US Air Force News

[MikeKozlowski]

And if we handwave away the infrastructure costs, let's look at the fact that there is NO ROOM for expansion at any tactical base in the USAF, let alone the new quality-of-life they're going to have to build (housing, dining halls, and most USAF bases have contracted their hospitals down so far that many don't even have ER's or maternity wards anymore). Oh, and imagine the fun when F-16 maintainers and crews start getting orders to places like Minot or Ellsworth.

I think there may be handful of bases that technically have the land to add ramp space, but I don't disagree with your overall conclusion.

Re. the bolded bit, anecdotally I think a lot of expectant mothers may see that as a feature, not a bug. I've got a cousin who is a C-130 driver. His first kid was born at Yokota. His ex-wife was thrilled beyond belief that they were back in CONUS for their second kid and she could have a civilian OB in a civilian hospital.

James,

Absolutely agree with you on that, but OTOH the civilian alternatives aren't always good. For instance, Shaw closed its ER and maternity ward because Tuomey Prisma is downtown. Good sized hospital, whose nickname - from long before I got there 31 years ago - was Tombstone Tuomey. FT Jackson, which is one of the Army's two basic training stations, shut down their ER and Maternity several years ago, and the civilian hospitals - Prisma Richland, Prisma Baptist, and MUSC Columbia - are pretty good and trustworthy. They are also - depending on traffic - almost ten minutes from the Fort. In an emergency, I don't know how comfortable I'd be with that.

Mike

[Johnnie Lyle]

And if we handwave away the infrastructure costs, let's look at the fact that there is NO ROOM for expansion at any tactical base in the USAF, let alone the new quality-of-life they're going to have to build (housing, dining halls, and most USAF bases have contracted their hospitals down so far that many don't even have ER's or maternity wards anymore). Oh, and imagine the fun when F-16 maintainers and crews start getting orders to places like Minot or Ellsworth.

I think there may be handful of bases that technically have the land to add ramp space, but I don't disagree with your overall conclusion.

Re. the bolded bit, anecdotally I think a lot of expectant mothers may see that as a feature, not a bug. I've got a cousin who is a C-130 driver. His first kid was born at Yokota. His ex-wife was thrilled beyond belief that they were back in CONUS for their second kid and she could have a civilian OB in a civilian hospital.

James,

Absolutely agree with you on that, but OTOH the civilian alternatives aren't always good. For instance, Shaw closed its ER and maternity ward because Tuomey Prisma is downtown. Good sized hospital, whose nickname - from long before I got there 31 years ago - was Tombstone Tuomey. FT Jackson, which is one of the Army's two basic training stations, shut down their ER and Maternity several years ago, and the civilian hospitals - Prisma Richland, Prisma Baptist, and MUSC Columbia - are pretty good and trustworthy. They are also - depending on traffic - almost ten minutes from the Fort. In an emergency, I don't know how comfortable I'd be with that.

Mike

Beale AFB is another good example. The closest hospital is Rideout in Marysville. While Adventist has put a lot of work into the place since its purchase, you still have all the issues of a small rural hospital and medical system (despite a patient population base of nearly 100,000). At one time it was the third worst hospital in America, and still glories in the “Ride in, Ride out” monkier. Other medical services are either Sutter Health or Adventist.

If you don’t want to go to Rideout, you’re looking at the Sac suburbs. There you’ll get Sutter and Kaiser, but it’s a good thirty minutes to an hour. UC Davis is also expanding out there too.

God help the folks really out in the sticks.

Basically, if you’re in a major metro area, you’re going to have access to lots of medical choice. If it’s a rural base, there’s not going to be much of a civilian medical system to utilize - and it’s frankly going to be shitty due to all the major issues facing rural medicine.

[James1978]

Tricky E-7 adaptations complicate U.S. Air Force, Boeing negotiations
By Stephen Losey
February 15, 2023

DENVER, Colo. — The Air Force’s desired adaptations to Boeing’s E-7A battlefield management aircraft are proving to be harder than expected and complicating price negotiations, top service officials said Tuesday.

“We’re having a hard time with [the E-7 program], getting price agreement with Boeing,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told reporters in a roundtable at the Air and Space Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium here. “We’re still in negotiations with them, and that’s not been finalized yet.”

The Air Force plans to buy 26 E-7s from Boeing by 2032 to replace its aging E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system aircraft fleet. The service awarded Boeing a $1.2 billion contract in February 2023 to start working on the aircraft.

The service plans to first buy two rapid prototype E-7s, with the first expected to be fielded in 2027, and in 2025 make a production decision on the rest of the fleet.

Australia already flies the E-7, which it refers to as the Wedgetail, and Boeing is also making the aircraft for other nations such as the United Kingdom. The Air Force’s version of the E-7 will have a modified design to meet U.S. satellite communication, military GPS and cybersecurity and program protection requirements.

“We’re partnering with the US Air Force to deliver this critical capability and are working diligently to reach an agreement,” Boeing said in a statement to Defense News.

Andrew Hunter, the Air Force’s assistant secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, said in another roundtable the sticky negotiations center on the E-7′s first two rapid prototype aircraft.

The level of engineering work needed to adapt the E-7 to the Air Force’s specifications was “above and beyond what we anticipated,” Hunter said.

“The big surprise there was an unexpected amount and degree of non-recurring engineering required to meet the requirement that the Air Force specified, which we thought was very close to what the U.K. is currently procuring from Boeing,” Hunter said. “Those discussions have been challenging.”

Hunter said the Air Force is trying to better understand Boeing’s proposal and determine what elements are essential, and what are unnecessary or could be deferred. The service has narrowed those nagging issues down to a smaller list, Hunter said, but he declined to detail them.

Hunter said he would prefer the process to be going faster. But he acknowledged it’s not surprising that Boeing is being particularly cautious as it negotiates on this program, and that the Air Force and Boeing are working through these challenges together.

“They’ve gotten into some contracts in the past that it’s apparent that as they were bidding those, there was key information they were lacking,” Hunter said. “At some level, it’s not that surprising that they’re trying hard to do their homework and not bid things and not understand the full scope of the work they can be expected to perform when they prepare their proposal.”

[James1978]

Some good news. This ought to enhance the credibility of US/NATO TacNukes.

F-35A officially certified to carry nuclear bomb
By Michael Marrow
March 08, 2024

WASHINGTON — The F-35A Joint Strike Fighter has been operationally certified to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, a spokesman for the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) tells Breaking Defense.

In a statement, JPO spokesman Russ Goemaere said the certification was achieved Oct. 12, months ahead of a pledge to NATO allies that the process would wrap by January 2024. Certain F-35As will now be capable of carrying the B61-12, officially making the stealth fighter a “dual-capable” aircraft that can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.

“The F-35A is the first 5th generation nuclear capable aircraft ever, and the first new platform (fighter or bomber) to achieve this status since the early 1990s. This F-35 Nuclear Certification effort culminates 10+ years of intense effort across the nuclear enterprise, which consists of 16 different government and industry stakeholders,” Goemaere said. “The F-35A achieved Nuclear Certification ahead of schedule, providing US and NATO with a critical capability that supports US extended deterrence commitments earlier than anticipated.​”

Responding to follow-up questions from Breaking Defense, Goemaere said US disclosure policy prohibits the release of information on dual-capable aircraft among NATO partners. According to analysis by the Federation of American Scientists, as of 2023 approximately 100 older variants of B61 bombs are housed by NATO allies Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, who share the alliance’s nuclear strike mission. The first four nations are all planned F-35 operators, with the need to have a nuclear-capable aircraft a key reason for Germany signing onto the program.

The F-35A is certified to only carry the newer B61-12 variant, which will replace the older models. The certification additionally does not extend to the stealth jet’s sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C. A delivery schedule of B61-12s to Europe is not clear, though Politico previously reported the bombs would be shipped out starting in December 2022.

“The F-35 is the world’s only 5th Generation multi-role stealth fighter, and in partnership with our customers, we continue to make advancements to ensure it stays ahead of threats,” F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin said in a statement.

A spokesperson for the US Air Force Air Combat Command told Breaking Defense that “all F-35As in the Air Force inventory are expected to be in a nuclear certified configuration in the future, independent of their assigned lot number,” but declined to elaborate on operational details. Goemaere explained that “USAF F-35As at designated units only are both design and operationally certified to carry the B61-12.”

An Air Force spokesperson additionally told Breaking Defense that “the B61-12 is compatible with any DCA [dual-capable aircraft] certified F-35,” and that the fighter’s suite of upgrades collectively known as Block 4 are not a requirement to use the weapon.

The F-15E was previously the first American fighter shown to be compatible with the B61-12. Three other groups of fighters — F-16A/Bs, F-16C/Ds and the PA-200 Tornado used by some NATO countries — are also authorized to carry nuclear weapons.

The dual capable aircraft serve another element of deterrence alongside the traditional nuclear triad of bombers, submarines and land-launched ICBMs, and are seen by European nations as a key part of staving off Russian aggression. Nuclear capability for the Joint Strike Fighter comes at a critical juncture for NATO amid the war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear saber-rattling in particular.

Dutch military officials appeared to previously hint at nuclear capabilities for the F-35A being rolled out in Europe, writing in a post on X in November that F-35As belonging to Amsterdam achieved “initial certification” for the role. But until now, US military officials have not confirmed the fighter was cleared to use the weapon operationally.

Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, noted the announcement is another milestone in America’s ongoing nuclear modernization effort.

“The stage is set for the tactical nuclear weapons upgrade in Europe with full-scale production of the B61-12 and four NATO allies and the US fighter wing at Lakenheath upgrading to operate the bomb on the F-35A,” he said.

The B61-12 is a life extension program that originated in the Obama administration and is replacing older -3, -4, -7 and -10 models. The first production unit of the B61-12 rolled out in November 2021, with production scheduled through the end of fiscal 2025. The program is estimated to cost $9.6 billion in FY22 dollars over its lifespan, although much of that cost has already been spent, according to an annual government accounting of nuclear warheads [PDF].

The Biden administration additionally announced in October that it would develop a new variant of the weapon dubbed the B61-13. The newer -13 is expected to have a yield similar to the -7, officials have said, which would roughly work out to a blast equivalent of up to 360 kilotons; however, the expectation among experts is the -13 will only be certified on bombers. The yield of the -12, by comparison, is estimated at up to 50 kilotons.

Technically, neither the B61-12 or -13 are “new” nuclear weapons that increase the stockpile, as they are taking the warheads from the older bombs and placing them in new housings.

[jemhouston]

I suspect the usual suspects are freaking out over this.

[James1978]

Air Force eyes picking first cyber warrant officer cohort this summer
By Rachel S. Cohen
March 5, 2024

The Air Force will likely pick its first cohort of enlisted troops to start the process of becoming warrant officers this summer, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne Bass said Tuesday.

Selecting that group will mark the next key step toward reinstatement of the Air Force’s first active duty warrant officers in more than 40 years, as it looks to build technical expertise in digitally focused career fields.

“We’ll roll out, I think, in the next several weeks, probably the first message that goes out on warrant officers,” Bass said during a livestreamed question-and-answer session with Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall. “We will probably select this summer, and then warrant officers will probably start school later on this year.”

That timeline dovetails with an Air University memo circulated on social media earlier this year that outlined plans to develop a training pipeline for junior warrant officers no later than October.

The memo claimed the Air Force will launch an initial class of 30 personnel at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. That program could eventually graduate as many as 200 junior warrant officers and up to 50 senior warrant officers between the grades of WO-2 and WO-5 each year, the document said.

Prospective candidates need to hold the enlisted rank of staff sergeant (E-5) or higher, and may come from the active duty Air Force, Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve, the memo added. Those plans are subject to change, an Air Force official told Military Times in February.

The service on Feb. 13 formally announced its plan to bring back warrant officers in a bid to improve knowledge and retention in cyber operations and information technology units. It’s part of a sweeping set of initiatives designed to ready the Air Force for future conflicts, particularly as it vies with China for military supremacy and influence around the world.

Used across the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, warrant officers are a highly trained class of technical experts who specialize in a single field, like intelligence or maintenance, and rank between the commissioned officers who lead units and the enlisted corps that forms the majority of the military’s workforce.

The Air Force began phasing out its warrant officers in 1959 because their jobs were deemed too inflexible to meet the Air Force’s personnel needs, according to the Warrant Officer Historical Association. Congress had also created two new top enlisted ranks, senior master sergeant and chief master sergeant (E-8 and E-9), to offer higher-level expertise and leadership.

The service has periodically considered reviving warrant officers to fix other workforce shortfalls, like its longstanding pilot shortage. It opted against that idea amid warnings that the idea would hurt retention and prove costly.

It’s unclear whether those concerns still stand for the cyber and IT workforces, which have struggled to recruit and retain highly qualified staffers who can find higher pay and more flexibility in the private sector. Warrant officers could bridge the knowledge gaps between niche specialties like expeditionary communications and defensive cyber operations.

The Air Force may eventually consider expanding warrant officers to include maintainers — another short-staffed field — but don’t hold your breath, Kendall said.

Recalling his work with warrant officer maintainers while serving as an Army officer in the 1970s and 1980s, Kendall indicated the Air Force may want to emulate their example.

“I thought they made a major contribution to the force,” Kendall said of the Army maintainers. “I think that’s one we’d want to consider at some point. I’m sure there are others.”

In the Army, the maintenance community’s warrant officers oversee sustainment needs for broad swaths of the weapon and vehicle inventories. They are experts in the field as a whole, compared to enlisted soldiers who specialize in a particular skill set, like small arms repair, or on a platform, like the M1 Abrams tank.

In the Air Force, that could translate to warrant officers who manage maintenance for aircraft, ground vehicles, electronic systems and weapons, instead of asking enlisted airmen with narrower skills to pitch in on platforms they aren’t trained to handle.

That kind of broad expertise could bolster the Air Force’s ability to deploy small, multi-skilled teams to outposts around the world in a crisis.

For now, though, the Air Force wants to see how the first group of cyber-focused warrant officers fare before reintroducing the rank elsewhere.

“We are going to be cautious before we broaden this beyond this one particular career field,” Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin told airmen Feb. 13 at the Air and Space Forces Association’s Air Warfare Symposium. “We want to make sure what we’re doing is fit for purpose and specific to the need that we have.”

[James1978]

Boeing . . . again.

U.S. Air Force Reveals New Yearlong Delay For T-7
By Steve Trimble
March 12, 2024

The U.S. Air Force has pushed back the in-service date by about another year for the Boeing T-7 Red Hawk to 2028, adding further delays to a program originally expected to be fielded this year.

The latest delay for the Air Force’s next primary jet trainer appeared with no explanation in the justification documents that the Pentagon submitted on March 11 to Congress to start the fiscal 2025 appropriations process.

The delays add further schedule and cost pressure to one of the five fixed-priced defense and space programs that have cost Boeing more than $12.8 billion combined over the past decade. Boeing has reported $1.33 billion in reach-forward losses so far on the T-7 program.

Despite the schedule delay, the Air Force slightly reduced the total spending on research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) for the T-7 program, with total estimated costs falling by $1.33 billion to $1.3 billion. But the Air Force decided to request $233 million in fiscal 2025 to buy only seven Red Hawks, or half the total in last year’s plan for the same period.

The Air Force also plans to buy a total of 351 T-7As, including five test aircraft.

Andrew Hunter, the Air Force’s assistant secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, told Aerospace DAILY in February that he remains worried about the T-7 program.

“We are not out of the woods on T-7 because flight test is the hard part of any aircraft program and we have just started flight tests on T-7,” Hunter said.

But the fiscal 2025 budget documents reveal a different story for the VC-25B program. The total estimate for completing RDT&E has surged nearly 19% to $5.57 billion compared to last year’s plan.

A Boeing spokesperson for the T-7 deferred comment about the new delay to Air Force officials.

The Air Force spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the latest T-7 delay.

Air Force’s T-7 trainer delayed another year
By Audrey Decker
March 13, 2024

The Air Force’s new T-7A pilot training jet won’t be ready for initial operations until 2028, documents show, putting the program another year behind schedule.

Originally, the trainer was supposed to be fielded this year. But testing revealed problems with the aircraft’s ejection seat that have pushed the in-service date back multiple times. Now, initial operational capability has been delayed until the second quarter of fiscal 2028, according to budget justification documents submitted with the 2025 budget rollout on March 11.

The documents do not detail the reason behind the fresh delay. The Air Force did not have a comment on the delay in time for publication, and Boeing deferred to the Air Force for comment.

The Boeing-Saab T-7A is built to replace the Air Force’s half-century-old T-38 trainers and train new pilots for fifth-generation fighters. Lawmakers have urged the Air Force to move faster to replace the T-38, several of which have crashed over the years.

The service’s 2025 budget proposal halves the year’s planned purchase of T-7s to seven, for $235 million. That reflects budget constraints but also a testing program that is moving more slowly than hoped, Andrew Hunter told reporters after a House Armed Services seapower and projection forces hearing March 12.

“I would also say we entered the flight test program a little later than we expected, so we’ll probably start production a little later than we expected. Right now, the flight test is going relatively well. If we don’t discover something unexpected, I do think we will get into production in fiscal 2025, that’s why we’re requesting production funds in our [20]25 budget, but it will probably be a little later in the year than we anticipated,” Hunter said.

Hunter also said the official start of production—Milestone C, in acquisition argot—might not happen in February 2025 as planned.

“TBD on when we do Milestone C. It’s event-driven. We’ll have to see how the test program carries out,” he said.

Service leaders had originally hoped to begin T-7 production in December 2023. Last year, they pushed the date to February 2025.

Now, the budget documents say: “The projected finish for Developmental Test and Evaluation is May 2025, and Initial Operational Test and Evaluation is scheduled to commence in January 2026. Milestone C is currently projected for May 2025 with the first Low Rate Initial Production [LRIP] deliveries anticipated in April 2026.”

Boeing said in a statement that they expect an award in fiscal 2025 and are “working with the U.S. Air Force to establish capabilities-based criteria to determine readiness to proceed into Milestone C.”

Boeing plans to have the new T-7 production line up and running by the middle of this year “and then shortly after that, we will load the first part on the line to begin LRIP production,” the spokesperson said.

The Air Force plans to buy a total of 351 T-7 jets, including five test aircraft. Boeing has delivered three of the test T-7s, and the final two should be delivered soon, according to the spokesperson. Delivery of the final two jets has been delayed due to quality problems with parts and supply chain woes, the company said in February.

Boeing has reported $1.3 billion in losses on the training jet. The company underbid in the original competition; delays and charges have added additional pressures. The T-7 is just one of several programs that Boeing won with a strategy of lowball bids intended to lose money in early production lots but profit on later lots and decades of support contracts.

[Poohbah]

How do you fuck up a trainer?

[James1978]

Older article, but related to why delays in the T-7A bite.

Hundreds of Airmen Stuck Waiting To Start Pilot Training As Shortage Persists
Sept. 11, 2023
By Greg Hadley

While some future Air Force pilots wait for cockpits to open up so they can start training, they’re doing everything from public affairs to marshaling aircraft on the flight line, the head of the 19th Air Force said recently—highlighting the persistent problems the service faces in trying to reduce its pilot shortage.

As of Aug. 25, more than 900 Airmen are waiting to enter the pilot training pipeline, according to 19th Air Force data. Roughly a quarter have been waiting less than three months, but most are between three and nine months. Another quarter—around 220 people—have been stuck even longer.

“Wings will have these lieutenants that are waiting pilot training work in their PA shop,” Maj. Gen. Clark Quinn said during a briefing with reporters. “They will have them work in their command post, doing reporting. They will actually take some of them and teach them how to not necessarily do aircraft maintenance, but put them out on the flight line and marshal aircraft in and park, and get them connected to the mission. So they are kept gainfully employed unless they choose to take some leave and obviously take some time off.”

A spokesperson later added that future pilots also knock out their survival training while they wait. Some are assigned to earn postgraduate degrees.

The total number of those waiting is down slightly from a peak of more than 1,000, Quinn said. The Air Force is limited in part by the availability of its training aircraft, all of which entered service at least two decades ago.

The T-38 Talon, in particular, used to train future fighter and bomber pilots, is “frankly, struggling,” Quinn said. Production of the T-38 ended in 1972.

“The mission capable rates of the T-38 are not good,” Quinn added, noting that engine problems have forced the 19th Air Force to limit flying hours—and, in turn, prevented it from reaching its goal of producing 1,500 pilots per year.

The T-38 is not alone in experiencing issues, however. A batch of T-6 Texan IIs were damaged in a recent storm at Vance Air Force Base, Okla., Quinn said. And the service is in the process of retiring the T-1 Jayhawk, with aircraft already heading to the Boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz.

Long term, the Air Force plans to replace the T-38 with the T-7 Red Hawk, an advanced new trainer currently undergoing flight testing. However, the Red Hawk has been delayed several times through development and is now not expected to reach initial operational capability until 2027.

There’s nothing Quinn can do to speed up the T-7’s schedule, but he said gaining it in the fleet will not only increase availability but also improve the overall training pipeline.

“[The T-38] a 60-plus-year old design that was designed for a type of aircraft that we haven’t flown in 30 years, and we spend a lot of time in training teaching young aviators how to do things that they don’t need in their next aircraft,” Quinn said.

In fiscal 2022, the Air Force produced 1,276 pilots. In 2023, that number increased slightly to around 1,350, but still short of the goal of 1,470. With demand from commercial airlines strong, the need for new pilots to replace those leaving the service is persistent. The 19th Air Force’s goal will be 1,500 new pilots in fiscal 2024, a spokesperson said.

Quinn said the overall pilot shortage remains at around 2,000, roughly the number it has been for the last several years. Vice Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin previously told Congress that the Air Force has taken steps to ensure the shortfall doesn’t mean aircraft aren’t flying.

“In order to have a healthy pilot professional force, you need first and foremost the combat cockpits filled,” Allvin said in April. “Then you need the trainer cockpits filled. Then you need the test cockpits filled. And after you fill out the cockpits, then our next priority is the leadership—you want the leadership positions filled. And then after you have all those filled, then you go to the staff positions. That is where we are currently absorbing our shortage: in the staffs.”

Echoing Allvin, Quinn said that not filling staff positions has a long-term effect by stunting the “mentoring and growth of the officers that we expect to be able to lead our Air Force in the future.”

Pilots aren’t the only staffing shortfall—even the civilian flight instructors who teach future pilots on simulators are undermanned, Quinn said.

“We have openings at all of our locations. In some cases manning is down at the 60 to 70 percent level,” Quinn said. “What we ended up having to do is take military instructors to fill those civilian gaps and teach them and when you’re teaching the sims, you’re not teaching the flights.”

To address that problem, the 19th Air Force is trying to hire remote simulator instructors to entice civilians who don’t live near Air Force training centers. At the moment, though, Quinn’s team is working on a latency issue affecting that effort.

[James1978]

How do you fuck up a trainer?

Have you met Boeing lately?

I think a lot of people were betting that Saab's involvement would mitigate Boeing, but apparently not.

We could have chosen in an service air frame with a proven record. But, no. Though to be fair, my understanding is that some of the issues may have come up no matter who won the contract.

[MikeKozlowski]

How do you fuck up a trainer?

Poohbah,

Let me introduce you to the Fairchild T-46.



Developed as the company was starting a doom loop - not at all helped by the refusal of the USAF to allow anybody else to buy A-10s (Israel and the ROK were seriously interested, and the Luftwaffe had made inquiries) - design and development were pushed way too fast and too cheap while the company was having trouble keeping the lights on. It got to the point where when the first aircraft was handed over to the USAF, it was discovered that Fairchild had stuffed weighted wooden boxes in the avionics bays, because said avionics weren't ready/hadn't been purchased yet. Since the contract required - in no uncertain terms - that the #1 airframe be flight ready on delivery, Fairchild didn't get paid.

There was still an outside chance that if the plane turned out to be a hit they might pull it off, but flight testing (six months late) revealed a touchy, skittish aircraft completely unsuitable for training work. That was something the Fairchild engineers could probably have sorted out eventually, and Congress tried to keep the program going, but even late Cold War budgets didn't have room for a mess like this.

Mike

[jemhouston]

How do you fuck up a trainer?

Boeing will find a way

[Rocket J Squrriel]

Why didn't USAF want anyone else to buy the A-10? Other than its allergy for ground attack planes. I believe General Chuck Horner of Desert Storm fame 'joked' that if a son of his decided to fly A-10s he would disown him.

I also heard that Israel did look at the A-10 and turned it down. Something about it being dead meat if they had tried to use it during the '73 war.

[James1978]

Boeing’s KC-46A refueler, T-7A trainer face more delays
By Michael Marrow
March 13, 2024

WASHINGTON — For years the fixed-price deals that Boeing signed for programs like the KC-46A Pegasus air refueling tanker and T-7A Red Hawk trainer have been headaches for the aerospace giant amid billions in losses stemming from delays, supply chain constraints and developmental woes. And now, according to the Air Force’s acquisition czar, more delays for both efforts could be coming.

Testifying before the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee on Tuesday, Andrew Hunter said that an upgrade for the KC-46A’s long-troubled vision system would likely arrive in 2026, slipping past an already 19-month delayed projected fielding date of October 2025. After the hearing, he separately told reporters that the service would “probably” approve production of the T-7A trainer later than previously expected.

“There is some schedule pressure there,” Hunter told lawmakers about fielding a new vision system for the KC-46A, dubbed RVS 2.0. “And depending on completion of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness certification process, I cannot guarantee you that we would be in a position to field in ‘25. It may be ‘26. And that is actually likely — I think it probably will field in ‘26.”

Following the hearing, Hunter explained to reporters a potential Pegasus delay is tied to the FAA certification process, reasoning that when RVS 2.0 is integrated, “you have to make sure that it doesn’t affect something else somewhere else on the airplane. So it makes the airworthiness process more complex than it might appear because it’s essentially about more than just the cameras that you’re dealing with.”

Hunter added he was “confident” that the Air Force and Boeing “have the right design” and that the team “will get through the full airworthiness process in the near future.”

Boeing so far has reported over $7 billion in losses on the Pegasus program due to its fixed-price structure, though it’s not clear if more losses could be associated with an additional delay for RVS 2.0. Boeing deferred questions to the Air Force, but the company has previously touted the capabilities of the new vision system as providing marked improvements over the baseline version.

Despite the vision system problems, the aircraft has been cleared for combat deployment and can refuel most of the US fleet except the A-10 due to a separate issue with an actuator on the tanker’s boom that is expected to be resolved by FY26. Hunter suggested last year that the service was leaning toward buying more of the tankers as part of a new strategy to continue recapitalization of the service’s aging KC-135 refuelers, though a service official would later say that an acquisition strategy had not yet been decided.

Europe’s Airbus has positioned itself as an alternative should the Air Force decide on a competition, after its partner Lockheed Martin announced it was bowing out.

In his testimony this week Hunter said that autonomous capabilities could be incorporated into the future of aerial refueling, but he told reporters that it would not be a requirement for the next tranche of tanker procurement.

“I think that would be something we would look at as an independent effort and then potentially field in the future,” he said of autonomous refueling.

In written testimony on Tuesday [[ur=https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/r ... (002).pdfl]PDF[/url]], Hunter additionally said the service would expand its current contract with Boeing slightly, adding four KC-46As for a total program of record of 183.

T-7A ‘A Little Later Than We Expected’
Meanwhile, budget documents confirmed the Air Force’s decision to halve the fiscal 2025 procurement of T-7A Red Hawk trainer aircraft, meant to replace the aging T-38 Talon, from 14 to seven, and indicate delays for the program are at hand as well.

That program was rebaselined last year to reflect a delay of over two years. A subsequent watchdog report found that issues with the jet’s flight control software and escape system continued to pose risks to the already delayed schedule, particularly as the jet moved to enter flight testing where the Air Force could discover new flight control deficiencies.

Now, it appears the trainer’s schedule could slide a bit further still. According to FY25 budget documents released by the service Monday evening, a Milestone C decision — or the point when the service officially approves a program to enter into production — is projected for May 2025. Previously, officials planned Milestone C for February 2025, though the program has allocated a full year of schedule margin for the decision.

To help mitigate delays, Boeing began buying long-lead parts to hit the ground running for an eventual production decision. That approach required a special agreement between the Air Force, Boeing and the Defense Contract Management Agency to supervise early production, which the service told Breaking Defense last year had been reached.

Additionally, as Aviation Week previously noted, budget documents further suggest the jet’s initial operational capability could be delayed by a year, from the second quarter of FY27 to Q2 FY28. Boeing so far has reported about $1.3 billion in losses on the Red Hawk program, and it’s not clear if new delays could result in more charges. Like with the KC-46, the company deferred questions about the T-7A to the Air Force, which did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Speaking to reporters after Tuesday’s hearing, Hunter explained that a decision to halve the buy of the T-7A in FY25 was mostly the result of topline fiscal pressures. Still, he said the lot size of seven Red Hawks “is a good place to start” for the service.

He said delays in the beginning the flight test program could translate to the trainer being approved for production later than anticipated. The service’s first T-7A touched down at Edwards Air Force Base in November.

“We entered the flight test program a little later than we expected, so we’ll probably start production a little later than we expected,” Hunter said. “Right now, the flight test program is going relatively well. If we don’t discover something unexpected, I do think we will get into production in fiscal year ‘25.”

Asked if the February 2025 Milestone C date is at risk, he replied “TBD on when we do Milestone C. It’s event-driven. We’ll have to see how the test program carries out.”

[James1978]

Revamped KC-46 vision system slipping into 2026, nearly two years late
By Stephen Losey
March 14, 2024

The rollout of the Boeing KC-46A Pegasus tanker’s new remote vision system will likely slip into 2026, placing it nearly two years behind schedule, according to the Air Force’s top acquisition official.

Andrew Hunter, assistant secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, told the House Armed Services subcommittee on seapower and projection forces that schedule pressures on the vision system, known as RVS 2.0, are placing in doubt the most recent goal of releasing it to the fleet by October 2025. As a result, RVS 2.0 could end up being nearly two years late.

Hunter indicated the FAA’s airworthiness certification process — the completion of which will officially close out the system’s design approval — is one of the factors again delaying RVS 2.0. Boeing and its primary subcontractor, Collins Aerospace, are the main companies working on RVS 2.0.

“There is some schedule pressure there,” Hunter told lawmakers during a March 12 hearing on the service’s proposed fiscal 2025 budget. “Depending on the completion of the FAA airworthiness certification process, I cannot guarantee you that we would be in a position to field [RVS 2.0] in ‘25. It may be ‘26 – and that is actually likely, I think it will probably field in ‘26.”

Boeing declined to comment and referred Defense News’ queries to the Air Force, which has not yet responded to follow-up questions.

RVS 2.0 will replace the KC-46′s original, troubled Remote Vision System, which does not respond quickly enough to sun and shadows and sometimes produces a distorted image. The Air Force fears that a faulty vision system could lead boom operators to accidentally damage receiving aircraft with the refueling boom.

It will use a series of sensors, screens and 4k ultrahigh-definition cameras to allow the KC-46′s boom operators a 3D, full-color picture as they guide refueling booms into receiving aircraft.

RVS 2.0 was supposed to be released in March 2024. But in October 2022, the service confirmed that schedule had slipped 19 months, largely due to supply chain problems affecting the project’s subcontractors.

Boeing said at the time that parts shortages had led to longer lead times for computing equipment and other technology needed for RVS 2.0. The FAA and Air Force’s airworthiness certification processes also were factors in that delay, Boeing and the Air Force said in 2022.

Hunter also said the KC-46 is still not completely cleared to refuel A-10 Warthog attack aircraft, due to a longstanding issue with the stiffness of its refueling boom and the A-10′s thrust.

It’s not impossible for the KC-46 to refuel an A-10, Hunter said, but “it’s not a particularly good idea to do it on a routine basis, and therefore, we don’t.”

Hunter said the Air Force has enough KC-135 Stratotankers in its fleet to safely operate A-10s wherever it needs.

Boeing is also working on a redesigned actuator for the KC-46′s boom that would allow safe refueling of the A-10.

The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation said in its fiscal 2023 annual report that the new boom actuator’s flight testing could start later this year, with flight testing of RVS 2.0 expected to start in 2025.

Hunter also told lawmakers he believes the improved video clarity of RVS 2.0 will open up new opportunities to add autonomous capabilities in the KC-46′s refueling operations. And the Air Force could introduce more autonomous capabilities in the KC-46′s cockpit to reduce the pressure on pilots, he said, who can become “task-saturated” during the “dicier” moments of the refueling process.

The Air Force expects to have 102 KC-46s in its fleet by the end of this year, and 118 by the end of 2025. The service is now on contract with Boeing for 139 KC-46s, and plans to buy 179 in all.

[MikeKozlowski]

Why didn't USAF want anyone else to buy the A-10? Other than its allergy for ground attack planes. I believe General Chuck Horner of Desert Storm fame 'joked' that if a son of his decided to fly A-10s he would disown him.

I also heard that Israel did look at the A-10 and turned it down. Something about it being dead meat if they had tried to use it during the '73 war.

Rocket,

By the time the Hog's production run was finished in IIRC '85, the USAF's attitude was, "Okay, we bought the damned airplane and we're never getting another one." Production capability was seen as a threat to other projects, and if other countries were buying them then it might suggest that USAF was wrong. Kill production, it can't come back. Buy F-16s instead; there's a good ally. And in fairness Fairchild was actually responsible for the final hit to the Hog - as they were going under because of the T-46, they scrapped the Hog's tooling and jigs to save storage money.

The problem was that the Hog's performance in ODS was pretty damned impressive, and from there on USAF was constantly on the defensive about getting rid of it. The replacements - the F/A-16 and supposed CAS capability of the F-35 - were never really serious. The -35 wouldn't be around in enough numbers to risk in a FEBA, and the F/A-16 was a good idea with dedicated CAS comms and sensors, but the podded 30mm was always trying to twist itself off the hardpoint. As far as allied purchases go, I was told by Hog drivers that there was always interest through the end of production from the Koreans and Israelis, but the USAF discouraged it as far as they could without directly saying "Don't buy the damned things."

Had 9/11 not happened, I really think the Hog would have been gone by 2005 at the latest - but the guys on the ground loved it, the bad guys hated it, and the folks back home only knew that it could deliver a bunch of hurt - and that kept it going.

Mike

[Drunknsubmrnr]

I don’t think that podded 30mm was going to be used in actual peer fighting. The A-10 would be looked at a lot differently now if it didn’t have the gun built in.

[MikeKozlowski]

I don’t think that podded 30mm was going to be used in actual peer fighting. The A-10 would be looked at a lot differently now if it didn’t have the gun built in.

It's possible - I was present at RED FLAG when the NYANG was doing tests with the F/A, and some of the comments I heard then suggested that the 30mm pod may have been on the same lines as the 20mm pods for the F-111 and F-106: a nice theoretical capability that we'd never actually consider using.

Mike

[James1978]

By the time the Hog's production run was finished in IIRC '85, the USAF's attitude was, "Okay, we bought the damned airplane and we're never getting another one." Production capability was seen as a threat to other projects, and if other countries were buying them then it might suggest that USAF was wrong. Kill production, it can't come back. Buy F-16s instead; there's a good ally. And in fairness Fairchild was actually responsible for the final hit to the Hog - as they were going under because of the T-46, they scrapped the Hog's tooling and jigs to save storage money.

Any idea just when exactly the tooling and jigs were scrapped?

The problem was that the Hog's performance in ODS was pretty damned impressive, and from there on USAF was constantly on the defensive about getting rid of it. The replacements - the F/A-16 and supposed CAS capability of the F-35 - were never really serious. The -35 wouldn't be around in enough numbers to risk in a FEBA, and the F/A-16 was a good idea with dedicated CAS comms and sensors, but the podded 30mm was always trying to twist itself off the hardpoint. As far as allied purchases go, I was told by Hog drivers that there was always interest through the end of production from the Koreans and Israelis, but the USAF discouraged it as far as they could without directly saying "Don't buy the damned things."

I've seen elsewhere that Fairchild was quoting minimum orders of 42 aircraft and that may have discouraged some potential operators.
I know the Turks were offered 50 in 1993, but they ended up not taking them. One source says the State Department wouldn't release the DU ammo to Turkey. Another blames an earthquake. And yet another says after the Turks looked at the total cost of adding a new type, surplus F-4Es were a better value.

For anyone interested in the A-16 / F/A-16 saga, I'd recommend this thread over at Secret Projects.

[MikeKozlowski]

By the time the Hog's production run was finished in IIRC '85, the USAF's attitude was, "Okay, we bought the damned airplane and we're never getting another one." Production capability was seen as a threat to other projects, and if other countries were buying them then it might suggest that USAF was wrong. Kill production, it can't come back. Buy F-16s instead; there's a good ally. And in fairness Fairchild was actually responsible for the final hit to the Hog - as they were going under because of the T-46, they scrapped the Hog's tooling and jigs to save storage money.

Any idea just when exactly the tooling and jigs were scrapped?

The problem was that the Hog's performance in ODS was pretty damned impressive, and from there on USAF was constantly on the defensive about getting rid of it. The replacements - the F/A-16 and supposed CAS capability of the F-35 - were never really serious. The -35 wouldn't be around in enough numbers to risk in a FEBA, and the F/A-16 was a good idea with dedicated CAS comms and sensors, but the podded 30mm was always trying to twist itself off the hardpoint. As far as allied purchases go, I was told by Hog drivers that there was always interest through the end of production from the Koreans and Israelis, but the USAF discouraged it as far as they could without directly saying "Don't buy the damned things."

I've seen elsewhere that Fairchild was quoting minimum orders of 42 aircraft and that may have discouraged some potential operators.
I know the Turks were offered 50 in 1993, but they ended up not taking them. One source says the State Department wouldn't release the DU ammo to Turkey. Another blames an earthquake. And yet another says after the Turks looked at the total cost of adding a new type, surplus F-4Es were a better value.

For anyone interested in the A-16 / F/A-16 saga, I'd recommend this thread over at Secret Projects.

James,

- I don't know an exact date on the tooling scrapping; I do know it was right around the time they delivered the first T-46. Fairchild had been holding onto it in hopes that somebody would make another order - but by that time they needed to scrounge every dime they could, and keeping the tooling in storage was expensive. And at the same time, given Fairchild's financial issues at the time, the longer it took to get the production orders again the more aircraft they were going to need to sell to get onto an even keel. That makes the minimum production order make sense - based on USAF TO&E at the time, IIRC that would have been two squadrons and a few spares.

- I had never heard about export restrictions on the DU ammo before - do you happen to remember the source on that one? Entirely possible though.

- And thanks for the link on the F/A-16, definitely going to check it out!

Mike