. Notably, China and Russia voted against the measure, and India abstained.

Competitive Endurance

Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman unveiled his Theory of Competitive Endurance at the AFA Warfare Symposium in March 2023; the theory offers a framework to guide Space Force plans to deter, and if necessary, defeat, aggression in space. Competitive Endurance is focused on ensuring U.S. access to space and preventing competition from escalating into conflict. The theory follows three core tenets: avoiding operational surprise, denying first-mover advantage, and responsible counterspace campaigning. The first two tenets continue efforts predating the Space Force to improve space domain awareness and resilience. However, the third tenet, responsible counterspace campaigning, is a new area requiring further development.

The need to understand a warfighting domain and threats in it is common practice for air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace forces. However, the space domain is unique because of the sheer vastness military forces must consider and the lack of first-person awareness. Guardians derive everything they know about the space domain from data received via sensors and satellites. In a way, Guardians are always “flying on instruments” with data that is not real-time and may even be days old due to the limited capacity of the legacy SSN and SCN. This is why improving space domain awareness is critical.

In recent years, the Space Force has increased the number and types of systems supporting the space domain awareness mission. Additional sensors around high-value space assets and key regions in space, like GEO and cislunar, will be required to address the expanding number of adversary threats. Furthermore, the Space Force must make significant improvements in how it processes data from sensors. Until a more responsive and capable processing system is online, the Space Force will have difficulty achieving the necessary level of space domain awareness to counter an adversary in space.

Second, the Space Force recognizes its architecture needs to be more resilient. The legacy space architecture is vulnerable to mounting threats, incentivizing adversaries to attack quickly in conflict in order to degrade the U.S. ability to respond. This “offense dominant” condition equates to a first-mover advantage and effectively invites, rather than deters, aggression. To deny this first-mover advantage, the Space Force must increase the resilience of its architecture, reduce the time needed to reconstitute it, and defend its critical space assets to such a degree that adversaries lack confidence in their ability to attack effectively.

A 2015 DOD white paper, “Space Domain Mission Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy,” suggested that resilience along with defensive operations and reconstitution comprise a larger mission assurance umbrella necessary to guarantee critical space systems will be available in a crisis or conflict to deliver essential warfighting effects.

One of the earliest and most visible realizations of this shift is in the Space Development Agency’s efforts to field a proliferated low-Earth orbit (pLEO) constellation for missile warning. By increasing the number of satellites in a constellation, this approach would make the loss of some assets tolerable, because the constellation’s overall performance could remain above an acceptable threshold. The use of small inexpensive satellites also improves deterrence by imposing greater costs on countering those satellites. When the cost of a direct-ascent KE-ASAT is greater than the target satellite, and the sheer number of satellites increases the complexity and cost of an attack, proliferation reduces the effectiveness and impact of these weapons and other co-orbital threats. The Space Development Agency’s pLEO system, coupled with existing U.S. GEO capabilities, like SBIRS, further diversifies the missile warning architecture and improves its overall level of resilience.

Additionally, diversification, distribution, and disaggregation of satellite constellations is also necessary. So is the enduring military practice of deception, which can be applied to confuse adversary understanding and complicate their ability to target U.S. satellites. Finally, the Space Force can expand its use of protection measures beyond nuclear hardening and anti-jam protection for a few satellites. By including protection measures, the Space Force can create options for decision-makers to employ defensive operations.

The booming space commercial sector and growing allied capabilities can provide critical support to both resilience and reconstitution. “Space is a team sport,” notes the Space Operations Command 2023 Strategic Plan. “We will leverage our Allies’ and Partners’ capabilities to improve the resiliency of our architecture.”

Leveraging commercial SATCOM and imagery is already common military practice. Further integration and the potential use of hosted payloads is much more extensive in the Space Force’s new approach, and while it does increase the resilience of the architecture, it also enables rapid restoration. The repositioning or use of allied or partner capability can effectively restore a lost or degraded Space Force system.

A more ambitious way to reconstitute capability is to rapidly launch new satellites. The Space Force is planning to demonstrate rapid launch for an urgent need in the VICTUS NOX mission, which aims to deliver a space domain awareness satellite into orbit within 24 hours of notification, according to Space Systems Command. While VICTUS NOX is characterized as an augmentation mission, the same approach can provide needed restoration of lost or degraded capabilities.

The final and least developed area of the Space Force’s Competitive Endurance initiative is to directly defend space systems and protect friendly forces from space-enabled attacks. Recognizing space as a warfighting domain means any serious effort to achieve space security must include space weapons. It’s oxymoronic to charge a new military service with protecting U.S. national interests in space without arming it with the weapons needed to accomplish its mission. Because it is also a key U.S. space interest to preserve the domain itself, U.S. defensive and offensive actions in space must minimize long-lived debris or other effects which might degrade friendly space architectures. This is why the Space Force calls this final element of its plan responsible counterspace campaigning.

Conclusion And Recommendations

The objective of any military force is to gain and maintain an advantage over its adversary. To achieve this, given today’s real threats in space, counterspace capabilities must be developed. The United States must have the potential to deny China access to the space capabilities that threaten U.S. space and terrestrial forces and national interests.

The Space Force should develop defensive and offensive counterspace capabilities and support elements to protect U.S. national interests in space and hold adversary space assets at risk. Concerted efforts to develop, field, and operate a range of counterspace capabilities will increase deterrence and provide the means for U.S. combatant commanders to defeat aggression should deterrence fail.

The U.S. administration, Congress, industry, and the Space Force should consider these eight steps to develop counterspace capabilities and their supporting infrastructure:

Senior U.S. civilian and military leadership should explicitly and publicly state the need to field counterspace systems. Clear guidance is essential to deter potential adversaries and align the resources necessary to field the required counterspace capabilities. Continued silence on the issue will risk further emboldening adversaries.

The Space Warfighting and Analysis Center should develop a jointly informed and accessible counterspace force design. This will require a detailed analysis of threats, current and emerging technologies, and the effectiveness and limitations of potential capabilities. Existing systems developed by the other services should also inform this force design to help prevent unnecessary duplication of effort. The force design must guide activities across the entire DOD in support of the counterspace mission.

Space Systems Command and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office should partner with industry to develop the necessary defensive and offensive capabilities. These capabilities should include both on-board and off-board defensive measures for high-value satellites. Offensive counterspace systems must be consistent with the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict and will clearly be required to defend joint and combined operations from adversary space-enabled attacks in future crises and conflicts.

The defense industry must respond quickly to USSF requirements and requests for information. Given the decades of relative neglect in the area of space weapons, the Space Force will need to be able to leverage technologies and lessons learned from industry and other domain acquisition programs in order to accelerate counterspace weapons development.

The Space Force must improve its space domain awareness capabilities to enable effective defensive and offensive counterspace operations. This includes growth in sensors and processing capabilities to enable tracking and warning of threats and a more enhanced SDA architecture capable of faster processing of collections and observations around high-value assets—and in key regions like GEO and cislunar.

The Space Force must improve its satellite Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT&C) capabilities. This is essential to rapidly respond to threats and maintain positive control over its space weapon systems. The Space Force will need a higher-capacity TT&C architecture capable of maintaining contact with its current and future systems, including space weapons.

The Space Force must improve its testing and training architecture. Additional live, virtual, and digital elements in the National Space Test and Training Complex are required for Guardians to evaluate new counterspace systems and train all operators for the reality of space being a warfighting domain.

Congress must authorize and fund additional Space Force growth. Increases to the Space Force’s civilian and military personnel and the construction of additional facilities are needed for counterspace systems. Establishing the counterspace mission as a central task for the Space Force will create a requirement for growth beyond USSF’s originally anticipated force size of 18,000 personnel.

A war extending to or starting in space is in no one’s interest. The United States is actively pursuing means of preventing such a conflict. A strong Space Force both aids the U.S. deterrent stance and provides integral war-winning capability should deterrence fail. Norms of responsible behavior, improved resilience, and expanded space domain awareness are all vital elements of a comprehensive strategy, but by themselves will not achieve all U.S. national security objectives. The Space Force must have a robust suite of counterspace capabilities to protect national interests in space and defend fielded forces from an adversary’s space-enabled attacks.

[James1978]

Space Force Sets New Speed Record Going from Orders to Launch in 27 Hours
Sept. 15, 2023 | By David Roza

The Space Force set a scorching new record Sept. 14 when it launched a satellite into orbit from Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., just 27 hours after receiving launch orders. The successful mission, named Victus Nox, is a milestone as the branch works to deploy new systems faster in response to changing operational requirements.

“The success of Victus Nox marks a culture shift in our nation’s ability to deter adversary aggression and, when required, respond with the operational speed necessary to deliver decisive capabilities to our warfighters,” Lt. Gen. Michael Guetlein, Space Systems Command boss (SSC), said in a press release Sept. 15.

“This exercise … proves the United States Space Force can rapidly integrate capabilities and will respond to aggression when called to do so on tactically relevant timelines,” he added.

The 27-hour launch record is just the latest in a series of rapid-fire preparations that began less than a year ago, when SSC, the field command responsible for acquiring and launching space systems, awarded contracts to Millennium Space Systems and Firefly Aerospace. Millennium built the satellite, which will help the service’s Space Domain Awareness mission, the manufacturer wrote in a press release, while Firefly built the launch vehicle.

In August, the two companies entered a ‘hot standby phase’ where they awaited an alert notification from Space Force that would give them 60 hours to transport the payload from the Millennium facility in El Segundo to Vandenberg 165 miles away, then test, fuel, and mate it to Firefly’s Alpha launch vehicle.

That series of tasks usually takes weeks or months to complete, but the Victus Nox team completed it in just 58 hours before standing on alert as they awaited the call to launch. The previous record of 21 days was set in June 2021, when SSC launched a Northrop Grumman Pegasus XL rocket carried by a modified airliner. That mission was called Tactically Responsive Launch-2 (TacRL-2)—the general ability to rapidly launch satellites to respond to urgent operational needs is called Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS).

Now that it is deployed in low Earth orbit, the Victus Nox satellite has a deadline to begin operations within 48 hours. The mission is a major accomplishment for SSC’s Space Safari Program Office, which is charged with responding to urgent on-orbit needs, a capability space experts say needs to move faster.

“We need to develop combat-ready forces that are resilient and are ready for the fight,” Lt. Gen. DeAnna M. Burt, deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber, and nuclear, said in March. “A key part of that is ensuring our architectures are threat-informed and capabilities are delivered at an operationally relevant pace and speed.”

In a Firefly press release, the company said it was ramping up production of Alpha launch vehicles, which could indicate future speed runs.

The Space Force has already started planning another Tactically-Responsive Space mission, in partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit. Dubbed Victus Haze, the mission’s goal is to combine ground stations, launch capabilities, and a satellite and be ready to launch on 24 hours’ notice, and mission-ready within 48 hours of reaching orbit.

US Space Force launches ‘Victus Nox’ responsive space mission
By Courtney Albon
September 15, 2023

WASHINGTON — Firefly Aerospace’s Alpha rocket successfully launched the U.S. Space Force’s second operational tactically responsive space demonstration Sept. 14, setting a record for flying within 27 hours of receiving launch orders.

The Victus Nox mission, Latin for “conquer the night,” was meant to demonstrate the ability to rapidly acquire, build, integrate and launch a satellite. Boeing subsidiary Millennium Space Systems built the spacecraft, which flew from Vandenberg Space Force Base, in California.

“The success of VICTUX NOX marks a culture shift in our nation’s ability to deter adversary aggression and, when required, respond with the operational speed necessary to deliver decisive capabilities to our warfighters,” Lt. Gen. Michael Guetlein, head of Space Systems Command, said in a Sept. 15 statement.

SSC’s Space Safari program office led the demonstration in partnership with the command’s Rocket Systems Launch Program.

With the satellite now in orbit, the team will work to begin operating it in within 48 hours.

The Space Force chose Firefly and Millennium in 2022 to conduct the mission. Last month, the service notified the companies they had entered a “hot standby” phase, indicating the 24-hour launch window could open at any moment.

During that phase, Millennium sent the satellite from its facility in El Segundo, California, to Vandenberg, where the mission team tested, fueled and mated it to its launch adapter in less than 58 hours — a process that can take weeks or months for a standard launch.

The Space Force wants to have an enduring responsive space capability as soon as 2026, which would allow it to quickly launch satellites into space either to respond to an in-orbit threat or augment a degraded or destroyed system. That could mean having a spare satellite in orbit that could be turned on or maneuvered into position as needed, working with commercial partners to buy data in a crisis or, as in the case of Victus Nox, have a satellite on the ground that’s ready to be launched on demand.

The mission is the Space Force’s second tactically responsive space demonstration; the first flew in 2021 on a Northrop Grumman Pegasus XL rocket.

The service is making plans for a third launch, this time working with the Defense Innovation Unit. DIU announced Aug. 24 that the effort, dubbed Victus Haze, would focus on “end-to-end execution using commercial capabilities.”

Victus Nox was the third flight for Firefly’s Alpha rocket. Following this week’s mission, the company said it is preparing for several upcoming missions for NASA, the National Reconnaissance Office, Lockheed Martin and other customers.

“As our third flight, this mission further validates Firefly’s technology rigor, passion, and dedication that’s required to prevail as the leading responsive launch provider for both government and commercial customers,” Firefly’s Vice President of Launch Vehicles Adam Oakes said in a statement.

[James1978]

‘Not enough’: Space Force pauses commercial strategy to flesh out ‘actionable’ plans with industry
"It can't just be a strategy with aspirational platitudes about how we're going to work together," Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said. "It has to have more tangible guidance, things that we can take action on."

By Theresa Hitchens
September 21, 2023

AMOS 2023 — Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman has, in essence, sent the Space Force’s draft Commercial Space Strategy back to the drawing board, seeking to flesh it out with more specifics on what exactly the service believes it needs from industry for each of its mission areas.

Saltzman on Wednesday told the annual Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies (AMOS) Conference in Hawaii that after reading through the draft, “I said, ‘this is not enough.’ … It can’t just be a strategy with aspirational platitudes about how we’re going to work together. I just don’t think that’s where we are today. It has to have more tangible guidance, things that we can take action on.”

The document, he stressed, has to move from “aspirational to actionable” — echoing the growing industry concerns about the need to turn rhetoric on leveraging commercial innovation into real programs with real money.

“So, I started asking some questions amongst the staff, like, ‘What is the appropriate division between those services which commercial industry can provide and those services which have to be inherently governmental because of the nature of the effort, the nature of the consequences that come with it? And quite frankly, there’s not a lot of easy answers,” Saltzman added.

Another question he wants answered is how to define the types of commercial assistance the Space Force might need, in order to guide an acquisition approach.

“What’s the difference between commercial services, commercial data and commercial capabilities? What exactly is it that I want the commercial industry to do?” Saltzman said. Defining those terms will allow the service to then develop solid requirements and put out more specific requests for proposals to industry, he added.

Speaking to Breaking Defense and Space News after his keynote presentation, Saltzman explained that his goal is to figure out exactly what the Space Force needs for each individual mission set — including the topic of AMOS, space domain awareness.

“I’m trying to get to ‘here are some significant gaps that we think are best filled by commercial data, or commercial services or a new commercial capability,'” he said. “We just don’t have that level of fidelity yet because we haven’t asked all those questions. So, that’s why I kind of put it on pause.”

Saltzman told the AMOS audience that he hopes the rewritten document will be completed by the end of the year. Further, he said he will be looking for industry reaction once it is made available.

“We’ll make this a dynamic document. If it doesn’t clarify things for you, if it doesn’t make things actionable for you, then it’s not doing what I intended, and I need that feedback as well,” he said.

[James1978]

Space Force sends Congress $1 billion list of unfunded projects
By Courtney Albon
22 March 2024

The Space Force asked Congress for more than $1 billion for a largely classified slate of high-priority efforts it didn’t include in its fiscal 2025 budget request.

The list, obtained by C4ISRNET, includes $846 million in classified projects. The remaining $305 million is largely focused on improving the resiliency of Space Force systems and training capabilities.

The military services and combatant commands send Congress a similar document each year, detailing programs they want to fund but that weren’t included in the annual budget request.

The unclassified efforts included on the Space Force’s list reflects its focus on making its satellites and ground systems resilient against adversary threats. In recent years, the service has started to shift toward building smaller satellites in large quantities across key mission areas like missile warning and communications.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, who provides civilian oversight for the Space Force, said that while the service’s $29.4 billion FY25 funding request is sufficient to continue those efforts, it won’t allow it to move as quickly as he would like in other missions, like positioning, navigation and timing and its mostly classified counterspace portfolio.

“We need to find a way to have PNT be more resilient, and I think there are some additional communications things that we need to do,” he told reporters March 8.

Among the unfunded projects is a request for $159 million to establish a fund to procure commercial satellite communications. Another $9 million would support an effort to improve the power supply at certain facilities that operate wideband SATCOM systems.

The list includes $42.5 million for the Space Development Agency’s fleet of demonstration and experimentation satellites. Without additional funding, the program would likely be delayed, the service said.

The service also asks for $60 million for an effort to improve energy efficiency at Buckley Space Force Base in Colorado and $19 million for the National Space Test and Training Complex, increasing the number of wargames the service conducts each year.

An additional $59 million in FY25 would allow the service to conduct up to two more Rocket Systems Launch Program missions, which support science and technology efforts across the Space Force, National Reconnaissance Office, NASA and the Missile Defense Agency.

“Restoring RSLP is not just a matter of maintaining ongoing projects, but is critical for progressing towards the goals set forth by the [National Defense Strategy] to innovate and ensure security in space,” the service said.