From the
Aerofax on the Hustler:
Camouflage Reprise:
Over the many years that now have passed since the publication of the first edition of this book, considerable controversy has reigned over whether the B-58 was ever painted in the Air Force's distinctive Southeast Asia camouflage pattern. As noted on p.130, the scheme was enunciated in Tech Order 1-1-4, but it remains unverified as to whether it ever actually was applied to an aircraft.
David Menard, who works in the Air Force Museum library in Dayton, Ohio, has studied this debate for many years and has corresponded with a number of legitimate authorities on the subject. Among these are Lloyd Jones, who submitted the following letter and associated correspondence:
"A model builder friend of mine was asked by one of his occasional friends if he could build him a model of the Hustler for display in his home. My friend consulted with me as to decals, markings, and colors. I said 'Why don't you blow him away with a camouflage version?' He didn't think he would appreciate it, so went ahead and finished it in the standard scheme.
"When he delivered the model to his friend, he commented that I had suggested he paint it in camouflage and the friend said, 'I flew the camouflaged one'. He then sent me the enclosed sheet on 'Project Bullseye', and confirmed the serial number, 59-2428.
"He said only one plane was painted and it was kept under armed guard in a hangar when not flying. No one was allowed to photograph the plane, although he indicated he had tried. The aircraft markings were typical of the SEA with red numbers on the vertical and on the nose gear doors. The national insignia was on the fuselage and upper wing. No comment was made about rescue or servicing marks."
Lloyd's friend went on to write the following description of the Bullseye Project:
"The Bullseye Project was a highly classified program directed by the USAF Chief of Staff, Gen. Jack Ryan, to test the feasibility of the use of the B-58 as a 'pathfinder' for the F-4 and the F-105 in an attempt to improve the bombing accuracy of those aircraft on selected targets in N. Vietnam.
"Gen. Ryan was very displeased with the bombing tactics being utilized by PACAF and felt the sophisticated radar bombing tactics utilized by SAC would be an improvement over the 'dive bombing' methods being employed in 1966-67. The dramatic loss of aircraft using these tactics was the result of the exposure time the aircraft incurred when they climbed to a bombing altitude to identify their targets. It was thought that low altitude, high-speed entry with no climbing exposure would cut the loss of aircraft. The concept was to use a B-58 as the lead ship with four chicks (F-4 or F-105) on his wing. The bomb run would be conducted by the B-58 and all stores would be released on his command. Mutual ECM support was a benefit as all five aircraft would be using their individual electronic equipment to jam enemy radar systems. The B-58 was selected because of its speed capability and maneuverability, as it could not only stay with the two fighters, it could go faster, was more stable, and could turn inside either the F-4 or the Thud'. It also provided an excellent radar system, and was manned by the best pilots, radar navigators (bombardiers), and defensive systems operators (DSOs) in the Strategic Air Command.
"The actual tactics to be employed were to have the aircraft start at an intermediate altitude (18,000 ft) and work down. All releases were to be made in straight and level flight, with no maneuvering, on the bomb run. Each day's effort would be evaluated and the altitudes would be changed (lowered) to determine the best bombing, as well as the most surviv-able zones.
"The tests were conducted at Eglin AFB, Florida on selected ranges in the spring and early summer of 1967. Aircraft from the 305th BW at Bunker Hill (later Grissom) AFB flew with the F-4s solely to test formation tactics and bombing accuracy. The B-58s from the 43rd BW at Little Rock AFB flew with the F-105s and also were concerned with mutual ECM effects. As was noted, altitudes would start high and work
down to 'tree-top' level. Avoiding detection would be a prime requisite for this exercise, therefore the lower the better. Speed was another factor! All drops were to be made as close to a Mach 1 threshold as possible. Most drops were made at .94 Mach (around 600 kts at the lower levels) with only minor variations. All drops were live!
"The B-58 had four 'hard' points (two on each wing) where bombs could be slung. Mach .94 just happened to be 'normal' cruise for the B-58. Turns off target had to be fairly gradual and measured as the B-58's large delta wing gave it a distinct advantage over either fighter. After the turn, speed could be increased above Mach 1 if needed, to exit the 'lethal SAM' areas. This tactic was not employed during the Bullseye tests to my knowledge. The Bullseye project was complete success, with bombing results at the lowest altitudes better than those at the higher altitudes, and circular errors (CEs) in a highly destructive range (less than 200 ft). Detection was minimal and mutual ECM proved extremely successful.
"Upon completing all the tests the project director indicated to the crews that the Chief was highly encouraged by the results. It was apparent to everyone that crews and aircraft would be deployed at an early date to U-Tapao Royal Thai AB in southern Thailand, which was a SAC base housing the 307th Composite Wing. Paint was rumored to already be at the two B-58 home bases.
"Unfortunately, the concept was killed at a level above the Chief of Staff, USAF - probably the Secretary of Defense. It was later divulged that Mr. McNamara felt it would not be a politically good move and could result in a demoralizing public outcry if a B-58 were to be lost in combat. It also was felt that it would provide the enemy with a rallying point if they were to capture a crew member from the cream of American aircraft. The B-58 therefore was never used in Vietnam despite the fact that it probably was one of the best-suited aircraft for that environment."
No name given...
MikeKozlowski wrote:I had the chance to discuss this at length with Mr. Menard some years ago ( and if ANYBODY ever deserved a show on the History Channel about aviation history, it's him) and he said at the time that one way or the other, he was going to solve this if it was the last thing he did.
Some other things that tie in:
*I've read and heard reliable - but unproven - reports of at least one SEA camo Hustler at Eglin in '67 - that would tie in with the Bullseye tests.
*There may be another reason that the -58 was looked at for SEA service. My advisor at USC was LTC Francis X. Doyle, USAF (Ret), a former RF-4 and RB-66 RSO. He told me that around '67-'68 there was a rumor that a squadron of -58s with recon pods would be sent over. There were supposedly 17 or 18 recon pods built - these were self contained units with one or two cameras that didn't require somebody IN them, like the B-52 and B-36 recon pods, and the 2nd crew position would have been converted to the RSOs slot. LTC Doyle said the idea of riding a -58 - and being much safer than in an RF-4 - appealed quite strongly to the RSO community, but after he heard the original report that was it.
