Just saw this - Battlecruiser Alignment Chart

[Johnnie Lyle]

In an alternative history:

Admiral Spruance detaches TF 54 to cover San Bernardino Strait, trusting Mitscher to get Ozawa's carriers.

Kurita on Yamato says, "We've got the biggest damn battleship in the world, what's the worry?"

Lookout: "Uh, sir, we're now apparently the fifth biggest battleship in the world. The Americans have the first four, and they're forming battle line."

Sigh. It would have been . . . glorious.

No, because they'd still be in the ways being built. Given the historical times for the Iowas and Montanas, I doubt they'd even be to the level of launching, much less getting ready for commissioning or being in the Pacific.

Also, you all are taking the chart way too seriously. If we look at the axis titles:

Good-Neutral-Evil is how much the ship actually resembles a battlecruiser

Lawful - chaotic has descriptions attached. It's somewhat incoherent. If it weren''t for Iowa, I would say Lawful is classic battlecruiser, but the armor meeting contemporary battleship standards has her as 'fast battleship' instead. Chaotic are cruisers that people shoehorn in because of size.

STALINGRAD screws it up. Use INVINCIBLE instead.

[1Big Rich]

My favorite would have been for Kurita to have been more aggressive and competent, pushed past the sky cancer on Oct 24th, and been met by the 4 Iowa and 4 Montana battleline, instead of pulling back.

Well, Kurita did have a couple of unexpected swims that day with his flagships being sunk out from under, before he checked into Hotel Yamato...

AIGF,

[Andy L]

Iowa is a battlecruiser?

Yea, cute graphic

How are we defining a battlecruiser? A fast wing of the battle line? A heavy scout? A raider-killer? A capital ship that sacrifices other features to obtain higher than average speed?

Under definitions 1 and 4, IOWA is - compare her to the MONTANAs or SOUTH DAKOTAs, and you clearly see the sacrifices for the extra 6 knots. Her designers just chose to pay in size and firepower instead of sacrificing protection.

How we define a 'battlecruiser' depends on which of the first two Navies concepts you adhere to. The Royal Navy originally called theirs "Fast Armoured Cruisers" and they were not intended to be used as part of the battleline. The Imperial german navy called theirs 'Grossekruezer' and they WERE designed to fight in the line-of-battle; consequently they displaced several tousand tons more than their British contemporaries and had rather more armour. (Both 'flavours' were evolutionary outgrowths of the armoured cruiser, whose tonnage and capability were approaching that of pre-dreadnaughts but with less armour protection.)

If we accept the original British philosophy expounded by Admiral Fisher, of a fast armoured cruiser capable of hunting down and sinking enemy cruisers and commerce raiders with relative impunity yet not really suited for the traditional line-of-battle role of dreadnaughts and super dreadnaughts, then the WW2 Alaska's were indeed 'Battlecruisers', whereas the Iowa's were proper Fast Battleships.

[Craiglxviii]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

[kdahm]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

Damn Beatty for a gloryhounding fool......

[Johnnie Lyle]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

Is it? Jutland was a scouting/counter-scouting mission. The RN’s light cruisers were pretty much left unmolested to scout, and then Beatty maintained contact with the enemy main body. His big problem was not keeping Jellicoe informed of Scheer’s movements.

If their job is to hunt the enemy’s scouting/counter-scouting force, then you’re going to have to fight similarly armed ships (and several navies of the time did have 10” armed cruisers, so). Conversely, if your job is to snack on raiding cruisers (which is my understanding of the plan for INVINCIBLE), then she’s exactly what you need - especially when you consider that a 6” belt was effective at keeping 12” shells out at Tsushima.

[Johnnie Lyle]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

Damn Beatty for a gloryhounding fool......

More for not phoning home. Not keeping the C-in-C informed of what’s going on was THE cardinal sin of Jutland.

[kdahm]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

Damn Beatty for a gloryhounding fool......

More for not phoning home. Not keeping the C-in-C informed of what’s going on was THE cardinal sin of Jutland.

And demanding rate of fire improvements, resulting in the issues with the charges laying around and the flash doors open. Beatty was responsible for most of the British losses for the day.

[Craiglxviii]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

Is it? Jutland was a scouting/counter-scouting mission. The RN’s light cruisers were pretty much left unmolested to scout, and then Beatty maintained contact with the enemy main body. His big problem was not keeping Jellicoe informed of Scheer’s movements.

If their job is to hunt the enemy’s scouting/counter-scouting force, then you’re going to have to fight similarly armed ships (and several navies of the time did have 10” armed cruisers, so). Conversely, if your job is to snack on raiding cruisers (which is my understanding of the plan for INVINCIBLE), then she’s exactly what you need - especially when you consider that a 6” belt was effective at keeping 12” shells out at Tsushima.

My recollection of Beatty’s positioning at Jutland wasn’t just as heavy support to the screen, but as a fast striking wing of the battle line proper.

Remember at the time the INVINCIBLES were designed, 20-21kt reciprocating-engine-powered armoured cruisers were the main opposition, and so they had a 4-5kt speed advantage or more dependent on weather + sea state.

It would be interesting to pull the design studies for these ships!

[Johnnie Lyle]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

Is it? Jutland was a scouting/counter-scouting mission. The RN’s light cruisers were pretty much left unmolested to scout, and then Beatty maintained contact with the enemy main body. His big problem was not keeping Jellicoe informed of Scheer’s movements.

If their job is to hunt the enemy’s scouting/counter-scouting force, then you’re going to have to fight similarly armed ships (and several navies of the time did have 10” armed cruisers, so). Conversely, if your job is to snack on raiding cruisers (which is my understanding of the plan for INVINCIBLE), then she’s exactly what you need - especially when you consider that a 6” belt was effective at keeping 12” shells out at Tsushima.

My recollection of Beatty’s positioning at Jutland wasn’t just as heavy support to the screen, but as a fast striking wing of the battle line proper.

It depends. My understanding is that Beatty pulled into the Grand Fleet’s van precisely to obscure Scheer’s view of the Grand Fleet so Scheer wouldn’t run.

The QUEEN ELIZABETHs were absolutely intended as a fast striking wing (and many dreadnoughts acted this way when the fleet was primarily 18kt pre-dreadnoughts), but I don’t believe Jellicoe intended Beatty to be that - though Beatty probably did.

The BCs may have become one de-facto during the night action; they did skirmish with the pre-dreadnoughts at the end of the German line after the second battle turn away.

Remember at the time the INVINCIBLES were designed, 20-21kt reciprocating-engine-powered armoured cruisers were the main opposition, and so they had a 4-5kt speed advantage or more dependent on weather + sea state.

It would be interesting to pull the design studies for these ships!

That explains INVINCIBLE’s design speed, but am pretty sure that her armor scheme drew heavily on the Japanese armored cruisers that took 12” fire at Tsushima not being penetrated.

[kdahm]

It depends. My understanding is that Beatty pulled into the Grand Fleet’s van precisely to obscure Scheer’s view of the Grand Fleet so Scheer wouldn’t run.

The QUEEN ELIZABETHs were absolutely intended as a fast striking wing (and many dreadnoughts acted this way when the fleet was primarily 18kt pre-dreadnoughts), but I don’t believe Jellicoe intended Beatty to be that - though Beatty probably did.

The BCs may have become one de-facto during the night action; they did skirmish with the pre-dreadnoughts at the end of the German line after the second battle turn away.

My understanding is that the BC squadron was intended as both a reinforced scout and as a reinforcement to the screen to stop the HSF scouts. 5th Squadron, the QEs, were there as a backup to BC squadron and as a fast striking wing to the battleline.

Also, BCF was based at Firth of Forth while the main fleet was at Scapa Flow, resulting in fewer opportunities to exercise together. This, and Beatty's communication difficulties, also created the major communications and doctrinal problems when 5th Squadron was attached. The result was that when Beatty went charging after Hipper, he not only outran the main fleet, he also left behind 5th Squadron with only vague instructions if any to Evans-Thomas. Then, after turning around and starting the Run to the North, he passed 5th Squadron again, with no instructions or consideration, leaving them to face the entire HSF.

The best comparison to Beatty I can think of is Custer after the Civil War.

[David Newton]

Perhaps another good comparison would be Jeb Stuart during the Gettysburg campaign

[Johnnie Lyle]

It depends. My understanding is that Beatty pulled into the Grand Fleet’s van precisely to obscure Scheer’s view of the Grand Fleet so Scheer wouldn’t run.

The QUEEN ELIZABETHs were absolutely intended as a fast striking wing (and many dreadnoughts acted this way when the fleet was primarily 18kt pre-dreadnoughts), but I don’t believe Jellicoe intended Beatty to be that - though Beatty probably did.

The BCs may have become one de-facto during the night action; they did skirmish with the pre-dreadnoughts at the end of the German line after the second battle turn away.

My understanding is that the BC squadron was intended as both a reinforced scout and as a reinforcement to the screen to stop the HSF scouts. 5th Squadron, the QEs, were there as a backup to BC squadron and as a fast striking wing to the battleline.

Also, BCF was based at Firth of Forth while the main fleet was at Scapa Flow, resulting in fewer opportunities to exercise together. This, and Beatty's communication difficulties, also created the major communications and doctrinal problems when 5th Squadron was attached. The result was that when Beatty went charging after Hipper, he not only outran the main fleet, he also left behind 5th Squadron with only vague instructions if any to Evans-Thomas. Then, after turning around and starting the Run to the North, he passed 5th Squadron again, with no instructions or consideration, leaving them to face the entire HSF.

The best comparison to Beatty I can think of is Custer after the Civil War.

5 BS was attached to the BCF because 3 BCS was doing gunnery exercises at Scapa Flow. Beatty wanted them permanently. Jellicoe didn’t want Beatty to have them at all - because he wanted them to be the Grand Fleet van. Jellicoe was very concerned about GF elements getting caught isolated, so he wasn’t too keen on “striking units” as much as fast deploying. The QEs really couldn’t do more than 23kts as a squadron, so the Grand Fleet’s van is the logical place for them. I’ll leave it to your imagination just how badly hurt the KOINGs would have been had they been taking 15” broadsides at 12,000 yards.

Twice.

Jellicoe specifically sent 3 BCS out with a small screen to find Beatty. That’s a classic heavy scout/cruiser mission.

Custer is far too complex and enigmatic a personality to properly describe Beatty. I’d say Beatty is closer to MacArthur, or Churchill, or an inverse Wolseley. Beatty basically had a rich wife and strong political and press patrons.

[Johnnie Lyle]

Perhaps another good comparison would be Jeb Stuart during the Gettysburg campaign

Inverse Stuart, maybe - Beatty and Hood at least found the enemy.

[David Newton]

Yeah but Stuart didn't tell Lee anything about it either.

[kdahm]

Looking at this, do we need to coin Fisher's Law:

"Any discussion about battlecruisers will eventually devolve into the Battle of Jutland and who did what there."

[Andy L]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

I've never come across the "Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser" name, but certainly Fisher made it clear, initially at least, they should never be employed in the battleline. As I understand it was the new Prime Minister Herbert Asquith who mistakenly referred to them as 'battle cruisers', and the name stuck; big, long ships with dreadnought armament, and high speed. Certainly such a name appealed to the government who wished no part of Fishers revolutionary 'flotilla defence' for the home islands and 'fast armoured cruisers' deployed worldwide to protect Britain trade routes.

Fisher did later say these vessels 'could' be used in the line of battle, but this (to me at least) smacks of political subterfuge to gain funding for them from a government solely interested in building dreadnoughts - "We want eight and we won't wait". Much the same as the Admiralty in the seventies hoodwinked the Labour government into agreeing to fund the 'Through-Deck Command Cruiser' to replace HMS' Tiger and Blake. Only a true naval person would understand a 689ft long warship with essentially a full-length full-width flight deck was nothing less than an aircraft carrier!

[Johnnie Lyle]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

I've never come across the "Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser" name, but certainly Fisher made it clear, initially at least, they should never be employed in the battleline. As I understand it was the new Prime Minister Herbert Asquith who mistakenly referred to them as 'battle cruisers', and the name stuck; big, long ships with dreadnought armament, and high speed. Certainly such a name appealed to the government who wished no part of Fishers revolutionary 'flotilla defence' for the home islands and 'fast armoured cruisers' deployed worldwide to protect Britain trade routes.

Fisher did later say these vessels 'could' be used in the line of battle, but this (to me at least) smacks of political subterfuge to gain funding for them from a government solely interested in building dreadnoughts - "We want eight and we won't wait". Much the same as the Admiralty in the seventies hoodwinked the Labour government into agreeing to fund the 'Through-Deck Command Cruiser' to replace HMS' Tiger and Blake. Only a true naval person would understand a 689ft long warship with essentially a full-length full-width flight deck was nothing less than an aircraft carrier!

Unfortunately, they already had been, in most of the naval actions of the last twenty years: the Battle of the Yalu, the Battle of Santiago, and most of the battles of the Russo-Japanese wars. The Japanese especially used their 8”/10” armored cruisers as an additional battle squadron, while Sampson and Schley’s battleships commanders handled theirs like cruisers. Frankly, keeping any ship of similar size and armament to a battleship out of the battleline was not going to happen unless the range was such that only 12” guns could reach.

Fisher knew, or should have known, that.

[Andy L]

Damn Beatty for a gloryhounding fool......

More for not phoning home. Not keeping the C-in-C informed of what’s going on was THE cardinal sin of Jutland.

And demanding rate of fire improvements, resulting in the issues with the charges laying around and the flash doors open. Beatty was responsible for most of the British losses for the day.

I dont think Beatty was solely to blame in the loss of the three RN battlecruisers. Irrespecive of the fact they shouldn't really have been there, the issue of high rate-of-fire was widely acknowledged within the fleet as the only real antidote to the better German rangefinding equipment. The resulting issue of not securing flash-tight doors and keeping large stacks of cordite charges in the handling rooms was already being addressed; indeed the Lion's gunnery chief Warrant Officer Grant had already instituded a ship-wide reorganisation of gunnery practice aboard his ship. These measures paid off handsomely during the battle when HMS Lion's Q turret suffered a catastrophic hit, much the same as Indefatigable, Queen Mary and Invincible. Lion survived, the others didn't. The afterbattle inquiry showed the three battlecruisers basically blew themselves up through unsafe ammunition and cordate practices to allow a greater rate of fire.

Interestingly the Germans had almost suffered a similar calamity during the Dogger Bank when Seydlitz' aft turret was hit and nearly blew the ship up. They instigated changes immedately, not only to both shipboard ammunition and cordite handling, but also to the design of the cordite charges themselves.

[Andy L]

Their original description was “Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser” and their employment was in finding and killing the armoured cruisers threatening the scout cruisers of the Screen. They were employed in this role at the Dogger Bank and Falkland actions. Pretty much everything else was misemployment for them.

I've never come across the "Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser" name, but certainly Fisher made it clear, initially at least, they should never be employed in the battleline. As I understand it was the new Prime Minister Herbert Asquith who mistakenly referred to them as 'battle cruisers', and the name stuck; big, long ships with dreadnought armament, and high speed. Certainly such a name appealed to the government who wished no part of Fishers revolutionary 'flotilla defence' for the home islands and 'fast armoured cruisers' deployed worldwide to protect Britain trade routes.

Fisher did later say these vessels 'could' be used in the line of battle, but this (to me at least) smacks of political subterfuge to gain funding for them from a government solely interested in building dreadnoughts - "We want eight and we won't wait". Much the same as the Admiralty in the seventies hoodwinked the Labour government into agreeing to fund the 'Through-Deck Command Cruiser' to replace HMS' Tiger and Blake. Only a true naval person would understand a 689ft long warship with essentially a full-length full-width flight deck was nothing less than an aircraft carrier!

Unfortunately, they already had been, in most of the naval actions of the last twenty years: the Battle of the Yalu, the Battle of Santiago, and most of the battles of the Russo-Japanese wars. The Japanese especially used their 8”/10” armored cruisers as an additional battle squadron, while Sampson and Schley’s battleships commanders handled theirs like cruisers. Frankly, keeping any ship of similar size and armament to a battleship out of the battleline was not going to happen unless the range was such that only 12” guns could reach.

Fisher knew, or should have known, that.

I think this ignores the pretty unique position the Royal Navy was in at the turn of the 19th/20th centuries. Britains Empire was big, not just big but BIG. No other country had requirements and demands of its navy as Britain had. Fishers problem as he saw it was less maintaining a battlefleet close to home to deter French or German moves, but more protecting Britains maritime commerce all over the world, from the middle east through to India through to Singapore and Malaya through to Hong Kong, Australia, Canada . . . all-points empire. He foresaw, way back in 1904, the biggest maritime threats to Britain were the torpedo and commerce raider. This proved prophetically true not only in the Great War but even more so in WW2.

Hence his concepts of Flotilla Defence to protect the UKs home islands, and the Fast Armoured Cruiser to protect the trade routes.

I agree with you on the factor of trying to keep vessels of similar size and armament as battleships out of the battle line; given the aggressive nature of the Royal Navy it was as you say, only a matter of time . . .