US Navy News

[James1978]

Navy Investigation of Carrier Water Contamination Finds Crew, Equipment Failures

16 May 2023
Military.com | By Konstantin Toropin

A newly released Navy investigation into drinking water contamination aboard two aircraft carriers last fall found the problem stemmed from aging systems on the ships.

But the investigation also found the incidents of contamination with E. coli and jet fuel were exacerbated by actions of crew members and policies that were unprepared to deal with contamination, particularly fuel, entering the water supply.

The pair of incidents -- though unconnected -- happened within days of each other aboard the aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of southern California in September 2022. In both cases, the initial reports of issues came from social media posts rather than Navy statements.

Although the Navy insists that the E. coli contamination aboard the Lincoln led to no reported issues, the service said 11 sailors aboard the Nimitz had symptoms that may have been caused by ingesting jet fuel that got into that carrier's water, though all were eventually cleared to return to duty.

In the first incident aboard the USS Nimitz, the Navy's investigation confirmed earlier admissions by the service that jet fuel had made its way into the ship's water supply.

However, the investigation revealed that the source of the jet fuel was not a leak but rather the result of crew members trying to work on a handful of the 26 potable water tanks aboard the ship that had been out of service.

Unbeknownst to the crew, one of the out-of-service tanks held JP-5 -- jet fuel -- that leaked into the tank during the ship's last deployment in 2021 through a deteriorated cover, according to the investigation.

However, it appears that that detail was forgotten or not properly noted, because by 2022 "informal records indicated [the tank] contained a mixture of potable water and seawater" and investigators found that "the ship did not know or consider the possibility that the tank might contain contaminants other than seawater."

The crew's plan was to clean the potable water system by flushing the piping and pump with clean water. It appears that the plan allowed for the jet fuel to make it into the rest of the ship through shared piping.

Since the Navy redacted all references that identified the specific tanks investigators were referring to, it is difficult to understand some specific sequences and events laid out in the report.

On Sept. 16, between noon and 3 p.m., as the crew was pumping water from one of the potable tanks, they noticed an odor of JP-5, according to the Navy investigation. Despite isolating some of the tanks and pumps and flushing sections of the system, at around 9 p.m. the engineering control hub on the ship started getting reports from the wardroom, staterooms and crew quarters that there was fuel in the water.

The report does praise the leadership of the ship for taking quick action once the problem was identified. Investigators found that it took about 30 minutes to shut off water service to the ship and 90 minutes for Capt. Craig Sicola to begin addressing the crew.

The report said that Sicola unequivocally told the crew not to use the ship's water.

However, the incident also revealed that Navy ships are not set up to deal with fuel contamination. The report noted that the crew "does not have capability or procedures to analyze water or [sewage] to determine the presence or concentration of JP-5" and "neither the ship nor shore support facilities had pre-planned procedures or response actions to recover a shipboard potable water system contaminated with JP-5."

As a result, testing had to be done by an outside laboratory, and samples from 12 onboard tanks showed the presence of hydrocarbons -- the broad term for compounds that include jet fuel -- that ranged from undetectable to as high as 4.9 parts per million.

The report says the Navy's limit, based on an Environmental Protection Agency analysis, is only 0.266 parts per million.

Although the ship was aided by the fact that it was able to pull into San Diego the day after the contamination was discovered, it still took the rest of September to remove all of the fuel contamination. On Oct. 1, the ship's water system was deemed usable again.

In contrast to the Nimitz, the sailors on the Lincoln faced a different contamination -- the bacteria E. coli. Furthermore, the incident aboard could have been prevented had the crew been more aggressive in identifying the issue.

Like the Nimitz, the Lincoln had a water tank that developed a hole from rust, which allowed contaminants to seep in. Unlike the Nimitz, the tank was in service. On Sept. 17, the day before the ship was to set sail, the tank "experienced an unaccounted for change in level" that added about 2,000 gallons, according to the report.

The extra liquid came from the bilge -- a system of voids and spaces under a ship's equipment that often collects substances like jet fuel and oil and functions as a kind of sewer for the ship.

The next day, Sept. 18, a crew member noted the higher than normal level but assumed it was extra water from the pier and did nothing.

Three days later, around noon on Sept. 21, the ship started using water from the tank; almost immediately, a sailor reported to a superior that the water had a "weird" taste. That superior did not report the issue further.

In all, investigators said there were four missed opportunities for watch standers to identify and flag the water contamination before it spread throughout the ship.

"Basic watchstanding principles would have prevented or minimized the spread of the contaminated water in this case," they noted.

In fact, reports kept coming in throughout the evening, but actions by the engineering staff did little. At around 9 p.m., the contaminated tank was even reintroduced back into service after being taken offline earlier in the day.

At 10 p.m., almost 12 hours after the first report of foul water, the ship's executive officer, Capt. Patrick Baker, was told there might be an issue. "Around this time, [Baker] noticed a run on the bottled water at the ship's store," the report also noted.

According to the report, although Baker then briefed the commanding officer, Capt. Amy Bauernschmidt, the decision was made for her to make an announcement to the crew the next morning. In the meantime, the crew started dosing the water with extra chlorine and taking samples for testing.

The next day, Sept. 22, tests revealed bacterial contamination, including E. coli, in seven samples.

Several undated videos of Bauernschmidt addressing the crew were eventually posted online. In one video, seemingly shot after the confirmation of the contamination, Bauernschmidt tells her crew "before anybody starts freaking out ... E. coli is an extremely common bacteria."

"Matter of fact, every single person on this ship has it in their digestive system right now," the captain said while sailors captured in the video listening to the announcement can be heard in the background loudly protesting, "That's not how that works!"

In another video, she says that she had in front of her a bottle "of exactly what everyone was talking about" before immediately explaining that she purposely took a shower the night before and explained that it was "marvelous."

"I even tasted the water," she said before explaining it was "good to go."

The report does not shed any more light on the remarks but does say that Baker had a meeting on Sept. 22 with the ship's doctor, chief engineer and other leaders to discuss a plan.

Military.com reported that the Navy declared the ship's contamination solved a month later. However, given the results of the investigation of the Nimitz, which found that ships cannot test for substances like fuel that often find their way into bilge water, it is still unclear whether the crew was exposed to other substances beyond E. coli. Unlike the Nimitz, the Lincoln's investigation makes no mention of samples being sent off to an outside lab for testing.

The report also notes that the Lincoln's response was hampered by several factors.

The crew didn't dwell on reports of five tanks having bacterial contamination from January through March 2022. Investigators said no other carrier had a drinking water tank test positive for bacteria in the past two years.

"This should have been a warning sign," they concluded.

Investigators also faulted the tests that the Navy uses as "not timely enough to support emergent decision-making" since they need 18 hours to incubate to be useful.

Finally, the ship's equipment for adding chlorine straight to the water supply was not working at the time. "If [it] had been present and online, they would have significantly mitigated this issue," the report notes.

Neither report suggests punitive measures for anyone associated with either incident. In fact, Bauernschmidt has since been recommended for promotion to rear admiral.

In a letter signing off on the investigations, Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell, the head of naval aviation, noted that he stood up an "Aircraft Carrier Potable Water Working Group" in November 2022 to review all the drinking water incidents from the prior year to help address future incidents. That working group should have made its final recommendations at the end of January, but it does not appear the Navy has made those public.

[David Newton]

I know that sailors traditionally drink "rocket fuel", but that's taking it a bit too literally.

[MikeKozlowski]

Navy, Shipyards Settle Dispute that Delayed Submarine Orders
It’s unclear how the sides came to agreement, or just how late the two Virginia-class subs will eventually arrive.

By Marcus Weisgerber
May 11, 2023

The U.S. Navy has settled an insurance dispute with two key shipbuilding companies that has delayed the ordering of two Virginia-class submarines, according to people familiar with the matter.

The dispute centered on who should pay if a Tomahawk cruise missile were to accidentally explode during construction, damaging or destroying a nuclear-powered submarine worth more than $3 billion. For years, the Navy had indemnified the yards—Electric Boat, which is owned by General Dynamics, and Newport News Shipbuilding, a division of HII—essentially providing the insurance that the yards found difficult to obtain from a private insurer.

But in 2018, the Navy decided the arrangement heaped too much risk on the service, and ceased to offer indemnification. The service asked the shipyards to find private insurance, but they declined. In February 2022, the Navy suspended plans to order long-lead parts for two Virginia-class attack submarines. “Under the current law, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro makes the final decision on indemnification for Navy and Marine Corps contracts,” USNI News wrote in December.

In January, Del Toro urged the companies to come to the table and negotiate.

“I’m going to hold the ground and I’m willing to compromise on some things,” Del Toro said. “I’m not willing to compromise on everything. They’re going to have to come to the table with reasonable language that the American taxpayer can accommodate on that ground.”

Congress as well expressed worry about the impending delays to the delivery of the planned submarines, and alluded to the dispute in the 2023 defense policy bill. This all comes as companies are trying to quell supply issues caused by the pandemic and hire workers.

Last week, Newport News Shipbuilding President Jennifer Boykin said delays in long-lead parts typically produce delays in sending the submarines to the fleet.

“In order for the assembly line to get healthy and to begin to increase the rate, the worst thing we can do as an enterprise is starve the beginning” of the supply chain,” Boykin said May 5. “That's part of what we're really working with the Navy on—to get advanced funding to those suppliers who are already struggling with workforce, etcetera, is key if we're going to, in two or three or five years later, actually increase our throughput rate. When you start the beginning, because the end is not coming out, you're not going to change the scenario.”

On Thursday, a Navy official said a deal had been agreed upon by the Navy and the shipyards.

“We have reached agreements with the companies that are involved here,” said the Navy official, speaking anonymously because the contracts for the sub parts had not yet been awarded.

The official declined to say what the deal entailed or whether the subs’ delivery would be delayed.

Both companies declined to comment before the contracts were awarded.

...What in the Hell is anybody doing with Tomahawks aboard in the yard...?

Mike

[Poohbah]

Navy, Shipyards Settle Dispute that Delayed Submarine Orders
It’s unclear how the sides came to agreement, or just how late the two Virginia-class subs will eventually arrive.

By Marcus Weisgerber
May 11, 2023

The U.S. Navy has settled an insurance dispute with two key shipbuilding companies that has delayed the ordering of two Virginia-class submarines, according to people familiar with the matter.

The dispute centered on who should pay if a Tomahawk cruise missile were to accidentally explode during construction, damaging or destroying a nuclear-powered submarine worth more than $3 billion. For years, the Navy had indemnified the yards—Electric Boat, which is owned by General Dynamics, and Newport News Shipbuilding, a division of HII—essentially providing the insurance that the yards found difficult to obtain from a private insurer.

But in 2018, the Navy decided the arrangement heaped too much risk on the service, and ceased to offer indemnification. The service asked the shipyards to find private insurance, but they declined. In February 2022, the Navy suspended plans to order long-lead parts for two Virginia-class attack submarines. “Under the current law, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro makes the final decision on indemnification for Navy and Marine Corps contracts,” USNI News wrote in December.

In January, Del Toro urged the companies to come to the table and negotiate.

“I’m going to hold the ground and I’m willing to compromise on some things,” Del Toro said. “I’m not willing to compromise on everything. They’re going to have to come to the table with reasonable language that the American taxpayer can accommodate on that ground.”

Congress as well expressed worry about the impending delays to the delivery of the planned submarines, and alluded to the dispute in the 2023 defense policy bill. This all comes as companies are trying to quell supply issues caused by the pandemic and hire workers.

Last week, Newport News Shipbuilding President Jennifer Boykin said delays in long-lead parts typically produce delays in sending the submarines to the fleet.

“In order for the assembly line to get healthy and to begin to increase the rate, the worst thing we can do as an enterprise is starve the beginning” of the supply chain,” Boykin said May 5. “That's part of what we're really working with the Navy on—to get advanced funding to those suppliers who are already struggling with workforce, etcetera, is key if we're going to, in two or three or five years later, actually increase our throughput rate. When you start the beginning, because the end is not coming out, you're not going to change the scenario.”

On Thursday, a Navy official said a deal had been agreed upon by the Navy and the shipyards.

“We have reached agreements with the companies that are involved here,” said the Navy official, speaking anonymously because the contracts for the sub parts had not yet been awarded.

The official declined to say what the deal entailed or whether the subs’ delivery would be delayed.

Both companies declined to comment before the contracts were awarded.

...What in the Hell is anybody doing with Tomahawks aboard in the yard...?

Mike

The only way I could see it happening is if the Navy screws up...

[Drunknsubmrnr]

Probably concerns builders trials where they have to prove the system is capable of launching Tomahawks before handover to the Navy.

[James1978]

I did a little digging re. the submarine insurance issue and found this article from December 2022.

Virginia Attack Boat Program Stalled Over Tomahawk, Hypersonic Missile Insurance Rift
By: Sam LaGrone
December 15, 2022

THE PENTAGON — Advanced procurement contracts for two of the Navy’s Block V Virginia-class attack submarines have been stalled for 10 months due to an impasse between the service and its lead submarine builder over insurance related to Tomahawk missiles and future hypersonic weapons, USNI News has learned.

General Dynamics and the Navy are split over which organization should be financially responsible if an accident occurred, either during construction or operations, aboard attack boats that field Tomahawks. The disagreement has held up the final long lead items contracts for the two submarines the Navy plans to buy in Fiscal Year 2024, four sources familiar with the conflict have told USNI News. Long lead contracts are typically issued two years ahead of the final construction contracts.

Since 2018, the Navy has not extended the liability protections for Tomahawks to General Dynamics’ new submarine construction, arguing the company should provide its own insurance to cover any accidents that result from its vertical launch system, according to a July report to Congress from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment obtained by USNI News. The company in turn has told the Navy it’s unable to obtain adequate insurance to meet the risk of an explosive accident that could result in billions of dollars in damages, the sources told USNI News.

The dispute over the obscure insurance issue between the defense company and the Navy could further delay new submarine construction. The Navy also denied a similar request from Lockheed Martin to indemnify the company from liability should an accident occur with the under-development Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile, a move that could further delay a new weapons program the Navy plans to field on the Virginia-class attack boat’s Virginia Payload Module. Hypersonic weapons and new attack submarines are high among the Department of Defense’s acquisition priorities, officials have said during the rollout of the latest Pentagon budget.

Under the current law, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro makes the final decision on indemnification for Navy and Marine Corps contracts.

The current Fiscal Year 2023 defense policy bill — passed by the House last week and the Senate on Thursday evening — includes language requiring the Department of Defense to study the indemnification issue and the Navy to deliver a report to Congress on the indemnification issue for the Conventional Prompt Strike weapon system.

The provision is a compromise from the House version, which would have stripped the indemnification authority from the service secretaries and put it under the purview of the Secretary of Defense.

“We remain concerned with the lack of resolution regarding open indemnification requests related to the Conventional Prompt Strike program, other weapons programs, and the associated planned employment platforms. We note these delays could lead to significant delivery delays for both Navy and Army hypersonic weapons programs, the next block of Virginia-class submarines, and other programs,” reads the explanatory statement accompanying the compromise Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.

“We are aware of the language in the draft NDAA and continue to actively work with industry to address any concerns related to conventional prompt strike, other weapons, and their employment platforms,” Capt. J.D. Dorsey, the spokesman for Del Toro, told USNI News this week.

‘Unusually High Risk’
For decades, the Navy financially indemnified General Dynamics Electric Boat against a Tomahawk accident on its submarines under an “unusually high risk” provision born from the service’s nuclear ballistic missile program.

The Tomahawk and the Navy’s ballistic missiles, like the retired Poseidon and current Trident II D5s, employ a high-energy solid rocket propellant that has been used for years without incident but carries a small risk of devastating explosions.

“The actual or potential cost of this indemnification is impossible to estimate since it is contingent upon the occurrence and of a nuclear incident or unusually hazardous incident attributable to the utilization of high-energy propellants,” reads a 2008 indemnification memo from then Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter.“Such incidents may never occur; but in the event of a major event, losses could be catastrophic … In the event of a major incident arising from nuclear risks or unusually hazardous risks attributable to the utilization of high-energy propellants, the possible claims against and loss to the contractors and subcontractors could exceed amounts that contractors should be expected to cover and could easily exceed available insurance.”

For example, if the propellant exploded at a naval base or at a repair yard, the results would not only damage the submarine but also other nearby ships and infrastructure, with damages that could easily roll into the billions, not including additional claims related to anyone killed or injured in the blast.

The Navy fielded a nuclear variant of the Tomahawk for decades and the service grouped the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile with the other nuclear submarine-launched missile in terms of indemnification, according to a July Pentagon report to Congress.

“In the past, DON approved indemnification requests for nuclear-capable Tomahawk missiles (TLAM-N) and related systems. In 2015, the Navy completed all actions related to the retirement of the TLAM-N, but the Tomahawk continued to be included in the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) annual indemnifications through 2018,” reads the report.

“The period of coverage for the non-nuclear version of the Tomahawk was brief, and DON adjusted its indemnification decision in a reasonable period of time … DoN never considered Tomahawk propellants to present an unusually hazardous risk on their own, nor does DoN believe contractors lack the ability to obtain adequate insurance for the risks this missile system now presents.”

The Navy does not indemnify Tomahawks aboard surface ships as an unusually hazardous risk, but the risk of an accident on a surface ship is much lower than it is aboard an underway submarine, one source familiar with the system told USNI News.

General Dynamics is the prime contractor for the Tomahawk vertical launching systems aboard the Navy’s Los Angeles and Virginia-class attack submarines, but Raytheon builds the actual missile.

“General Dynamics Electric Boat’s request for indemnification is different, as the company is under contract solely for the launch systems, not the missiles,” reads the July Pentagon report.

The fear from a company like GD is that claims from a catastrophic incident could be an existential threat to the company, three sources familiar with the company’s reasoning told USNI News.

A General Dynamics spokesman acknowledged a request for comment but referred USNI News to the Navy. A Raytheon spokesperson declined to comment on the issue when contacted by USNI News. A Lockheed Martin spokesman referred questions from USNI News on their indemnification request to the Navy.

Defense contractors involved in the effort have been unsuccessful in finding an insurer to cover the risk of a Tomahawk accident, one lawmaker said during a May House Armed Services Committee hearing.

“One issue, which I think the Navy has created some schedule risk was the change in policy for unusual hazardous risk indemnification, which again, there’s just no question the Navy changed its policy in the last administration, in terms of how, you know, who bears the cost in terms of indemnification,” Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.), who chairs the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee chair, said during an exchange with Jay Stefany, who at the time was performing the duties of the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition.
“[Private industries] have found insurance coverage that is the maximum allowed in the market, $2 billion of coverage, which I think is certainly a good faith effort.”

In a July military readiness hearing, Courtney said repair work on both Virginia-class and Los Angeles-class attack boats at the private shipyards could stall due to the indemnification rules.

“This issue really is just screaming out for a resolution. And I honestly believe there’s a compromise here,” he said.
“We can have contractors get insurance — risk insurance to the maximum that’s available in the market. But that — as was the case for 40 years, that the Navy will be there sort of as a backstop… [for] this high-risk activity.”

[MikeKozlowski]

Probably concerns builders trials where they have to prove the system is capable of launching Tomahawks before handover to the Navy.

...We had fully wired dummy missiles - from Sidewinder up through Maverick and ALCM - that could be used to checkout test sets, pylons, and bomb bays - I'd be truly surprised if the USN didn't have similar inert birds.

Mike

[Drunknsubmrnr]

I agree. The real test is for the torpedoes, not the missiles. The missiles just need the A cable and firing system tested. The torpedoes need a lot more TLC.

[kdahm]

From the top of the page

However, the incident also revealed that Navy ships are not set up to deal with fuel contamination. The report noted that the crew "does not have capability or procedures to analyze water or [sewage] to determine the presence or concentration of JP-5" and "neither the ship nor shore support facilities had pre-planned procedures or response actions to recover a shipboard potable water system contaminated with JP-5."

So why in hell does a carrier not have the equipment to do minimal testing on drinking water to ensure that it's potable. I'm not talking about a mass spec to see what VOCs are in it, but a more simple go/no go test plan to ensure that there aren't 5000 sailors in the middle of the Pacific without drinking water.

Even if it's not propagated down to the escorts, they could still periodically send samples to the carrier or phibs. It must be a matter of, 'We didn't really care until the 90's, then we didn't care and it wasn't public enough to authorize the money."

[Johnnie Lyle]

From the top of the page

However, the incident also revealed that Navy ships are not set up to deal with fuel contamination. The report noted that the crew "does not have capability or procedures to analyze water or [sewage] to determine the presence or concentration of JP-5" and "neither the ship nor shore support facilities had pre-planned procedures or response actions to recover a shipboard potable water system contaminated with JP-5."

So why in hell does a carrier not have the equipment to do minimal testing on drinking water to ensure that it's potable. I'm not talking about a mass spec to see what VOCs are in it, but a more simple go/no go test plan to ensure that there aren't 5000 sailors in the middle of the Pacific without drinking water.

Even if it's not propagated down to the escorts, they could still periodically send samples to the carrier or phibs. It must be a matter of, 'We didn't really care until the 90's, then we didn't care and it wasn't public enough to authorize the money."

There’s also an element of “it sucked for us and we turned out okay, so it should suck for you.”

But so many of these examples come down to senior officers and NCOs not caring about their people - and not comprehending that people quit due to bad bosses applies to the Navy too.

[James1978]

There’s also an element of “it sucked for us and we turned out okay, so it should suck for you.”

But so many of these examples come down to senior officers and NCOs not caring about their people - and not comprehending that people quit due to bad bosses applies to the Navy too.

There's definitely that.

I think it's also a failure to accept that society changed. General trust in authority/institutions has been seriously eroded over the last several decades, and the military is not immune to that. With modern media, problems on one ship or base are much more widely known than they once would have been. It's getting harder to write off problems to one bad CO, or thinking things are only bad on your ship/base. Being a good sailor/soldier/airman/marine only goes so far before even they know that the trust has been broken.

The service member putting up with hardship is one thing - there family members is another. Think about the toxic water issues out of Camp Lejeune, the oil in the water in Hawaii, toxic mold in poorly maintained base housing.

I still think our service members are fully capable or rising to the challenge. But for the most part, life is just easier than it used to be, there is less hardship. People are less willing to accept "bad stuff" today that once upon a time was just how things were. Someone who will accept losing a limb in combat won't accept toxic water in the USA

[Poohbah]

I saw this post on Facebook in response to someone posting a piece from CDR Salamander's Substack about how Navy readiness has gone downhill in the past six years since the Fitzgerald collision.

Speaking as an Australian, distinct and separate from the f*#$ing lunatics in government, this scares me on a geopolitical level. Between the Afghanistan withdrawal, the apparent lunacy of the US executive, depleted stocks of ground warfare equipment sent to Ukraine, and now this level of failure in basic naval readiness, the Pax America is looking damned shaky.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, there was an arc of war that broke out in areas that it had for lack of better words policed. Everyone with a coastline is always keeping an eye on where US CBGs are, to either ensure their security or gauge exactly how much shenanigans they might get away with. If that lid comes off, the conflagration will be global.

(Emphasis added.)

[Johnnie Lyle]

There’s also an element of “it sucked for us and we turned out okay, so it should suck for you.”

But so many of these examples come down to senior officers and NCOs not caring about their people - and not comprehending that people quit due to bad bosses applies to the Navy too.

There's definitely that.

I think it's also a failure to accept that society changed. General trust in authority/institutions has been seriously eroded over the last several decades, and the military is not immune to that. With modern media, problems on one ship or base are much more widely known than they once would have been. It's getting harder to write off problems to one bad CO, or thinking things are only bad on your ship/base. Being a good sailor/soldier/airman/marine only goes so far before even they know that the trust has been broken.

Agreed. And, like so many other parts of society and government bleeding away trust, they don’t understand - or want to understand - that is happening.

The service member putting up with hardship is one thing - there family members is another. Think about the toxic water issues out of Camp Lejeune, the oil in the water in Hawaii, toxic mold in poorly maintained base housing.

Absolutely.

I still think our service members are fully capable or rising to the challenge. But for the most part, life is just easier than it used to be, there is less hardship. People are less willing to accept "bad stuff" today that once upon a time was just how things were. Someone who will accept losing a limb in combat won't accept toxic water in the USA

As Mike Kozlowski is wont to say, the kids are all right. It’s often the alleged adults who are failing in their duty to care for the kiddos. I dunno if life is less hard - that really depends on where you sit, and a lot of military families come from the communities that have had it really hard of late. Tech bros, trust fund babies and the laptop class -especially their kids - are not signing up for Uncle Sam’s nickel, and haven’t for years.

But the hardships are different, and often more spiritual and existential. We know we no longer have to accept “bad stuff” physically because we have seen it mitigated and addressed in so many ways - and, of course, so many people flaunt it.

They also won’t accept toxic water in the USA because it’s their job to protect us, and they take it seriously. They mentally know they’re not failing to protect us because it’s not something they can fight, so that eats away at folks. Saw that a lot with COVID, especially when I was helping friends prepare their people to return to the US after foreign deployments. It’s like a doctor losing family to illness - same emotions.

That’s fueling a lot of “fuck it, protect me and mine and come home” or “son, it ain’t worth the heartache.”

[James1978]

Military Aims for October to Begin Draining Hawaii Fuel Tanks That Poisoned Water

17 May 2023
Associated Press | By Audrey McAvoy

HONOLULU — The U.S. military on Tuesday proposed an October start date for a plan to drain a World War II-era fuel tank facility that poisoned 6,000 people when it leaked jet fuel into Pearl Harbor's drinking water 18 months ago.

Fuel from the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility leaked into a U.S. Navy drinking water well supplying water to 93,000 people in 2021. The episode poisoned about 6,000 people — mostly military personnel and their families — on and around the Hawaii naval base. It also prompted Honolulu's water utility to shut down nearby wells that provided about 20% of the city's water supply.

After the spill, the state of Hawaii ordered the military to drain and close the tanks. Last year, the military said it expected to remove fuel from Red Hill in July 2024 after it finished repairs to prevent leaks.

The military said it a news release that it would begin removing 104 million gallons (394 million liters) of fuel from the facility on Oct. 16 and finish by Jan. 19.

But that won’t remove all the fuel. The military said it's likely that 100,000 to 400,000 gallons (378,500 to 1.5 million liters) would remain. It said it will propose additional plans to remove the final gallons.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Hawaii Department of Health must sign off on the military's new plan.

Kathleen Ho, Hawaii's deputy director of environmental health, said she was encouraged by the new proposal.

"We will carefully review this submission to ensure that the updated timeline and plan can be executed safely without any further risk to the environment,” Ho said in a statement.

The tanks can hold 250 million gallons (1.1 billion liters) of fuel but are at less than half capacity now. Thirteen of the 20 tanks have fuel in them.

A Navy investigation found a cascading series of mistakes, complacency and a lack of professionalism over the course of six months led to the 2021 fuel spill. It has yet to announce disciplinary action in response to the spill.

[James1978]

'A 9/11-like Event': Navy Report on Carrier Suicides Cites Missed Warning Signs, Leadership Failures

18 May 2023
Military.com | By Konstantin Toropin

A Navy investigation of an unprecedented streak of suicides aboard the USS George Washington aircraft carrier has revealed failures at all levels of leadership, and the service is now promising to provide sailors better ameneties and pay in the future.

The massive investigation released Thursday, which aimed to look at the challenges for all aircraft carriers undergoing long and complex refueling like the George Washington, found that the ship had woefully understaffed departments and lacked senior leadership. Navy surveys found widespread thoughts of suicide among the crew.

At the same time, the ship was failing to provide many of the programs that were supposed to help the crew deal with stress. During a briefing to reporters, Adm. Daryl Caudle, the man who oversees much of the Navy's East Coast fleet, said he saw the cluster of deaths as "a 9/11-like event."

"It was pointedly obvious that the Navy had failed the George Washington through a host of things that we put that ship into," Caudle said.

Among the 86 findings of fact and 87 recommendations was one especially striking detail: The warning signs for the pending crisis were captured in the ship's own survey data but never acted on by the carrier's leadership.

Investigators found that the ship had the highest number of suicide-related behaviors from 2017 to 2019 when compared to all aircraft carriers on the East Coast.

In a 2019 command climate survey, the George Washington's results were below aircraft carrier and Navy-wide averages in all assessment categories. A 2020 survey showed the same results.

Plus, from 2019 to 2020, those same surveys showed that sailors' "awareness of suicidal ideations" on the ship ballooned from 31% to 56%. The report notes that the ship "did not address this finding."

The carrier also struggled to get the crew to participate in the surveys. It had as few as 11% of the crew giving leaders their feedback.

During the investigation, Capt. Brent Gaut, the ship's current commanding officer, told investigators that "there was nothing out of the ordinary that was voiced in that survey that could have given the awareness of a massive problem or anything particularly related to suicidal ideations."

Gaut took command of the ship in June 2021 and has presided over five of the seven suicides that Navy data says occurred aboard the ship between 2020 and 2023.

It took sailors reaching out to Military.com after the final incident in April 2022 to make the spate of suicides public. The sailors who were interviewed pointed to issues like commuting time, challenges with living aboard, and absent leadership as problems far before any Navy report.

The Navy investigators also found that the Command Resilience Team, or CRT -- a group of sailors who, among other things, were charged with running those climate surveys and putting plans in place to address the concerns they raised -- was not doing its job.

"USS George Washington CRT functioned poorly and did not execute its duties and responsibilities effectively" and the ship's leaders "did not provide effective oversight" of this team, investigators found.

Team members were not formally named by Gaut, and the senior command climate specialist didn't even know that was a requirement. This specialist also didn't know that there was a requirement to keep notes of the CRT meetings. Investigators found that the meetings varied in frequency and were poorly attended.

The report goes on to say that the ship's executive officer, Capt. William Mathis, is supposed to be head of the CRT, but he "was not aware of this requirement and had not attended any CRT meetings during his first 4 months aboard."

In all, investigators made eight findings of deficiency or noncompliance by the ship's crew related to either the CRT or the overall command climate efforts.

Furthermore, the report said both the current and former commanding officers of the carrier said they were not provided formal lessons learned -- reports that documented issues prior carriers had going through during the same type of maintenance and refueling.

Housing
Another major revelation of the report is that the Navy has never properly articulated what makes a ship habitable by crew and who is ultimately responsible for making that call.

This detail is critical because sailors cited harsh living conditions aboard the ship -- it was functionally a construction zone at the time -- as one of the key issues that was making life miserable.

While investigators concluded that moving the crew aboard in June 2021 was "premature," they also say that their interviews revealed "divergent opinions regarding who had the authority to declare habitability and the criteria to reach this determination."

There were four, if not more, groups involved in this decision, including inspectors from the commander of the Navy's Air Forces Atlantic; the supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair; the project office that controlled the money for the overhaul; and the leadership aboard the George Washington.

Also driving this decision was money. The report noted that the entire overhaul was underfunded by $322 million -- money meant to pay for both the work on the ship and housing for the crew. As a result, quality-of-life programs became bill payers for contract maintenance shortfalls, the report says.

In fact, George Washington's previous commander, Capt. Kenneth Strong, tried to delay the move aboard in early 2021 but was told by the Navy office paying for the overhaul that the money to house sailors off-ship was gone. Investigators said that the program manager in that office was given direct orders not to take on any additional financial obligations.

A former program manager told investigators that, once the ship is deemed habitable, "there is no requirement to fund sailor off-ship billeting with ship maintenance funds" and "that the term 'quality of life' is not part of any habitability standard."

Meanwhile, accommodations at the shipyards were far from ideal. The report found the Newport News Shipyard's residential building did not meet Defense Department or Navy standards for accommodation, though the Navy's contract with the shipyard does not prescribe minimum standards of lodging.

As a result, sailors who were able to get into these barracks had on average 85 square feet in shared rooms -- in a building that the Navy believed likely had lead paint, asbestos and other toxic substances. The use of the 149-room building cost the Navy about $4.36 million per year.

Meanwhile, according to a prior investigation into the suicides aboard the carrier, sailors were resorting to sleeping in their cars or paying for rent out of paychecks that are typically less than $2,000 a month.

Rear Adm. John Meier, to whom the George Washington's commanders report, said in his letter on the report that "it came as a surprise to me that Navy unaccompanied housing falls below minimum adequacy standards set by the Department of Defense."

Todd Corillo, a spokesman for Huntington Ingalls Industries, the company that runs the shipyard, told Military.com in a statement that it is reviewing the findings of the report and they "remain committed to working closely with the Navy and all stakeholders on exploring options that continuously improve quality of service."

The Path Forward
The letters of the three admirals who reviewed and accepted the report, including Caudle, all promised that big, institutional changes are coming.

Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell, who oversees all of naval aviation, wrote in his letter that the entire carrier refueling process needs a fundamental shift to improve sailor quality of life and work, as well as the quality and timely maintenance of the carrier.

In the letter written by Caudle, he recommended that the Navy assign first-term sailors to ships undergoing the same kind of overhaul for no more than two years, and give them a chance to spend time with operational units.

He also recommended that sailors be paid a food allowance regardless of whether the ship's galley is running, and a housing allowance even for sailors who would not normally receive it.

Caudle also recommended that no sailor should live on a housing barge, with the exception of a small rotating portion of the crew that stands watch on the ship overnight.

Corillo also noted that some improvements have already been put into place, such as better parking, Wi-Fi, food service and security.

However, when pressed for a timeline in which sailors can expect all the changes -- especially some of the more ambitious ones like the extra pay -- to materialize, Caudle would not give a firm answer.

"It's hard to give you a definitive timeline on when this will all be wrapped up," he said. "It is going to take resourcing and working with partners in Congress to get some funds in place to do the things we're talking about."

The Navy also hopes to allow leaders from its East Coast commands to oversee and control carriers that come to the Newport News Shipyard from the Pacific.

Meier noted in his letter that he does not have the authority to hold commanders of ships like that accountable. "Responsibility without authority is less than ideal," he wrote.

Meanwhile, Caudle said there would not be firings or any other administrative measures taken against any of the people listed in the report.

"While it may seem that there's not a person ... being held accountable, I'm telling you, this is the most exquisite accountability we have had post a major mishap," the admiral said.

"You basically got a letter of instruction written by the chief of naval operations and the secretary of the Navy to Navy leadership, holding us accountable to fix the quality of service in the Navy," he added.

The Navy's data found that 57% of all aircraft carrier suicides from 2017 to the present happened while the ship was in the shipyard. The George Washington had been slated to complete her overhaul in March 2023, but at the moment she is still at the shipyard.

[James1978]

Junior Sailors on USS George Washington Endured Some of the Toughest Living Conditions in the Military, Says New Navy Investigation
By: Sam LaGrone and Heather Mongilio
May 18, 2023

Since 2017, junior sailors assigned to aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) were subject to some of the toughest living conditions in the military, according to a new Navy investigation released on Thursday.

Sailors assigned to the carrier over its almost six-year-long maintenance period at HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding experienced poor living conditions, up to three-hour commutes and isolation from their families and peers as part of life in the shipyard. Complaints about the life as a George Washington sailor, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, fell on deaf ears within Navy leadership, according to the quality of life investigation released on Thursday and reviewed by USNI News.

While Washington has been in the middle of its midlife overhaul and refueling at Newport News Shipbuilding, nine sailors died by suicide, according to Navy records reviewed by USNI News.

After years of complaints from sailors aboard and assigned to the ship, three suicides in April 2022 by sailors assigned to and aboard the carrier prompted the investigation into the quality of life for sailors aboard the carrier.

The suicides are the starkest statistic of a crew that had a high rate of substance abuse, experienced poor oversight from leadership and had a higher-than-average rate of first-tour sailors who spent their first four years in the Navy working in the shipyard, according to the command investigation overseen by commander Naval Air Force Reserve Rear Adm. Brad Dunham and released on Thursdays.

In a call with reporters on Thursday, U.S. Fleet Forces commander Adm. Daryl Caudle blamed some of the crew stress on the service neglecting to account for how an almost two-year extension of the maintenance period would affect the crew aboard.

“We got ourselves into a space that we were just not ready to understand what can happen with this length of overrun,” he said.

Navy leadership focused more on the effects of the material condition of the carrier and delays rather than the effects of an extended maintenance period on the crew, Naval Air Force Atlantic commander Rear Adm. John Meier said in his endorsement of the investigation.

“We failed to stop and account for the true costs of this process on our sailors. … We understand the ‘stuff’ and we can quantify it, test it, improve upon it, and master it almost to the level to where it becomes predictable. This is the area in which we are most comfortable,” he wrote. “While extremely important, it pales in comparison to how we take care of the people.”

Mid-Life Upgrade
George Washington is nearing the end of one of the most complex and demanding periods of the carrier’s 50-year-long service life.

Programmed into the life of each Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is a four-year repair period called the refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH). In addition to refueling the two nuclear reactors, almost every space in the 90,000-ton carrier is renovated and modernized.

The multi-billion dollar maintenance periods are done solely at HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding – an almost 140-year-old shipyard perched across the James River from Naval Station Norfolk, Va. RCOHs have historically accounted for about a third of the yard’s business, with the other two-thirds split between new aircraft carrier and submarine construction.

Unlike the new-build carriers and submarines, which belong to the shipyard until they are delivered to the Navy, the carriers in RCOH belong to the service and the ship’s crew has a major role in assisting the shipyard with the overall maintenance period.

George Washington entered Newport News Shipbuilding on Aug. 4, 2017, after being forward-deployed in Japan from 2008 to 2015. George Washington was the first Japan-based U.S. nuclear carrier to undergo a different maintenance regime from the other carriers based in the U.S., adding to the amount of work on the carrier, HII told USNI News in a statement.

Factors that extended the RCOH included, delays and changes in her RCOH planning and induction timeline due to FY15 budgetary decisions to inactivate (vice refuel) this ship; the arrival condition of the ship, which was more challenging than expected, planned or budgeted for, including growth work in significant areas of the RCOH; the requirement to remove critical parts from CVN-73 to support higher-priority, deploying aircraft carriers; and the impact of COVID-19 on the workforce and industrial base,” reads the statement.

According to Navy data and the USNI News carrier database, George Washington’s RCOH will last 34 percent longer than planned – or will deliver more than a year and half late.

Washington also entered the yard as Newport News’ other major programs were suffering delays. The carrier started RCOH a month after the Navy commissioned first-in-class carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), which would suffer continuous delays to its deployment schedule and require yard resources. During the same period, HII was also running behind on its Virginia-class submarine program and contracted delivery dates as the effects of the COVID-19 lockdowns began to hit the shipyards.

In its investigation, Naval Air Forces commander Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell blamed the yard for shifting resources from George Washington’s overhaul to new construction carriers and submarines.

“[Aircraft carriers] undergoing RCOH continue to experience unnecessary delays, due to both underfunding of RCOH and the shifting of HII-NNS priorities away from RCOH work to new build CVNs or submarines,” Whitesell wrote in his endorsement. “Financial incentives must be established for on-time delivery with all combat systems and ships service systems fully functional. Without on-time incentives, current delivery delays will continue, compounding the already backed-up shipyard.”

The resource problems worsened when next-in-line carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) crossed the river from Naval Station Norfolk to Newport News for its RCOH on May 13, 2021.

“Underfunding of USS George Washington RCOH and shifting of shipyard priorities to USS Gerald R. Ford created undue stress upon the crew of USS George Washington. The resulting delays and introduction of USS John C. Stennis to HII-NNS only exacerbated pre-existing strain on resources and workplace stressors of shipyard life faced by sailors,” Whitesell wrote.
“This shipyard backlog has put more CVNs and sailors in the shipyard than current HII-NNS facilities and manning can support.”

In a statement to USNI News, the shipyard said “has been, and continues to be, aggressively engaged with the Navy and City of Newport News to enhance quality of service for Navy sailors and shipbuilders at Newport News Shipbuilding. Specific examples include: improving parking and transportation options; enhancing Wi-Fi and IT services; facility improvements and modifications at buildings used by shipbuilders and the Navy; increased security presence; additional onsite food services; support for regular on-site visits by trained therapy dogs; and regular meetings with the Navy and City of Newport News.”

According to the Navy, HII was not consulted as part of its investigation.

By the Numbers
Life in a shipyard is “arduous,” a reality the Navy accepts, Meier wrote in his endorsement of the investigation. Statistics on aircraft carrier suicides between 2017 and 2022 show that 57 percent of those deaths were among sailors whose ships were in maintenance, according to the report. Of the 42 deaths, nine were George Washington sailors. USNI News previously reported that a 10th suicide may have also occurred in the time period.

Although the investigation does not indicate whether the Navy used calendar or fiscal years, suicides among aircraft carriers accounted for four out of 58 deaths, or 6.9 percent, based on Fiscal Year 2021 data, which is the most recent data available for overall suicides.

In 2019 – the worst year for suicides since 2017 – deaths among aircraft carrier sailors accounted for 12 out 74 suicides, or 16.2 percent. Of the 12 suicides, eight happened during maintenance and one was a GW sailor.

The suicide rate in the Navy has increased over the past 10 years, USNI News previously reported. The most recent available suicide rate is from the FY 2021 report, which found that the Navy experienced 16.7 deaths per 100,000 sailors, the lowest rate in five years. During 2021, there was one suicide among GW sailors.

“Increased awareness of suicidal ideations and behaviors within the organization should have triggered both concern and invasive action by the chain of command,” Dunham wrote in his investigation.

Trust in Command
In addition to the Navy not properly administering command climate surveys, a dysfunctional command resilience team and little buy-in department heads on George Washington allowed a poor climate to continue, according to the report. Commanding officer Capt. Brent Gaut asked the command chaplain to set up a subcommittee of the command resilience team to focus on “at-risk” sailors.

The chaplain reported that 50 percent of department heads supported the subcommittee’s requirements, with pushback primarily due to the time it would take.

The suicide prevention coordinator, who is a mandatory member of the command resilience team, did not participate. The inspection report did not say why the suicide prevention coordinator was not involved.

George Washington sailors had not run a crisis response drill since June 2020, despite a Navy requirement for annual drills.

“The former USS George Washington suicide prevention coordinator indicated that drills may have been difficult to execute because he believed suicide prevention was given a lower training priority. From his perspective, the routine occurrence of suicide-related behaviors adequately exercised the crisis response plan,” reads the inspection released Thursday.

The ship’s psychologist, or psych boss, was overwhelmed, a previous inspection into the GW suicides found, USNI News previously reported. GW also had a wait time of 32 days for an initial intake, which was double the average wait time among carriers, the quality of life inspection found.

Overall, the majority of the crew did not trust the mental health care resources on the ship. A common concern among sailors is that if they tell Navy mental health professionals about their concerns, it will negatively affect their careers.

Interior Communications Electrician 3 Natasha Huffman, who was one of the sailors who died by suicide in April of 2022, had complained she did not trust the mental health providers.

In the July 2021 Defense Organizational Climate Survey, sailors reported that they experienced stigma, shame and discouragement for seeking mental health resources. Some junior sailors reported that leaders would not allow time off to receive care.
Of the survey participants, 58 percent said they did not trust military health care providers, with 23 percent saying they did not trust mental health care providers in general.

“I have developed mental issues that I feel I cannot resolve because I KNOW my chain of command does not care and production is what must be pushed every day to the maximum,” reads a statement from a sailor aboard George Washington.
“I feel unsafe asking my leadership for help or even telling them I am going to see the psych boss, or chaplain or whatever because in return they will make me stay late to complete the work I was unable to do when I was at said appointment.”

The data provided in the report gave a snapshot of Navy suicides, usually not seen in the annual Defense Department report. While the DoD report breaks out data by demographics, it does not usually breakdown where the suicides occurred.

The GW investigation reported that a majority of sailors who died by suicide were between 18 and 25 years old, which follows data included in the annual suicide report. In FY 2021, 37.9 percent of suicides were among sailors 20 to 24 years old, with the next highest percentage, 27.6 percent, among those 25 to 29 years old.

The majority of sailors who died by suicide used a personal firearm, according to the data in the report. Master-at-Arms Seaman Recruit Xavier Mitchell-Sandor used a service-issued sidearm to take his life while on duty aboard the carrier.

Caudle and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy James Honea told reporters that they are aware of the issues with firearms and suicide, with Honea referring to the Independent Review Commission on Suicide, which highlighted a number of recommended changes around firearm use. Caudle and Honea both said the Navy was part of an overall Pentagon effort to mitigate the risk from firearms, but did not give additional details.

Three Hours to Get to Work
A sailor who lived in the Norfolk area and commuted to George Washington might start their day as early as 4 a.m.

They would get ready for a day at the shipyard, and although they would not muster until 7 a.m., for sailors living away from the shipyard, getting to George Washington could be a three-hour journey.

First, they would drive to an HII parking lot to catch the shuttle bus leaving at 5 a.m. The shuttle, depending on traffic through the Monitor Merrimac Memorial Bridge Tunnel, could get to the dropoff location by 6 a.m.

The sailors then had a 12-minute walk to George Washington, allowing them to get to the ship before their 7 a.m. muster. For female sailors, that 12-minute walk might include a catcall or two from the shipyard workers, according to the report.

That’s the example timeline laid out in the GW inspection. However, depending on traffic a 20-minute drive could become two hours, according to a comment in the inspection.

“Regarding parking further away from the ship, one comment noted, ‘We cannot expect sailors to add an additional bus ride over the bridge each way. The bridges/tunnels back up and a nominal 20-minute drive can become a 2-hour drive. Making Sailors do this would crush morale that is ok at this point but on a thin footing,” reads the report.

HII provided multiple parking facilities for ships in the shipyard, including four locations in Newport News, Va., one in Suffolk, Va., and one in Chesapeake, Va. Shuttle buses, sometimes driven by Navy personnel, took sailors closer to the ship.

“Sailors joined the Navy ‘to see the world,’ accelerate their lives, or to be ‘forged by the sea,’ but not to see the shipyard or drive a bus,” Meier wrote in his endorsement of the investigation.

However, depending on where a sailor might live from the shipyard, traffic congestion could add up to an hour to a sailor’s commute, according to Dunham’s investigation. Sailors assigned to ships homeported in Norfolk, Va., that were now in RCOH had longer commutes due to traffic. Sailors who moved to the Norfolk area because their ship was in RCOH could choose to live closer to Newport News, but that meant they had less access to services provided at Naval Station Norfolk, according to the investigation.

Sailors voiced concerns over parking, with Dunham writing that the disjointed parking led to sailors feeling as if their commute issues were not a concern for “Big Navy.”

Parking concerns were a well-known issue among the ship’s leadership, which took them to AIRLANT. Former executive officers on the ship fought for solutions to the parking challenge, with one former commanding officer highlighting that this was a problem back in 2005 when he served on his first tour.

A former executive officer took the complaints to AIRLANT to no avail.

“I said this was unacceptable but eventually saw the writing on the wall and stopped fighting because the discussion was going nowhere … I believe all RCOH carriers experience the same parking issues. This is a solvable problem and it’s really about money; it’s an issue of the burden we put on Sailors versus the cost we (Navy, HII-NNS and [Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Newport News]) are willing to pay for that parking,” Capt. Michael Nordeen, former executive officer from 2020-2022 said in the report.

After the three deaths in April 2022, the Navy began to address the parking problem, according to the report.

Accommodations
Housing issues for GW sailors stemmed from both living in Huntington Hall and living on the ship.

Huntington Hall is a residence building operated by HII. The Navy pays $4.36 million a year to house sailors there, with each room costing the service about $2,438 per month. For comparison, a 1,068-square-foot apartment in Newport News rents for $1,500 a month on average, according to a May nationwide study from RentCafe.

Of the 149 rooms, 15 go to each submarine in Newport News Shipbuilding, with the remaining used to house aircraft carrier personnel. Sailors at Huntington Hall shared a common bedroom and bathroom with at least two other crew members. Each sailor had about 85 square feet per person.

Per Navy standards, sailors with E-4 ranks in Navy-provided housing should have at minimum a shared unit with a private bedroom, a bathroom shared with one other person and at least 90 square feet per person.

Sailors with ranks E-1 through E-3 should have a shared unit with bathrooms shared between two sailors and a shared bedroom with a minimum of 90 square feet per person.

A Naval Sea Systems Command study in 2010 said Huntington Hall was past “its useful economic life,” according to the inspection.

“Continued use of Huntington Hall is a normalization of deviation,” Dunham wrote as an opinion in the report.

When John C. Stennis arrived for its maintenance period, George Washington sailors were forced out of Huntington Hall and the floating accommodation facility in order to open space up for the other aircraft carrier’s crew.

Sailors who had ranks up to E-4 who are not given basic housing allowance were then moved to George Washington to live aboard in an active construction zone. Ideally, a crew moves back on a ship within six to nine months of redelivery, according to the report.

For the GW crew, the redelivery date kept getting pushed back.

When the last sailors moved out of Huntington Hall, the redelivery date was August 2022. By May 2022, the date had been pushed to January 2023, nearly a year and a half after the last sailors moved out of Huntington. George Washington still has not redelivered, meaning sailors will have lived on the ship for nearly two years.

The Navy required waivers from DoD policy to accommodate sailors from George Washington, reads the investigation.

A former executive officer on the ship told Dunham that the crew move should have been tied to a more realistic date for redelivery.

“He acknowledged that while sailors need to start using the ship’s systems at a certain point, there was a ‘willful blindness to not see we [weren’t] going to meet projected dates or milestones.’ He emphasized that there needs to be an ‘open and honest conversation about RCOH scheduling, [because] the way we do it now is not the best way,’” reads the report.

In addition, most junior sailors assigned to a ship in RCOH have few options to live off the ship. One of the Navy recommendations included a review of basic housing allowance, including evaluating whether the service can provide that option to junior sailors.

“Since 1962, basic allowance for housing/quarters has been restricted to exclude those junior sailors on sea duty,” wrote Meier.
“Where other services provide housing to their junior service members at the installation the Navy is able to rely, in part on ships’ berthing to house our sailors. This berthing, while habitable and designed for an operational environment, is not suitable for supporting a standard of living to which most working-class adults are accustomed.”

When it comes to housing, the Navy raised the question of whether a place was habitable or suitable. While Huntington Hall and George Washington may have been habitable, they were not suitable for the junior sailors, according to the report.

The housing issues were compounded by a lack of resources that sailors would usually have, like a gym, according to the report.

Next Steps
Following the investigation, Caudle issued 48 recommendations to improve conditions at Newport News Shipbuilding, including expanding housing options, finding parking closer to the shipyard and improving the food available to sailors.

Among the 48 recommendations are directives to the chief of Naval Personnel to better assess the number of sailors the Navy needs aboard for RCOH, limit first-term sailors to two years on a carrier in RCOH before sending them to sea and providing junior sailors in RCOH a housing allowance to live off of the shipyard.

Caudle also included minimum standards for habitability on a ship, setting a policy that only has sailors on duty stay on the ship or the berthing barge and create a standard for contractor-supplied housing in his recommendations.

While the Navy can make some policy changes now, others will take longer, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday wrote in a memo outlining improvements to sailor quality of service, released in conjunction with the report. .

“Navy [quality of service] will not be corrected with the stroke of a pen. Instead, it will require sustained effort that began with the Navy’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 President’s Budget 2024 budget submission,” they wrote.
“To accelerate this effort, we will realign FY 2023 resources, and partner with Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to request additional resources and authorities. These additional resources will be used to accelerate improvements for sailors at Newport News Shipyard, refurbish and modernize facilities, as well as provide the tools and training necessary to build stronger people and healthy unit climates.”

In summing up the improvements, Caudle said making service safe was a major effort going forward.

“This is the time to get after this,” he told reporters on Thursday. “This is an epidemic that’s going through our nation.”

[James1978]

Navy Finishes Seismic Repairs to Dry Dock 4 at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
By: Mallory Shelbourne
May 15, 2023

The Navy has finished seismic repairs to one of its Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility dry docks, the service announced late last week.
Ohio-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735) is now in Dry Dock 4 for a refit after the dry dock received a new certification, according to a news release from the facility.

“Construction efforts include drilling holes for the installation of anchors inside the dry dock walls to enhance structural integrity and ensure the safety of the workforce, community, environment, and submarines,” the release reads. “The mitigation efforts updated existing emergency response plans to better address the chance of a catastrophic earthquake, along with improved early-warning employee notification systems in the dry docks.”

Following a seismic assessment, the Navy in January announced it would temporarily close three dry docks at Puget Sound in Bremerton, Wash., and the delta pier at the Trident Refit Facility in Bangor, Wash., for overhauls so the infrastructure could better sustain earthquake damage. The service subsequently issued a $76.35 million task order to Kiewit-Alberici SIOP MACC JV for the work in February.

“Mitigation work continues at Dry Dock 5 in Bremerton and the Trident Refit Facility Delta Pier in Bangor. Based on future planned improvements to Dry Dock 6 and differences in ship design and the size of aircraft carriers, it was determined immediate seismic mitigations are not required. Aircraft carrier maintenance at PSNS & IMF remains unaffected,” the release from Puget Sound reads.
“The need for mitigations in the remaining docks will be determined once current efforts are complete and may include stability enhancements for submarine availabilities.”

The dry docks and the Trident Refit Facility are near a major fault line that runs from Northern Vancouver Island to Cape Mendocino, Calif.

Navy officials in March told Congress that the dry docks should be ready for submarine maintenance by July, USNI News previously reported.

“We’re focused on those portions of the dock that are closest to the nuclear power plant in the submarines,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday told the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee at the time.
“That’s the most substantial work that we’re doing, essentially repairing both sides of the entire dry dock.”

[James1978]

SECNAV Del Toro Names New Class of Medical Ships After Bethesda Medical Center
By: Heather Mongilio
May 15, 2023

The Navy’s new class of expeditionary medical ships will be named after a Maryland military medical center, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro announced Friday.

The future USNS Bethesda (EMS-1) will be the first in the class for the new line of expeditionary medical ships.

Bethesda is named after Naval Support Activity Bethesda, home to naval and military medical facilities including the Walter Reed National Military Hospital.

“The name ‘Bethesda’ is connected to the world-class medical center for healing that has served a countless number of service members since 1942,” Del Toro said in a statement. “This ship will honor the medical staff, who compassionately dedicate their time and expertise to take care of our service members. Bearing the name Bethesda will continue the legacy of life-saving and medical innovation.”

The new expeditionary medical ships are part of Navy medicine’s transformation as it looks to the future of combat. Navy medicine put out its first campaign order in 2023, USNI News previously reported.

The focus of the campaign order is adjusting for future combat, likely in the western Pacific, which will require Navy medicine to provide care over vast differences. The past 20 years had been focused on more land-based care in countries like Afghanistan, where distances between combat and care centers were much closer.

The expeditionary medical ships are designed for distributed maritime operations, according to the Navy release.

The new Bethesda-class will be based on the Spearhead-class (T-EPF-1) aluminum shallow draft highspeed transports built by Mobile, Ala., shipbuilder. Bethesda was formerly designated EPF-17.

The Bethesdas will provide hospital-level care, with three operating rooms, as well as a laboratory. Providers aboard the ship will be able to offer critical care, radiological capabilities, primary care, dental care, mental health services and obstetrics/gynecological care.

The ships are also built to take on multiple casualties, with the ability to stabilize patients on board.

The ship is also meant to be fast, traveling at up to 30 knots and the ability to maintain speeds of 18 knots for more than 5,000 nautical miles, making the ship quicker than the current hospital ships USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) or USNS Mercy (T-AH-19).

“This first-in-class ship will be state-of-the-art and the Navy’s first medical ship in 35 years,” Del Toro said in a Mental Health Month video. “This ship, designed with more expeditious and direct access to diagnostic, specialty and hospital care, will allow for increased capabilities and health care. Just as the hospital at NSA Bethesda has served as a beacon of hope to those who entered its doorways, USNS Bethesda (EMS-1) will serve as a beacon to those in need around the world.”

Navy medicine christened another type of expeditionary ship in February. USNS Cody (EPF-14) is the first Spearhead-class EPF Flight II. Like Bethesda, Cody will be able to sail in shallow waters. It will also be able to provide limited intensive care in addition to other medical facilities.

[James1978]

US Navy may accelerate investments to extend some Ohio subs’ lives
By Megan Eckstein
May 19, 2023

STEWART AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, N.Y. — The U.S. Navy may begin investing in life extensions for some Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines earlier than expected, with the service secretary telling a crowd that spending could begin in fiscal 2025.

The Navy requires at least 10 of these submarines are available for operations at any given time. These ballistic missile submarines lurk in waters around the globe with nuclear missiles onboard, their sole mission being to remain hidden and ready if called upon in a doomsday scenario.

As a hedge against shortfalls in the 2030s as the Ohio class reaches the end of its life and the Columbia class enters service, the Navy has considered extending select Ohio boats by a few years. In November, submarine community leaders said a decision would be made by FY26 so work could start in FY29.

While speaking at a May 5 defense innovation roundtable in Newburgh, New York, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said the service has “now determined five where we can actually extend those service lives, and in the ’25 budget we’re [planning on] putting in money to make that investment so we can extend those lives.”

Del Toro told Defense News in a May 18 statement that this new timeline is his intention but remains subject to the 2025 budgeting process.

The Navy has already extended the life of the entire Ohio class, from 30 years to 42 years. In 2020, submarine community leaders acknowledged that while the Navy couldn’t extend the entire class again, it could look at each individual hull and determine if any were in good enough physical condition to continue operations for a few more years.

The replacements for the Ohio boast, the Columbia class of ballistic missile submarines, is on schedule; Navy leadership said it fell a few months behind a more aggressive goal but is still on track to meet its contractual construction schedule.

Prime contractor General Dynamics Electric Boat and its suppliers have been able to devote significant attention to the lead ship, bought in FY21, due to a three-year gap between the first and second boats. There’s a two-year gap between the second and third boats, and beginning in FY26 the Navy will buy the remaining 10 at a pace of one per year.

“There is still the mountain to climb: When we go to one Columbia a year, starting in 2026 for 10 straight years, there’s hiring that’s required” at Electric Boat and at its suppliers, the acting assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, Jay Stefany, told Defense News in September 2021 when discussing the potential life extensions.

“So if you were to ask me, I’d say Columbia No. 1, pretty high confidence. Columbia No. 2, yeah, pretty high as well. But when we start going three, four, five, six, seven, all in a row ... that’s the risk,” he said.

[James1978]

Navy Talks Details on LCS Mine Countermeasures Mission Package
By: Mallory Shelbourne
May 12, 2023

After several years of delays, the Navy’s mine countermeasures mission package for the Littoral Combat Ship has finally reached its initial operating capability.

Last year, the Navy tested the mission package and its systems aboard Independence-class LCS USS Cincinnati (LCS-20), leading the service to announce last week that the MCM mission package achieved the IOC milestone.

The mission package includes unmanned aviation and surface systems, like the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) and the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) for aviation. The mine countermeasures unmanned surface vehicle includes modular payloads that can perform both the mine hunting mission, which employs a towed sonar, and the sweeping mission, performed by the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) that achieved IOC last year. For the hunting mission, the Navy uses Raytheon’s AN/AQS-20C mine hunting sonar.

Asked about the delays to the mission package IOC, Rear Adm. Casey Moton, the program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants, noted the Navy had to change course after realizing the original remote mine hunting system did not have the reliability the service needed. The Navy instead opted to use unmanned surface vehicles. The first version of the package was supposed to IOC in 2015.

Since then, the LCS Mission Modules program office, or PMS 420, has been “starting over with the truck for the sonar, so getting the USV designed, built, tested, long testing, platform integration with the ship, launch and recovery,” Moton told reporters Thursday.
“And then also with the USV itself, it has modular payloads and each of those payloads had to be tests – the sweep system and then also the sonar towing system – just really to get those components of that package ready. And that was certainly a long process. There were challenges. Overall we’ve proceeded well throughout it.”

Since making the changes, Moton said the new mission package includes the new truck, a better version of the AN/AQS-20C mine hunting sonar, and the fielded sweep system.

During the initial operational testing and evaluation period, the Navy incorporated the Mk-18 Knifefish Unmanned Undersea Vehicle, which was not part of the original plans for testing. Moton described the tests as a way for the Navy to see how LCS would integrate with a Block 0 Knifefish. He noted the Navy has paused Knifefish procurement while it tests the first block.

For the IOT&E testing, Moton said Cincinnati’s crew operated the mission package “against a simulated minefield to achieve required mission objectives, including maintenance, pre and post-mission system prep, post-mission data analysis, in-mission command and control and launch and recovery.”

The Navy’s goal is to get the Independence-class LCSs with the MCM mission package to Bahrain in U.S. Central Command by 2025, officials have said. Moton on Thursday emphasized that the Navy is planning for a first deployment for the MCM mission package in 2025, but would not say where that might be. Officials have said the Navy envisions the LCS operating as a “mothership” for unmanned platforms, given that it can accommodate the MQ-8C Firescout, USV and UUV systems.

Last year’s testing featured engineering development models configured like the systems the Navy plans to procure for the production phase, Moton said. The service tested the MCM mission package in a variety of conditions.

“We completed approximately 230 hours of MCM USV mine hunt operations, over 33 missions from the host LCS as well as from a shore-based command center to fully asses the sonar’s performance. We executed a total of 12 airborne sorties, with fielded ALMDS and AMNS systems demonstrating the full integration with the MCM mission package,” Moton said.

“We executed the first-ever dual USV operations from a host ship for the U.S. Navy with simultaneous USV sweep and hunt electrooptical identification missions, demonstrating command and control with real time data feedback to ship operators,” he continued. “We demonstrated simultaneous command and control of three offboard systems, including two USVs – mine hunting and UISS – and one UUV, Knifefish. We demonstrated 16 full launch and recovery iterations in the MCM mission package IOT&E.”