Opinions expressed here are personal views of contributors and do not necessarily represent the companies, organizations or governments they work for. Nor do they necessarily represent those of the Board Administration.
...It's TASS, but it likely wouldn't have been run unless it was official. I think it's an interesting point that at least part of PETR VELIKY's crew is being crossdecked to ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV - indications of personnel shortages?
MOSCOW, July 14. /TASS/. The heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky will be decommissioned after the repairs and upgrade of the same-type warship Admiral Nakhimov, a source close to the Russian Navy told TASS on Friday.
"A principal decision on decommissioning the Pyotr Veliky has been made. This is due to take place after the Admiral Nakhimov re-enters service," the source said.
The larger part of the crew of the battlecruiser Pyotr Veliky has transferred to the board of the Admiral Nakhimov in the expectation of the warship’s delivery to the Navy. The remaining crew provides for the battlecruiser’s operational survivability, he said.
TASS has no official confirmation of this information yet.
Sevmash Shipyard Head Mikhail Budnichenko told TASS at the International Maritime Defense Show in St. Petersburg in June that the battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov could enter shipbuilders’ sea trials in December this year or May next year after its repairs and upgrade at the shipbuilding enterprise. The warship is currently at the final stage of its repairs and modernization, which involve over 3,000 workers. Simultaneously, the naval ship’s mooring trials are underway. The warship is preparing for accommodating the crew on its board, he said.
Russian battlecruisers
The heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov has been under repairs at the Sevmash Shipyard since 1999. Real work on the warship has been carried out since 2013.
The upgrade has substantially boosted the cruiser’s strike capabilities. In particular, the warship will carry 10 versatile shipborne launchers for eight Kalibr-NK and/or Oniks cruise missiles. Eventually, the Admiral Nakhimov will carry Tsirkon hypersonic missiles.
On April 18, the battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy marked 25 years since the St. Andrew’s naval flag was hoisted on its board. The Project 1144.2 Orlan missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky (NATO reporting name: Kirov class) is the Russian Northern Fleet’s flagship and the world’s largest surface combatant that is not an aircraft carrier. It is outfitted with a nuclear powerplant and missile armament. The warship is designated to strike large surface targets and provide all-round air and anti-submarine warfare defense.
MikeKozlowski wrote: ↑Sun Jul 23, 2023 12:10 pm
...It's TASS, but it likely wouldn't have been run unless it was official. I think it's an interesting point that at least part of PETR VELIKY's crew is being crossdecked to ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV - indications of personnel shortages?
I had to go and look up their old names. YURI ANDROPOV is to be scrapped “for cost reasons” and KALININ, mothballed since 1999(!!!!) and apparently brought into “upgrade” from 2015, is to replace her as flagship.
A pound to a pinch of poo that Peter the Great will be used as a parts hulk, for everything that hasn’t been fully poxed, rusted up and fallen off.
Maybe the Ukrainians will need to use two drones instead of one.
Craiglxviii wrote: ↑Sun Jul 23, 2023 7:27 pm
I had to go and look up their old names. YURI ANDROPOV is to be scrapped “for cost reasons” and KALININ, mothballed since 1999(!!!!) and apparently brought into “upgrade” from 2015, is to replace her as flagship.
A pound to a pinch of poo that Peter the Great will be used as a parts hulk, for everything that hasn’t been fully poxed, rusted up and fallen off.
Maybe the Ukrainians will need to use two drones instead of one.
I was pondering this for a bit, and I wonder if it has something to do with the Nakhimov being completed during the Soviet times and the Pyotr Veliky only being, very belatedly, completed in 1998. What I’m getting at here is that the former was finished during a time when things hadn’t quite gone completely south with their military industry, and the latter during the era of completely unchecked corruption, mafia reign, and draining of both engineers and skilled labor from the industries.
Ie, have they perhaps figured out that the Nakhimov is fundamentally better built? (Comparatively.)
Craiglxviii wrote: ↑Sun Jul 23, 2023 7:27 pm
I had to go and look up their old names. YURI ANDROPOV is to be scrapped “for cost reasons” and KALININ, mothballed since 1999(!!!!) and apparently brought into “upgrade” from 2015, is to replace her as flagship.
A pound to a pinch of poo that Peter the Great will be used as a parts hulk, for everything that hasn’t been fully poxed, rusted up and fallen off.
Maybe the Ukrainians will need to use two drones instead of one.
I was pondering this for a bit, and I wonder if it has something to do with the Nakhimov being completed during the Soviet times and the Pyotr Veliky only being, very belatedly, completed in 1998. What I’m getting at here is that the former was finished during a time when things hadn’t quite gone completely south with their military industry, and the latter during the era of completely unchecked corruption, mafia reign, and draining of both engineers and skilled labor from the industries.
Ie, have they perhaps figured out that the Nakhimov is fundamentally better built? (Comparatively.)
Or PYOTR was run hard, put away wet, and dragged out half asleep to prove Russia’s “might” while NAKHIMOV quietly rusted before getting a polish up.
Craiglxviii wrote: ↑Sun Jul 23, 2023 7:27 pm
I had to go and look up their old names. YURI ANDROPOV is to be scrapped “for cost reasons” and KALININ, mothballed since 1999(!!!!) and apparently brought into “upgrade” from 2015, is to replace her as flagship.
A pound to a pinch of poo that Peter the Great will be used as a parts hulk, for everything that hasn’t been fully poxed, rusted up and fallen off.
Maybe the Ukrainians will need to use two drones instead of one.
I was pondering this for a bit, and I wonder if it has something to do with the Nakhimov being completed during the Soviet times and the Pyotr Veliky only being, very belatedly, completed in 1998. What I’m getting at here is that the former was finished during a time when things hadn’t quite gone completely south with their military industry, and the latter during the era of completely unchecked corruption, mafia reign, and draining of both engineers and skilled labor from the industries.
Ie, have they perhaps figured out that the Nakhimov is fundamentally better built? (Comparatively.)
Or PYOTR was run hard, put away wet, and dragged out half asleep to prove Russia’s “might” while NAKHIMOV quietly rusted before getting a polish up.
To put it this way: I'd rather the russians use their resources on that steel penis rather than on smaller, more numerous platforms that actually pose a serious threat, like their submarine force.
As for the question of personell shortages: the various fleets have been "encouraging" sailors afloat to "request" transfers to the naval infantry for front service in Ukraine for the past year.
delfin wrote: ↑Tue Jul 25, 2023 9:48 pm
To put it this way: I'd rather the russians use their resources on that steel penis rather than on smaller, more numerous platforms that actually pose a serious threat, like their submarine force.
As for the question of personell shortages: the various fleets have been "encouraging" sailors afloat to "request" transfers to the naval infantry for front service in Ukraine for the past year.
The navy and Luftwaffe of the Third Reich had to form "infantry" detachments by the end of the war to serve as meat shields...I am getting the same vibes here.
delfin wrote: ↑Tue Jul 25, 2023 9:48 pm
To put it this way: I'd rather the russians use their resources on that steel penis rather than on smaller, more numerous platforms that actually pose a serious threat, like their submarine force.
As for the question of personell shortages: the various fleets have been "encouraging" sailors afloat to "request" transfers to the naval infantry for front service in Ukraine for the past year.
The navy and Luftwaffe of the Third Reich had to form "infantry" detachments by the end of the war to serve as meat shields...I am getting the same vibes here.
Yeah, I think this is a recurring phenomenon when pressure/desperation levels reach a certain point. I would also argue that there’s two separate levels as to how pressured the armed forces of a country are when this phenomenon pops up. The lesser of these can be exemplified by the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/63rd_(R ... )_Division in WWI, using reservists and Royal Marines initially. Then people who there’s not a pressing need for in their regular branch are utilized. The second more grave stage of pressure/desperation is what I’d judge that the Russians are doing, by using active duty members of another branch, members who have a role to fill in their own branch and their absence will reduce the capability of that branch.
(Okay so the above explanation is perhaps a bit less than ideally clear on my part, I’m a wee bit tired at the moment.)
Micael wrote: ↑Wed Aug 02, 2023 7:02 pm
Yeah, I think this is a recurring phenomenon when pressure/desperation levels reach a certain point. I would also argue that there’s two separate levels as to how pressured the armed forces of a country are when this phenomenon pops up. The lesser of these can be exemplified by the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/63rd_(R ... )_Division in WWI, using reservists and Royal Marines initially. Then people who there’s not a pressing need for in their regular branch are utilized. The second more grave stage of pressure/desperation is what I’d judge that the Russians are doing, by using active duty members of another branch, members who have a role to fill in their own branch and their absence will reduce the capability of that branch.
Oh, like when the USAF was augmenting the US Army in Iraq?
Micael wrote: ↑Wed Aug 02, 2023 7:02 pm
Yeah, I think this is a recurring phenomenon when pressure/desperation levels reach a certain point. I would also argue that there’s two separate levels as to how pressured the armed forces of a country are when this phenomenon pops up. The lesser of these can be exemplified by the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/63rd_(R ... )_Division in WWI, using reservists and Royal Marines initially. Then people who there’s not a pressing need for in their regular branch are utilized. The second more grave stage of pressure/desperation is what I’d judge that the Russians are doing, by using active duty members of another branch, members who have a role to fill in their own branch and their absence will reduce the capability of that branch.
Oh, like when the USAF was augmenting the US Army in Iraq?
The Navy actually sending cryptologic technicians (not linguists) as individual augments to Iraq and Afghanistan at one point.
Micael wrote: ↑Wed Aug 02, 2023 7:02 pm
Yeah, I think this is a recurring phenomenon when pressure/desperation levels reach a certain point. I would also argue that there’s two separate levels as to how pressured the armed forces of a country are when this phenomenon pops up. The lesser of these can be exemplified by the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/63rd_(R ... )_Division in WWI, using reservists and Royal Marines initially. Then people who there’s not a pressing need for in their regular branch are utilized. The second more grave stage of pressure/desperation is what I’d judge that the Russians are doing, by using active duty members of another branch, members who have a role to fill in their own branch and their absence will reduce the capability of that branch.
Oh, like when the USAF was augmenting the US Army in Iraq?
I can’t recall the details of that, it would depend on what they were doing and so on. I’m more getting at the usage of personnell in roles that are widely divergent from their regular one (and expertise). Using sailors as infantry being one example of that. But if you use people from one service to augment another while still serving in their area of expertise (or very close to it) that’s not necessarily indicative of a desperation/pressure situation, that can just be efficient usage of available resources.
Micael wrote: ↑Wed Aug 02, 2023 7:02 pm
Yeah, I think this is a recurring phenomenon when pressure/desperation levels reach a certain point. I would also argue that there’s two separate levels as to how pressured the armed forces of a country are when this phenomenon pops up. The lesser of these can be exemplified by the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/63rd_(R ... )_Division in WWI, using reservists and Royal Marines initially. Then people who there’s not a pressing need for in their regular branch are utilized. The second more grave stage of pressure/desperation is what I’d judge that the Russians are doing, by using active duty members of another branch, members who have a role to fill in their own branch and their absence will reduce the capability of that branch.
Oh, like when the USAF was augmenting the US Army in Iraq?
I can’t recall the details of that, it would depend on what they were doing and so on. I’m more getting at the usage of personnell in roles that are widely divergent from their regular one (and expertise). Using sailors as infantry being one example of that. But if you use people from one service to augment another while still serving in their area of expertise (or very close to it) that’s not necessarily indicative of a desperation/pressure situation, that can just be efficient usage of available resources.
Having helicopter pilots and/or cryptologic technicians on convoy security duties is not a good use of resources.
James1978 wrote: ↑Thu Aug 03, 2023 1:21 am
Oh, like when the USAF was augmenting the US Army in Iraq?
I can’t recall the details of that, it would depend on what they were doing and so on. I’m more getting at the usage of personnell in roles that are widely divergent from their regular one (and expertise). Using sailors as infantry being one example of that. But if you use people from one service to augment another while still serving in their area of expertise (or very close to it) that’s not necessarily indicative of a desperation/pressure situation, that can just be efficient usage of available resources.
Having helicopter pilots and/or cryptologic technicians on convoy security duties is not a good use of resources.
No, that I agree with. A cryptologic technician doing cryptology work for the army would be different however.
I can’t recall the details of that, it would depend on what they were doing and so on. I’m more getting at the usage of personnell in roles that are widely divergent from their regular one (and expertise). Using sailors as infantry being one example of that. But if you use people from one service to augment another while still serving in their area of expertise (or very close to it) that’s not necessarily indicative of a desperation/pressure situation, that can just be efficient usage of available resources.
Having helicopter pilots and/or cryptologic technicians on convoy security duties is not a good use of resources.
No, that I agree with. A cryptologic technician doing cryptology work for the army would be different however.
Micael wrote: ↑Wed Aug 02, 2023 7:02 pm
Yeah, I think this is a recurring phenomenon when pressure/desperation levels reach a certain point. I would also argue that there’s two separate levels as to how pressured the armed forces of a country are when this phenomenon pops up. The lesser of these can be exemplified by the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/63rd_(R ... )_Division in WWI, using reservists and Royal Marines initially. Then people who there’s not a pressing need for in their regular branch are utilized. The second more grave stage of pressure/desperation is what I’d judge that the Russians are doing, by using active duty members of another branch, members who have a role to fill in their own branch and their absence will reduce the capability of that branch.
Oh, like when the USAF was augmenting the US Army in Iraq?
